Husserl and the Problem of Empathy
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Publication date: 2014

Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print

Citation for published version (APA):
Husserl and the Problem of Empathy

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A PhD Thesis submitted to
The Faculty of Humanities
University of Copenhagen

August, 2014
Acknowledgements

During my three-year research stay at the Center for Subjectivity Research, a lot of dear colleagues and friends have helped me through various stages of my Ph.D. project. Their kindness has made me feel at home, their incessant support has guided me on the right track, and their excellence and professionalism has sharpened my philosophical view. It is really an honor to have had the chance to work with these great minds. Among them, I first wish to thank both of my supervisors, Dan Zahavi and Søren Overgaard, for having offered every possible means to ensure the completion of this project. It is together with all the “chamber” talks with them that this project can unfold its multiple problems and its most fruitful aspects. Both of them not only help to shape my way of thinking about philosophy but, more importantly, they also demonstrate the interdisciplinary spirit shared and the hard work undertaken by the researchers at the Center.

I have benefited a lot from all my colleagues. I always feel lucky to work with them, to talk with them, and to be inspired by them. It is almost impossible to think of what my stay would have looked like, if I had not received Merete Lynnerup’s warm and skillful assistance from the very start. I want to thank my Ph.D. colleagues James Jardine and Adam Farley for sharing research information about the group project on “empathy” and for exchanging thoughts about work and life. Thanks to other Ph.D. colleagues Simon Höffding, Kristian Martiny, Felipe Leon, Alba Sanchez, and Yuko Ishihara for their moral support. And it has been a great pleasure to meet and befriend Katsunori Miyahara, Yoshiaki Motobayashi, Marek Pokropski, and Hanne Jacobs.

I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Nivedita Gangopadhyay and Professor Shi’er Ju and Professor Sara Heinämaa for giving me constant encouragement and support, and to Joona Taipale, Alessandro Salice, Meng ZHAO, and Wenjing CAI for reading some of the chapters at draft stage and giving valuable comments and suggestions. Here I also feel thankful to Rebecca Qu for helping to translate some of the French literature into Chinese and for sharing her wonderful ideas about film, philosophy and life. Especial thanks to Adele Jourdan for proofreading this thesis and suggesting numerous linguistic and argumentative improvements.

Finally, I owe a great deal to my family and, especially, to my wife Qingwan XIE – it was my happiest moment when we welcomed our first daughter into the world. And it would be impossible for me to finish this project without their incessant support. They are the constant sources of my thought and life.
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### Abstract & Sammenfatning

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Introduction

Among various critiques leveled at Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, the issue of alterity, as it were, lies at the core. Many critics reproach Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity by saying that, despite the fact that Husserl conceives of it as the completing block of his entire transcendental enterprise, his privileging the ego over the Other, immanence over transcendence, subjectivity over intersubjectivity, and so forth, results in severe difficulties. Many commentators argue that, if Husserl’s own argumentation about the Other is thoroughly carried out, his account is found to be undermined by some substantially problematic presumptions, e.g., solipsism, objectivism, and naturalism. Hence, many authors suggest that we should turn to other alternatives. For instance, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas of the Frankfurt school argue for an intersubjective transformation of philosophy by emphasizing the significance of language. By contrast, Emanuel Levinas and his followers argue that, in order to do full justice to the Other’s absolute alterity, we need to question the ontological position inherent in the entirety of western philosophy and opt for an ethical position towards the Other.

Indeed, the problem of alterity in Husserl has received a large amount of attention over the years from both proponents and opponents of Husserl’s transcendental theory.¹ Although different camps of critiques give rather distinctive

interpretations of Husserl’s theory, it seems to me that we should discriminate between two interwoven levels therein, so as to specify at which level Husserl’s argument and its criticism are actually taking place.2

On the one hand, we need to consider the transcendental level of intersubjectivity. In this regard, we need to ask a series of questions: does self-constitution necessarily precede Other-constitution, or vice versa? Is the phenomenology of intersubjectivity founded upon the phenomenology of subjectivity, or vice versa? That is, does the consciousness of other people presuppose a sort of self-consciousness, or is self-consciousness already a sort of recognition of other people? And what does the constitutional priority of subjectivity over intersubjectivity, ipseity over alterity, mean in Husserl’s phenomenology? Or, how should we understand the nature of the procedure by which one transitions from the ego’s self-constitution to the constitution of the Other, from immanence to transcendence? As Schutz (1942, p.328) points out, these questions are concerned with the constitutional order and, thus, they have nothing to do with the empirical existence of the Other.

On the other hand, we need to consider the psychological level of intersubjectivity, and ask the question of how the ego, as an experiencing subject, accesses foreign conscious life. If we do have experiential access to others by, e.g., perceiving others’ expressive acts, then how should we understand the peculiar kind of empathic intentionality therein? Moreover, how should we account for the others’ expressivity and its function with regard to empathic understanding? These questions, in contrast with the transcendental questions illustrated above, are directly related to our de facto encounter with others and, in this sense, are deeply rooted in our

2 To be noted, Max Scheler distinguishes between six sets of questions in respect to the problem of the other subject in his book, The Nature of Sympathy (2008, pp. 216-233): 1. the ontological problem concerning whether a subject’s existence is independent of the other subject’s existence; 2. the epistemological problem concerning the justification of one’s own belief that the Other exists; 3. the constitutional problem concerning the constitutional order from the ego to the Other (or vice versa); 4. the empirical-psychological question concerning the scientific investigation of other people’s psychological states; 5. the metaphysical problem concerning whether the other subject consists of two parallel Cartesian substances, i.e., the physical and the psychical; and 6. the value problem concerning social acts such as love, duty, responsibility and gratitude toward the other subject (Cf. Schutz, 1942, pp. 328-329). This framework also serves as a guiding line for subsequent discussions, see, e.g., Carr (1987), chapter 2, Lee (2006), and De Warren (2009), chapter 6.
existential facticity in the world. To be sure, these questions are also qualitatively different from empirical psychological questions, because they are neither about setting up experiments so as to collect data about how people interact in social life, nor about scanning the brain so as to observe how neurons are activating during social interaction, and so forth. Instead, phenomenological psychological questions are interested in the subjective experience when concrete empathic acts are taking place. In other words, with these questions, we are concerned with the intentional features of the empathic act.

It is with these two sets of guiding questions that, I believe, we can properly understand Husserl’s transcendental theory of intersubjectivity and differentiate it from other approaches, on the one hand, and properly evaluate its critiques, on the other hand. That is, depending on different attitudes towards these questions, commentators divide themselves into different camps of interpretation. The complexity consists in the fact that Husserl’s own position evolves over time\(^3\) and that there are various passages in his experimental research manuscripts that support different interpretations. It is not surprising to see that radical critics of Husserl, such as Levinas, may turn out to be in fundamental agreement with him. Thus, to do justice to the complexity of Husserl’s life-long analysis, and to disclose the richness of his concrete investigations, will require us not only to explore his numerous manuscripts (both published and unpublished) but also to put such an exploration to the test by means of a systematic critique. To this end, we should take a close look at Alfred Schutz’s paper, “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” (1957/70), and contribution of his like-minded successors for mainly two reasons.

First, Schutz’s paper is the first systematic treatment of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity, and its main tenet has been subsequently developed into a persisting and prevalent line of criticism by authors such as Theunissen (1967/86), Kozłowski (1991) and, recently, Schloßberger (2005). This Schutzian line of critique, to be sure, has substantially influenced so many commentators that it is related to most discussions in the literature in one way or another. Second, Schutz’s critical examination of Husserl’s account leads him to conclude that this account ultimately

\(^3\) For a nice illustration of this point, see Iso Kern’s editorial introductions to the three volumes of *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (Hua 13 – 15). See also Kern (1989), chapter 5.2.
faces a dead end and, thus, Husserl’s transcendental approach has to be replaced by what he calls a “mundane” approach, which emphasizes the “preconstituted substrata” of pre-given social life (Schutz, 1970a, p.66). This conclusion has become so widely accepted that, notwithstanding important defenders of Husserl’s transcendentalism (E.g., Yamaguchi, 1986; Römpp, 1992; Depraz, 1995; Zahavi, 2001), many commentators tend to downplay Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity in favor of what they take to be more advanced theories (Cf., e.g., Theunissen 1967/86; Held, 1972; Franck, 1981/2014; Kozlowski, 1991; Sawicki, 1997; Reynaert, 2001; Schloßberger, 2005; Smith, 2011; et passim). In spite of its thoroughness and importance, the Schutzian line of interpretation as a whole, however, has so far not been systematically examined, especially in comparison with other lines of critique, e.g., the critique from linguistic pragmatics or Levinasian ethics.

It is noteworthy that Schutz’s original critique precisely works at the two mentioned levels. Briefly speaking, Schutz, “the distinguished connoisseur of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity” (Theunissen, 1986, p.398), examines various steps of Husserl’s argument at the psychological level and holds that, at each step, Husserl’s account faces unsurmountable difficulties. For instance, as Schutz sees it, if Husserl’s account of empathy starts with the physiomorphic similarity between one’s own body and the foreign body, then this account ultimately results in human centralism and necessarily rules out the possibility of empathizing with ego-like animals (Schutz, 1970a, p.64). Therefore, Schutz claims that Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity does not work at the transcendental level either, if his theory consists in the constitution of the Other from the ego, intersubjectivity from subjectivity (Schutz, 1970a, p.82). On the basis of Schutz’s critical examination, his like-minded successors further argue that some central aspects of Husserl’s account are also riddled with grave aporias: for instance, with the transcendental ego as an indifferent spectator, Husserl ignores the significance of the sociocultural, habitual, and environmental elements of subjective life and, with the critical analogy drawn between empathy and recollection, Husserl ends up conceiving of the Other as an immanent modification of the transcendental ego and, thus, deprives the Other of her

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4 To be noted, there are works criticizing Schutz’ interpretation, see, e.g., Carrington (1979), Zahavi (2001), chapter 2, and Barber (2013).
true alterity. As a result, they simply take it to be a common view that Husserl fails to account for transcendental intersubjectivity and that his transcendental approach has to be overthrown and substituted by some version of Schutz’s “mundane” approach, which starts with pre-given sociality rather than the transcendental ego and emphasizes the practical engagements inherent in social life rather than the intentional capacity of the isolated ego.

