Another Europe is Possible
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Published in:
The Handbook of European Union Politics

Publication date:
2007

Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print

Citation for published version (APA):
INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades critical perspectives on the study of the European Union have blossomed in ways unimaginable from within the intellectual straitjacket of traditional political science during the Cold War era. The multitude of vistas provided by scholars working on European Union politics across the social sciences means that I can only provide a limited view of this vast wealth of critical perspectives. What becomes clear in writing this chapter is that EU politics, as found at EU Studies Associations across Europe and beyond, represents only a small portion of a now much broader and diverse field of social science.

Despite over five decades of European integration to analyse and a huge array of attempts to explain these processes, the EU is now more diverse and less well understood than ever. This is not to say that those who study EU politics are searching for one explanation or model, simply that traditional approaches based on assumptions and techniques developed to analyse political systems during the Cold War look increasingly out of touch with contemporary EU politics. As EU referenda constantly remind us, many EU citizens (and non-citizens) are critical of the EU as a neoliberal political project, similar to the way in which traditional political science fails to challenge or change existing structures of power and injustice.

As the two previous chapters have demonstrated, traditional approaches are forced to make many ceteris paribus assumptions in their analysis of the EU as an arena for political and social choice. In contrast, critical perspectives question the starting assumptions of political science by constantly raising these three questions – what is being studied? (ontological questions); what can we know? (epistemological questions); and how are we going to know? (methodological questions) (Hay 2002: 61–3). For critical scholarship, the answers to these questions are always political rather than neutral, as Jupille (2006) illustrates when he uncritically seeks to naturalize rational choice theory as a metatheory.

Critical scholars understand that if politics is power, then political science involves the study of the processes and consequences of the
way power is acquired, distributed, and exercised (Hay 2002: 73). For critical theorists the centrality of power in pre-determining the questions asked and the theories used is summed up thus: ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ since ‘theory constitutes as well as explains the questions it asks (and those it does not ask)’ (Cox 1981: 128; Hoskyns 2004: 224). In contrast to the discussions of the two previous chapters which attempt to apply theories to political questions without questioning the broader power consequences, critical theories are distinctively political theories in that they understand the political nature of political enquiry.

Critical scholars therefore seek to escape the intellectual straitjacket of traditional political science by questioning assumptions about political systems and institutions, economistic rationalities and methodologies, all of which have evolved out of the interest of earlier political scientists in the US political system and its foreign policy (see Manners 2003a; Smith 2004; Kinnvall 2005). But more than anything else, critical scholars share a commitment to uncovering preconceptions about historical reality and the contextual nature of knowledge, and they seek to change politics. In this respect all four critical perspectives on EU politics can be characterized by a dedication to emancipation – the freeing of humans and knowledge from the negative consequences of modernity.

The rest of the chapter sets out to examine the contribution of critical perspectives to the study of European Union politics. As stated at the outset, it will not be possible to include all critical perspectives and contributions, but I will hope to provide insights from four perspectives. The term ‘perspective’ is chosen with care – many of the scholars encountered here are not easily located in one theoretical ‘school’ or ‘tradition’, in addition to which the boundaries between perspectives are highly permeable and contested. Unfortunately, I was not able to include as many perspectives as I might have wished, and regret the absence of the Marxist perspectives of world systems, regulation and state theories, as well as post-colonial scholarship and work on race and racism (for examples see Cole and Dale 1999; Tausch and Herrmann 2001; Chafer and Cooper 2003; Jessop 2004; Bailey 2006). In addition, I will undoubtedly exhibit an English-language bias in this chapter, which is also to be regretted.

The first perspective, historical materialisms, consists of critical approaches which draw explicitly on the intellectual heritage of Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci (see Rupert and Smith 2002, for a good overview). The second perspective, Frankfurt Critical Theories, involves critical approaches which can be identified with the intellectual heritage of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, including the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas (see Jay 1996, for a good overview). The third perspective, postmodern sciences, includes critical approaches which can be located within the critiques of modernity initiated by Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, amongst others (see Weber 2005, for a good overview). Finally, feminist perspectives comprise of critical approaches which seek to question gender and power, and to promote social change (see Steans 2006, for a good overview). The ordering of the perspectives reflects a journey from more positivist to more post-positivist political science, with feminist perspectives including liberal, radical, and post-structuralist approaches, rather than any judgement on the relative merits of the differing perspectives.

HISTORICAL MATERIALISMS

Historical materialist perspectives on EU politics have grown out of the work of Marx, although prior to the end of the Cold War they were broadly ignored by traditional integration theory (Rosamond 2000: 81; Smith 2002: 264; Hoskyns 2004: 226). Remarkably, this relative lack of engagement has occurred despite the socialist origins of federalists such as Altiero Spinelli and Mario Albertini. During the Cold War a few scholars interrogated the processes of European integration from a
Marxist perspective, including Mandel (1970), Galtung (1973), and Holland (1980). What these scholars shared was a critique of the ahistorical and decontextual nature of contemporary integration studies and a commitment to paying greater attention to the larger scale dynamics of capitalism which drove capital concentration (larger companies) and their relationship to the dominance of the elite political class.

The end of the Cold War brought renewed energy to historical materialist approaches as scholars turned their attention away from Marxist theorizing of the capitalist state, and towards two differing perspectives on transnational human social and economic relations termed Open Marxism and Neo-Gramscianism. Although both perspectives share a historical materialist understanding of the capitalist context of social, economic and political relations, they differ in the relative primacy they give to early Marx’s emphasis on human social relations compared to Gramsci’s emphasis on critical economy (see Bieler and Morton 2003; see also ‘Americanism and Fordism’ in Gramsci 1971: 277–318).

