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A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

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  • Ola Andersson
  • Erik Roland Wengström
Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEconomics Letters
Vol/bind95
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)398-401
ISSN0165-1765
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2007

Bibliografisk note

JEL classification: C72, D43

ID: 2736855