In this regard, I think it proves fruitful to critically engage with the Schutzian line of interpretation when investigating Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity, so as to reexamine Husserl’s central presuppositions and bring his profound analysis into a new light. As I will demonstrate in the current thesis, the Schutzian assessment is at bottom problematic and misguided, because it overemphasizes the extent to which, by privileging the transcendental ego, Husserl’s theory is Cartesian in nature, and overlooks the philosophical context in which his theory of intersubjectivity is carried out. Even though many available texts (the V. Cartesian Meditation in particular) do suggest, and even reinforce, this Cartesian impression, it is by no means the defining feature of Husserl’s philosophy; moreover, Husserl distances himself from the classic pitfalls of Cartesianism by offering what he takes to be a more mature account. In order to do justice to both Husserl’s complex position and its Schutzian interpretation, we need to take into account the development of Husserl’s thinking by means of consulting his research manuscripts on intersubjectivity. More importantly, we should also situate his account of the Other within his numerous analyses of other individual phenomena, especially that of incarnation. It is only with the help of these related analyses that, as Bernet (1988) recommends, we can properly understand the genuine insight of Husserl’s account of the Other.

By doing so, I hope to accomplish three intertwined purposes. First, I hope to give a new and original account of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity with a focus on the problem of empathy. That is, I will limit myself to the psychological level of intersubjectivity so as to articulate how I, as an experiencing subject, have experiential access to other subjects’ conscious life in and through empathic perception. Second, I hope to defend Husserl’s transcendental approach to the Other vis-à-vis the Schutzian interpretation. And, third, I hope to illuminate the multidimensionality of interpersonal understanding, so as to account for the role played by bodily mobility, bodily orientation, and the Other’s bodily expressivity in
our ordinary empathic experience. More specifically, I want to understand how bodily mobility enables us to adopt another person’s perspective, and in what sense the empathic situation affords a rudimentary niche in which empathy takes place. And, above all, how should we characterize the peculiar kind of intentionality inherent in the empathic act? Given that empathy is a *sui generis* sort of intentional act, what is the intentional structure of empathic intentionality? I believe that Husserl’s phenomenology serves as a good guide to answer these questions. In this sense, I also think Husserl’s phenomenology helps us to gain a better self-understanding of our intentional life and, conversely, the latter illustrates the significance of the former.

Accordingly, the current thesis is divided into five chapters. In chapter one, I focus on the problem of embodiment in Husserl and its operative function in empathy. In Husserl’s view, the lived body is a perceiving body in that it regulates all perceptual experience of the world in which we live. Empathy as a sort of Other-perception [*Fremdwahrnehmung*] is also intrinsically structuralized by the following three features of the lived body, i.e., the mobility, orientation and double-sensation. With the first two features, we can characterize the central issue of perspectivity in empathy. That is, the first person perspective is, due to bodily mobility, essentially connected with the possibility of adopting another perspective. It is bodily mobility that makes it possible to adopt a foreign subject’s perspective. The orientation feature also leads to a sharp distinction between oriented and homogeneous space. As Husserl explicitly argues in his later research manuscripts, it is within the oriented space that empathy genuinely takes place. This basic insight provides us with the chance to reexamine a central and recurrent issue in Husserl’s theory of empathy, i.e., the issue of similarity between one’s own and the foreign body. As I will argue, it is within the oriented space that we can account for the true sense of similarity. In connection with Husserl’s consideration of double sensation, and his especial emphasis on the tactual modality inherent in auto-affection, key features of his account of the twofold nature of bodily manifestation, I argue that, by means of explicating a particular sort of tactual contact, i.e., handshaking, one can see that the similarity in question above consists in the fact that one’s own and the foreign body are bodily given in a similar twofold manner rather than in the fact that they might physiognomically resemble each other. With these results in hand, I will give a new account of Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception. That is, I wish to call attention to the function of
mobility in the empathic act and suggest that analogizing apperception can be understood as a form of quasi-perspective-taking. In doing so, I will also fend off some Schutzian criticisms leveled at Husserl’s account.

The ego’s incarnation not only suggests the functioning role of embodiment but also points to the embedded nature of empathy; that is, due to its oriented nature, the interpersonal encounter has to be situated within a certain sphere where people come into face-to-face interaction. In chapter two, I further develop the significance of this empathic situatedness by drawing upon Husserl’s account of hetero-affection. Following Husserl, I describe the Other’s passive emergence out of the oriented situation and the affective relief structure of that situation. By doing so, I hope to answer two related questions: how does the Other become prominent in the perceptual field in the first place and to what extent does empathic situatedness contribute to the Other’s passive emergence. I argue that the empathic situation is essentially characterized and articulated by a varying distribution of stronger or weaker affective forces and that, furthermore, the Other’s passive emergence consists in the situated contrast of her affective pull with regard to the rest of the perceptual field. In this regard, I think Husserl not only seriously considers the importance of sociocultural, habitual and environmental factors in contextualizing empathy but also offers a genetic framework with which to analyze how such contextualization affords a meaningful context for the empathic encounter. This leads to another finding in Husserl’s account of passive empathy. In contrast with his paradigmatic conception of objectifying intentionality, passive empathy encompasses a peculiar sort of pre-objectifying, or feeling, intentionality, by means of which the ego pre-predicatively engages with the Other’s pre-thematic presence. These results make it possible to give a new account of “associative pairing” in the V. Cartesian Meditation and to shed light on a proto-social component of the self-Other relation at the level of passive constitution.

In chapter three, in an effort of dissect the complexity of empathic intentionality, I further develop the proposal of quasi-perspective-taking and argue that empathic perception is characterized by a twofold intentionality. Husserl accounts for empathic intentionality by systematically analogizing empathy with other intentional acts, so as to elucidate the peculiar form of empathic presentification. The most prominent analogy is that between empathy and recollection, and this analogy,
to be sure, incurs serious criticism when read from a Schutzian perspective. That is, Husserl’s theory of empathy is underpinned by recourse to egoic recollection and, on this account, the Other turns out to be a duplicate of one’s own ego, her genuine alterity a camouflage of egoic ipseity. I think, however, that this radical criticism mistakes Husserl’s main tenor of empathic presentification simply because the Schutzian perspective overlooks the analogy drawn between empathy and image consciousness and, thereby, misunderstands the intentional structure of empathic intentionality. By closely examining Husserl’s image theory, I believe we can illuminate the complex intentionality of empathic perception: first, empathy comprises a peculiar sort of intentional fusion of presentation [Gegenwärtigung] and presentification [Vergegenwärtigung]; second, empathic intentionality is in nature bidirectional, in that it is at once directed at both the Other’s sensuously given body and the Other’s non-sensuously given subjectivity; and third, empathic perception thus understood is *sui generis*, insofar as it is neither reducible to external perception *simpliciter* nor derivable from other forms of intentional acts, such as recollection, expectation and pure imagination. In this regard, I also shed light on the quasi character of quasi-perspective-taking. That is, as if putting the empathizer in the empathee’s position, the intentional accomplishment of empathic presentification makes present the Other’s first person perspective, insofar as it affords a quasi or non-predicative understanding of the Other’s intentional life.

A theory of empathy is not complete if it does not account for the role played by the Other’s bodily expressivity and the extent to which it contributes to interpersonal understanding. For most of the time, the conception of the Other’s bodily expressivity oscillates between Cartesianism, which takes the Other’s body to be a fully meaningless substance, and behaviorism, which conceives of the Other’s body as the entire manifestation of the Other’s mental life. In chapter four, I argue for an alternative conception that emphasizes the unitary Gestalt of the Other’s bodily behavior without falling into either the Cartesian or the behaviorist extreme. In the *first Logical Investigation*, Husserl thinks that the Other’s exterior behavior bears no intimate relation with her interior psychic life and that, therefore, the meaning of that behavior needs to be interpreted so as to specify the psychic life it indicates. This Cartesian conception is open to skeptical challenge and has been put in critiques. However, as Husserl refines his theory of indication, he also offers a substantially
new account of the Other’s bodily expressivity. That is, Husserl recognizes that the indicator is not in an external or contingent relation with the indicated; rather, the indicator is a physical substrate that serves to make present or awaken the indicated state of affairs. Accordingly, Husserl argues that the Other’s bodily behavior is a meaning-laden constituent of the Other’s expression and, furthermore, that it is genuinely constituted as an “expressive unity” and serves to make manifest the Other’s psychic states. Husserl’s new account of the Other’s bodily expressivity stresses the importance of the behavioral whole and is fundamentally akin to Merleau-Ponty’s account of behavior as found in *The Structure of Behavior*. In light of the latter account, I further specify the constitutive elements of bodily expression and substantiate the Gestalt theory of the Other’s bodily expressivity.

With the above four individual analyses, I hope to shed new light on central aspects of Husserl’s theory of empathy, e.g., embodiment, contextualization, empathic intentionality, and bodily expressivity, vis-à-vis the Schutzian interpretation. I believe that Husserl’s in-depth analysis of concrete empathic experience illuminates the pre-reflective accomplishment of the empathic act and helps us gain a better understanding of our ordinary interaction with other people. Against this background, I think it is appropriate to reflect upon the methodological issues in Husserl’s transcendental theory of the Other by means of offering a charitable reading of his methodic operation of reduction. Hence, in chapter five, I recapitulate the main results established in previous chapters so as to specify the core constitutional problem of the Other – to properly understand the Other’s genuine manner of givenness. Accordingly, the phenomenological reduction is not designed to secure a Cartesian certitude from which we can deduce the rest of the world; rather, the transcendental function of reduction, as Husserl sees it, consists in the fact that it serves to explicate the transcendental subjectivity to which the Other is originally given. It is only with radical self-reflection or -critique that we can legitimately claim that transcendental subjectivity is always and already within an intersubjective network and that transcendental intersubjectivity is only possible if subjectivity is brought into full concretization. In this regard, I think Husserl’s methodic operation of reduction also provides a framework with which to analyze the phenomenological sense of Levinas’ ethics, according to which subjectivity in its genuine sense is encumbered with an ethical responsibility towards the Other. In other words, Levinas’ account of the
Other’s face brings to light the very existential facticity that, in being exposed to the Other’s supplicating gaze, I am bound with the urgency of responding and experience the acute nature of the ethical situation – it is my responsibility to respond to the face before me.

The discussions in the current thesis mainly draw upon Husserl’s research manuscripts on intersubjectivity and are in conjunction with Husserl’s analysis of other phenomena, such as image consciousness. In some measure, this thesis serves as a re-reading of the fifth Cartesian Meditation. With the last few paragraphs, I wish to justify this approach and differentiate it from others that we can find in the literature.

