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Sharing the Costs of Access to a Set of Public Goods

Publikation: Forskning - peer reviewBidrag til bog/antologi

A group of agents share assess to a set of public goods. Each good has a cost and the total cost of all goods must be shared among the agents. Agents preferences are described by subsets of goods that provides the agent with service. As such, demands are binary, and it is further assumed that agents prefer a low cost share, but other differences in their individual preferences are irrelevant, making demand fully inelastic. The model captures central aspects of several classes of
practical problems and therefore has many potential applications. The paper surveys some recent axiomatic characterizations of relevant allocation rules and provides a overview of how the problem of fair division can be approached and structured subject to the richness inherent in the description of agents service
constraints.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelGame Theory in Management Accounting : Implementing Incentives and Fairness
RedaktørerDavid Mueller, Ralf Trost
Antal sider14
ForlagSpringer
Publikationsdato2018
Sider287-300
ISBN (Trykt)978-3-319-61602-5
ISBN (Elektronisk)978-3-319-61603-2
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2018
SerieContributions to Management Science
ISSN1431-1941

ID: 185439898