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Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project. / Cassimon, Danny; Prowse, Martin; Essers, Dennis.

Institute of Development Policy and Management Working Paper 2011:06, University of Antwerp, Belgium, 2011.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Cassimon, D, Prowse, M & Essers, D 2011 'Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project' Institute of Development Policy and Management Working Paper 2011:06, University of Antwerp, Belgium.

APA

Cassimon, D., Prowse, M., & Essers, D. (2011). Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project. Institute of Development Policy and Management Working Paper 2011:06, University of Antwerp, Belgium.

Vancouver

Cassimon D, Prowse M, Essers D. Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project. Institute of Development Policy and Management Working Paper 2011:06, University of Antwerp, Belgium. 2011 aug.

Author

Cassimon, Danny ; Prowse, Martin ; Essers, Dennis. / Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project. Institute of Development Policy and Management Working Paper 2011:06, University of Antwerp, Belgium, 2011.

Bibtex

@techreport{b58652d1e1da498aa8bd3323266a2173,
title = "Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project",
abstract = "As one of Kyoto’s three flexibility mechanisms for reducing the cost of compliance, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the issuance of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits from offset projects in non-Annex I countries. Whilst much attention has focused on the widespread use of the mechanism by China and India, the complex project cycle, and the lack of convincing baselines, little attention has been paid to the financing of CDM projects. In this paper we assess the extent to which CDM projects with public bodies should utilise debt swaps as a form of finance. The paper does this through analysing the use of a debt swap between Uruguay and Spain within a CDM wind farm project in Uruguay. The paper assesses this transaction according to a simple framework by which debt swaps can be evaluated: whether it delivers additional resources to the debtor country and/or debtor government budget; whether it delivers more resources for climate purposes; whether it has a sizeable effect on overall debt burdens (thereby creating ‘indirect’ benefits); and whether it adheres to the principles of alignment with government policy and systems (key elements within the new aid approach).",
author = "Danny Cassimon and Martin Prowse and Dennis Essers",
year = "2011",
month = "8",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project

AU - Cassimon, Danny

AU - Prowse, Martin

AU - Essers, Dennis

PY - 2011/8

Y1 - 2011/8

N2 - As one of Kyoto’s three flexibility mechanisms for reducing the cost of compliance, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the issuance of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits from offset projects in non-Annex I countries. Whilst much attention has focused on the widespread use of the mechanism by China and India, the complex project cycle, and the lack of convincing baselines, little attention has been paid to the financing of CDM projects. In this paper we assess the extent to which CDM projects with public bodies should utilise debt swaps as a form of finance. The paper does this through analysing the use of a debt swap between Uruguay and Spain within a CDM wind farm project in Uruguay. The paper assesses this transaction according to a simple framework by which debt swaps can be evaluated: whether it delivers additional resources to the debtor country and/or debtor government budget; whether it delivers more resources for climate purposes; whether it has a sizeable effect on overall debt burdens (thereby creating ‘indirect’ benefits); and whether it adheres to the principles of alignment with government policy and systems (key elements within the new aid approach).

AB - As one of Kyoto’s three flexibility mechanisms for reducing the cost of compliance, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the issuance of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits from offset projects in non-Annex I countries. Whilst much attention has focused on the widespread use of the mechanism by China and India, the complex project cycle, and the lack of convincing baselines, little attention has been paid to the financing of CDM projects. In this paper we assess the extent to which CDM projects with public bodies should utilise debt swaps as a form of finance. The paper does this through analysing the use of a debt swap between Uruguay and Spain within a CDM wind farm project in Uruguay. The paper assesses this transaction according to a simple framework by which debt swaps can be evaluated: whether it delivers additional resources to the debtor country and/or debtor government budget; whether it delivers more resources for climate purposes; whether it has a sizeable effect on overall debt burdens (thereby creating ‘indirect’ benefits); and whether it adheres to the principles of alignment with government policy and systems (key elements within the new aid approach).

M3 - Working paper

BT - Financing the clean development mechanism through debt-for-efficiency swaps? Case study evidence from a Uruguayan wind farm project

CY - Institute of Development Policy and Management Working Paper 2011:06, University of Antwerp, Belgium

ER -

ID: 41824451