Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom
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Historical struggles for freedom are often portrayed as born of the unbearable experience of oppression and, therefore, as a matter of casting off a yoke, of freeing oneself from something. This image, even if it does give some insight into the meaning and importance of freedom, gives the misleading impression that freedom is merely the absence of something, and that it can be understood and defined in negative terms only. To avoid this impression, and to appreciate that it is a misleading impression, we need a deeper understanding of the experiences of unfreedom, of what the other of freedom is.

The idea that freedom must be understood in relation to its opposite is prominent in the republican tradition of political thought. Philip Pettit has become the most influential contemporary theorist of republican freedom, and he has systematically developed and defended a conception of freedom as non-domination (Pettit, 1997; 2001; 2008). In the republican tradition, according to Pettit (1997, p. 31), “liberty is always cast in terms of the opposition between liber and servus, citizen and slave.” In another strand of republican thinking, a strand that Pettit (1997, p. 8) distances himself from, stands Hannah Arendt for whom the extreme experience of unfreedom lies in being stateless. According to Arendt (1979, pp. 296f.), the plight of the stateless is “deprivation of a place in the world,” which is different from the situation of the slave who “still belonged to some sort of human community.” We find in these two republican thinkers, then, two contrasting images of unfreedom: slavery vs. statelessness; a contrast that, as I shall show, has important
implications for how we may understand freedom. Specifically, it can cast light on and contribute to challenging the common contrast between negative and positive conceptions of liberty. Moreover, it can help clarify the intrinsic and instrumental values of democracy in relation to freedom.

This chapter argues that both the freedom-versus-slavery theme and the phenomenon of statelessness supply important insights into the meaning and importance of freedom. We must, therefore, bring Pettit and Arendt into dialogue, something that is rarely done because of needless divisions in contemporary political theory. Integrating Pettit’s insights into domination and Arendt’s insights into the plight of being excluded from a community that is responsive to one’s opinions and actions requires adjusting each position. The chapter analyzes differences between Pettit and Arendt related to their respective uses of slavery and statelessness as freedom’s other. I find three core elements that differentiate the two: First, there is the question of whether unfreedom requires the presence of a dominator (as the slave metaphor indicates), or whether unfreedom is characterized by extreme loneliness (the stateless). Second, there is the issue of whether unfreedom is best understood as a form of status (as the slave does have), or whether it means a lack of status (the stateless is apparently status-less). Third, does unfreedom involve being used as a means by someone else (the slave), or does it mean being superfluous in the eyes of others (the stateless)? The analysis and discussion of these three differences between slavery and statelessness as freedom’s other leads to a discussion of the relationship between freedom and democracy. The main question here is whether, or to what extent, or in what way, we should regard freedom as a positive notion. I also discuss whether freedom is intrinsically or only instrumentally related to democracy. I argue for regarding republican freedom as having positive dimensions but in a non-Rousseauian sense.

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1 Pettit’s work is mainly discussed among analytical philosophers, while Arendt’s work tends to be discussed exclusively by continental philosophers and political theorists.
The Slave and the Stateless

1) The free man and the slave

In Pettit’s understanding of the republican tradition, and in his own conception of freedom as non-domination, freedom is understood in contrast to slavery. The condition of the slave is to live “at the beck and call of a master,” and to be “in a position where fear and deference will be the normal order of the day” (Pettit, 1997, pp. 32, 64). Even the most fortunate slave, even the slave with the most permissive master, will live a life in unfreedom because she is “depending on [someone else’s] grace and favor” (Pettit, 1997, p. 33). The liberty-versus-slavery theme implies, according to Pettit (1997, p. 32), that “the ultimate in unfreedom is having to live at the will of another – the arbitrary will of another – in the manner of the slave; the essence of freedom is not to have to endure such dependence and vulnerability.” The slave is the most extreme example of this dependence, because she is the property of another. Pettit gives a compelling picture of the ills that this sort of dependence entails.

