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Emmanuel, Nikolas George; Rothchild, Donald

Published in:
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding

Publication date:
2007

Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Citation for published version (APA):
Emmanuel, N. G., & Rothchild, D. (2007). “Economic Aid and Peace Implementation: The African Experience”.
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(2).

Economic Aid and Peace Implementation: The African Experience

Nikolas Emmanuel and †Donald Rothchild

This paper examines the potential importance of externally-facilitated peace dividends and donor coordination in sustaining peace after the signing of an accord. We extend our previous research on US performance after civil wars to learn if adversary assumptions on peace dividends have additional positive impact when a wider sample of major Western European donors is included. Was the lack of US follow-through compensated for in whole or in part by the extension of development assistance allocations from European allies? We find that cases in which donors provide significant and sustained post-conflict aid are somewhat less likely to return to civil war than those who do not receive comparable assistance. Moreover, we find in such cases that donor coordination reinforced behaviour that encouraged the implementation process, providing an extra incentive for maintaining the peace agreement over the five-year threshold and beyond.

Keywords donor coordination; implementation; incentives; peace dividends; post-conflict aid; sustainability

Introduction

To what extent can international actors facilitate ethnic reconciliation and, in grave cases, the ending of civil wars by making externally-offered incentives available? One means that deserves greater attention in the peace implementation literature than it has received thus far is the extension of economic assistance and its effects on conflict management (Woodward 2002; Ball, Friedman and Rossiter 1997). It seems logical to assume that increased relief and development assistance after civil wars represents an inducement to state and insurgent elites to sign on to peace agreements; nevertheless, our previous research indicates that there is in fact little evidence of significant rises in US development assistance aid following Africa's negotiating processes. In three of the six African cases studied, US assistance did produce a short-term spike in relief aid but this did not lead to particularly generous development assistance in the period afterwards (Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006).

But was that lack of US follow-through compensated by the extension of extraordinary development assistance allocations from allied countries in

Western Europe? In this paper we extend the initial research to learn if adversary assumptions on a peace dividend after civil wars have validity when the sample of major donors is expanded. If the major powers act in a similar manner and reinforce each others' efforts, there is reason to contend that increased economic assistance may provide an incentive for peace. Such a precedent on the use of economic incentives should be important in the event that other peace negotiations take place, because the bargaining parties can then have solid reasons to assume that the major donors will deliver on their implied or actual promises to provide support once the hostilities have ended.

Incentives emerge when third parties, individually or collectively, offer symbolic or material benefits to draw parties that are 'sufficiently dissatisfied with their present costs... or future prospects' into a negotiation process (Zartman 2001: 301). Incentives are offered by third parties to raise the costs of continued war or to firm up existing agreements by expanding the benefits that follow from abiding by the new rules of relationship. Not only are the adversaries advantaged by the promise of political stability and peace dividends but the donor states also gain from the resulting goodwill, a strengthening of the international state system, and the extension of a zone of peace in which they can engage in commerce and investment. The following questions emerge from this analysis: first, to what extent are diplomatic incentives likely to prove sufficient to encourage the target states or insurgent movements to shift their behaviour toward peaceful internal relations? Second, do collective incentives, whether explicit or implicit, have greater credibility as a consequence of their concerted impact on the negotiation and implementation processes?

This paper will first examine the foreign aid distributions of all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donors towards 12 cases, largely focusing on the conflict-reducing aspects of bilateral aid. We then turn to the assistance allocations of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States to gauge the extent that they pursued parallel and reinforcing policies on assistance to African countries engaged in the negotiation or implementation of peace accords. What was the trajectory of their foreign assistance programmes, and were these programmes sufficient to influence the targeted parties to move in the direction of sustained peace?

Four Patterns of Aid Trajectory

Our examination leads us to distinguish four patterns in the aid trajectories of 12 post-conflict African countries: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

In the Pattern 1 cases, donors provide substantial reconstruction and development assistance after a peace agreement delivered over an extended period of time. This prolonged increase in development aid aims to rebuild the infrastructure and capacity of economies in Africa shattered by a prolonged civil

war. Frequently, the surge in assistance can last for up to a decade after violence has ended. We posit that long-term development aid for economic reconstruction has more enduring consequences than relief, primarily because it better supports the conditions for lasting peace (Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006). Substantial amounts of assistance provide an incentive to the various warring parties to enter into, and maintain, a peace agreement. It represents a peace dividend for state and insurgent elites, inducing them to sign a peace agreement. In our sample, half, or six of the 12, of the cases examined received substantial aid flows from US and European donors over the decade after the peace agreement (Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe).