Open Marxism

Open Marxist scholars, led by the work of Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burnham, Guglielmo Carchedi, Bernard Moss, and Hazel Smith, have sought to examine EU politics in terms of class, imperialism, labour commodification, and institutionalist bias. Open Marxism places an emphasis on Marx’s open-ended class struggle within nation states. Bonefeld and Burnham have argued that the politics of monetary union can be explained by the attempts of the capitalist classes within member states to reinvigorate ‘capital accumulation’ (investment in capital goods and associated reproduction of capitalist social relations) while de-politicizing fiscal restraint and other ‘competitive pressures’ on the national working classes (Burnham 1999; Bonefeld 2001). Moss places much emphasis on the EU as a neo-liberal construction which serves, and is shaped by, the rivalries of the capitalist classes of its member states (Moss and Michie 1999; Moss 2004). Carchedi’s (2001) work focuses on the interplay between class relations and the EU’s imperialist relations with the rest of the world. Carchedi (2001: 30–4) moves beyond a statist Marxist position when he argues that the Commission serves a ‘transnational capitalist class’ through a network of lobbying groups.

Both Hazel Smith and Gustav Peebles interrogate the way in which the EU treaties commodify labour through the harmonization of labour-power rules (Peebles 1997; Smith 2002). Smith (1998, 2002: 265–6) has also gone further than most Marxists in identifying the ‘institutionalist bias’ manifest in work on EU politics. This institutionalist bias involves two institutionalist fallacies of overemphasizing the study of institutional decision making and allowing the EU institutions to determine the constitution of the field of study, a criticism sometimes shared with non-Marxists.

The Open Marxist approach has revived political questions of ‘who is the EU for?’ – in particular by analysing the way in which European integration serves the political elite of one or several member states. Such scholarship argues that the single market and the single currency have changed the political relations between national ruling elites and national working classes. The growth of anti-capitalist groups and actions since the 1990s, together with the revival of parties of the left in Europe, illustrates the extent to which Open Marxist arguments over the role of the EU in reinforcing national class distinctions resonates with the wider European public (although see Mau 2005; Rhodes 2005; Sykes 2005, for non-Marxist political economy).

Neo-Gramscian Perspectives

Neo-Gramscian scholars such as Stephen Gill, Hans-Jürgen Bieling, Andreas Bieler, Adam David Morton, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Alan Cafruny, and Magnus Ryner adopt a transnational historical materialist perspective in analysing EU politics with particular reference to the ‘sphere of production’ in its widest sense.
In contrast to Open Marxism, Neo-Gramscian perspectives emphasize the role of ‘social forces, engendered by the production process, as the most important collective actors’ (Bieler and Morton 2001: 17), in particular transnational forces at the European and global level. Gill (1998, 2003) has argued that economic and monetary union has, since the early 1990s, constitutionalized neo-liberal discipline within the EU and contributed to the formation of a neo-Gramscian ‘transnational historical bloc’ which socially and politically embeds neoliberalism. Bieling extends Gill’s argument by looking at the impact of EU neo-liberalism on industrial relations, in particular at the way in which trade union organizations have been incorporated into ‘competitive corporatism’ (Bieling and Steinhilber 2000). Outside of the ‘Amsterdam School’ of international political economy, Bieler and Morton (2001) have led the way in arguing for neo-Gramscian perspectives on European Union politics. Bieler and Morton (2004) go further than simply advocating neo-Gramscian perspectives by raising the possibilities of counter-hegemonic EU strategies by labour and social movements, particularly within the context of the European Social Forum.

van Apeldoorn (2002), following van der Pijl and the Amsterdam School, argues that the EU and its processes of integration are embedded in neo-liberal discipline shaped by the hegemony of a transatlantic, transnational class as manifest in the role of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (for good overviews of the work of Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and the Amsterdam School see Gill 1993; Overbeek 2004). From this perspective, van Apeldoorn et al. (2003: 32) engage in a neo-Gramscian critique of mainstream theories of European integration with an emphasis on the ways in which neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist, multi-leveled, and liberal constructivist approaches lack ‘a more comprehensive, critical, transnational, historical, and materialist theory of European integration’. Cafruny and Ryner (2003: vii–viii) capture much of the emancipatory ethic of the slogan that ‘Another Europe is Possible’ when they raise the question of whether the European attempts to create a fortress of resistance to US-led, transnational neo-liberal hegemony now lie in ruins. What they argue, like most neo-Gramscian scholars, is that the EU itself needs to become more social-democratic, turning to successful social democratic models such as Sweden ‘for inspiration in the search for emancipatory alternatives to neo-liberalism’ and ‘establish regulatory policies across a wide array of international regimes’ (Cafruny 2003: 300; Ryner 2004: 115).

By developing historical materialist ideas about the post-Cold War EU, Neo-Gramscian scholars are raising critical questions about the role of hegemonic practices in EU politics. Such scholarship both challenges traditional integration theories for their decontextualized neo-liberalism, and argues that neo-liberal capitalism has become transnationalized, particularly within the EU and across the Atlantic. The growth of the World Social Forum and European Social Forum since 2001 illustrates the way in which widely-held beliefs about the transnationalization of neo-liberal politics are reconfiguring both political participation and academic study in the EU. In particular, the widely shared ESF banner of ‘Another Europe is Possible’ became the rallying cry of the anti-Constitution forces in the referenda rejections during 2005, a cry no political scientist can ignore.

CRITICAL THEORIES

Critical Theories originating in the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research have attempted to develop, and then move beyond Marx in order to advance a critical theory of society that responds to the alienation of advanced capitalist society and questions ‘traditional’ theories (McCarthy 1981; Bernstein 1985; see also Díez and Steans 2005, for a more recent review). Like historical materialist perspectives, Frankfurt Critical Theories have remained largely disconnected from European integration theory (Hoskyns 2004: 226–7). This disconnection is increasingly addressed by the impact of probably the most widely known and read scholar on the EU: Jürgen Habermas.
The Frankfurt School has given rise to at least two perspectives based on the work of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno here termed ‘critical social theory’, and the later work of Habermas here termed ‘deliberative theory’.