The slave metaphor serves also the more systematic purpose of showing the possibility of unfreedom without interference. This is essential, because Pettit believes that freedom as non-domination is different from (and superior to) the alternative conception of freedom as non-interference, which we know from thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and Isaiah Berlin. Freedom as non-domination is, like freedom as non-interference, a negative conception of freedom, but it is concerned with absence of domination rather than absence of interference. For Pettit, the republican tradition’s contrast between liberty and slavery and the possibility of living in slavery without being interfered with “is a sure sign of taking liberty to consist in non-domination rather than in non-interference” (Pettit, 1997, p. 32). For “slavery is essentially characterized by domination, not by actual interference: even if the slave’s
master proves to be entirely benign and permissive, he or she continues to dominate the slave” (Pettit, 1997, p. 32). This proposition, of course, requires a definition of domination as something different than interference. Pettit suggests that A dominates B, if A has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in certain choices that B is in a position to make (Pettit, 1997, p. 52). “Domination can occur without interference, because it requires only that someone have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in your affairs; no one need actually to interfere” (Pettit, 1997, p. 23). Thus, the slave metaphor, via the example of the non-interfering master, is used to argue for the possibility of living in unfreedom without experiencing interference.

To view unfreedom and domination as “a generalization of the case of slavery” (Markell, 2008, p. 11) has some important implications. I would like to highlight three elements for our further discussion. First, the slave metaphor suggests that unfreedom involves a relationship between persons akin to that of a master and his slave. To be dominated means “being subject to the alien control of others” (Pettit, 2008, p. 102, emphasis added; cf. 2010, pp. 73, 75). Domination in this view, then, involves the presence of the dominator and unfreedom is part of a human relationship. Second, it is interesting to note that the slave occupies a certain position in society. Being a slave is a form of status (usually one legally defined) and as such slaves have a relation to human society. This is not something Pettit emphasizes, but it is part of what slavery historically has involved, and we will see its relevance in contrast to the phenomenon of statelessness. Third, slaves are used by their masters; they are used to serve the ends of their masters rather than their own. When this idea is generalized, it means that domination involves someone exploiting someone else for her own ends. Unfreedom, in this view, means being used as a means rather than as an end.

2) Statelessness, membership, and humanity
We find Arendt’s description of statelessness in the second volume of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Arendt, 1979, p. 267cc). The stateless are those persons who do not belong to and who do not have a status in any political community. Arendt’s category of the stateless should not be confused with (even if it can inform a discussion of) our days refugees, who since the 1951 Refugee Convention have had a legal status in international law. The stateless in Arendt’s discussion are people who have no nation of their own and/or who have been excluded from or stripped of their citizenship and juridical status in any other nation, as the Jews were by the Nazis in the 1930s. Arendt’s main concern is understanding what makes the stateless so vulnerable, but we might also understand the situation of the stateless in terms of unfreedom. Arendt’s description of statelessness as freedom’s other, which pointedly differs from Pettit’s liberty-slavery theme, has some interesting implications for freedom’s positive dimensions. I shall consider the three elements listed under Pettit above in turn.

It is possible for a stateless person, Arendt notes, to have more freedom of movement than a person within a political community: a lawfully imprisoned criminal, for example. But this negative freedom, this absence of interference, experienced by the stateless “is due to charity and not to right” (Arendt, 1979, p. 296). There is a parallel here between the situation of the stateless and the slave and, thus, an apparent similarity to Pettit’s contention that unfreedom does not require interference. Clearly, neither Arendt nor Pettit see freedom as defined by non-interference and, in both cases, slavery and statelessness, unfreedom has something to do with the lack of security against arbitrary interference. But the cases of the slave and of the stateless differ in terms of whether lack of freedom requires the presence of a *dominus*. What is special about the situation of the stateless is that there is no one (no particular other) who controls or rules her; she is, rather, at the mercy of *any* would-be dominator. The stateless is also not the property of anyone, as is the slave. The plight of the stateless is not that she has no rights against a particular master, but that she does not have anyone to whom she can
address herself; she does not have anywhere where she can press claims. “The fundamental deprivation” of the rightless, according to Arendt (1979, p. 296), “is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.” The predicament of the stateless “is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them” (Arendt, 1979, pp. 295c).

“[I]n the light of recent events [totalitarianism, the holocaust],” Arendt writes (1979, p. 297):

it is possible to say that even slaves still belonged to some sort of community; their labor was needed, used, and exploited, and this kept them within the pale of humanity. To be a slave was after all to have a distinctive character, a place in society – more than the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human [which is the plight of the stateless].

