The public finance potential of community forestry
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The Public Finance Potential of Community Forestry Evidence from Nepal

**Introduction**

Community-based and decentralized approaches to natural resource management are increasingly being evaluated on the criterion of rural poverty alleviation. One of the ways in which poverty alleviation can be achieved is through redistribution of natural resource values through taxation of forest products use and redistribution of the tax revenue at the community level. The poverty alleviation potential of this mechanism is, however, contested. Hence, there is scope for empirical research to explore this public finance potential, i.e. the magnitude of forest taxation revenue and the degree to which it finances local public services and infrastructure and contributes to poverty alleviation.

This brief reports on two larger empirical investigations of the potential of community forestry taxation in the mid-Hills of Nepal. The results...
The amounts of forest taxes collected in Nepal’s mid-Hill community forests are marginal compared to the economic value of the forest products harvested; as a result, the redistributive potential of forest taxation is miniscule.

Redistribution through investments in public services and infrastructure financed by community forestry taxation is highly skewed towards a few high-income communities.

Efforts to increase the redistributive potential should consider the wealth profile of users of forest products to avoid increasing the tax burden of the poorest.

Policy Conclusions

- The amounts of forest taxes collected in Nepal’s mid-Hill community forests are marginal compared to the economic value of the forest products harvested; as a result, the redistributive potential of forest taxation is miniscule.
- Redistribution through investments in public services and infrastructure financed by community forestry taxation is highly skewed towards a few high-income communities.
- Efforts to increase the redistributive potential should consider the wealth profile of users of forest products to avoid increasing the tax burden of the poorest.

Results

Revenue income

The studies arrive at an average annual CFUG income level of Nepali Rupees (NRs) 22-24,000 (~ USD 300). The CFUG level income distribution is, however, highly skewed. Lund et al. (2010) thus find that the highest and lowest income quartile of CFUGs account for approximately 50% and 5% of the total income. Similarly, Chhetri et al. (2011) find that the highest and lowest income quartile of CFUGs account for 59.8% and 3.1% of the total income, respectively.

Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the main income sources also differ between the CFUGs, with timber, and partly firewood, being more dominant in the high income CFUGs. Analyses show that the income from timber is highly dependent on the species composition of the community forests, with the valuable timber species Sal (Shorea robusta, C. F. Gaertn.) and Chir Pine (Pinus roxburghii Sarg.) being decisive for the income potential.

Further, in terms of poverty alleviation, it is important to gauge the actual amounts of money being redistributed. Doing so reveals that the average annual CFUG taxation income per CFUG member household is NRs 5.5 and NRs 2.9 for the Chhetri et al. (2011) and Lund et al. (2010) study, respectively. Comparing these figures with the results of recent household income surveys in the area, reveals that the private benefits from community forestry – in the form of income from forest products from these forests – are hundreds fold higher than the amounts of tax revenue collected. Chhetri (2010), for example, finds an average annual income from forests of NRs 2,943 on the basis of a household survey conducted in 2008 with a random sample of 303 households drawn from the populations of two Village Development Committees in Gorkha district.

Revenue expenditure

In terms of expenditure patterns, the two studies report slightly differing findings. Both find that the CFUGs allocate 45-50% of their total expenditure to local public services and infrastructure, such as building of roads, schools and...
temples, extension of the local electricity grid, and support to poor people and local associations, see Figure 1 and 2.

On forest management, however, findings differ. Whereas Lund et al. (2010) find that 30% of total expenditure is allocated to forest management, Chhetri et al. (2011) arrive at a higher share of 46.6%. On administrative expenditures, it is noteworthy that the share of expenditures allocated to forest administration, including allowances, drops to less than 10% for the high-income CFUGs. There are, in other words, no indications of extravagancy among CFUG executive committee members in Nepal’s community forestry.

The expenditure pattern is, furthermore, highly skewed. Lund et al. (2010) find that the highest quartile CFUGs spend around 30 times more than the lowest on forest management – a difference that is driven mainly by expenditures associated with patrolling. In the high income CFUGs this is predominantly done by a paid team of guards, whereas it is done by all members on a rotational basis in the low income CFUGs.

Lund et al. (2010) also show that 50% of the total community development expenditure is attributable to a mere four

Table 3: Average annual CFUG expenditure in NRs divided on income quartile and source (Lund et al. 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>0-25%</th>
<th>25-50%</th>
<th>50-75%</th>
<th>75-100%</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest management</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>3.216</td>
<td>7.042</td>
<td>13.360</td>
<td>6.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services and infrastructure</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>4.977</td>
<td>9.322</td>
<td>26.387</td>
<td>10.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office administration</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>1.967</td>
<td>2.617</td>
<td>3.457</td>
<td>2.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>1.330</td>
<td>5.274</td>
<td>1.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.665</td>
<td>10.588</td>
<td>20.311</td>
<td>48.478</td>
<td>20.504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Average annual CFUG expenditure in NRs divided on income quartile and source (Chhetri et al. 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>0-25%</th>
<th>25-50%</th>
<th>50-75%</th>
<th>75-100%</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest management</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>6.254</td>
<td>11.133</td>
<td>18.815</td>
<td>9.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services and infrastructure</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>2.103</td>
<td>5.676</td>
<td>25.051</td>
<td>8.724</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office administration</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.258</td>
<td>1.616</td>
<td>1.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>3.405</td>
<td>1.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.352</td>
<td>10.369</td>
<td>18.842</td>
<td>48.887</td>
<td>20.618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CFUGs. Similarly, Chhetri et al. (2011) show how 75.1% of all public services and infrastructure have been financed by the high-income quartile CFUGs.

**Discussion and conclusion**

The comparison of CFUG revenue income levels with households’ forest incomes shows that the current pricing of forest products implies that the potential of community forestry to redistribute benefits through locally-based taxation of forest products is not realised. Further, as both poor and more affluent households seem to use the same types of forest products, only in varying quantities (Chhetri 2010), redistribution of benefits through increased taxation of forest products is unviable. Hence, using taxation to induce more equity in community forestry would require more sophisticated approaches to ensure that the poor are not excluded from accessing the products they need. This could entail free subsistence quotas for poor CFUG members or other means of assuring them access on favourable terms, while more affluent members could be required to pay higher fees for the same products.

**Authors**

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**References**


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i The censoring was done by use of three criteria concerning the CFUGs: minimum 5 years of age; minimum of 30 members and; minimum of 5 ha of community forest. The purpose of this censoring was to ensure that we would be able to gather financial records at least 5 years back in time, and that there would be some minimum of financial flow. The random drawing from the three lists of CFUGs resulted in 45 CFUGs that fulfilled the censoring criteria, whereas 33 were discarded mainly because of the area and age criteria.

ii In both studies, the average CFUG age at the time of the empirical study was 10-11 years.