Pattern 2 countries experience a sharp, *but unsustainable*, increase in donor allocations after a civil war. This response consists primarily of short-term humanitarian relief, such as food or emergency medical assistance, to alleviate the immediate suffering of at-risk populations. After the conclusion of a conflict, relief aid pours into these countries causing aid levels to spike during the transition after civil war. In Pattern 2 situations, donors typically provide relief aid for up to three years following a conflict, after which aid levels decline significantly. This reaction parallels relief efforts after natural disasters involving hurricanes, floods, earthquakes and so forth. However, this relief aid does not represent a long-term commitment on the part of donors. As noted previously, 'Once the immediate short-term crisis is over, donors tend to shy away from costly longer-term programmes of reconstruction' (Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006: 126). Aid to the DR Congo, Liberia and Rwanda followed this trajectory.

Countries in the Pattern 3 category experience no increase in post-conflict assistance. In our sample, Ethiopia was the only example in this type of donor response. Meanwhile in Pattern 4, donors actually decrease their assistance after the ending of a civil war. Two of our cases, Chad and Mozambique, fit this model. In the case of Mozambique, however, the decline in aid was from relatively high levels compared to many of the post-civil war African states.

Pattern 1: Sustained Increase in Development Assistance

Years of protracted warfare can leave a country devastated, with its infrastructure destroyed and its economic capacity in ruins. Rebuilding from the ashes of war can prove extremely costly. In many cases, therefore, reconstruction depends upon the generosity of the international community. Furthermore, donor promises to contribute assistance can play a large part in moving negotiations between warring parties forward at critical junctures. For example, in the cases of Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe, OECD donors used aid as an incentive to encourage the negotiating parties to reach a compromise.

Certainly aid donors can exert a considerable influence on the behaviour of various actors negotiating peace accords, and Zimbabwe's transition to majority-rule provides a striking example of this. Reflecting on the role of third party




Figure 1 Zimbabwe (Aid from all OECD Donors)

incentives in the negotiations, former United States President Jimmy Carter pointed out that, ‘there’s no doubt that to some degree financial promises played a role’ in inducing the warring factions to accept the Lancaster House Agreement (Rothchild 1997: 178). In such Pattern 1 cases, as for Zimbabwe, the post-conflict aid package proved substantial. Donors committed almost \$2 billion in economic reconstruction and development aid for Zimbabwe over ten years, as part of an effort to facilitate a bargain between the rebel Patriotic Front and the regime led by black moderates, with white backing. This was a rather special case of continued colonial aid support and can be explained in part by the unique circumstances surrounding the intense Cold War nature of the negotiating process. Primarily, the package aimed to help finance land resettlement, economic development, job creation and educational programmes.

Furthermore, this aid acted as part of a peace dividend and incentive to actors to negotiate and implement the Lancaster House Agreement. The offer was enticing enough to harden ‘the political resolve of internal actors to maintain the momentum of the peace process’ (Boyce 1996: 130). For the negotiating parties, these donor commitments represented something tangible that went beyond emergency aid. Each of the negotiating parties could use this support to gain the backing of their constituents for a peace agreement that enabled them to deliver on their commitments at the bargaining table. Once the agreement was signed assistance began to pour in. Aid levels increased 1,386 per cent between 1979 and 1983, one of the largest increases in our sample, and it remained high for an entire decade after.