I get back to slaves being needed and used in the next paragraph; the point I want to note here is that while the slave has a status, the stateless does not; the latter, as Arendt sees it, is statusless. Arendt suggests that the slave gets a character and place in society because of what she does or what she contributes with, her labor. But it should be noted also that the slave’s status is defined in legal terms and as such the slave is (in a sense) part of a human community. The slave has a place in and is part of both the socio-economic and the legal structure of society, even if she is excluded from the polis or the political life of the community. The stateless, by contrast, has no place whatsoever in any of these human structures. I challenge and qualify this description below, but here we should note the important connection to Arendt’s famous idea of “a right to have rights” (1979, p. 296). The right to have rights is a right to
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membership and is prior to specific rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. What the stateless lack, as James Bohman (2008, p. 203) notes, is “the capability to have a status as such,” and the right to membership is “a right to the statuses and powers that make our freedom secure and allow us to be free to avoid the ills and evils that result from the loss of such a status.” The question that will occupy us below is whether the status of being a member can be understood merely in terms of security against arbitrary interference or whether it also has intrinsic value.

As we just saw, slaves being needed by other human beings is what gives them a place in society. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt describes how the Nazis saw the Jews as “superfluous” (e.g. Arendt, 1979, p. 296), and in a letter to Karl Jaspers she explains that “making human beings as human beings superfluous [means] not using them as means to an end, which leaves their essence as humans untouched and impinges only on their human dignity; rather, making them superfluous as human beings” (Arendt & Jaspers, 1992, p. 166).

It is not immediately clear why Arendt thinks being used as a means keeps slaves “within the pale of humanity,” while the Jews under Nazism were made “superfluous as human beings.” Nor is the distinction between violating human dignity by being used as a means and undermining the essence as human beings by being regarded as superfluous entirely clear.

Aristotle, who Arendt is so fond of citing, describes the slave as a “living piece of property” on par with other tools and instruments (Aristotle, 1992, 1253b28-32; cf. Hansen, 1999, pp. 120c). Does this make slaves needed as human beings? Slaves could not act in Arendt’s specific sense of self-disclosing action among equals in the public space (Arendt, 1958, pp. 175-247). And action is usually what makes us (fully) human to Arendt; if one only labors, as the slaves does, one does not rise above the sphere of necessity and meaninglessness. How can slaves be part of humanity when they are deprived of the possibility of participating in the most human of human activities? I can see why being needed gives the slave a certain
security that persons who are regarded as superfluous lack, since rational people will be inclined to give some protection to what they need over and above what they do not need. But protection based on someone else’s need does not imply making the protected part of humanity. Clearly the slave’s humanity is not respected in the Kantian sense, which is why Arendt says the slave’s dignity is impinged. She must, therefore, have another understanding of humanity in mind when she speaks of what the stateless are excluded from and deprived of. I return to this other understanding of humanity below (in subsection three of the following section).

**Freedom of the City**

Above I have analyzed three important differences between regarding freedom’s other as slavery and statelessness, respectively. I have done so with little comment or criticism of the two theorists. In what follows I discuss the three elements – presence/absence of dominator, status, and being used as a means vs. superfluousness – in more detail. This discussion will require also consideration of further details of the views of Pettit and Arendt. This section will form the background of an examination of the relationship between freedom and democracy in the section "Freedom, Politics, and Democracy".

1) **Presence/absence of dominator**

In Pettit (2008, pp. 102cc) unfreedom requires the presence of someone who is in position to control certain of your choices, and freedom from domination requires security against such alien control. Moreover, the only positive dimension to freedom as non-domination that Pettit allows for is the requirement of the presence of security against interference on an arbitrary basis; the positive dimensions involved in participating in politics and self-government are
rejected as external to the conception (Pettit, 1997, pp. 51, 27cc). An obvious way to gain freedom on this basis seems to be to escape from the presence of other people who might dominate you; for where could one find more security against arbitrary interference than in the solitude of a deserted island? This issue does not arise in Arendt, it seems, for her description of the situation of the stateless shows not only that without rights one is in danger of arbitrary interference from anyone, but also – and more fundamentally – that one lacks a place in the human world. And lacking a place in the world means in and of itself lacking freedom. Actually, Pettit (1997, p. 66) denies that freedom as non-domination can be achieved by isolation: “Non-domination, as that is valued in the republican tradition, means the absence of domination in the presence of other people, not the absence of domination gained by isolation.” The question is whether seeing freedom as social or civil freedom – “the status associated with living among other people, none of whom dominates you” (Pettit, 1997, p. 66) – is compatible with regarding security against arbitrary interference as the only positive dimension of freedom. Why is non-domination in the city more valuable, if one rejects the intrinsic values of political participation, as Pettit does?