Unlike historical materialist perspectives, Critical Theories did not have to contend with the intellectual and ideological consequences of the end of communism in the same way – indeed outside of EU studies, Frankfurt Critical Theory became widely accepted during the 1980s and 1990s, with Habermas (1986, 1989, 1992) as one of the prime sources of contemporary social theory. It was only during the 1990s that the social, cultural and political consequences of European union, globalization, and Europeanization began to be addressed and understood from a Critical Theory perspective (see Habermas 1992; Delanty 1995; Linklater 1998). My differentiation between the perspectives of Habermasian ‘deliberative theory’ and earlier Frankfurt ‘critical social theory’ needs explanation in the context of EU political science. Both perspectives share a concern for understanding and challenging the social production of knowledge; historicizing and contextualizing subjectivity; and a commitment to progress and emancipation as the goals of research (see Warleigh 2003: 52). However, by following Habermas’s advocacy of ‘communicative action’ in the public sphere, it is clear that deliberative theorists are more interested in the liberal promotion of deliberative democracy than the critical questioning of the socio-cultural production of human knowledge characteristic of critical social theory. In contrast, critical social theory is a more diverse collection of scholars who share Horkheimer and Adorno’s agenda of progressive and radical critique of modern society (see Calhoun 1995).

**Deliberative Theory**

Following Habermas, scholars such as Deirdre Curtin, Andrew Linklater, Christian Jörges, Jürgen Neyer, Kirstin Jacobsson, Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum, Helene Sjursen, and Alex Warleigh have sought to use his ideas to understand the development of deliberative processes and democracy within a post-national EU polity. Deliberative theorists are interested in understanding, and advocating, the European Union as a post-national and cosmopolitan democracy where citizenship and democracy can and should be developed beyond the Westphalian state on the basis of ‘constitutional patriotism’. Habermas has developed his themes of communicative action and constitutional patriotism to argue that, in the face of globalization and terrorism, the EU is ‘the only normatively satisfactory alternative as a socially and economically effective European Union, constituted along federalist lines – an alternative that points to a future cosmopolitan order sensitive to both difference and social equality’ (Habermas 2001: xix).

For Habermas the EU would ‘aim toward a common practice of opinion- and will-formation, nourished by the roots of a European civil society, and expanded into a European-wide political arena’ and ‘inspire the Kantian hope for a global domestic polity’ (Habermas 2001: 100; Habermas and Derrida 2003: 297).

Linklater (1998) and Curtin (1997) were amongst the earliest scholars to develop Habermasian thinking in order to explore the EU in terms of cosmopolitan citizenship and deliberative democracy. Linklater (1996: 85) argues that critical theory and discourse ethics are ‘explicitly concerned with an emancipatory project with universalist aspirations which transcend national frontiers’ which he finds immanent in the cosmopolitan democracy, citizenship and civilising process of the EU. Curtin (2003: 58) draws on Habermas’s link between ‘communicative action, deliberation and civil society’, arguing that EU post-national democracy should be built on deliberation in the public sphere. Similarly, Christian Jörges, Jürgen Neyer, and Kirstin Jacobsson have also used deliberative theory to analyse comitology, legitimacy and order in the EU and to argue that deliberative processes have a different basis of legitimacy to those of representative politics (Jacobsson 1997; Jörges and Neyer 1997; Neyer 2003).

Since 2000 the ARENA group of Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum, and Helene Sjursen have played a leading role in bringing together
Habermasian deliberative theorists to interrogate and advocate deliberative democracy in the EU, including questions of ‘democratic deficit’, a European public sphere, foreign policy, and reflexivity in the European polity (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Sjursen 2002, 2006; Eriksen 2005). Scholars following Habermas’s lead are keen to explore the relationships between communicative action, public sphere, citizenship, deliberation, and cosmopolitan democracy (for example Warleigh 2003).

Over the past 15 years, Habermas and the Deliberative Theorists have moved the theoretical debates in EU politics beyond arguments over how best to analyse EU politics towards how best to achieve cosmopolitan and deliberative democracy in a post-national EU polity. In this respect, Deliberative Theorists are working with crucial political questions in a post-Cold War Europe very much concerned with questions of democratic deficit, legitimacy and citizenship within both EU member states and the EU institutions themselves. In the aftermath of the EU democratic deficit debates of the 1990s, and the EU counter-terrorist debates of the 2000s, liberal concerns regarding such questions are clearly paramount to EU political science.

Critical Social Theory

Critical social theory (CST) perspectives on EU politics are led by the work of a diverse range of scholars including Gerard Delanty, Chris Rumford, Craig Calhoun, Seyla Benhabib, Pierre Bourdieu, and Niilo Kauppi (see discussion in Manners and Whitman 2003: 394–397). In a wide variety of ways these scholars have sought to draw on Adorno and Horkheimer’s critical theory, together with Berger and Luckmann’s social constructionism, in the study of Europe whilst taking ‘the risk of trying for liberation, for equality, justice, and all the other problematic terms that join with freedom to make up the most popular normative and political path for critical theory’ (Calhoun 1995: xvi).

Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford have taken the lead in bringing social theory and political sociology to the study of Europe and EU politics (Delanty 1995; Rumford 2002; Delanty and Rumford 2005). Delanty begins his work with reference to a central question for EU politics posed in Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1979) Dialectic of Enlightenment: ‘An indictment of an entire civilization, this celebrated work of the “Frankfurt School” of critical theory poses the question of the very possibility of a European identity in the wake of the Holocaust’ (Delanty 1995: x). Delanty and Rumford (2005: 185, 188) argue that the transformations of the current period, conveniently summarized under the heading of globalization, have made much conventional social scientific theorizing about Europe redundant. … There is now a cosmopolitan aspect to society in Europe which was not previously evident. … A cosmopolitan perspective holds many attractions, not least of them being that a major problem in the way Europe is studied, perhaps the problem, is that the political and social science associated with the nation-state still pervades EU studies.

