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Sorting and sustaining cooperation

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Sorting and sustaining cooperation. / Vikander, Nick.

I: Oxford Economic Papers, Bind 65, Nr. 2, 2013, s. 548-566.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikel

Harvard

Vikander, N 2013, 'Sorting and sustaining cooperation', Oxford Economic Papers, bind 65, nr. 2, s. 548-566. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gps030

APA

Vikander, N. (2013). Sorting and sustaining cooperation. Oxford Economic Papers, 65(2), 548-566. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gps030

Vancouver

Vikander N. Sorting and sustaining cooperation. Oxford Economic Papers. 2013;65(2):548-566. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gps030

Author

Vikander, Nick. / Sorting and sustaining cooperation. I: Oxford Economic Papers. 2013 ; Bind 65, Nr. 2. s. 548-566.

Bibtex

@article{2bb9d8beaa214fd6b23a5e915864403a,
title = "Sorting and sustaining cooperation",
abstract = "This paper looks at cooperation in teams where some people are selfish and others are conditional cooperators, and where lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date. I show that the best way to sustain cooperation prior to the lay-offs is often in a sorting equilibrium, where conditional cooperators can identify and then work with one another. Changes to parameters that would seem to make cooperation more attractive, such as an increase in the discount factor or the fraction of conditional cooperators, can reduce equilibrium cooperation if they decrease a selfish player's incentive to sort.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences",
author = "Nick Vikander",
note = "JEL classifications: L23, D82, M50",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1093/oep/gps030",
language = "English",
volume = "65",
pages = "548--566",
journal = "Oxford Economic Papers",
issn = "0030-7653",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sorting and sustaining cooperation

AU - Vikander, Nick

N1 - JEL classifications: L23, D82, M50

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - This paper looks at cooperation in teams where some people are selfish and others are conditional cooperators, and where lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date. I show that the best way to sustain cooperation prior to the lay-offs is often in a sorting equilibrium, where conditional cooperators can identify and then work with one another. Changes to parameters that would seem to make cooperation more attractive, such as an increase in the discount factor or the fraction of conditional cooperators, can reduce equilibrium cooperation if they decrease a selfish player's incentive to sort.

AB - This paper looks at cooperation in teams where some people are selfish and others are conditional cooperators, and where lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date. I show that the best way to sustain cooperation prior to the lay-offs is often in a sorting equilibrium, where conditional cooperators can identify and then work with one another. Changes to parameters that would seem to make cooperation more attractive, such as an increase in the discount factor or the fraction of conditional cooperators, can reduce equilibrium cooperation if they decrease a selfish player's incentive to sort.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

U2 - 10.1093/oep/gps030

DO - 10.1093/oep/gps030

M3 - Journal article

VL - 65

SP - 548

EP - 566

JO - Oxford Economic Papers

JF - Oxford Economic Papers

SN - 0030-7653

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 71471942