For a long time (even nowadays), commentators take the fifth Cartesian Meditation to be the most important text of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity. I think this is a fair assessment, because the text still serves as Husserl’s most systematic formulation in that regard. Nonetheless, the text is so dense, complicated, and at times confusing that it has, as it were, engendered much exegesis and many debates. Husserl’s proponents try to reconstruct its inner logic so as to defend his transcendentalism, whilst his opponents readily attack some of the central theses so as to downplay such transcendentalism in favor of their own alternatives. The single text itself has become “the battlefield of endless controversies” (Kant). A reasonable way out, I believe, is to put the text back into Husserl’s philosophical context wherein the text is prefigured, prepared, produced and, later on, reflected upon, revised and developed – in short, a charitable reading of the fifth Cartesian Meditation needs to be carried out in conjunction with a careful consideration of Husserl’s research manuscripts on intersubjectivity, especially the three volumes of Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität (Hua 13 -15), so as to specify what Husserl is really concerned with. As Dan Zahavi (2001, p. 213) argues, such an effort does not mean “to cast doubt upon the philosophical quality of the Cartesian Meditations, but only to emphasize that this work’s true sense can hardly be understood without referring to the research manuscripts.”

Indeed, commentators have come to understand the value of Husserl’s research manuscripts and use them so as to support their interpretations. However, when it comes to the problem of empathy, a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s account on the basis of consulting the research manuscripts is still in need. In this sense, the current thesis is different from other works on Husserl’s theory of
intersubjectivity, such as Haney (1994), Costello (2012) and Franck (2014), insofar as they still mainly rely on the fifth *Cartesian Meditation*. To be noted, in his masterpiece, *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology* (2004), Ronald Bruzina offers another reading of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity (chapter 9) through Eugen Fink’s works, the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* in particular. With Fink as a medium, Bruzina sheds new light on some of the main theses in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation*. As original and provocative as Bruzina’s interpretation is, I take it to be more philosophically appropriate and exegetically rigorous to interpret Husserl through his own eyes, i.e., through his own research manuscripts.

To conclude, the current thesis is both historical and systematic. On the one hand, I hope to take into account the development of Husserl’s thought, not so as to illustrate Husserl’s varying positions, but to demonstrate the very complexity of the problem at stake. To be sure, the problem of empathy is one of the most perplexing phenomena and has triggered a huge amount of discussion, as is evident in the contemporary social cognition debate. There seems to be no simple or single solution to the issues it presents. Husserl, the ever beginning phenomenologist, tries to stay true to the problem as such and experiments with different directions of thinking. On the other hand, I also hope to present what Husserl takes to be a more mature account of the problem of empathy vis-à-vis the Schutzian interpretation. It seems to be infeasible to offer an all-encompassing presentation of Husserl’s final thought, because Husserl becomes more and more sensitive to the complex nature of intersubjectivity and, in the final stage of his life, writes various manuscripts on its related aspects, such as infantile ontogenesis, generativity, death, and even gender difference. Instead, by critically engaging with the Schutzian critique, I focus on the most central issues and reconstruct Husserl’s arguments about them. I hope that the current thesis is not only an exegesis of Husserl but also serves as a philosophical investigation of empathy – one of the central aspects of human life.
In this first chapter, I focus on the problem of how we can conceive of the Other’s body as animated on the basis of the self-constitution of one’s own lived-body. In our ordinary life, we encounter others as other human beings and, in our continuous world-experience, we have constant contact with them (Hua 6/166[163]). It seems that we normally have no skeptical stance to the fact of “living-with-each-other [Miteinanderleben]” (ibid.), and we rarely raise questions such as whether the person perceived is similar to the same conscious creature that we ourselves are. Within this “natural” attitude, so to say, we smoothly live with others and do not thematize the belief that we encounter others as having similar features that we ourselves share. However, if we consider this natural belief more closely, and if we reflect upon the way in which we experience a foreign person, it becomes clear that this living-with-each-other belongs to the most complex and perplexing phenomena. Indeed, we do perceive others as embodied beings and take their bodies to be animated; yet, we cannot perceive their bodies in the same way as they perceive themselves, e.g., we cannot wave another’s hand as she volitionally does. We can literally perceive the objective or physical aspect of others’ bodies, but we cannot originally experience the subjective or lived aspect (Hua 14/345). This gives rise to the question of how we understand the Other’s body as animated. Husserl thinks that this sort of understanding has to be conditioned by a self-awareness of one’s own functioning body [Eigenleiblichkeit] (Hua 14/281) and accomplished by a particular sense-transference [Sinnesübertragung] through which the Other’s body appropriates the sense of “lived body” (Leib) (Hua 1/143). In short, it is through a kind of analogizing apperception that we come to take the Other’s body to be animated; and this apperception, as Husserl sees it, serves as the core of our empathic act.

Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception or empathy in general, to be sure, has been critically examined and evaluated ever since its first appearance in *Cartesian Meditations* (1929). One central and recurrent issue concerns Husserl’s particular

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5 For a more detailed analysis of the human encounter in the “natural” attitude, see Gurwitsch (1979).
conception of the similarity between one’s own and the foreign body. According to Husserl, this bodily similarity is the starting point not only for constituting the Other’s body as animated but also for his theory of empathy by and large. However important this bodily similarity is, Husserl’s own account of it is fundamentally problematic. Husserl seems to presume that bodily similarity is a sort of physiological or physiomorphic resemblance between one’s own and the Other’s body. This starting point, however, is not sufficient to account for the animate nature of the Other’s body. This critique deserves cautious consideration, not only because it cuts into the bottom of Husserl’s theory of empathy, but because it is related to some essential questions regarding our empathic act: what kind of similarity can serve as the starting point of empathy? And what is the characteristic attitude we posit toward the Other? These questions, as I hope to answer in this chapter, shall guide the discussion below.

In order to fully spell out the problematic of empathy, we need to first look into the central role played by the lived body, so that we can bring to the fore the embodied nature of empathy. That is, the empathic act is first and foremost carried out and characterized by the functioning body. For this purpose, I start in section one with an account of the functioning body and propose that it is (co-)experienced in and through all perceptual experience and, moreover, it serves as the first person perspective on the world. By further exposing the body’s index and kinaesthesia feature, I shall make clear that the first person perspective is intersubjective in nature. When perceiving a certain object, the perceiver also posits a possible perspective on the same perceived object, and the posited possible perspective, as it were, cannot simultaneously belong to the perceiver but has to be distributed to a possible currently co-existing foreign subject. I shall further develop this perspectivity issue in section 3.

In section 2, I reconsider the similarity thesis and give a new account of the similarity between one’s own and the Other’s body. I emphasize the priority of tactual experience in the self-constitution of the lived body and its significance for Husserl’s rethinking of the similarity thesis. Husserl’s theory of embodiment makes possible a distinction between the oriented and homogeneous space, and he takes the oriented sphere to be the genuine interpersonal sphere. It is within the oriented sphere that we can work out the particular kind of twofold givenness of the Other’s body through a particular sort of tactual contact, i.e., handshaking. By doing so, we can redefine bodily similarity as the similar manner of twofold bodily givenness between one’s
own and the foreign body rather than as physiomorphic resemblance. This renewed similarity thesis, as will become clear, sheds new light on the sense in which empathy is essentially a concrete I-Thou encounter.

In section 3, I reconstruct Husserl’s theory of sense-transfer along with an engagement with Alfred Schutz’s critique. I suggest that sense-transfer can be read as a form of quasi-perspective-taking by which one can recognize the genuine foreign perspective. Contrary to Schutz, I think sense-transfer in the fifth Meditation is more a sort of sense-explication than sense-creation. Empathic perception of the Other’s body is not concerned with the physiological composition of that body but with the sense of that body for “me”, i.e., the foreign embodied perspective for “me.”

1. The functioning body and the implicit play of alterity

Husserl’s theory of empathy is at core a perceptual account. His concrete analysis of empathy is intimately related with his theory of perception, in which the lived body plays a crucial role. The difficult issue, however, is that the lived body not only pre-delineates perceptual experience, but it itself is co-constituted in and through the perceptual process: “by all thingly experience the lived body is co-experienced as functioning lived body (therefore not as a mere thing)” (Hua 14/57, 15/264). Thus, it is highly pivotal to analyze the implicit bodily function in empathic perception.

1.1 Co-constitution of the lived body in perception

When I perceive an external object, e.g., my laptop, I can see it from different angles by, say, moving around it and bring different profiles into view. Nonetheless, whenever I perceive the laptop, I can only perceive it from a certain perspective, focusing on the screen for instance, while other profiles elude my present visual reach. Strictly speaking, only one aspect of the perceived is actually given, whilst other aspects are literally hidden. This shall not mean that the hidden aspects are not intended at all; on the contrary, they are co-intended in such a way that they are vaguely anticipated. For example, the backside of the laptop is expected to be colored, no matter how indeterminate the expectation may be with respect to the precise color (Hua 16/58[49]). In this sense, concrete perception encompasses both the “proper” manifestation of the actually intended aspect and the “improper” manifestation of the vaguely co-intended aspects (Hua 11/5[41], 16/50[43]): it is “a complex of full and
empty intentions” (Hua 16/57[48]). In other words, perception has a horizontal structure, in and through which the unseen profiles of the perceived object are cogiven or adumbrated together with the intuitively given one. As Husserl extensively explores in his lecture course, *Thing and Space* (1907), this preliminary description of horizontal givenness characterizes an essential feature of perceptual experience.

But why is the horizontal structure essential or indispensable to perception? Or how would perception look if one could only perceive the strictly given aspect at each moment? If the proper manifestation of the object were isolated from the improper ones, could one still perceive an *unchanged* object in a series of changing perceptions? Obviously, an external entity appears from various sides, and only one side at each moment is literally manifest. If the appearance were only a one-sided exhibition of the entity, and if the proper givenness were disintegrated from the horizontal cogivenness, then one would be left with a series of discrete appearances that one then synthesizes into a unity of a higher level (Hua 16/60[51]). However, the synthesis does not amount to the establishment of one identical object. “After all, the appearance of the front of one piece of paper and the back of another match excellently, but we nevertheless conceive of them as being appearances of two similar but different objects” (Zahavi, 1996, p.95; cf. Hua 16/155[131]). In order for the appearances to be of the same object, they have to be supplemented by a kind of continuum which necessarily presupposes that the unseen profiles must be already co-present or co-intended, be it retained or expected, in the intuitive presentation of the current profile. Therefore, the horizontal structure of givenness and co-givenness is indispensable to perception insofar as the object has manifold manifestations, and insofar as these manifestations are of one and the same object.