Perhaps the experience of the stateless can point to another, additional, positive dimension of freedom than slavery does? Pettit (1997, p. 66, emphasis added) merely says that the non-domination “that is valued in the republican tradition [is] the absence of domination in the presence of other people,” but it is difficult to see how this can be made part of his definition of non-domination. This is particularly so when the only positive dimension allowed for in his conception of freedom is presence of security against arbitrary interference. Pettit’s formulations entail that there could be freedom outside the city, but that this is not the freedom valued by republicans. Arendt’s engagement with statelessness, in contrast, suggests more clearly that there can be no freedom outside a political community. Her claim is partly a historical and contingent claim about stateless people lacking legal protection. But when she
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says that the plight of the stateless shows that one must be a member of a political community in order to have “the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man” (Arendt, 1979, p. 300), her point is a deeper one. One may ask whether her position is the stronger one that our humanness is constituted by belonging to a political community or the weaker one that our humanness can appear only in political communities. I think the latter possibility is the more plausible interpretation. The subject that is to be free can appear only in a human world in which others are responsive to one’s actions and opinions. In this way there is a further positive dimension to freedom than mere security and protection, a dimension of intersubjective relationships and human responsiveness. In what sense this dimension is political is something to which we return.

2) What kind of status

When we see the position of the slave in contrast to that of the stateless, it becomes clear that the slave has a positive status that the stateless lack. As mentioned, the slave has a position in both the legal and the socio-economic structure of the society in which she lives. The slave experiences domination exactly because of her position or status in the social structure of society and not merely because of lack of guarantees against arbitrary interference, as Pettit says. The unfreedom of slaves is a product of the positive privileges that their master have against them. The same is true of Pettit’s other examples of dominated persons, the worker in capitalist society and the wife under patriarchy (Pettit, 1997, pp. 138-143). The domination of these categories of people is the product of social structures and institutions, of the capitalist division of labor and the patriarchal family. If this is right, domination does not exist by the mere fact that someone has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in others’ affairs but in their
accepted right to do so. We must, therefore, distinguish between the mere capacity to interfere arbitrarily and the accepted right (or authority) to do so with impunity.

At first glance, and as Arendt sometimes describes the matter, it appears that the situation of the stateless is to be *status-less*. The stateless does not occupy a position that gives others the right or authority to arbitrarily interfere in her affairs. The stateless is entirely outside legal and also economic relations. Or so it seems. It is important to remember that even if masters can interfere arbitrarily in the lives of their slaves with impunity, there are limits to how they can treat their slaves. In ancient Athens, for example, masters could not, most importantly, put their slaves to death with impunity (Hansen, 1999, pp. 120c). With regard to the stateless, there are no legal limits on how they can be treated by others, as long as being stateless means lacking the “right to have rights.” But can we describe the situation of the stateless as entirely outside of and deprived of human relationships, as Arendt does? I would like to suggest that being stateless is still something one is in relation to something; it cannot be understood in negative terms only.

As we learn from Arendt herself, the situation of the stateless in the interwar period should be seen in relation to the European nation state system. “Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether” (Arendt, 1979, p. 297). Not having a nation state, as the Jews did not, is a deprivation in relation to a system that protects people on the basis of their nationality. Moreover, stateless was not merely something Jews (and others) were but rather something that was *done to them*. So even if the stateless have no status within any particular nation state, they do have a status in relation to nation states and from the perspective of the international system. Stateless is a status in the international political system. And it is a status that one is commonly pushed into. Thus, the difference between statelessness and

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2 As Henry Richardson (2002, p. 34) has argued, kidnappers have the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with people’s lives, but we do not for that reason regard them as dominating their potential victims (all of us). Cf. Rostbøll (2008, pp. 48c).
slavery cannot be understood in terms of the dichotomy between having and not having status in a political community. What matters for freedom is what kind of status in what kind of political community.

