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The regulation of hunting: a population tax

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

The regulation of hunting : a population tax. / Abildtrup, Jens; Jensen, Frank.

Frederiksberg : Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2012. s. 1-21.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Abildtrup, J & Jensen, F 2012 'The regulation of hunting: a population tax' Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, s. 1-21.

APA

Abildtrup, J., & Jensen, F. (2012). The regulation of hunting: a population tax. (s. 1-21). Frederiksberg: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. FOI Working Paper, Nr. 2012/2

Vancouver

Abildtrup J, Jensen F. The regulation of hunting: a population tax. Frederiksberg: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2012, s. 1-21.

Author

Abildtrup, Jens ; Jensen, Frank. / The regulation of hunting : a population tax. Frederiksberg : Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2012. s. 1-21 (FOI Working Paper; Nr. 2012/2).

Bibtex

@techreport{13a13864bf6b46c3804f10f7d8a08e99,
title = "The regulation of hunting: a population tax",
abstract = "Within hunting, wildlife populations are estimated to be too high in many countries which is assumed to be due to the market failure, that each hunter harvests too little compared to what the regulator wants. This may be due to the existing regulation which, among other things, requires knowledge of the individual harvest. However, information about the individual harvest may be costly to obtain. Thus, we may have to look for alternatives to the existing system. This paper proposes a population tax/subsidy as an alternative which is the difference between the actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The variable tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference in marginal value of the population between the hunter and the regulator. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum. Thus, the population tax is a good alternative to the existing regulation.",
author = "Jens Abildtrup and Frank Jensen",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
series = "FOI Working Paper",
publisher = "Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",
number = "2012/2",
pages = "1--21",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The regulation of hunting

T2 - a population tax

AU - Abildtrup, Jens

AU - Jensen, Frank

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Within hunting, wildlife populations are estimated to be too high in many countries which is assumed to be due to the market failure, that each hunter harvests too little compared to what the regulator wants. This may be due to the existing regulation which, among other things, requires knowledge of the individual harvest. However, information about the individual harvest may be costly to obtain. Thus, we may have to look for alternatives to the existing system. This paper proposes a population tax/subsidy as an alternative which is the difference between the actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The variable tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference in marginal value of the population between the hunter and the regulator. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum. Thus, the population tax is a good alternative to the existing regulation.

AB - Within hunting, wildlife populations are estimated to be too high in many countries which is assumed to be due to the market failure, that each hunter harvests too little compared to what the regulator wants. This may be due to the existing regulation which, among other things, requires knowledge of the individual harvest. However, information about the individual harvest may be costly to obtain. Thus, we may have to look for alternatives to the existing system. This paper proposes a population tax/subsidy as an alternative which is the difference between the actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The variable tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference in marginal value of the population between the hunter and the regulator. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum. Thus, the population tax is a good alternative to the existing regulation.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - FOI Working Paper

SP - 1

EP - 21

BT - The regulation of hunting

PB - Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

CY - Frederiksberg

ER -

ID: 47202849