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Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Standard

Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare : the case of aquaculture regulation. / Gedefaw Abate, Tenaw; Nielsen, Rasmus; Nielsen, Max.

I: Aquaculture Economics & Management, Bind 22, Nr. 1, 02.01.2018, s. 27-48.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Gedefaw Abate, T, Nielsen, R & Nielsen, M 2018, 'Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation', Aquaculture Economics & Management, bind 22, nr. 1, s. 27-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

APA

Gedefaw Abate, T., Nielsen, R., & Nielsen, M. (2018). Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation. Aquaculture Economics & Management, 22(1), 27-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

Vancouver

Gedefaw Abate T, Nielsen R, Nielsen M. Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation. Aquaculture Economics & Management. 2018 jan 2;22(1):27-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

Author

Gedefaw Abate, Tenaw ; Nielsen, Rasmus ; Nielsen, Max. / Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare : the case of aquaculture regulation. I: Aquaculture Economics & Management. 2018 ; Bind 22, Nr. 1. s. 27-48.

Bibtex

@article{44734a0d5e874b59b8eaaeddf36256d5,
title = "Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation",
abstract = "This article is grounded in public choice theory and develops a framework to explain how non-benevolent behavior on the part of public regulators and the resulting lack of collaboration between different agencies have been affecting aquaculture growth. Although regulators are assumed to work for the best interest of the people, they can have their own rational agendas; such as career advancement, self-aggrandizement and loyalty for a particular political ideology. We show that when officials are non-benevolent and agencies have unequal relative decision-making power, it is likely that a more powerful agency dictates policies in favor of its own agenda, even when such policies may not necessarily lead to optimal social welfare. In the case of aquaculture, higher relative power of a pro-environment agency leads to underdevelopment of the sector, as is the case in developed countries, whereas larger relative power of a pro-industry agency leads to higher growth, as is the case in developing countries.",
author = "{Gedefaw Abate}, Tenaw and Rasmus Nielsen and Max Nielsen",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243",
language = "Dansk",
volume = "22",
pages = "27--48",
journal = "Aquaculture Economics & Management",
issn = "1365-7305",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare

T2 - the case of aquaculture regulation

AU - Gedefaw Abate, Tenaw

AU - Nielsen, Rasmus

AU - Nielsen, Max

PY - 2018/1/2

Y1 - 2018/1/2

N2 - This article is grounded in public choice theory and develops a framework to explain how non-benevolent behavior on the part of public regulators and the resulting lack of collaboration between different agencies have been affecting aquaculture growth. Although regulators are assumed to work for the best interest of the people, they can have their own rational agendas; such as career advancement, self-aggrandizement and loyalty for a particular political ideology. We show that when officials are non-benevolent and agencies have unequal relative decision-making power, it is likely that a more powerful agency dictates policies in favor of its own agenda, even when such policies may not necessarily lead to optimal social welfare. In the case of aquaculture, higher relative power of a pro-environment agency leads to underdevelopment of the sector, as is the case in developed countries, whereas larger relative power of a pro-industry agency leads to higher growth, as is the case in developing countries.

AB - This article is grounded in public choice theory and develops a framework to explain how non-benevolent behavior on the part of public regulators and the resulting lack of collaboration between different agencies have been affecting aquaculture growth. Although regulators are assumed to work for the best interest of the people, they can have their own rational agendas; such as career advancement, self-aggrandizement and loyalty for a particular political ideology. We show that when officials are non-benevolent and agencies have unequal relative decision-making power, it is likely that a more powerful agency dictates policies in favor of its own agenda, even when such policies may not necessarily lead to optimal social welfare. In the case of aquaculture, higher relative power of a pro-environment agency leads to underdevelopment of the sector, as is the case in developed countries, whereas larger relative power of a pro-industry agency leads to higher growth, as is the case in developing countries.

U2 - 10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

DO - 10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

M3 - Tidsskriftartikel

VL - 22

SP - 27

EP - 48

JO - Aquaculture Economics & Management

JF - Aquaculture Economics & Management

SN - 1365-7305

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 179925689