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Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

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In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Vol/bind144
Sider (fra-til)204-218
ISSN0167-2681
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 1 dec. 2017

ID: 186156349