Alongside Delanty and Rumford, Calhoun (2001, 2003) has advanced a critical perspective on EU politics with particular emphases on the politics of identity, democratic integration, and the public sphere in Europe. Calhoun (2001: 38) argues that in EU politics it is important ‘to build institutions that encourage and protect multiple, discontinuous, sometimes conflicting public spaces and modes of public engagement rather than attempt to nurture or impose some unified European culture’. He also suggests that ‘the EU has an international (that is, global or supra-European) identity’, but one that is ‘always subject to construction and reconstruction’ as part of the politics of EU identity (Calhoun 2003: 269–70).

Benhabib (2002, 2004) examines the politics of migration and citizenship in the EU from a CST perspective, arguing for ‘moral universalism’ and ‘cosmopolitan federalism’. Benhabib examines the way the ‘disaggregation of citizenship’ in the EU has produced mixed results, arguing that, while a promising development for post-national EU citizens, for large groups of ‘third country’ nationals such disaggregation is dangerous (Benhabib 2002: 38). Instead, she advocates moral universalism based on Habermasian discourse ethics, which...
involves the recognition of the rights of all to speech and participation in moral conversation (Benhabib 2004: 13). For Benhabib cosmopolitan federalism involves multiple iterations of cosmopolitan norms between the layers of international law and democratic legislatures, of which the EU is at the forefront (Benhabib 2004: 176–7).

From a more radical perspective, Bourdieu (1998, 2001) has played a role as an observer and actor in EU politics by arguing for a 'reasoned utopia' and instigating Raisons d’Agir in 1995, both of which contributed to the creation of ATTAC and the European Social Forum. Bourdieu was a Critical Theorist par excellence in that he saw no separation between social science scholarship and commitment to a European social movement – ‘I can assert that intellectuals are indispensable to social struggles, especially nowadays given the quite novel forms that domination assumes’ (Bourdieu 1998, 2001: 20). Bourdieu formulated the question which he believed ‘ought to be at the centre of any reasoned utopia concerning Europe: how do we create a really European Europe, one that is free from all the imperialisms?’ (Bourdieu 1998: 129–30).

Following in Bourdieu’s footsteps, but developing his structural theory of politics into a theory of European integration, is Kauppi’s (2005) ‘structural constructivist’ work on EU politics. Kauppi’s work primarily focuses on the European Parliament as a revolutionary site which contributes to changing the structural features of member state (specifically French and Finnish) political fields by introducing new institutions and practices. Kauppi (2005: 22) argues that in order to understand the dislocating effects of European integration on political fields we should develop Bourdieu’s structural constructivist theory of politics because it ‘offers powerful instruments for a critical analysis of political power’ and ‘remedies some of the weaknesses of most versions of social constructivism, such as their diffuse conception of power and ideational notion of culture’. For Kauppi (2005: 22), a structural constructivist theory of European integration moves beyond existing theories in order to ‘examine the European Union as a multi-levelled and polycentric evolving field’.

Critical Social Theorists have begun to raise some difficult questions in the study of EU politics, in particular regarding the politics of identity, culture, imperialisms, and ethnicity. Such politics are by no means new to the integration process, but what is new is the way in which CST problematizes these questions in the context of the EU, rather than its constituent member states. Alongside the work of Habermas, the CST scholars considered here are read far more widely than most work cultivated within EU political science, which does raise the question of why there has not been more engagement between critical theory and EU politics? Alongside the contributions of Open Marxism and Neo-Gramscianism, the wider public reception of CST scholars (for example, Bourdieu through the French left, Raisons d’Agir, ATTAC, and the ESF) also illustrates the extent to which, prior to about 2001, the content of EU political science was fairly out of touch with contentious EU politics.

POSTMODERN SCIENCES

Lyotard’s (1984) ‘postmodern science’ involves perspectives aimed at ‘producing not the known, but the unknown’ in order to ‘wage a war on [the] totality’ of metanarratives (in Manners 2003b: 254–5). In parallel with historical materialisms and Critical Theories, postmodern sciences have largely been avoided by traditional integration theory which has been mainly interested in ‘producing the known’ in the form of meta-narratives (all encompassing stories) about EU politics. Since the early 1990s postmodern scientific perspectives have increasingly contributed to the study of EU politics through the engagement of scholars such as Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva, as well as the more recent contributions of EU scholars using methods such as genealogy, governmentality, and deconstruction from Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Derrida.
Postmodern scientific perspectives have probably benefited more than historical materialist and Critical Theoretical perspectives from the loosening of political science’s intellectual straitjacket in the post-Cold War era. In discussing postmodern scientific perspectives care must be taken not to simply equate postmodern with poststructural – ‘In keeping with current conventions, I treat postmodernity as a broad term encompassing a complex historical condition, and poststructuralism as a reference to a more specific response to philosophical dilemmas that have become especially pressing under postmodern conditions’ (Rob Walker in Manners 2003b: 254 n. 62). Hence, most of the scholarship I shall consider here should be considered poststructural rather than postmodern, although there are exceptions. Unlike the previous perspectives, I shall differentiate between three different perspectives on the basis of work which argues the postmodern condition of the EU, work that follows Nietzsche and Foucault’s ideas on genealogy and governmentality, and that which follows Derrida’s ideas on deconstruction.