In 1979, the British government convened a conference at Lancaster House in London. In the ensuing negotiations it orchestrated a settlement to end the war and transfer power to majority-rule, while providing some safeguards for the European minority. Although the British played the central role, the United States closely supported their efforts by providing important aid incentives at critical junctures. This coordination on the part of the mediators proved highly significant. Land was the core issue for the Patriotic Front and it almost undermined the peace process. To overcome the impasse, Carter pledged to contribute a considerable aid package once the negotiations had reached a successful outcome. US officials insisted that the money was not designed to buy out white-owned farms, but to be used for broader development purposes, such as increasing agricultural production and boosting educational and job opportunities for the majority population (Rothchild 1997: 178). This incentive encouraged Patriotic Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo to sign on and stay committed to the Lancaster House peace process (Rothchild 1997: 78; 259). In return, the new majority government would provide certain guarantees to the white-minority community. It was stipulated that for a ten-year period land ownership in Zimbabwe could only be transferred on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ basis, which was opposed by some as effectively limiting the extent of land reform. In addition, in an effort to reassure the European residents, they were allotted a parliamentary quota of 20 out of a total 100 seats to be elected on a communal roll basis for at least seven years, a proportion that far exceeded that community’s actual percentage of the population.

The strong aid packages that followed the signing of the Lancaster House agreement were significant in stabilizing the implementation process that followed. During much of the initial post-settlement period, the United States was Zimbabwe’s primary aid donor, followed by the Germany and the United Kingdom (OECD 2005). US aid represented a substantial commitment – \$331 million over the decade, between 1979–89, peaking in 1984 at \$73 million. Over the same period, Germany provided \$293 million and the UK gave \$266 million.

Pattern 2: Sharp, but Unsustained, Increase in Assistance

Civil wars can cause enormous amounts of human suffering that often requires urgent attention. The disruption of food production and distribution, as well as the breakdown of minimal state services and the destruction of critical infrastructure, puts the lives of countless individuals in peril. Frequently, such grim situations lead international donors to rush in with food aid and emergency medical assistance after civil conflicts occur. The resulting aid causes assistance levels to spike quickly. Nevertheless, this increase in aid tends to be short-lived, normally lasting no more than three years. Once the immediate short-term crisis is over, donors are inclined to shy away from costly longer-term programmes of reconstruction. As seen in the cases of Rwanda and Liberia, such an emergency relief response has a minimal impact on the behaviour of the former adversaries.




Figure 2 Rwanda (Aid from all OECD Donors)

As a consequence, we contend that this pattern does little to consolidate peace after a civil war comes to an end.

Rwanda represents a typical example of a Pattern 2 post-conflict relief response following civil war. This case involved a dramatic spike in aid in the immediate period after the signing of the 1993 peace agreement, lasting only for two or three years when the short-term humanitarian relief dried up. Unlike Zimbabwe, or other Pattern 1 cases, Rwanda provides a pattern of a typical short-term, emergency relief operation.

The Arusha Accords, orchestrated by donors, regional governments, and the OAU in the summer and early fall of 1993, ended the civil war that had continued since the 1990 invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from its base in Uganda. A transitional government was agreed upon that shared power between the rebel RPF, the Government of Rwanda, and the politically moderate Hutu organizations. However, during the negotiations the donors did not offer any form of peace dividend to entice the warring parties to enter into the bargain. To the contrary, donors threatened to cut off aid to the Habyrimana government in mid-1993 if they did not negotiate with the RPF (Des Forges 1999: 148).

After the Rwandan civil war and genocide took place, the international community provided huge quantities humanitarian assistance. As the killing eased in July 1994, thousands of tons of food aid were airlifted to Rwanda in the days following the 100 days of genocide. However, this increase was short-lived and by 1995 aid levels began to return to their previous levels. As a consequence, Rwanda conformed to the typical Pattern 2 humanitarian relief response after civil war.

Although donors provided Rwanda with over two and a half billion dollars in aid in the ten years following the 1993 Arusha Accords, most of this assistance was concentrated on the short-term period after the genocide. The United States was by far the largest contributor, providing just over a half a billion dollars in the decade following the genocide. The United Kingdom followed, making \$341 million in aid available from 1993–2003. Germany followed with \$301 million in assistance over the same time period.

Pattern 3: No Increase in Aid

Ethiopia offers an example of a Pattern 3 case. In such instances there is no peace dividend and donors do not provide any significant increase in aid after the termination of the conflict.

