Forskning ved Københavns Universitet - Københavns Universitet

Forside

Late Budgets

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Dokumenter

  • Wp-10-04

    Forlagets udgivne version, 698 KB, PDF-dokument

The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budget
negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
UdgiverDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Antal sider26
StatusUdgivet - 2010

Bibliografisk note

JEL classification: D72, H11, H72, H83

Antal downloads er baseret på statistik fra Google Scholar og www.ku.dk


Ingen data tilgængelig

ID: 19436201