**Postmodern Condition**

Although numerous scholars have emphasized the postmodern characteristics of the EU (for example, Ruggie’s (1993) ‘postmodern international political form’), scholars such as Ian Ward and Peter van Ham have led the way in analysing the postmodern condition of the EU. Drawing on Lyotard and Derrida, Ward (1995: 15) argues that ‘the European Union can best be understood as a postmodern text, and perhaps a postmodern polity’ because ‘from a political perspective, the European Union apparently continues to defy objective determination’. Ward’s (2003) approach is informed by, and develops, the Critical Legal Studies movement by going beyond sovereignty. Ward argues that in order to more fully understand Europe and develop a public philosophy we need to think beyond sovereignty, democracy and constitutionalism towards ‘a sense of justice which lies “beyond” rather than “before” the law’ (Derrida 1992b in Ward 2001: 40).

van Ham’s (2001) study of *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition* has given us probably the most comprehensive attempt to interrogate questions of governance, democracy, and identity from a postmodern perspective. van Ham’s work is multifaceted, in line with Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern as ‘incredulity toward meta-narratives’ (Lyotard in van Ham 2001: 9), but does try to ‘come to an understanding of the vastness of political life on a European scale, reading the process of European integration a postmodern attempt at framing disorder’ (van Ham 2001: 22). One interesting point he makes is that EU politics is one increasingly shaped by identity/affinity politics where cultural production and the ‘brand state’ are determining features.

Undoubtedly, one of the myths of EU political science has been the mantra of postmodern science having neither ambition nor power to analyse EU politics. In analysing the EU’s postmodern condition, the scholarship discussed here seeks to understand how the unbundling of sovereignty, territory, and governance has significant consequences for EU politics. In particular, the assumptions of modern-state form clearly need to be problematized in a world increasingly characterized by global economic competition, overlapping international jurisdiction, and radical cultural changes which seem to turn fundamentalist beliefs into just causes. But the assumptions of this postmodern condition are not simply relativizing – the scholarship considered here goes beyond analysis and towards advocacy, in particular through rethinking justice and democracy.

**Genealogy and Governmentality**

Drawing on the works of Nietzsche and Foucault, scholars such as Stefan Elbe, William Walters, Jens Henrik Haahr, and Henrik Larsen have used approaches based on genealogy, governmentality, and discourse to understand the EU as a site of power relations. From this perspective, the EU is the location where knowledge and power meet, with consequences for
the understanding of the past, present, and future through disciplining, governing, and discursive practices.

For Elbe (2003: 114), Nietzsche provides a perspective from which to look beyond the evil of European nationalisms, to become 'good Europeans' who 'would find their meaning in the diverse and enigmatic aspects of existence'. Such diversity is itself practiced through the notion of perspective, as Nietzsche (1998: 98) argued that 'perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival “knowing” the only kind of “knowing”'. It is this diversity of Nietzschean perspectival knowing that Ruggie (1993: 172) argued is constitutive of the EC and its analysis: 'it may constitute the first “multi-perspectival polity” to emerge since the advent of the modern era [where] the concept of multiperspectival institutional forms offers a lens through which to view other possible instances of international transformation today' (see Rumford and Murray 2003; Bohman 2004, on multi-perspectival approaches). Elbe has sought to develop a Nietzschean perspective on EU politics through engaging in genealogical reflections on European nihilism, nationalism, and the idea of Europe. Drawing on Nietzsche, Elbe (2001: 260) reminds us that 'genealogy is a specific type of historical inquiry' which is 'primarily concerned with providing a history of the present' and which insists 'on the necessity of allowing for a plurality of appropriations'. Undoubtedly, Elbe's most important reading of Nietzsche is in his argument that a vision of Europe that is deeply meaningful and not excessively technocratic ... would be an idea that could contribute to a peaceful European community not because Europeans would share an identical and homogenous conception of what it means to be European, but because they would share a deep and valued experience of autonomy (Elbe 2003: 119).

In their discussions of Governing Europe, Walters and Haahr's (2005: 16–17) genealogical perspective is located in Michel Foucault's reading of genealogy as the excavation of singular events in order to understand the construction of the present (see also Elbe 2001: 260 n. 3). Walters and Haahr's (2005: 5) approach is based on Foucauldian 'governmentality [which] combines discourse analysis with a focus on the history of governing. As such it allows us to situate the study of European integration in relation to the much broader history of rationalities, arts and techniques of government'. By adopting a perspective of governmentality, they interrogate EU politics through the power/knowledge themes of political analysis, including the forms, relationality, and technologies of power, before using these themes in the genealogy of the genesis of the EC, the common market, justice and home affairs, and the open method of coordination (Walters and Haahr 2005). In denaturalizing EU politics, Walters and Haahr (2005) argue that 'European integration can be reframed in terms of the governmentalization of Europe', and suggest that histories of EU freedom and security are two of the narratives to be found in their work.

Also located in the work of Foucault, although with an emphasis on discourse analysis rather than genealogy or governmentality, are Henrik Larsen's studies of member state and EU foreign policies. Larsen's (1997: 2) work is primarily aimed at developing a theoretical framework for dealing with beliefs in FPA [Foreign Policy Analysis] which takes into account the languages in which beliefs are expressed and their social nature'. Moving beyond the analysis of member state foreign policy, Larsen argues that 'along the lines of Foucault a discourse is understood as a limited range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings. Discourses constrain what it is possible to say' within Danish and EU foreign policy (Larsen 2002: 287; 2005).

Methods of genealogy and governmentality provide a means of analysing and understanding the power of the EU to shape the idea of Europe, European identity, the market, internal affairs, and foreign affairs. From this perspective, European integration theories are unconvincing in explaining how EU politics develops in the way it does, but by engaging in a historical revealing of the present it becomes possible to understand how EU politics assumed the governmental mentalities of technocratic coordination. Similarly, by analysing the discursive constructions of regulation and policy, we can begin to make sense of legal, economic,
cultural, regional, and neighbourhood policies as power politics. However, power politics here is not the ability to shape the agenda, or negotiation, but the preferences themselves.