On the other hand, the horizontal structure of perception shall not imply that the co-given aspects manifest as fully as the given one; otherwise, perception could not warrant the identity of the perceptual object either. Let us hypothesize that we can intuitively see all aspects of an entity such that they are absolutely given in one single perception (Hua 16/116 [97]). In this case, we hold fast to the givenness of the front side in its fullness and saturation and at the same time have in view the other sides in the most complete possible way (Hua 16/115[96]). In other words, every profile of the perceived is by definition fully manifest, so much so that the appearance of what appears becomes *equivalent* to what appears, instead of being *one* demonstration of
what appears. Upon closer examination, however, the hypothesis becomes indefensible. If one were to have such an exhaustive perception of the object, and if one slightly changed the viewpoint, then the new perception could no longer be a perception of the same unchanged object. Given that what was previously perceived already appeared from all aspects, and given that the changing of viewpoint introduced a new aspect, then, by hypothesis, the new perception does not belong to the series of the previous perception and hence is not a perception of what was previously perceived. Thus, the hypothesis leads to a situation in which we can perceive one and only one object each time; and the object as such by definition necessarily changes all at once when a new perception arises. The result is obviously bizarre: a glance of the screen and a slightly different glance of the same screen have to be distributed to two different objects, respectively. Therefore, the hypothesis leads to two seemingly unfavorable corollaries: either we can hardly perceive any transcendent object, since everything perceived is fully present and nothing falls outside of perception; or we cannot perceive any identical thing, since every perception introduces an entity that is ontologically non-identical with the object of a previous perception. Thus, we would have to reject the hypothesis and admit that the unseen aspects are not as fully and intuitively given as the front side, if we hold onto the fact that a new aspect indeed counts as one aspect of the same object. That is, as Husserl explicitly points out, the idea of fully original givenness of all profiles is by necessity ruled out from actual perceptual experience: “vollkommene Anschaulichkeit, allseitige und nach allen Seiten ursprünglich anschaulich auslegende Erfahrung ist (wie eine Analyse des Erfahrens von Realen wesenseinsichtig macht) unmöglich” (Hua 15/97, 16/116[97]). In this sense, Husserl can even claim that, if God wanted to perceive the same world and entities therein, He would have to comply with the same horizontal structure (Hua 3/351 [362], 16/117[98]).

Our perception as such, therefore, is by necessity carried out in a perspectival manner. It is a process extending from momentary givenness to further givenness, bringing into view the unseen profiles, be they a confirmation or frustration of what was anticipated in previous perceptions (Hua 11/67[108]). As Husserl confirms in a manuscript written in 1930, “im Wandel der Wahrnehmung kommen immer neue Seiten zu wirklicher Selbstdarstellung, im Fortgang also lerne ich den Gegenstand immer besser kennen bzw. komme auf früher schon Bekanntgewordenes zurück”
In other words, the perceived becomes more and more saturated and determined if the perceiver constantly approaches it (ibid., Hua 16/111 [93]).

Then how does the perceptual process take place? And how is the co-givenness converted into genuine manifestation? Answering these questions quickly reveals the role played by the constituting body. When I try to grasp a cup beside me, I do not solely focus on its spatial position so as to direct my hand to it; I am also constantly and tacitly aware of the spatial relation between my own body and the target, e.g., where my hands lie, and I am aware of my own bodily capacity by which I can stretch out my hand to grasp the cup. One may say that intertwined with actual perception is a constant self-awareness of one’s own body. To be more specific, every perception is essentially doubled in that, on the one hand, perspectival givenness is connected with the self-awareness of one’s somatic position; and, on the other hand, the somatic position is correlated with an inherent possibility, i.e., the somatic ability to move one’s body, stepping backward, forward and so forth (Cf. Claesges, 1972, p. 64). In this sense, the perceived object is given in a restricted way: “the same thing appears to me in the relation to my lived-body with a series of appearance” (Hua, 13/12). That is, an intrinsic intentional correlation exists between perspectival appearance and the perceiving body: the presently appearing aspect is a correlate of the actual somatic position, whereas the unseen aspects are correlates of possible somatic positions. In other words, perceptual givenness constantly refers back to the perceiving body, and Husserl claims this relationship of “referring back” as an “if-then” structure:

“If a free unfolding of one series of this [kinaesthetic] system occurs (e.g., any movement of the eyes or fingers), then from the interwoven manifold as motive [Motivat], the corresponding series must unfold as motivated” (Hua 4/57-58[63]; cf. 6/164[161], 9/390, 13/287, 13/386).

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6 See the original German, “dasselbe Ding erscheint mir in Beziehung auf meinen Leib mit den Erscheinungsreihen,” The text continues: “in Beziehung auf einen anderen Leib würden sich andere Möglichkeiten ergeben, andere Erscheinungsreihen würden ‘dasselbe’ Ding darstellen Dasselbe Ding”. It is obvious that, even in the perceptual givenness, there is already an implicit theme of intersubjectivity, which Husserl refers to as “open intersubjectivity” (Hua 14/289).
To paraphrase, if I constantly move in a certain way, then the appearance of the perceived will continuously and correspondingly alter; for instance, the unseen backside of the laptop will be originally intuited and the predicted yet indeterminate color will be specified, once I turn that very backside into genuine intuition. Husserl consequently claims that perception essentially contains two corresponding but parallel series: on the noematic side, there is a motivated series of perspectival appearances regulated by horizontal givenness; and on the noetic side, there is a motivating series of bodily experiences regulated by what Husserl calls a “kinaesthetic system” (Hua 4/58[63]) – a system of free bodily movement. To be noted, although the bodily mobility itself is not a perception, it is an indispensable component of perception such that we can perceive and subsequently refer to the object through its manifold manifestations (Hua 4/56[61]; cf. Zahavi, 2003, p.100).

Therefore, the dynamic process of perception and its fulfillment presuppose the functioning body; that is, the manner of perspectival manifestation intrinsically depends upon both bodily position and mobility (Hua 4/55[60], 4/66[71]; cf. Claesges, 1964, p.128). Properly speaking, perception is in nature embodied; and the body co-experienced in perceptual experience is not a mere thing but a lived and functioning body. In order to specify the phenomenological sense of bodily functionality, we need to work out its self-givenness or self-constitution (Welton, 1999; cf. Hua 15/266).

1.2 Self-constitution of the lived body and the problem of perspectivity

One of Husserl’s important philosophical contributions is his incessant emphasis on and analyses of the subjective (aspect of the) body; by doing so, Husserl can radically set himself apart from the predominant Cartesianism that takes the human body to be a merely physiological thing (Körperding). As indicated above, the perspectival givenness constantly refers back to a bodily position; in other words,

7 In fact, Husserl makes a distinction between two types of embodiment: one is Verleichlichung and the other Verkörperung. And he broadly applies the term “embodiment” not only to the incarnate subject but also to spiritual products, such as music, painting and even social institutions. As Husserl sees it, embodiment is the way in which they exist in space and, in an indirect way, their spiritual aspect also anchors in the same space (Hua 6/220[216]).

8 On the difference of Husserl’s philosophy from Cartesianism, see Landgrebe’s classic contribution, “Husserl’s departure from Cartesianism” (Landgrebe, 1981; chapter 3). For a more recent development of this point, particularly in respect to Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment as a substantial alternative to the standard Cartesian mind-body dualism, see, e.g., Thompson (2007, p. 235ff).
the lived body serves as a perceptual viewpoint upon the world. Whenever I perceive something, I perceive it from my somatic “here,” from which I have a “perspective” of the object. Moreover, I orient my surrounding and the entities therein in such a way that they circumscribe me in accordance to my “here.” The lived-body, perceptually speaking, is the center of orientation, “the bearer of here and now, out of which the pure ego views the space of the sensual world” (Hua, 4/56[61]). In this sense, it is a point of coordination, according to which we can tell near from far-away, left from right, and above from below (Hua 4/56[62]). This “here,” to be sure, is not a detectable point in space that can be identified by using a global positioning system; rather, the sense of being “here” is always immediately felt whenever and wherever we move – it is always with “me”: “der Leib ist immer da” (Waldenfels, 2000a, p. 31).

What makes the somatic here so special is that it is a point without any spatial extension and a point in relation to which there is always a “there” (Hua 4/158[166]). As Edith Stein argues, it cannot “be geometrically localized at one point in my physical body” (Stein, 1989, p.43); rather, it is an ideally abstracted center of perceptual experience, through which one can accordingly organize one’s spatial experience. A landscape, for instance, is seen through a visual center, and a piece of soft silk is touched according to a center of the tactual palm, and so forth (ibid.). My lived body is thus “for me the nearest, the nearest thing of perception, of feeling, and of volition” (Hua 14/58). Husserl also opts for terms like “null point” (Nullpunkt) or “null appearance” (Nullerscheinung) to describe this non-extensionality. Metaphorically speaking, this point of orientation can be seen as the zero point of mathematic coordinates: it is not a particular point but the point from which all other coordinate points derive their meaning. The egoic individuation “here and now first makes possible for space and time to take on significance, starting with the here and now” (Levinas, 1987, p.36). The somatic “here” is the ultimate center, the absolute point, according to which all perceived objects are “there” (Hua 4/159[166], 14/58).

As we shall see in section 3, the absoluteness of the bodily index plays a crucial role for Husserl’s theory of empathy. For now, we need to specify the sense of such an indexical absoluteness, i.e., the somatic “here” in principle excludes its being simultaneously “there” and hence the embodied subject cannot be simultaneously “here” and “there”. But why so? Think of a possible world in which I could project and duplicate my ego into an arbitrary position (Hua 14/145) and, in this somewhat
hallucination-like world, the projected or virtual ego could talk with the projecting or actual ego. Thus I literally have a second ego and, simultaneously, a second “here.” Even in this case, I do not have one identical but two numerical “heres.” My projected ego is talking from the projected “standpoint” from which “he” could perceive “me” now speaking to him, and my actual ego speaks from the actual standpoint from which I am presently projecting and listening. Still, the two (virtual and actual) perceiving “heres” exclude one another, insofar as the projected here has to be a “there” with regard to the projecting here, and vice versa. Thus, it is a priori that “an ego cannot be in the meantime here and there” (Hua 13/264). My own absolute here and my whole individuality, which it bears, are necessarily different from others’ in terms of being “there.” Accordingly, my subjectivity is strictly limited to a “here” insofar as I can only perceive the Other and her absolute “here” as well from my first personal perspective; and I cannot at the same time take over the Other’s perspective – for, if it were the case, then the Other’s perspective would be reduced to mine and hence I would simultaneously have two points of view upon the world, which is by definition a contradiction. Perception, therefore, is ubiquitously performed from the first person perspective; and the first person perspective always refers to and thus belongs to a “mineness,” which no others can share in the meantime.