In early 1991, after years of civil war, the Mengistu regime’s grip on Ethiopia was weakening. Various rebel groups began seizing towns across the country, and the main rebel umbrella organization, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF), was poised to occupy the capital. No longer being able to count on support from the Soviet Union, Mengistu was forced to flee into exile in Zimbabwe. The United States coordinated Mengistu’s move into exile and the rebel ceasefire in an effort to build stability in Ethiopia as quickly as possible. When asked why Mengistu went into exile, a senior American official in Washington said: ‘That’s what we told him to do.’ (ARB 1991: 10130)




Figure 3 Ethiopia (Aid from All OECD Donors)

Simultaneously, as the EPRDF was preparing its move on the Ethiopian capital, the United States brokered a two-day London peace conference in May 1991 which put together a ceasefire agreement. US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen recommended that the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the dominant wing of the EPRDF, enter and take control of Addis Ababa to restore order, something bitterly criticized by the government in power (Cohen 2000; ARB 1991: 10134). The United States, fearing that a battle would destroy the city, sanctioned the EPRDF takeover. Two months later, the EPRDF, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and other major former-rebel factions agreed to a transitional constitution establishing a Transitional Government of Ethiopia.

Unlike the Pattern 1 and 2 cases, where aid levels did rise, Ethiopia did not experience an increase in assistance after the American-orchestrated conclusion of its civil war. Donor outlays to Ethiopia actually declined in the first two years after the agreement, then increased for one year, and then fell back abruptly to levels seen during the war. Although aid levels remained relatively high, averaging just under \$450 million a year from all OECD/DAC donors between 1986 and 2001, there was no significant difference in aid distribution before and after the end of the civil war in 1991, as well as before and after the establishment of the Transitional Government. Three countries contributed around half of the \$4.6 billion in aid that Ethiopia received in the decade after the EPRDF's seizure of power. Of this amount, the US provided \$940 million while Germany and Italy gave \$780 and \$471 million, respectively. This outcome showed little change following from the peaceful conclusion of the civil war, something in line with Pattern 3 expectations.

Pattern 4: A Decrease in Assistance

Finally, we use the Chadian experience to demonstrate our fourth pattern. In such cases, external aid decreases after the conclusion of a civil war. As noted in Figure 4 below, donors reduced their support to Chad following the signing of the peace agreement.

On 18 April 1997, the Chadian government accepted a peace agreement with the Southern-based rebel movement, the Forces Armées pour une République Fédérale (FARF) led by Loakein Barde (ARB 1997a: 12664). The government agreed to a seven-point plan which included a general amnesty for the insurgents, the integration of FARF soldiers into the national army and civil service, the transformation of FARF into a political party, and the possibility of establishing a truth and reconciliation commission (IRIN 1998). Agreements were also reached with rebels from the Front National du Chad (FNT) and the Movement pour le Justice Social and Democratie (MJSD) several months later. However, the peace proved to be short-lived, as FARF rebels clashed with government soldiers, leaving more than 100 people dead in the Moundou region (the future oil producing area) in October 1997. FARF spokesmen claimed that the government failed to implement the April accord (ARB 1997b: 12937).




Figure 4 Chad (Aid from all OECD Donors)

As Figure 4 indicates, aid to Chad was in steady decline around the time of the Moundou peace agreement and provided little incentive to negotiate or implement peace. France provided over half of Chad's foreign aid during this period, and its large decrease in aid had a major impact on overall support levels. Germany, Chad's second largest donor, also reduced its aid after 1997.

Coordination between Donors

We now examine the foreign aid distributions of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States to the 12 post-conflict cases in our sample to gauge the extent that these donors pursued parallel and reinforcing policies on assistance to African countries. We ask: do collective incentives represent a greater inducement to state and insurgent elites to sign and implement peace agreements than unilateral efforts? We recognize that external economic assistance often performs other tasks as well, including supporting good governance, policy reform, structural adjustment programmes, encouraging opportunities for the poor, and improved human rights. Even so, despite the importance of many of these tasks, we focus in this paper on the conflict reducing aspects of economic aid (Murshed 2006).