**Deconstruction**

Post-structuralist scholarship informed and inspired by the work of Foucault and Derrida is to be found in the work of a number of EU politics scholars exploring the construction and structure of truth, threat, self, and other. What this scholarship shares is a commitment to deconstructing narratives within Europe and the EU in order to understand and reveal alternative truths and possibilities. Undoubtedly Derrida’s own work is significant in this respect, with his scholarship on Europe and the EU emphasizing the extent to which, more than anything else, European integration is and should be a journey towards the other (Derrida 1992b; Borradori 2003). Such a journey, argues Derrida (1992b: 29, 48), ‘is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity and advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not … to advance itself as a heading for the universal essence of humanity’. Crucially, for Derrida, this other heading is towards a ‘new figure of Europe’ recalling the memory of a European promise to its ‘advanced non-theological political culture’ in order to contribute to cosmopolitan democracy, international law, and emancipation for all (Derrida 1992b: 48, 76–8; Borradori 2003: 113, 116, 140, 170).

Kristeva’s (1982, 1991) psychoanalytic post-structuralism argues that the other is always part of the self – an abject-foreigner which is part of our conscious and unconscious selves. Kristeva’s work uses psychoanalysis to understand ‘the creation of self as an internal psychological process’ in which ‘the other exists in our minds through imagination even when he or she is not physically present’ (Kinnvall 2004: 753). Kristeva’s (1982: 4–5, 155–6) work helps to understand the way in which Europeans deal with the horrors of fascism and Nazi crimes, such as Auschwitz, by abjecting (rejecting the abjectness) of their past selves and projecting them onto others. Kristeva (1991: 191–2) advocates recognizing that ‘the foreigner is within us’ and ‘by recognizing our uncanny strangeness we shall neither suffer from it nor enjoy it from the outside’. Kristeva (1991: 192–5; 2000) sees European integration as part of a cosmopolitan ethic that recognizes the strangers to ourselves, the othering practices of nationalism, and a different type of freedom.

Beyond Derrida and Kristeva, and within the study of EU politics, Diez’s (2001) post-structuralist work has probably made the greatest impact towards an understanding of ‘the politics of integration discourse’. Diez’s (1997, 1999) studies of ‘speaking Europe’ have sought to understand the role of language in constructing EU politics, as well as the implications of using Foucault and Derrida to deconstruct and open up space for alternative EU constructions or horizons. Diez’s (2002, 2005) work goes beyond the deconstruction of integration discourses to understand the construction of EU self and others in world politics through his examination of discourse of EU ‘normative power’ and relations with Turkey and Cyprus.

Focusing on post-structuralist understandings of EU securitizations in the areas of migration and policing, Jef Huysmans and Didier Bigo both engage in critical approaches to the study of liberty and security. Huysmans’s (2000) work emphasizes the way in which the incorporation of migration issues into the EU has been ‘securitized’ in the sense that immigration and asylum, the Schengen and Dublin arrangements, and the third pillar of the TEU have been politicized as ‘threats’ to European and national securities. Challenging ‘spill-over’ accounts for European integration, Huysmans’s (2000) work emphasizes the way in which the incorporation of migration issues into the EU has been ‘securitized’ in the sense that immigration and asylum, the Schengen and Dublin arrangements, and the third pillar of the TEU have been politicized as ‘threats’ to European and national securities. Challenging ‘spill-over’ accounts for European integration, Huysmans’s (2005) argues that a Foucauldian emphasis on the technologies of government and control provide a means of better understanding the securitization of the area of freedom, justice, and security. Similarly, Bigo’s (1996) work emphasizes the way in which ad hoc intergovernmental arrangements for policing Europe...
such as Trevi and Schengen are linked together in the third pillar of the EU and Europol, with the effect of aggregating and securitizing previously discrete policing issues. Bigo draws on Bourdieu’s theory of field to argue that the EU’s security field increasingly securitizes and wraps together internal and external issues like a Möbius ribbon, where the borders between issues such as migration, asylum, crime, unemployment, religious zealotry, terrorism, and failed states become difficult to detect (Bigo and Guild 2005).

In using deconstruction to analyse and understand EU politics, post-structural scholars are seeking to denaturalise stories about European integration which are spoken as common sense. Hence, stories about where the EU is heading, what it is, what it does, and how it becomes more secure, are all interrogated in the search for emancipation. But deconstruction is but the first step, as the release from naturalized truths also brings responsibilities regarding where and what the EU should be heading/doing/securing. Thus, post-structural scholars advocate the alternative possibilities of EU politics in terms of non-theological political culture, reconciliation with otherness, reflexive foreigning policy, and the desecuritizing of migration and criminal matters in EU politics.

FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES

Feminist perspectives on EU politics address the most omnipresent aspect of all politics – the construction of difference, in particular, gender differences. Feminist perspectives are the strongest in terms of participants and contribution, but the most discriminated against in terms of exclusion from traditional EU political science. This may strike many as nonsensical, given the high profile of women in the discipline of EU politics. Clearly we must not confuse women with feminists. Rather, feminist scholarship highlights the pervasiveness of power relations embedded in social institutions such as EU political science and the EU institutions themselves – despite the many successful examples we can think of, gender equality is nowhere near being achieved. The perspectives considered here broadly share the position that ‘Feminism is characterized by a focus on gender as a central organizing principle of social life; an emphasis on the concept of power and the ways that it affects social relations; and an unwavering commitment to progressive social change’ (Mills and Whitty 1999: 35, in Shaw 2000: 412).