The index feature alone, however, is not sufficient for perceiving an object as identical; it needs to be supplemented by a “sliding transition” that enables the continuum of changing appearances (Zahavi, 1999, p.95). This transition, as indicated, presupposes a sort of bodily mobility, which, to be sure, is first and foremost a pre-thematic and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness, a form of kinaesthesis. When I play badminton, my attention is mostly directed at my opponent’s postures and the rallies on the court, and my body from my part is immediately co-experienced and co-functioning without my attending to it. If I do constantly keep an eye on my body, my intention would be so diffused that I could hardly keep pace with my opponent. But this is not so trivial as to claim that bodily movement is in play whenever we explore the world and the objects therein. The point would rather be that perception presupposes a minimal contribution of bodily mobility (ibid.; Zahavi, 2003, p.100); for instance, my observing the rallies presupposes ocular-motor awareness, although I need not reflect upon this awareness.
The most significant feature that distinguishes kinaesthesis from other forms of movement consists in its spontaneity, by which kinaesthesis can truly be defined as volitional action. Kinaesthesis is a bodily movement that the ego “governs” or “holds sway” over, a movement subordinated to the egoic will (Hua 14/447). In this respect, Husserl says, “all kinaestheses, each being an ‘I move,’ ‘I do,’ are bound together in a comprehensive unity – in which kinaesthetic holding-still is [also] a mode of the ‘I do’” (Hua 6/108[106]). Kinaesthesis as a whole constitutes a realm of “I can,” through which I can always by myself initiate anew my own movement (Ich-beweege-mich) (Hua 16/206[174]). And, by actualizing the potential of this open-ended mobility, I can always enrich my perceptual experience and further determine the perceived object (ibid.). Husserl even claims that, in order to perceive movement, kinaesthesis must also be implicitly at work – it is “a means [Mitel] for producing a mediate [mittelbare] spontaneous movement of other things, e.g., things pushed, grasped, lifted, etc., by my immediately spontaneously moved hand” (Hua 4/151). My lived body is always immediately lived and at my disposal; and it is through this interoceptive mobility that other forms of spatial movement can become perceived at all. This shall not mean, however, that one’s own kinaesthesis is the causal origin of other entities’ movement, even though it is true that one can move, say, a laptop by means of pushing it. The point is rather that kinaesthesis has to be presupposed if one wants to perceive other forms of movement (Hua 14/62, 15/293), including perceiving one’s own spatial movement, e.g., waving one’s hand in the air. In this sense, perception of both still objects and spatial movement as such necessarily presupposes a minimal awareness of self-movement.⁹

As Alva Noë later on claims, perception thus understood is inherently intermingled with and based upon a pre-reflective bodily action: “to be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory stimulation” (Noë, 2004, p.1). That is, along with my intentionality, which is directed at perspectival data, I also have a kinaesthetic intentionality (Hua 15/316; cf. Waldenfels, 2000a, p.146), or motor intentionality in Merleau-Ponty’s sense (Merleau Ponty, 2012, p. 112) that is

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⁹ This point relates to a general aporia in Husserl’s theory of spatial constitution: the lived-body is the pre-condition of spatial constitution, to which a constitution of one’s own body also belongs. A circularity is clearly in play; for a Husserlian solution, see Claesges (1964, pp. 99; cf. Hua 15/326-327).
directed at the co-given aspects. I can fulfill kinaesthetic intentionality by means of actualizing possible kinaesthetic situations and then bring into view previously unseen profiles. In virtue of such kinaesthesia, I can always step forward or backward and so forth, converting any spatial “there” into my authentic “here”, as Husserl writes:

“due to free modification of my kinaesthesis, particularly those of locomotion [Herumgehen], I can change my position in such a manner that I could convert any spatial There to a Here – i.e., I could appropriate any spatial locus with my corporeality” (Hua 1/146[116]).

The last point, as we will see shortly, is central with regard to the nature of perspectivity and Husserl’s theory of empathy by and large. Although our perspective is always given first-person, and it is always with “me,” it is nonetheless self-transcending in that the intertwined kinaesthetic component always affords new and open perspectives. When I perceive a certain entity, I do not limit my intention to the intuitively given aspect but direct my intention beyond the proper manifestation toward the improperly co-given aspects. In other words, I somehow surpass the current perspective and anticipate a possible perspective from which the currently unseen profile would correspondingly appear. But this is not to say that the possible perspective adherent to my current perception is intrinsically “mine,” since, to repeat, I cannot simultaneously possess two different perspectives of the perceived object. Hence, the possible perspective has to be posited as a foreign perspective in that it necessarily belongs to a possible foreign subject. One might object by saying that, although one cannot possess two different perspectives simultaneously, the possible perspective can nonetheless pertain to “me” in that it is not yet one’s actual but potential perspective. Indeed, one can always turn a potential perspective into an actual one; yet this should not muddle the real concern. What is at stake here is that the possible perspective cannot be granted to “me” when I am perceiving the object hic et nunc. As quoted above (footnote 6), Husserl maintains that the perceptual object currently presents itself not only to me, but at the same time to other subjects (Hua 13/12). That is, while the possible perspective cannot be simultaneously given to me, it is plausible to assume that it is simultaneously given to a possible foreign subject who is viewing, say, the backside that is presently inaccessible to me from my viewpoint. This seems to be what Husserl has in mind when he writes:
“I cannot have the appearance that I have from ‘my standpoint’ (the location of my physical body in the now) from another standpoint; with the shift in standpoint, the appearance is altered in a lawfully regulated way, and it is evident that the appearances are incompatible. I can have the incompatible appearance at another time if I take up another location in space. And likewise, an ‘other’ can have that same appearance, now, precisely if that other is now at another location” (Hua 13/2-3; Cf. Hua 13/377-78, 1/145[115-16], 4/322; my italics).

As Zahavi (2001, p. 49) observes, if we closely examine the perspectival character of perception, we can immediately find that an inherent relation or reference to the foreign subjectivity is already at work in and through perception. That is, to every thingly or worldly appearance accordingly belongs an implicit and constant co-acceptance of possible foreign subjects – even when I have no explicit and concrete intention directed at them (ibid., p.50). In this regard, we can conclude that the first person perspective is in nature intersubjective. Through a thorough elucidation of the functioning body and its constituents (i.e., its indexity and mobility), it becomes evident that an “other” perspective is already implicitly in play within the first person perspective, such that one can after all perceive the same object. For example, someone else might kindly point out that what I am presently seeing as a real person is actually a well-designed mannequin (Hua 6/165[162]). Hence, the first person perspective is so self-transcending that it is, to be sure, intrinsically intertwined with the foreign perspective. Radically speaking, transcendental subjectivity thus understood is by no means solitary, confined within the so-called transcendental consciousness; rather, it is in essence characterized by its openness to alterity and, thus, it is already within the network of transcendental intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 2001, pp. 61, 63, 84). As Husserl points out in an early draft of Cartesian Meditations, “zum Wesen des sich als solus findenden Ich gehört, dass es im Lauf seines Fortlebens sich als socius von Genossen finden könnte” (Hua 15/52; original italics).

The intersubjective nature of the first person perspective proves to be pivotal for our entire investigation. It sets a key tone to Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity in that subjective being bears an irreducible connection to a foreign perspective, or alterity as such. More importantly, with a systematic unfolding of the foreign
perspective and its “cashing in” in the first personal life in particular, we can establish a new interpretation of Husserl’s theory of empathy. That is, the functioning body and its mobility implicitly afford the very possibility that the ego, as it were, quasi-takes over the Other’s perspective without abolishing the self-other differentiation.\footnote{As I will further develop in chapter 3, the structure of quasi-perspective-taking enabled by bodily mobility also prescribes a particular or \textit{sui generis} sort of empathic intentionality. For a comparison of the view proposed here with versions of the simulationist view in the recent social cognition debate, see in particular Coplan (2011).} As I will flesh out in section 3, this form of quasi-perspective-taking serves as the core of Husserl’s theory of empathy.

2. Twofold manifestation of the body and the problem of similarity

So far we have articulated two distinctive features of the lived body. In addition to the subjective aspect, the lived body also has an objective, anatomical aspect that can be externally perceived (Hua 4/144[152]). Thus, we have, on the one hand, the pre-reflective or pre-thematic givenness of the subjective body, a functioning body that is always there with me [mit dabei ist] during the course of my immersing myself in worldly experience; on the other hand, the same body is given reflectively or thematically as the objective body, a publicly observable body that can be submitted to, say, medical study (Hua 14/56). Now the central question is how we shall conceive of both manifestations. Husserl holds that they are originally constituted as a primary unity: “one needs to notice here that the lived body is co-experienced as functioning lived-body (therefore not as a mere thing) by all thingly experience, and that \textit{it is experienced exactly in a doubled and unitary way as an experienced thing and functioning lived body when it itself is experienced as a thing}” (Hua 14/57; my italics).\footnote{See the original text: “es ist hier auch zu beachten, dass bei aller dinglichen Erfahrung der Leib miterfahren ist als fungierender Leib (also nicht als blosses Ding) und dass er, wo er selbst als Ding erfährt ist, eben doppelt und in eins als erfahrenes Ding und als fungierender Leib erfahren ist.” See also, “Erfahrung von Leiblichkeit als Leiblichkeit ist also schon seelische oder vielmehr zweiseitig psychophysische Erfahrung” (Hua 9/131).}

As a manuscript written in 1921 indicates, it is in the context of the full-fledged constitution of the lived body and its relevance to empathy that Husserl seriously considers the well-known phenomenon of “double sensation” (Hua 14/75-77). Through careful explication of tactile experience, one can fully explicate the...
lived body “in a doubled and unitary way” and thereby illuminate the motivational question of empathy – *in what sense* one comes to perceive the foreign body as *similar* to one’s own (Hua 14/283-84). The clarification of the first question will necessarily pave the way for the clarification of the latter (Hua 14/515; cf. Hua 14/340, 15/660). As Husserl renders rather explicit in *Crisis*, the following are two closely related questions: “how the consciousness originates through which my lived body nevertheless acquires the ontic validity of one physical body among others, and how, on the other hand, certain physical bodies in my perceptual field come to count as lived bodies, lived bodies of ‘alien’ ego-subjects” (Hua 6/109[107]). In the following subsection, I focus on the first question and reserve the second for subsection 2.2.