3) Superfluosity vs. being used a means

The liberty-slavery theme in Pettit implies that domination and compromising others’ freedom is the product of self-interest and partiality and that the misfortune of the unfree is similar to being someone’s else’s property, that is, being exploited and being used as a means. Arendt’s description of the stateless and of how the Jews and others were made superfluous under totalitarianism suggests, by contrast, that deprivation of freedom might be unconnected to self-interest and to some using others for their own ends. Rather, unfreedom is not to be seen and heard, not sharing a world with others. This difference has implications for the respective positive specifications of freedom that we might reach, beginning from either slavery or statelessness. In one, a central issue for freedom is whether one’s interests are neglected or not; in the other, the more fundamental issue for freedom is the possibility of acting among others in a shared world. This contrast, as we shall see below, leads to different views of the connection between freedom and democracy, as well as of what kind of democracy is required in order to respect and/or enhance freedom.

While it is true that the stateless discussed by Arendt were not used in the direct material self-interest of particular masters, as slaves are, to regard the Jews as utterly superfluous for the Nazis is misleading. Clearly, depriving the Jews of their rights did have some function for Nazi Germany, for example, as creating the Other of Arian identity. As argued earlier, the stateless is defined in relation to something else, and not only in legal terms, but also in terms of identity. Still, the important insight for our further discussion is that perhaps the issue of being used in the interest of others is not the only or even the most fundamental dimension of
unfreedom. To exploit this insight we need to become clearer on what it means to being made superfluous as a human being, than is Arendt. First, is it being made so or being so that constitutes unfreedom? Second, what does it mean to be (or being made) superfluous as a human being? In Kant, being treated as a means implies being treated as someone who does not have ends of one’s own, but who exists only for the sake of others’ ends. Humanity refers to the rational capacity of setting ends for oneself (Kant, 1996, pp. 74cc). Arendt must mean something else. Here we must, I think, bring in her notion of natality, the human capacity to insert oneself in the human world through words and deeds. Arendt (1979, pp. 438, 454c) describes the stateless as being deprived of their humanity by being deprived of the capacity to begin. The capacity to begin belongs to all of life not merely to action, but “action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality” (Arendt, 1958, p. 9; see also Arendt, 1979, p. 438). It seems that being denied the right to act politically does not entirely undermine the human capacity to begin something new; only the more radical being made superfluous does so. The ability to begin is more fundamental than the ability to have ends of one’s own, because it entails becoming somebody and being acknowledged as somebody who is welcome in a human community (cf. Markell, 2003, p. 180). The capacity to begin, then, requires in the first instance a human community that welcomes one as a member. It is this particular status of being welcome that the stateless lack. The slave is not a full member but also not entirely unwelcome; only those who are regarded as superfluous are not welcome at all.

**Freedom, Politics, and Democracy**

I have suggested that to understand freedom properly we need a positive dimension beyond and in addition to security against arbitrary interference. This point leads us to a discussion of
the relationship between freedom and politics, and in particular freedom and democracy. Now, one may think that the positive dimension of freedom that I am urging is the Rousseauian idea that in order to be free one must be the author of the laws to which one is subject. This is how we have learned to understand positive liberty by Isaiah Berlin (1969). Pettit (1997, pp. 8, 27cc) – and before him Quentin Skinner (1983; 1991, p. 202; 1998; 2002) – has argued that republican liberty is not a positive conception in this sense; a point I shall not challenge here, since I am concerned with a different possibility. Arendt, however, might because of her critique of liberalism and negative liberty be seen as advocating a positive conception of freedom. But if she does so, it is not freedom in the sense of Rousseauian popular sovereignty (Canovan, 1992, p. 212). Rousseau represents for Arendt, just as much as liberalism does, a wrongheaded tradition that regards politics in terms of sovereignty and ruling (Rostbøll, 2006, p. 308; 2010, pp. 32cc). Thus, neither Arendt nor Pettit hold a positive conception of freedom in the sense of collective self-rule, nor is that the positive dimension of freedom that I shall explore below.