Like all the perspectives considered here, feminist scholarship on the EU was to be found during the Cold War era, as part of second wave feminism during the 1970s and 1980s (see Hoskyns 1985; Vallance and Davies 1986; Buckley and Anderson 1988; Prechal and Burrows 1990; Pillinger 1992). Similarly, the post-Cold War period has seen an eruption of feminist work which seeks to contribute to and reconfigure EU politics and EU political science, including more liberal feminism emphasizing rights and equality, as well as more radical feminism focusing on gender constructions and patriarchy (see Elman 1996; Hoskyns 1996a; Monk and Garcia-Ramon 1996; Rees 1998). This differentiation between the politics of equality and the politics of difference partially reflects the ‘Wollstonecraft dilemma’ within feminist perspectives – should feminists seek equal rights, or recognition and support for difference? (Rees 1998: 29; Lombardo 2003). However, the range of feminist scholarship goes far beyond this differentiation to also include, for example, constructionist, critical, and poststructural feminisms (see Shaw 2000: 412; Kronsell 2005: 1036 n. 3). Unfortunately, it is simply not possible for me to attempt to cover most of this feminist scholarship, so instead I will try to illustrate what feminist perspectives bring to EU political science by looking at some examples of work on EU policies, and work on EU politics. Whereas the former has tended to focus on equal rights, the latter tends to focus on the institutionalization of masculinity and the implications this has for power relations within the EU. Broadly speaking, EU feminist scholarship has followed three different routes to gender equality, emphasizing equal treatment,
positive action/discrimination, and gender mainstreaming (Rees 1998; Booth and Bennett 2002). My overview of feminist scholarship and theorizing should be seen as complementary to Elisabeth Prugl’s chapter on gender policy-making in this volume. As is clear, it is important not to compound women, gender, and feminism (see discussion in Carver et al. 1998; Weber 2005: 81–101).

**Feminist EU Policies**

Feminist scholarship on EU policies began with an emphasis on article 119 of the Treaty of Rome which asserted ‘that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work’ (Elman 1996: 1; Rees 1998: 1). Article 119 on equal treatment became the first focal point of feminist EU scholarship following activism in Belgium on behalf of Gabrielle Defrenne which established the direct effect of the equal pay principle in 1976 (Hoskyns 1996b: 15–17). Further scholarship focused on equal treatment law and policies during Hoskyns’s ‘hard times’ of the 1980s, concerning pay, employment, social security, self-employment, pregnancy, and parenthood (Fredman 1992; Gregory 1992; Hoskyns 1992).

The end of the Cold War division of Europe saw new feminist scholarship on EU enlargement, including perspectives from central Europe (Havelkova 2000; Watson 2000; Bretherton 2001; Matynia 2003; Pető and Manners 2006). What this work shared are fairly unremitting critiques of the way in which EU enlargement policies has failed to mainstream gender equality and of the way in which central European feminists were often sidelined in the process. In particular, bitter criticisms have been raised over the way in which the EUs liberalizing approach often colluded with central European reactionary politics to roll-back the achievements of socialist equality and reproductive rights for women (Alsop and Hockey 2001; Matynia 2003).

More recent work on EU policies has begun to address the external actions of the Union, in particular with an emphasis on development policy and ACP relations (Turner 1999; Painter and Ulmer 2002; Lister 2003). Scholarship here focuses on the inclusion of gender in development relations since 2001, highlighting the problems of existing institutional structures attempting to adapt to new practices without sufficient funding, staff, or training in order to do so. Painter and Ulmer (2002) argue that the policy of attempting to mainstream gender into development cooperation has sought to promote gender ‘everywhere’, but in practice the absence of resources, trained staff, legal provisions, and the abandonment of positive discrimination has led to gender being ‘nowhere’.

Feminist scholarship on EU policies has led the way in bringing critical voices to the study of the EU, with particular emphases on gender, social, and rights policies, as well as more limited interest in enlargement and development policies. What is interesting about these feminist perspectives is the way in which the more critical work originated from within legal studies, then spread to social policy and political science. What is also clear is that most of the writers are participants, reaffirming the critical, emancipatory aims of feminist scholarship. However, with the end of the Cold War, and the 1980s pre-occupation with the market, feminist scholarship turned towards questions of politics in the EU.

**Feminist EU Politics**

Despite the creation of the EC Women’s Bureau/Equal Opportunities Unit in Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs (1976/1994), the Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities (1982), and the first two Action Programmes on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities (1982–85 and 1986–90), by the 1990s it became clear that they were ‘failing to bring change to women’s lives’ (Booth and Bennett 2002: 437). During the 1980s the Actions Programmes and the creation of an equality networks by the Commission moved the agenda from equal treatment to positive action, with an emphasis on addressing the question of disadvantage in gender equality.
A number of feminist scholars have charted how women's policy networks, in particular the European Women's Lobby (EWL) created in 1990, together with the Women's Committee of the European Parliament have been influential in promoting positive action, as well as moving the gender equality debate into the development of gender mainstreaming during the 1990s (Bretherton and Sperling 1996; Cockburn 1997; Mazey 1998). What this scholarship argues is that the networking together of the EWL, the EP Women's Committee, the Equal Opportunities Unit, and the Advisory Committee together with the European Trades Union Congress and a much wider network of interested organizations and activist scholars has contributed towards the third debate of EU feminism – gender mainstreaming.

Rather than 'tinkering' with equal treatment legislation, or 'tailoring' positive action measures, gender mainstreaming is advocated by feminist scholars as a means of 'transforming' the pre-existing malestream organizations, structures, and norms in order to 'feminize the mainstream' (Rees 1998: 42–6). As Rees summarizes, 'the essence of the mainstreaming approach is to seek to identify these hidden, unrecognized and unremarked ways in which systems and structures are biased in favour of men, and to redress the balance' (Rees 1998: 189). The first step towards challenging the 'malestream' in EU politics began with the coincidence of the fourth and fifth Action Programmes on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities (1996–2000 and 2001–05), and feminist scholarship on integrating gender – a coincidence of 'intellectual and 'real world' mainstreaming' (Mazey 2000).

This coincidence of feminist mainstreaming has contributed to a series of significant interventions in EU politics, including the work of Beveridge et al. (2000), Mazey (2001), Shaw (2000; 2002), Liebert with Sifft (2003), and contributions to Rossilli’s (2000) edited volume. One interesting aspect of the mainstreaming approach has been the calling into question of the EU’s gender representation of the EU and its constitution through a process of gender auditing. Scholars such as Diaz and Millns (2007) and Hoskyns (2003) critically analysed the convention and Constitution for Europe from a feminist perspective, arguing that both were unrepresentative of women and women's views, as well as suggesting this would result in ratification problems. However, there is also a critique to be raised against gender mainstreaming which has often remained focused on implementation issues rather than power challenges and shifts.