### 2.1 The lived body and its full-fledged constitution

With sensitivity to the context of § 36 of *Ideas II* where Husserl introduces tactile experience, we can find that the main thesis Husserl articulates is a distinction between sensing [Empfindnis] and sensation [Empfindung]. The unique feature of this distinction is that both sensing and sensation are to be found in the same location of the bodily surface. When I touch something, say, sliding over this standing desk, the touching hand as a perceiving organ has various sensations of the touched desk, for instance, hardness, smoothness and coldness. And these sensual appearances are objectified as real properties that are attributed to the perceived, the physical desk. The marvelous thing, however, is that this series of haptic sensations is localized “on my part” of the body where, if I pay attention to the localized sensations, I immediately find that I have a parallel series of “interior” *sensing* sensations that I am experiencing or touching in the same location of the skin. In Husserl’s words, “in the interior of the hand, running parallel to the experienced movement, I find motion-sensations, etc.” (Hua 4/146[153]). In short, we find two parallel series of experiences within tactility: on the one hand, we have localized sensations of physical properties of the perceived; on the other hand, we also find on the same location a roughly determinate scope of sensing directed at the sensed object.

Something striking happens when we put our own hands together: the two series of experiences become reflexive and mutually illuminating when one hand palpates the other – sensations such as softness and warmth in the palpation are ascribed to the sensing hand, whereas the sensing hand also obtains physical
determinations such as “being felt as soft and warm.” The touched hand reveals itself as a sensing organ in the very process of being touched, whereas the touching hand is in the meantime objectified or physicalized as an external entity – it “descends into the thing” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 134). Husserl’s words are worth quoting at length,

“touching my left hand, I have touch appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, which are objectified as features of the thing, ‘left hand,’ belong in fact to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, which are ‘localized’ in it, though these are not constitutive of properties (such as roughness or smoothness of the hand, of this physical thing)” (Hua 4/144-145[152]).

In this sense, such sort of tactile experience exposes the depth of the self-experience of our own body. As said, we do not experience own body as a merely physiological composition, a biochemical corpse standing on par with others in the midst of the world. To the thingly experience of our body belongs an inseparable series of sensing that is intimately lived from within. Nor do we, as embodied subjects, have a self-enclosed conscious life and explore the world by taking in and processing tactual and visual stimuli. To the contrary, we are already encumbered with a body and thereby anchored in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 68). An extramundane subject from beyond the material world would not have this kind of double sensation since it cannot be physically palpated from the outside. In order to have these two series of experiences, a subject must have physical extension, through which it not only touches other things but can also be touched as well. Phenomenologically speaking, the subject is embedded in the world through its very embodiment in terms of these double manifestations. As Husserl writes,

“mein Leib ist der einzige, an dem ich die Verleiblichung eines Seelenlebens, nämlich eines Empfindens, Vorstellens, Fühlens, usw., das mein eigenes Leben ist, oder das sich in leiblicher Gestalt, in wechselnden leiblich-dinglichen Vorkommnissen „ausdrückt,“ in absolut unmittelbarer
Weiser erfahre, derart daß ich in eins nicht nur das Ding Leib und sein dingliches Gehaben wahrnehme, sondern zugleich mein psychisches Leben, und endlich beides eben in eins: das Sich-verleiblichen des letzteren im ersteren, das Sich-ausdrücken des einen im anderen” (Hua 8/61; my italics).

As the last quote demonstrates, although the series of sensations and that of sensing are two different facets of the same tactual experience, and should hence be distinguished from one another with regard to their respective modes of being, they are not two ontologically independent regions between which we can drive a wedge. The touching hand or the functioning body already has an “outside” that can be touched, and it is by means of being touched that the touching hand reveals itself and penetrates into sensual reality. The problem does not consist in whether or not the hands will grow numb when cold or when shot through with morphine (Sartre, 2003, p. 348); rather, the crucial point lies in the fact that the touched hand calls for the touching in order to reveal its functioning nature, whereas the touching hand in the meantime becomes materialized through external palpation: “both constitute themselves in one another and indivisibly from one another” (Landgrebe, 1981, p. 45). The touched and the touching hand illuminate each other, so much so that the boundary between the touching and the touched, between the subjective and the objective, between inner and outer, is somewhat blurred or even shattered (ibid.). As Merleau-Ponty insightfully observes about this nexus, there is “a sort of dehiscence [that] opens my body in two, […] between my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 123). Nonetheless, “there is overlapping or encroachment, so that we must say that the things pass into us as well as we into the things” (ibid.). In this sense, the body originally manifests itself

12 It is debatable whether or not Husserl is still entangled within the Cartesian vocabularies of subject-object, or inner-outer, whether or not he could ever distance himself from Cartesianism of one form or another, and whether or not it is a better solution to opt for the Heideggerian concept of “da,” which is neutral to the dichotomy between subject and object, or inside and outside, in order to account for the concrete human existence in the world or being-in-the-world (Cf. Overgaard, 2004, p.158). But, I think, this way of questioning is a bit misleading insofar as the concepts of “subject” and “object” in Husserl’s usage undergo a significant change in meaning, and insofar as they are no longer used in the traditional way (Cf. Waldenfels, 2000a, p.42; Hua 14/86). A weaker yet more appropriate way of raising the question would be to ask to what extent Husserl’s exposition of the lived body contributes to a new understanding of subjectivity and thus transforms the meaning of subject or subjectivity.
in two fundamentally different yet unitarily interlaced manners; or, better, the functioning body and the materialized body are two indispensable aspects of the same lived body:

“the lived body is originally constituted in a double way: first, it is a physical thing, matter; it has its extension, in which are included its real properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and whatever other material qualities of that kind there are. Secondly, I find on it, and I sense ‘on’ it and ‘in’ it: warmth on the back of the hand, coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the fingertips” (Hua 4/145[153]).

Accordingly, the lived body is constituted as a twofold unity, a unity that has an interiority that is always localized in the correspondingly exterior aspect and an exteriority that, as the primordial field of expression, always indicates its interior correspondent (Hua 8/79). As Husserl emphasizes in other manuscripts:

“die erste, ursprüngliche Kundgabe: Das doppelseitige (aussen und innenseitige) „ich bewege“ indiziert durch die Äusserlichkeit die Innerlichkeit. […] Das erste ist die Konstitution der Leiblichkeit in sich. Die Konstitution der Einheit von Aussenleiblichkeit und Innerleiblichkeit” (Hua 14/328-329).

“Beides ist untrennbar eins und zusammen verwirklicht, kontinuierlich liegt der Äusserlichkeit die Innerlichkeit „zugrunde“ ” (Hua 14/491).

Needless to say, Husserl is not simply suggesting that the lived body has an interior aspect viewed from inside and an exterior aspect viewed from the outside, as if these two aspects were just a result of an oscillation of attention directed at the same body, as Martin (1992) seems to suggest. What Husserl emphasizes is the functionality of the primal unity of these two aspects for our kinaesthetic movement and embodied

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13 “Die Möglichkeit der Wechselverständigung setzt „Ausdruck in der Leiblichkeit“ voraus: die Leiblichkeit in inneren und äusseren Gesamterscheinungen” (Hua 14/70). We will come back to the issue of bodily expression in chapter 4.
situatedness. With either aspect distorted or diffused, our corporeal existence in the world would be significantly impeded.14

The exposition so far leads to the question of bodily exteriorization, which, when considered closely, already refers to the presence of the Other, insofar as the exteriorized body is publicly accessible.15 Some of Husserl’s manuscripts document that his own position fluctuates between achieving the exteriorization through the co-constitution of the Other or through egoic accomplishment. As a manuscript written in the 1920s shows, Husserl feels troubled by the following question: “weist das nicht darauf hin, dass mein Leib in der ursprünglichen Erfahrung eben als mein Leib (und vor aller Objektivierung durch Intersubjektivität) keineswegs mit einer Unterschied „physischer Dingleib“ erfahren ist” (Hua 14/57)? It seems to me that Husserl is reluctant to accept the first proposal, and ultimately opts for the second.

It may be hypothesized that bodily exteriorization is an outcome of the Other’s co-constitution. If I confine myself in an absolute, solipsistic attitude or realm, and I am sufficiently complacent about my being at home, feeling settled down in my solipsistic life, then nothing would motivate any self-alienation (Hua 15/29-30), the alienation that ultimately brings me into the outer world. Therefore, such a motivation necessarily presupposes the presence, say, the alienating gaze, of the foreign subject, so that I can after all “discover” in the mirror a body that is subsequently identified as my own (Cf. Hua 14/508-509). This hypothesis becomes even more appealing if the body is recognized as imperfectly constituted within a solipsistic attitude, e.g., I can see neither my own eyes nor the back of my body (Hua 4/159[167]). Although I can touch them by stretching out my hand, the Other’s perspective is nevertheless more or less superior to mine, because the foreign person can give a more precise determination of my bodily parts that are invisible to me. But this line of argumentation faces a vicious circle within the context of Husserl’s theory of empathy.

14 For a recent development of this point, see Ratcliffe (2008).

15 A correlative problem is about the mundanization of the ego, which is frequently and can be readily conflated with bodily exteriorization (Cf.Overgaard, 2004, pp. 153-154). Although the possibility of the first presupposes the success of the latter, and the first is a result of the latter, both theses should still be distinguished from each other in the sense that the latter is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the first. That is, bodily exteriorization enables empathy, which further makes possible the mundanization of the ego by means of the relation with others; however, this sort of founding relation cannot be reversed.
More specifically, the way I perceive the Other’s body as animated and recognize the Other’s perspective presupposes the full-fledged constitution of my own body; that is, to perceive the Other presupposes that my own body has already been exteriorized. However, the exteriorization of my own body, by hypothesis, again presupposes the perspective of the Other (Cf. A. D. Smith, 2003, p. 224; Zahavi, 2012, p. 238). In this regard, we seem to face a circular argument; thus, the proposal here seems not to be persuasive.