We found some evidence of parallel and reinforcing aid distributions in five of the 12 cases (or 42 per cent). These include Angola, the DR Congo, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Four of these cases are in the Pattern 1 category and the fifth is from Pattern 2. That is to say, most of the Pattern 1 cases experienced close donor coordination, which are illustrated by Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone in

the pages below. Three other examples are explored for comparative purposes: Angola, Liberia and Rwanda. Angola shows some moderate levels of parallel activities by donors, while Liberia and Rwanda demonstrate a total lack of donor coordination in their post-conflict aid distributions.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe provides one of the best examples of reinforcing and parallel donor behaviour. Beyond simply being partners in the Lancaster House peace process, the United Kingdom and the United States followed through on the promises they made during the negotiation phase. Both provided significant levels of development aid during the implementation of the peace process, with distribution patterns of aid from these primary donors appearing to be coordinated closely. The three major donors, Britain, the United States and Germany, appear to have synchronized their aid increases in an effort to stretch the peace dividend as long as possible in Zimbabwe. Each donor concentrated on a particular period in the decade that followed Lancaster. The UK provided \$119 million in aid from 1980 to 1982, while the US donated \$185 million from 1983 to 1985, and Germany granted \$126 million from 1986 to 1988. In the ten years that followed the Lancaster agreement, these three donors together provided over \$900 million in development aid to Zimbabwe, or almost half of the total aid provided by OECD donors. We suspect that this type of coordinated donor response provides the best support for post-conflict implementation.




Figure 5 Zimbabwe and Donor Coordination

Sierra Leone

The civil war in Sierra Leone devastated and traumatized an already deeply impoverished country. The main rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), known for its brutality and use of terror against the civilian population, was responsible for a conflict that caused an estimated 20,000 to 75,000 war-related deaths. This brutality also caused roughly half of Sierra Leone’s population to become internally displaced or refugees living outside the country. One of the prime motivations behind the war in Sierra Leone was to maintain dominance over the country’s diamond fields, with the rebels seeking control of the state to advance this end.

In an attempt to end the conflict, President Kabbah and the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, signed the Lomé peace agreement in July 1999, although the agreement was not fully respected until 2001. The deal resulted in the Kabbah government sharing political power with the RUF. Under the agreement, Sankoh was pardoned of treason, granted the status of vice president, and given the chairmanship of a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources (that is, diamonds). Naming the RUF leader to this post was a clear attempt to secure his support. Lomé also called for the presence of a UN peacekeeping force after April 2000, which was to replace ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.

Almost immediately, however, the RUF began to violate the terms of the agreement, holding hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage and seizing their weapons and ammunition. This situation ended with Charles Taylor’s diplomatic intervention to release the captured UN soldiers and, more fundamentally, with




Figure 6 Sierra Leone and Donor Coordination

the arrival of some 800 British special forces and paratroopers to evacuate British citizens and secure Freetown's airport. The British role was rapidly expanded to include assisting the Sierra Leone government and UN forces fighting the rebels, as well as in hunting down and capturing key rebel leaders. With the intervention of British troops, Sierra Leone's armed forces and UN peacekeepers were able to deploy gradually throughout the country in 2001. By 14 May 2002, the country peacefully re-elected Kabbah to the presidency, with the RUF's political wing failing to win a single seat in the new parliament.

As in the case of Zimbabwe, two donors, Britain and the United States, appeared to synchronize their aid patterns in Sierra Leone. The United Kingdom's actions demonstrated the special relationship that it had built up during colonial times, and in particular, with the Kabbah government during the civil war years. Not only did the British armed forces play a role in securing the peace, but the UK was also the primary aid donor to Sierra Leone following the signing of the peace accord. In the five years after Lomé, the United Kingdom provided the largest share of post-conflict aid – \$289 million. The second donor, the United States, gave \$193 million in development aid over the same period. These two donors worked together in Sierra Leone to offer a peace dividend to rebuild the country. The increases in their post-conflict assistance not only tracked each other, but also reinforced the efforts of the others. In Figure 6, the UK raised its aid considerably during the 2000–01 period, and this was followed by the United States from 2002–03. This type of parallel and reinforcing aid disbursement, similar to that seen in Zimbabwe, provides the most significant and enduring donor response to a post-conflict situation. It reveals the donors' commitment to the peace implementation process. However, this reaction did not happen with all of the cases in our sample, as seen in part in Angola, and more clearly by the cases of Liberia and Rwanda below.

Angola

Talks in Bicesse, Portugal, between the Angolan government and UNITA (the Union for the Total Independence of Angola), as well as their international patrons – the Soviet Union and the United States – sought to facilitate an end to the growing civil war. The accords included measures on: a ceasefire; international monitoring for the ceasefire, the banning of external military assistance; the formation of new unified armed forces, the disarmament and demobilization of the remaining troops, UNITA's right to participate in the political process, and the holding of multiparty elections.