The last bastion for feminist analysis is undoubtedly European integration theory, although even this fortress has been recently breached (Hoskyns 2004; Kronsell 2005). Hoskyns (2004: 224) argues that gender-sensitive integration theory would have to start with social relations, be honest about subjectivity, and 'it would need to be one that sought to theorize change, transformation, and power, and had a broad definition of the political'. Discouragingly, Hoskyns concludes that 'both the core of EU policy-making and many of the key concepts in theorizing European integration remain virtually untouched' which is where Annica Kronsell's feminist analysis takes off (Hoskyns 2004: 233; Kronsell 2005: 1023). Kronsell systematically critiques existing malestream theories of 'national interest'; transnational, multilevel, and network governance; and institutional norms in order to envision integration from a feminist viewpoint. In conclusion, Kronsell (2005: 1035–6) argues that existing integration theories leave the 'male-as-norm unquestioned and invisible' and 'work from a simplistic view of power'.

Feminist perspectives on EU politics are now raising the most important and interesting questions about the EU as a democratic, participatory, and just polity. Feminist scholarship has gone beyond an emphasis on rights and policies, towards the gendered nature of the polity itself. Such studies revolve around questions of gender mainstreaming, representative politics, gender auditing, and integration theory. Feminist perspectives have undoubtedly been encouraged and facilitated by the growth of European networks such as EWL and ATHENA, as well as the launching of wall-breaking new journals such as the European Journal of Women’s Studies, the Journal of...
CONCLUSION: CRITICAL, NOT MONSTROUS

Many circumstances can conspire to extinguish scientific discoveries, especially those that cause discomfort about our culture’s sacred norms. As a species we cling to the familiar, comforting conformities of the mainstream. However, ‘convention’ penetrates more deeply than we tend to admit. Even if we lack a proper name for and knowledge of the history of a specific philosophy or thought style, all of us are embedded in our own safe ‘reality’. Our outlooks shape what we see and how we know (Margulis 1998: 3, in Manners 2003a: 67).

As I suggest from the outset, the wide variety of critical perspectives on EU politics considered here do not present a parsimonious (i.e. thrifty) means to post-Cold War EU political science. The multitude of perspectives which I briefly, and undoubtedly unfairly, represented here do not provide cheap, quick, or even particularly new ways of understanding EU politics in the 21st century. But what they do share is a means of challenging the comfortable conventions of Cold War political science which has sought to extinguish the critical understanding of the EU in its current context. As Lynn Margulis has suggested in the ‘natural’ sciences, the familiar conformity of mainstream science can conspire to extinguish new discoveries – it is often found to be producing not the unknown, but reproducing the known.

Critical perspectives also share a concern for the role of power in their analyses – the power to pre-determine the questions asked, the power to pre-determine the theories used, and the power to shape what is and is not allowed in EU politics. A fuller understanding of this power in EU political science becomes clearer when asking what EU political science is not considered ‘normal science’? Which papers are not included in an EU political science conference? Which articles are inadmissible in which EU political science journals? Which EU political scientists will not get which jobs? Critical perspectives have no shared accounts for this power – for some it is class and capital, for others it is hegemony and culture, whilst others still look to identity and difference. But what critical perspectives do share in this respect is a concern to emancipate humans from the conditions created by traditional explanations for the modern European Union.

Bringing these three shared concerns together – critical of conventions; critical of power; and concerned with emancipation – I would reiterate that the critical perspectives discussed here present distinctively political theories. Just as history is written by the winners, and knowledge reflects power, so conventional EU political science reproduces these power structures. Critical perspectives are thus political in that they understand they are not just analysing, but fighting power conformities, in order to more fully understand EU politics.

Clearly these perspectives are not new in political science, but they are relatively new to EU political science, reflecting the loosening of the intellectual straitjacket. Thus, these critical perspectives provide a means to re-connect EU political science to the rest of the social sciences in a political way. They also offer the opportunity to escape the normative wasteland and monstrous claims of ‘normal science’ of economistic pathologies – that path leads only to tighter straightjackets (see Strange 1991; Green and Shapiro 1996). Examples of these types of claims include the stories told by Dowding (2000: 139), Schneider et al. (2002: 5), and Pollack (2005: 35) that rational choice theory, comparative politics, and positivism are the new ‘normal science’ of EU politics. Such claims are hilariously summed up in Hix’s (2005: 13) assertion that ‘the basic theoretical assumptions of modern political science can be expressed in the following ‘fundamental equation of politics’: preferences + institutions = outcomes’ (see also Manners 2003a: 71–3). It is worth noting that most of the contributions to this volume would not fit this definition of ‘normal science’.

Finally, I am not arguing that critical perspectives bring more parsimonious, less falsifiable, or more generalizable explanations. I am not claiming a new turn in theory, or the achievement of a Kuhnian paradigm of
‘normal science’ (Kuhn 1962). The critical perspectives I have discussed here are simply multi-perspectival – they see EU politics from a variety of perspectives; they know EU politics from a multitude of vistas. These critical perspectives are political theories that acknowledge the presence of other political theories, and should not be considered ‘one-eyed monsters – one-eyed because they [are] oblivious of politics; monsters because they [are] so arrogant towards all outsiders’ (Strange 1991: 33 in van Ham 2001: 11). And most important of all, they make another Europe possible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am particularly grateful to Catarina Kinnvall, Annica Kronsell, Björn Fägersten, Andreas Bieler, Adam David Morton, and the editors, as well as Torbjörn Bergman, Vivienne Boon, Sverker Gustavsson, Anders Hellström, and Magnus Jerneck for their helpful comments.

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