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A quasi-proportional electoral system 'only for honest men'? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems

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  • Daniel Bochsler
Mixed compensatory systems have risen in popularity in recent years. Under such systems, single-seat districts elect only the leader of the local suffrage, but the systems nevertheless produce (nearly) proportional outcomes overall, via compensatory mandates. Elections in Albania, Italy, Lesotho, and Venezuela, however, demonstrate a particular loophole for such systems: strategic voting, organized by political parties. Large parties can achieve over-representation by encouraging their voters to split their votes. In this way, they outsmart the compensatory mechanism designed to lead to proportional results. These disproportional results are particularly controversial, since they are deliberate and strategic. This article takes the 2005 Albanian elections as its main case study, and uses simulations to illustrate its political consequences.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftInternational Political Science Review
Vol/bind33
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)401-420
Antal sider20
ISSN0192-5121
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2012

ID: 171626315