Husserl also conceives of the problem of exteriorization as a process of self-exteriorization through a particular sort of sensory localization, whose execution has nothing to do with the Other but whose effectuation subsequently serves as a seed for the possible encounter with the Other (Waldenfels, 2004; Zahavi, 1999, p. 170). When I touch something, I not only have sensations of the touched, I also find that these sensations have the same spatial position or scope as the touched. And I can consequently identify the place of sensing with the place of the localized sensation. This coincidence between the locus of sensing and that of sensation is a primitive form of the bodily spatialization. Although sensing is not yet in space, the loci of sensing are nevertheless in correspondence with those of sensation to such an extent that we can conclude that sensing, together with sensory data, such as warmth- and cold-data, is localized in space and hence effectuates its exteriorization. Husserl conceives of this line of argumentation as the primitive constitution of bodily self-exteriorization (Hua 14/329). In short, the lived body is essentially constituted by its genuine kind of twofold manifestation and, thus, self-constitution is strictly carried out within one’s own sphere, i.e., a sphere where there is no reference to the Other.

As Husserl ultimately recognizes, full-fledged self-constitution of one’s own body has to be in place, in order to set in motion a radical investigation of empathy. That is, “the first [issue] is the constitution of corporeality [Leiblichkeit], i.e., the constitution of the unity of bodily exteriority and interiority” (Hua 14/328-29). Thus, radical self-constitution, as I see it, serves at least two theoretical purposes: on the one hand, it saves Husserl’s theory of empathy from circularity, as just mentioned; on the other hand, this self-constitution provides evidence for the sense in which the body is experienced as lived body and, thereby, it serves as a basis for sense-validity, upon which one can establish a meaningful explication of the foreign body as a similarly animated, lived body, as I will pursue further below.
2.2 The problem of similarity: critique and response

In light of the previous exposition, we are now at a proper stage to approach the second question, which concerns the sense in which the Other’s body bears similarity to one’s own. Husserl’s believes that the self-constitution of one’s own body serves as a springboard for the alteration of bodily givenness, and the latter is motivated by the former (Hua 14/331). In other words, the manner of the Other’s bodily givenness can only be accounted for with regard to the authentic givenness of one’s own body, because “I grasp the Other’s expressive body according to the rules (ana logon) that govern my apprehension of my own expressive body, and not the other way around” (Bernet, 2003, p. 50).

However, the similarity thesis in Husserl is somewhat more complicated than commentators think. Many authors share the view that, despite all the importance the similarity may have (Hua 1/[140], 13/270, 14/163), Husserl seems to basically take such similarity to be physiomorphic in kind, that is, the outlook of the Other’s body overlaps [Deckung] with or resembles the physical appearance of one’s own body (Schutz, 1957/70; Theunissen, 1986, pp.60-65; Kozlowski, 1991, p.108ff; Reynaert, 2001; de Preester, 2008; P. Smith, 2011). Although other authors show a certain reservation towards this physiomorphic similarity, and think that it is not sufficient for Husserl’s theory of empathy to get off the ground, they nonetheless take it to be the most prominent view (Depraz, 1995, chapter 3; Held, 1972; Zahavi, 2012, p. 238). As I will show shortly, physiomorphic similarity itself causes a series of difficulties, and thus it has been criticized to such an extent that some authors even think that Husserl’s theory of empathy is not well grounded. Husserl’s own consideration of the similarity issue, on the other hand, clearly undergoes significant development between the years 1914/15 and 1926/27. By means of seriously thinking about tactual modality and bodily givenness during this time, Husserl goes beyond the seminal argumentation for physiomorphic similarity and offers a more convincing alternative. As a result, he ultimately holds that “the similarity that enables empathy” (Hua 14/283-84) must consist in the similar manner of one’s own twofold manifestation

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16 To be noted, Depraz also offers a fairly complex reading of similarity in Husserl, see Depraz (1995), §11. By contrast, Georg Römp (1992, chapter IV.3) seems to downplay the significance of similarity in Husserl’s theory of empathy, probably because of the problematic implications similarity entails.
and that of the foreign body. In this subsection, I will unfold the development of Husserl’s thinking on the similarity issue and show why we should endorse the second proposal instead of the predominant interpretation in the literature.

First of all, it is rather straightforward to think that such similarity can only take place between two physical bodies, one’s own and the foreign body, given that the Other’s body is perceived externally and that my own body, by contrast, is primarily lived or experienced from within (Cf. Schutz, 1970a, p.64-65). My lived body as an outstanding unity is given to me in an immediate and unique way. It is the absolute “here” that I can neither depart from nor get into, and that always orients my perceptual field as a “there.” I can freely move to and appropriate any arbitrary position, and I have series of kinaesthetic sensations and sensory fields localized in or on the body. But all these characteristics do not occur when I perceive the Other’s body, which in a literal sense can only be seen in its external appearance. Given the foregoing, the problem is rather obvious: how do I experience and become aware of the similarity in question without entertaining any comparison when I perceive the Other’s body? In the years 1914/15, Husserl thinks that since the appearance of the Other’s body to me, in principle, cannot attain the mode of “here,” it is plausible to suggest a kind of “self-physicalization” (Verkörperung) through which the appearance of my physical body [Körper] actualizes the overlapping [Deckung] with the appearance of the Other’s body (Cf. Theunissen, 1986, p. 67). According to Husserl, 17

17 Iso Kern, the editor of the three volumes of Intersubjektiviät (Hua 13-15), has stated rather explicitly in his Einleitung des Herausgebers (Hua 13/XXIV, 14/XXXIV) that Husserl himself was unsatisfied with physiomorphic similarity and had been working towards an alternative solution over the years. It seems, however, that this point rarely draws commentators’ attention. A wide-spread (mis-)understanding of the similarity thesis can be traced back to and systematically based upon Schutz’s critique in his influential article “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” (1957/70). A similar situation can also be found in Kern’s very initial emphasis on the two meanings of primordial reduction, which remains largely unnoticed in the debate (Cf. Overgaard, 2002, p.221, n.12).

18 “Eine Grundvoraussetzung ist: Der fremde Leibkörper ist ähnlich meinem Körperleib. Wie erfasse ich diese Ähnlichkeit, bzw., wie kann diese Ähnlichkeit ohne vergleichende Betrachtung und Erfassung wirksam werden, bewusst werden?” (Hua 13/270), and “jetzt kommt also die Hauptschwierigkeit. Der „fremd“ Körper ist insofern faktisch nicht auf dieselbe Weise konstituiert als mein Leib und mein Körper, als er nicht in der Null-Erscheinungsweise gegeben sein kann” (Hua 13/273-74).

19 Kozlowski insists that two ways of arriving at the similarity thesis should be differentiated from each other: the Other’s body counts as being similar to mine according to the appearance of my own body; and my body counts as being similar to the Other’s body according to the appearance of the Other’s body. As he states, “zieht man in Betracht, daß im Wahrnehmungsfeld der andere menschliche Körper als ganzer erscheint, der eigene dagegen nur partiel, so stellt das Problem, welcher von beiden welchem
this self-physicalization is accomplished given the possibility of kinaesthetic alteration: to the essence of my free mobility belongs the possibility of varying my kinaesthetic situation and appropriating any arbitrary spatial position: thereby, I can speculate [erdenken] that, if I moved toward [hinbewegen] the Other’s spatial position, then my lived body at the present “here” would appear in the same way as the Other’s physical body does, as if I were in the Other’s position “there” (Hua 13/55, 266, 277, 289, 331-32). Following this line of thinking, Husserl argues that one can have two appearances of one’s own body, though the way in which “ich „die Versetzung meines Leibes an beliebig andere Raumstellen“ vollzogen habe, habe ich die Zuordnung der Nullerscheinungsweisen meines Leibes und der äusseren Erscheinungsweisen Von ihm” (Hua 13/277). Consequently, my body has the same sort of external appearance as the Other’s body, so I can through self-physicalization overlap with the Other’s bodily appearance and arrive at the similarity required.

In order to forestall misunderstandings, two things should be immediately pointed out. First, self-physicalization should be distinguished from self-exteriorization, although both expressions invite confusion (Cf. A. D. Smith, 2003, p. 224). The reason for this is that in the years 1914/15 Husserl was still struggling towards but had not yet arrived at the full-fledged constitution of the lived body. Correlatively, his formulations of the body make room for the interpretation that the Husserlian body bifurcates into two ontologically independent realms, i.e., Leib and Körper, or the-body-for-me and the-body-for-other in the Sartrean sense. Husserl amends his view of self-physicalization from the early 1920s on by more seriously

20 This critique can typically be found in Schutz (1970a). See also Husserl’s own words: “jedenfalls wirklich und eigentlich wahrgenommen kann der eigen Leib als physisches Ding von mir selbst nicht werden, sondern nur von einem Andern” (Hua 14/62).

21 As a note written in the 1921 documents, “eben für meinen Leib in seinen einzigartigen Gegebenheitsweisen das spezifisch Somatalogische des Sinnenleibes untrennbar eins mit solchem
thinking about the particular phenomenon of “double-sensation,” and he develops a more adequate account of the lived body as presented above. One may even claim that Husserl’s account of the fully constituted lived body develops hand in hand with his account of empathy. Second, as will be clear in section 3, Husserl does not simply give up his conception of kinaesthetic alteration developed in this period, but he substantially changes its constitutive function. That is, kinaesthetic alteration, in different terms like *Hineinbewegung*, *Versetzung*, *Hineinversetzung*, *Hineindenken*, etc., serves the purpose of sense-transfer rather than that of self-physicalization. Husserl insists that it is by means of one’s own kinaesthetic alteration that one can make intelligible the *sense* in which the foreign body is another lived body and bears a genuinely alter perspective.

Nevertheless, the argumentation for physiomorphic similarity, as Husserl realizes in the 1920s, faces several difficulties. For one thing, “the way I apprehend my body as being for-the-Other” does not coincide with “the way I apprehend the Other’s body as being-for-me.” As Kozlowski acutely points out, the Other’s physical body can be given to me as fully as possible, given the proper distance and circumstances; by contrast, my own body in my nearest sphere can only be partially given to me, as long as I do not have *visual* access to some parts of my body, such as my back, for instance (Kozlowski, 1991, p.113; cf. Hua 14/239, footnote 2; 14/473, 522, 527). As Husserl admits in *Ideas II*, mere visual modality cannot give rise to the full-fledged constitution of the *physical* body, much less the *lived* body (Hua 4/150[158]). Hence, insofar as bodily physiomorphy is concerned, one’s own body can at best approximate a partial overlapping with the foreign body, but is far from the required external coincidence.