Another way of regarding the relationship between democracy and freedom is to ask whether democracy is intrinsic to freedom or whether it is instrumental to freedom. To say that the relationship between democracy and freedom is an intrinsic one is to hold that democracy is an inherent part of freedom, and that freedom is not merely an external consequence of democratic decision making. On the intrinsic argument there is something in democracy that makes us free. By participating in (or perhaps by having the opportunity to participate in) democratic politics, citizens are free. To say that democracy is instrumental to freedom is to hold that the value of democracy in relationship to freedom is that of a means that furthers a valuable end. In the instrumental justification, democracy has no value in itself but only the value it derives from being a means to freedom. Now, it seems that the intrinsic argument gives a stronger foundation to democracy than the instrumental one, because the
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first gives democracy unconditional value while the instrumental connection, by its nature, is a contingent and conditional one.

How can we place the republican conception of freedom in relation to the distinction drawn in the previous paragraph? Pettit explicitly denies that the relationship between democracy and freedom is intrinsic and notes that the importance of democratic control comes “from the fact that it is a means of furthering liberty” (1997, p. 30, emphasis added). Still, Pettit thinks Berlin’s famous conclusion that there is no necessary connection between freedom and democracy exhibits a shortcoming of freedom as non-interference (Berlin, 1969, p. 130; Pettit, 1999, pp. 168cc). While Berlin notes that democracies might be better at protecting freedom (as non-interference) than non-democracies, he sees this as a contingent matter. Pettit, in opposition to Berlin, wants to show that democratized states represent a lesser assault on republican freedom than nondemocratic ones, and not just contingently but “just in virtue of being democratized” (1999, p. 163). His aim is to show that coercive law and government is not necessarily the enemy of liberty, and that democratization is what is required for law and government not to be dominating or hostile to freedom. What is noteworthy in Pettit’s republicanism is the attempt to show such a relationship between freedom and democracy without appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic participation or to the idea that a law given by the people cannot dominate the people. Pettit’s position, then, seems to be that the relationship between democracy and freedom is instrumental but nonetheless robust (Rostbøll 2014).

Let us look at why Pettit thinks the relationship between democracy and freedom is robust (yet not intrinsic). Recall that for Pettit freedom is not defined as absence of interference but rather as non-domination. This means, according to Pettit, not only that there can be domination without interference (as in the case of the non-interfering master), but also that there can be interference without domination. The decisive question is whether the
interference is arbitrary or not. What democratic governments do, according to Pettit, is to substitute one form of interference with a completely different kind. And, “interference occurs without the loss of liberty when the interference is not arbitrary and does not represent a form of domination” (Pettit, 1997, p. 35). Interference is non-arbitrary when it is “designed to track people’s interests according to their ideas” (Pettit, 1997, p. 149), or more precisely, “to the extent that it is forced to track people’s common avowable interests” (Pettit 2001, p. 139; cf. 1999, p. 176). Thus, democracy is robustly connected to freedom, in Pettit’s view, because it is a form of government that is designed and forced to track people’s interests as they see them and to interfere exclusively on that basis.

One may ask here whether the emphasis showing the robust relationship consist in that democracy is designed to track people’s interests or rather in the idea that democracy is designed to track people’s interests. The first possibility entails an outcome based view of democracy that is susceptible to the criticism that democracies cannot provide an infallible method for making non-arbitrary decisions that track and track only common avowable interests (Bellamy, 2008, pp. 164cc). The second possibility has the tendency to turn the view into an intrinsic one. If what makes democracy valuable is that it is designed to treat everyone’s interests equally, its value comes not from the fact that democratic decisions actually do so, but rather from the equal status afforded everyone in the democratic process. I believe the latter argument would be the stronger one, but Pettit has excluded himself from endorsing this view because of his rejection of any intrinsic justification of democracy. He fails to see that there are other intrinsic justifications of democracy than Rousseauian and perfectionist ones, the first involving collective self-rule and the latter relying on political participation being the highest form of life.