Although the ceasefire held, the implementation of the peace accords went months behind schedule as distrust grew between the Angolan government and UNITA rebels. The Cuban and South Africa troops did withdraw following the Angola-Namibia accords, but the UN was unable to keep the internal process on track because of its small budget and staff. The slow and difficult process of reintegration and demobilization of both sides' armed forces proved to be a




Figure 7 Angola and Donor Coordination

source of major contention and distrust. Both sides accused the other of building up their forces in secret and hiding weaponry. At the time of the general elections, thousands of troops were still waiting to be demobilized or reintegrated in the new national army. This left large forces on both sides ready to be called upon in the event of renewed conflict.

The climax of the Bicesse peace process came with the September 1992 elections, Angola's first ever multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections. In the first round of the two-round majority electoral system, the incumbent, President José Eduardo dos Santos, came just short of an absolute majority with 49.57 per cent of the vote. In the second round, dos Santos was to face the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who had garnered 40.6 per cent in the first round. However, Savimbi, realizing that he could not take power through popular elections, pulled his forces out of the national army and returned to war. This ignited one of the most brutal phases of the civil war, with UNITA and government forces engaging in pitched battles in Angola's major cities, leaving a devastating human toll in their wake. Attempts at finding some sort of negotiated solution to the conflict appeared to pay off in 1994 when both sides came to the bargaining table and signed a series of accords in Lusaka, Zambia. Unfortunately, as was the case with the Bicesse accords before it, the Lusaka protocol failed. UNITA leader Savimbi, insecure over his future in an integrated Angola, balked at the opportunity to share power and become one of two vice presidents. In Savimbi's own words, 'No leader in history that I have known disarmed and stayed in power' (Rothchild 1997: 140). The civil war therefore continued until Savimbi was hunted down and killed in 2002.

Angola is one of a handful of cases (3 of 12) in our sample that returned to civil war after the signing of a peace agreement. It also represents the only case

where donors as a group failed to boost aid initially, then briefly increased their aid, only to be followed by a collective downturn in external economic support. As Figure 7 shows, aid levels remained flat and very low before the signing of the Bicesse peace agreement in 1991. Only France raised its support in response to the Bicesse agreement. Donors did respond somewhat to the 1994 Lusaka peace accords, however, with all four of the donors tracked in the figure above slightly increasing their aid in 1994 and 1995, only to drop their support beginning in 1996. During the decade following Bicesse, the United States was by far the most generous donor, providing \$287 million of foreign assistance between 1991 and 2001. Nevertheless, this support may be related to an increased American interest in Angolan petroleum production rather than being specifically designed with post-war reconstruction as the sole objective.

Liberia

After ten abortive efforts to achieve peace since the beginning of the civil war in 1989, the Liberian warlords reached an agreement in August 1995 at Abuja, Nigeria. The Abuja agreement called for a ceasefire, the installation of a transitional power sharing government that included the leaders of the primary warring factions, the disarming of ex-combatants, and elections within a year (ARB 1995a: 11955; Rothchild 2005). Pressure for the deal came mainly from the United Nations and several of Sierra Leone’s West African neighbours.

The transition to an elected government was far from easy. The peace process stalled repeatedly as fighting persisted between fluid alliances of warlords making up the power-sharing executive. At first, in November 1995, the ceasefire was broken by clashes between Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of




Figure 8 Liberia and Donor Coordination

Liberia and Alhaji Kromah’s United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia faction. Then, in April 1996, bitter fighting broke out in Monrovia, Liberia’s capital, as Taylor and Kromah combined forces and turned against those of Roosevelt Johnson and George Boley, two other members of the transitional government (Rothchild 1999; *Africa Confidential* 1996). Despite this sporadic violence, elections were held in July 1997, in which Charles Taylor won the presidency with 70 per cent of the vote.

Liberia presents a case that lacks donor coordination. Germany was the only donor to provide an increase in aid after the 1995 agreement, with its assistance rising significantly the following year. This unsustained reaction is exemplary of our Pattern 2 cases. We suspect that giving increased aid for only one year provided little incentive for former combatants to maintain the peace process. Other than the one-year German response, the international community failed to deliver on promises of increased support. Aid pledges had been high initially, but they were not followed up on (ARB 1995b: 12059). Even Liberia’s historic ally, the United States, failed to provide any major commitment to the peace process.

Rwanda

As Figure 9 indicates, the international community did very little in the way of reconstruction in the aftermath of the Rwandan civil war and genocide; instead, it provided large quantities of emergency food and other humanitarian supplies. The United States gave the vast bulk of this relief aid, just under \$300 million in 1994 and 1995. This US aid accounts for the dramatic spike in aid in the immediate period after the genocide. Two years later, this short-term burst of humanitarian relief dissipated. Although to a somewhat smaller extent than the




Figure 9 Rwanda and Donor Coordination

Americans, the United Kingdom also increased its aid in the 1994–97 period, from almost nothing to just over \$40 million over a three-year period. As with Liberia, the type of donor reactions seen in the case of Rwanda did not provide a sufficient level of support to buttress the Arusha peace process.

Conclusion

Although the data set used here is a limited one that deals exclusively with African countries after civil war, we feel that it does throw some light on the importance of both peace dividends and donor coordination in sustaining peace after the signing of an accord. As shown in Table 1, peace broke down in only three of our twelve African cases – Angola, Chad, and Rwanda – within five years of reaching a peace agreement. The results from this sample are significantly more positive than the findings in the literature on civil wars. For example, Collier *et al* (2003: 83) indicate that at the end of a civil war, a typical country faces a 44 per cent risk of a return to conflict within five years. Based on this data, one would expect much higher levels of violence after the peace agreements examined here.

However, when analyzed in terms of our four donor response patterns discussed earlier, Angola proved to be the only one of our six Pattern 1 cases that experienced a return to civil war within five years (see Table 1). By contrast, two of our six cases in Patterns 2, 3, and 4 suffered from an outbreak of civil warfare shortly after a peace accord. Thus, the probability of Pattern 1 cases

Table 1 Post Civil War Cases: Return to War and Donor Coordination

| | Date of Accord Examined | Return to civil war in 5 years? | Evidence of Coordinated Increase in Aid? |
|------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| Pattern 1 | | | |
| Angola | 1991 and 1994 | YES | Moderate |
| Burundi | 2000 | No | no |
| Sierra Leone | 1999 | No | YES |
| South Africa | 1993 | No | YES |
| Sudan | 1972 | No | no |
| Zimbabwe | 1979 | No | YES |
| Pattern 2 | | | |
| DR Congo | 1999 | No | YES |
| Liberia | 1995 | No | no |
| Rwanda | 1993 | YES | no |
| Pattern 3 | | | |
| Ethiopia | 1991 | No | no |
| Pattern 4 | | | |
| Chad | 1996 | YES | no |
| Mozambique | 1992 | No | no |

returning to civil war were half those of the other categories combined. From this, we conclude that cases in which donors provide significant and sustained post-conflict aid are somewhat less likely to return to civil war after a negotiated peace than those that do not receive such assistance. Moreover, we find in most of the Pattern 1 cases that donor coordination reinforced behaviour that facilitated the implementation process, providing an extra incentive for sustaining the peace agreement for the minimal five-year threshold time horizon and beyond.

Certainly, the aid assistance that did encourage peace in the Pattern 1 cases could be said to have a downside: the aid funds reinforced the dominant political and economic elites, enabling them to hold on to the reins of political and economic power. Why, then, did their subordinate elements acquiesce in a situation of unequal benefit? No doubt the less advantaged elements of the population were fatigued with war and its heavy human and material costs. In addition, the aid held out prospects of future development, furthering hope of repeated iterations into the future (Murshed 2006); this created possibilities for advantages in the years ahead for a wider circle of citizens. In this respect, aid became an incentive of prospective future benefit, encouraging the less advantaged to endure current restrained circumstances in the expectation of future progress. Over the long term, however, the incentives of the recipient actor may change and its ruling coalition may decide at that juncture to renege on its earlier bargain.

Acknowledgements

This article is dedicated to the memory of Donald Rothchild, who passed away on 30 January 2007 in Davis, California.

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