It is an assumption of Pettit’s view of the relationship between democracy and freedom that the core (and only) complaint one can have against one’s oppressors or the government is
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that one’s interests are not tracked. He follows the classical view, which has its roots in Aristotle (1992, 1279a22-b10), that deviated forms of government are characterized by the rulers governing in their own as opposed to the common interest. Arendt (1979, pp. 460cc), in contrast, believes that 20th century totalitarianism exploded this distinction between arbitrary and legitimate government because the leaders of the totalitarian movements did not rule in their own interest. She emphasizes over and again that the horrors of totalitarianism cannot be understood in terms of treating others as means or exploiting them for one’s own ends. This is relevant for understanding Arendt’s alternative view of the relationship between democracy and freedom. To be excluded from a place in the human world and from political participation entails a different and more fundamental unfreedom than one’s interests not being tracked and incorporated in political decisions. What exactly this unfreedom consist in and why it is an unfreedom is complicated, but it has to do with the lack of possibility to speak and act, to be heard and seen. And clearly it is actively engaging in these activities, and being responded to when one does so – rather than any consequences that may accrue from this – that is of value and necessary for freedom.

To be heard and seen is related to the capacity to become somebody, to natality or the capacity to begin. In The Human Condition, Arendt writes that beginning “is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner himself” (1958, p. 177). The ability to begin is a precondition of becoming somebody, of gaining individuality and having and attaining status. When someone begins, she distinguishes herself “instead of being merely distinct” (Arendt, 1958, p. 176). The beginner is not merely ascribed an identity by others but shows in word and deed, by her own initiative, who she is. This possibility of becoming somebody, which the stateless lacked, is prior to and existentially more fundamental than having interests or ends. Becoming somebody is a precondition of having ends at all. Having one’s interests tracked in Pettit’s sense is also not sufficient for becoming
somebody, for in that case one is only a “what,” someone who has interests that she shares
with many others, and not a “who,” which distinguishes her from “anyone else who ever
lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt, 1958, p. 8).

Which view of the relationship between democracy and freedom is implied by Arendt’s
view as outlined above? And what kind of democracy is required for freedom in this view?
Freedom entails, as we just saw, becoming somebody, becoming a distinct individual. The
stateless, the person outside politics, according to Arendt (1979, p. 302), is “other,” but since
he is “without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and
specify himself,” he is merely “different in general, representing nothing but his own absolute
unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and action upon a common world,
loses all significance.” What is it, then, that democratic politics does for freedom? It
organizes and guarantees a common public space in which people can meet each other, a
space “into which each of the free men [can] insert himself by word and deed” (Arendt 1993,
p. 148). This helps explain why the value of democracy for Arendt lies in participation, rather
than in interest representation. For Arendt (1990, p. 235, pp. 268c) “expressing, discussing,
and deciding” are “in a positive sense [...] the activities of freedom,” while having one’s
interests represented through voting is not.

We are now able to see the contours of a core difference between Pettit’s and Arendt’s
view of the relation between democracy and freedom. The difference can be understood in
terms of a distinction between control and involvement suggested by Patchen Markell (2008,
p. 12). When Pettit says that democracy is robustly connected to freedom, because democracy
secures that political decisions track common interests, this is a matter of politics being
controlled by citizens’ common interests. When the question of the relationship between
political power and freedom is phrased as a matter of involvement, the question is: “whatever
it is that’s happening, and, however it’s being controlled, to what extent is it happening
through you, through your activity” (Markell, 2008, p. 12). Now, sometimes control and involvement go hand in hand, but it is also possible that “the mechanisms that guard against arbitrariness and subject decisions to control [...] displace involvement” (Markell, 2008, p. 12). While the latter possibility falls out of view (or is not regretted) in Pettit and explains his rather minimalist view of democracy, the issue of involvement is fundamental in Arendt and explains her criticism of representative democracy as “oligarchic” (Arendt, 1990, p. 269).

In Arendt there are two strands of thought – perhaps two positive dimensions of freedom – that goes further than Pettit’s account of freedom as non-domination: one concerns membership, and the other political participation. One may argue that Arendt does not sufficiently distinguish the value of being a member of a political community and the value of active involvement in politics. Actually there are two issues here. First, it is unclear whether the value in both cases is merely instrumental (being a means to secure life and liberty) or intrinsic (valuable in itself, as an expression and the essence of freedom). Second, if there is intrinsic value in being a member of a human community, can this be enjoyed only as an active participant in politics? The latter is a controversial view, which seems to exclude the possibility that most people find more fulfillment in the private sphere than in politics.

While it is possible to find places in Arendt’s writings that commit her to the latter view, I think this objection fails to see the force of her position. Even if most people “would rather cultivate their garden than the common good” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 162), it doesn’t follow that having the status of someone’s whose actions and opinions are responded to is not intrinsically valuable and part of what freedom means. It might be that this status is not exclusive to politics, but understanding (political) action as Arendt does in The Human Condition helps us understand its distinctiveness and value. Arendt’s celebration of political involvement should be seen as the sharpest possible contrast to being stateless, and her point might be that if we don’t understand the value of political action, we may not understand the
value of being a member of a political community, and therefore may not understand what freedom means and requires (Arendt, 1993, p. 148).

Now, it is an important objection to intrinsic and noninstrumental justifications of democracy that they cannot on their own explain the importance of democratic procedures, for this we need also some idea of which procedures make for epistemically good decisions (Estlund, 2008, ch. 4 & 5). With regard to Arendt’s position the problem is that the intrinsic value of political participation might be a mere by-product of aiming at substantial outcomes; political participation requires an instrumental aim to be valuable (Elster, 1997, pp. 19cc).

The intrinsic value of political participation is conditional upon its instrumental value. But this does not mean that the noninstrumental value of democracy has no weight of its own. As Elizabeth Anderson (2009, p. 225) has pointed out:

> The proper test of the noninstrumental goodness of an activity is not whether we’d prefer to do it, even if it didn’t result in desirable consequences. It is rather whether we’d still prefer to engage in it, even if the same consequences could be brought about by other (passive) means.

Of course, Arendt does not think that the value of belonging to a political community could be achieved by other means, but she goes too far in ignoring the instrumental dimension of democratic politics (Habermas, 1985). Here Pettit’s idea that democratic procedures must be designed to track common interests comes into its own. It is an important part of the justification of democracy that it has instrumental value in tending to making non-arbitrary decisions that promote the interests of everyone equally. The dialogue between Pettit and Arendt, thus, points to the need to combine intrinsic and instrumental justifications of democracy.
Arendt’s understanding of the experience of the stateless highlights what it means to “lack common liberty held with others” (Bohman, 2008, p. 206) in a way that Pettit’s use of the slave metaphor and his conceptualization of non-domination as security against arbitrary interference does not. This difference has implications also for their view of the raison d’être of democratic politics, which for Pettit is to secure that interference is non-dominating by tracking common avowable interests, while it for Arendt is to secure the conditions of acting together in common liberty, creating a world where everyone can become somebody by her own initiative. Thus, Pettit’s concern for exploitation and control can be traced back to the liberty-slavery theme, while Arendt’s concern for involvement can be seen in light of her discussion of totalitarianism and statelessness. The argument of this chapter is that while both the use of the slave metaphor and the description of statelessness are suggestive and lead to valuable insights, they also result in blind-spots in Pettit’s and Arendt’s respective understandings of democracy and freedom and their relationship. Neither the exploitation of the slave, nor the superfluousness of the stateless can stand alone as freedom’s other.

The dialogue between Arendt and Pettit has helped us approach an understanding of which positive dimensions republican freedom has and does not have. I have argued that there is a further positive dimension to freedom than mere security against arbitrary interference. The additional positive dimension is the capacity to become somebody by inserting oneself in a common world, which is responsive to one’s opinions and actions – and not merely to one’s interests. This argument has implication for how we should view the relationship between democracy and freedom. I have suggested some distinctions that make new possibilities
apparent, for example, that one can regard democracy as robustly connected to freedom without seeing the connection as intrinsic, and that one can be committed to an intrinsic justification of democracy without this relying on a Rousseauian idea of collective self-rule or on the idea that political participation is the only truly good life. In the end, I argued for (what we might call) a dual justification of democracy and freedom that includes both intrinsic and instrumental concerns. Democracy is valuable both because it affords everyone the possibility of becoming somebody and holding common liberty with others, and because it has the instrumental value of protecting citizens against arbitrary decisions and domination. And, it should be emphasized, the value of holding common liberty with others goes beyond being a means to ensuring that one’s avowable interests are tracked on an equal footing with others’ interests. We would and should, I propose, still prefer being active members of political communities that welcome and are responsive to our actions and opinions, even if non-arbitrary decision making could be secured by other means.

References


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