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22 Here is a note written in 1922 where Husserl argues against Lipps’ analogical theory of empathy: “er [Leib] sich in dieser doppelten Weise und als Einheit dieser doppelten Weise konstituiert, das setzt eben schon voraus (oder dass er als diese Einheit erfahrungsmässig und ursprünglich sein kann) die Mitwirkung der Erfahrung vom Andern. Es ist klar, dass ich und jeder, der einen Leib als Leib und als volles Ding erfahren kann, die Erfahrung vom Andern hat” (Hua 14/238).
For another thing, there is a more serious problem. Husserl’s similarity thesis cannot bridge the gap between the Other’s body given as Körper and that given as Leib. More specifically, if the similarity in question is exclusively restricted to the scope of physical appearance, then it would be, as Kozlowski holds, “impossible to empathize with the layer of the psychical in the physical body” (Kozlowski, 1991, p. 112; original italics). Notwithstanding his Cartesian interpretation of Husserl, Kozlowski is still alert to the above difficulty; that is, by such an account, Husserl could only tackle the physical givenness of the Other, and could hardly say anything positive about the particular givenness of the Other’s subjectivity, because it is not taken into account in the similarity thesis. A self-critique written in the 1920s shows that Husserl becomes aware of this difficulty: as he writes, “inwiefern ist nun doch mein Leib, und in Notwendigkeit, Körper „wie ein anderer“ und ermöglicht so nicht nur überhaupt Ähnlichkeit mit andern Körpern innerhalb der Gattungsgemeinschaft Körper, sondern solche Ähnlichkeit, dass ich zu einer Appräsentation eines andern Leibes und Subjekts kommen kann, und wie ist diese neuartige Apperzeption geleitet von der Apperzeption „mein Leib“, wie ist die Apperzeption „anderer Leib“ und „Mensch dort“ möglich?” (Hua 13/273; my italics) This sort of new apperception requires a revised account of the similarity thesis, which Husserl constantly speaks of in connection with “the second/foreign lived corporeality” [der zweite Leibkörper].

In the years 1926/27, Husserl comes up with a more satisfying solution by considering the bodily givenness delineated by tactile experience, so as to distance himself from the visual model of bodily givenness. He questions whether or not his “old interpretation” (Hua 14/522) of visually modeled similarity can sufficiently account for the Other’s bodily similarity to one’s own, given the fact that the Other’s body not only behaves in a similar way to how I would behave, but also behaves in such a way that it indicates an interiority that makes the behavior meaningful. Along with this basic observation, Husserl’s conception of the similarity issue introduces

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23 To be noted, in a footnote in Ideas II, Husserl briefly mentions another solution, that is, the self-produced voice serves as the first bridge of empathy before the child has developed or can develop other forms of sensory similarity, such as visual or tactual similarity (Hua 4/96[1-01]; cf. de Preester, 2008, p.134). However, given the priority of tactuality over other sense modalities, such as vision or hearing, in the whole discussions of bodily constitution (Hua 4, §36, §37), it is reasonable to think that the observation concerning vocalization is either of editorial interest or another example of the experimental character of Husserl’s philosophic work.
something significantly different. “Ist nun das Wesentliche dies, eben dass nicht eine blosse starre ruhende Dingähnlichkeit da ist, auch nicht eine blosse Ähnlichkeit des Gehabens von Dingen, denen ich bloß zusehe, also nach ihres Sich-verändern und der Kausalität ihrer Veränderungen. Sondern eine Ähnlichkeit eines „Gehabens” mit meinem leiblichen Gehaben als leiblichem” (Hua 14/284; my italics; see also Zahavi, 2012, p.238ff). However, the problem is still “how”: how can one, besides the visual similarity, articulate a second similarity between the Other’s behavior and one’s own? Does it make any phenomenological sense to talk about a second similarity that is not visually given? What makes the situation even more difficult is that, in order to block possible circularity, the similarity in question should be originally given or perceived, without reference to any comparison or other forms of intentional accomplishment that already presuppose the performance of empathy.

Along with his rethinking of the similarity issue, Husserl develops a pivotal distinction, i.e., the distinction between homogeneous or objective space and oriented or surrounding space. Oriented space first of all always pertains to my side, a space that is directly reachable by means of setting kinaestheses in motion, such as stretching out my hands, turning my head around, moving myself over there, and so forth. Husserl constantly talks of the oriented space as a near-field [Nahfeld] that is always reachable through the tactual sense. The lived-body stands out in the near-field as the nearest, most intimate sphere. It is the null-sphere [Nullsphäre], in contrast to which everything else is given in the outer-sphere. There would simply be no “there,” and thus no object given in the mode of “there,” if my lived body together with all its quintessential characteristics devolved into a mere physical thing, that is, if I no longer enjoyed my bodily givenness as “here,” and if I lost the capacity of moving around. It is by virtue of bodily kinaestheses that I can appropriate any spatial position “there” and make it a bodily “here.” In other words, it is by virtue of kinaesthetic de-severance [Entfernungskästhesen] that I am allowed to approach the more or less vague spectacle in the far-field and then bring the objects therein into the near-field, eventually making them touchable. As Husserl puts it,

“indem aller Seinsinn von Aussendingen zurückbezogen ist hinsichtlich aller ontischen Gegebenheitsweisen, der orientierten, auf die Nahsphäre der Berührbarkeit und Greifbarkeit, der praktischen, unmittelbaren
Vermöglichkeit des Schiebens, Stossens etc., sind alle Aussendinge - immer in der Primordialität, im Rahmen meiner eigenen originalen Erfahrung - eo ipso zurückbezogen auf meinen berührenden Leib” (Hua 15/309).

“Jedes Nahding der „Aussenwelt“, das sei es aktuell tastend wahrgenommen ist order ohne weiteres, etwa durch Austrecken der Hand, bestastbar ist. Aber Ferndinge sind für mich auch erreichbar, nämlich durch Gehen” (Hua 14/511-12).

Stated differently, my tactile experience articulates a sphere – a null-sphere and near-sphere as well – to which the remote-sphere and objects therein constantly refer back.

By contrast, homogeneous or objective space has a fundamentally different sense of being. It is a space in which all objects are scientifically determined such that they are not only exactly measurable but also manipulatable as well. My computer, for instance, is no longer considered as a tool I am working with, a tool helping me out of various problems; rather, it is simply taken as an assemblage of separated items like CPU, memory, etc.. Similarly, my lived body is no longer perceived in the mode of “here”; rather, it just possesses an arbitrary spatial point that can be exactly pinpointed and navigated by using some measuring device, such as a global positioning system. The lived body in this sense completely regresses into a mere physical thing.24 In homogeneous space, there is no more distinction between “here” and “there,” “up-side” and “down-side,” “right” and “left,” and “back” and “front,” because to talk about these distinctions already presupposes and refers back to a “kinaesthetic here.” In this regard, each objective point is so qualitatively indifferent to others that we can in principle substitute one body with another body without causing any conflict. Thus, my body is not different at all from other people’s bodies regarding the way in which it is given: “my lived body is therewith [damit] such a

24 See Husserl’s own words: “die Reduktion meiner Erfahrungswelt auf meine original erfahrbare führt zwar zur original von mir erfahrenen Natur, aber Natur in einem subjektiven Modus und nicht als homogene Natur, in der der eigene Leib und die „Aussendinge“ gleichstehen. Die notwendigen Besonderheiten, in denen mein Leib in der originalen Erfahrung von anderen für mich erfahrbarer Dingen unterschieden ist, bedingen es, dass mein Leib keine Bewegung im Raum in demselben Sinn zulässt, der zu jedem anderen als offene Möglichkeit gehört” (Hua 14/413).
physical body through and through that it is so well similar to any other physical body, and vice versa” (Hua 14/514). In other words, the lived body is nothing other than a physical being, and bodily behaviors are bereft of any subjective significance. “Wir eine Welt von Körpern haben mit Wesenseigenheiten, alle Körper haben können, und Menschen (Tiere) haben, die durch „Seelen“ ausgezeichnet sind, fast als ob es nur eine besondere Dingklasse, ein besonderer Typus wäre mit besonderen Klasseneigenschaften, wie etwa Holz und Eisen” (Hua 15/309-310; italics added). We can gauge the speed of bodily movement and predict where the body will be, provided that basic information such as velocity and time is already given. Nevertheless, there is no genuine room for a subjective, lived body with its corresponding internally given movement, insofar as it is, by definition, ruled out of the picture of homogeneous space. Ultimately, Husserl writes: “er [Leib] wirklich jeden äusseren Körper gleichsteht, und korrelativ jeder äussere Körper ihm – wenn also der ursprüngliche Gegenstanz von Nullkörper und Aussenkörper in einem homogenen Körperbegriff zur Aufhebung kommt, ebenso wie der Begriff des Nullraumes und des äußeren Raumes” (Hua 14/513). This state of bodily-being obviously amounts to what Husserl labels as a sort of “self-forgetfulness”: it is at its core an outcome of the naturalistic attitude toward our embodied existence in the world such that the lived body becomes a purely physical organ (Hua 4/184[193]).

The distinction between homogeneous and oriented space proves highly decisive,25 because it makes clear for the first time where the similarity issue takes its footing. More specifically, Husserl’s new account of the similarity issue can only be carried out in the oriented space, insofar as the Other’s lived corporeality authentically manifests in different manners from those by which mere physical entities manifest. Furthermore, the distinction also allows us to genuinely talk about difference in addition to similarity, i.e., what inherently discriminates foreign bodily givenness from our own bodily givenness. Mere physiological differences cannot serve this purpose, not because one body can be operated on and amended in order to more or less resemble somebody else, but because exclusive physical givenness offers no clue into the genuine givenness of the foreign subjectivity, as we have argued.

25 The importance of the oriented sphere will be even clearer when it comes to the issue of empathic contextualization and the Other’s passive emergence, as I will discuss in chapter 2.
Indeed, a phenomenological exposition of bodily givenness not only makes this move possible but also makes it necessary. On the one hand, the fully constituted lived body demonstrates its genuine ways of givenness, i.e., the twofold manifestations originally given in and through tactile experience. On the other hand, given the priority of tactility over visuality in respect to bodily constitution, we need to seriously consider the authentic givenness of the Other’s body within the realm of tactile experience, instead of visual experience. In other words, we do not primarily inspect the foreign body like a non-involved observer; rather, we first and foremost establish contact – physical or otherwise – with others, namely, we interact with them.

In this regard, we can further explicate the Other’s bodily givenness in the near-field that is, to be sure, primarily articulated by tactual sense. As a note written in 1922 documents, “wir haben nun in Bereich der Nähe, was eine Möglichkeit ist, eine Ding, das unseren Leib [...] äusserlich gleich oder ähnlich ist. Offenbar wird eine solche Ähnlichkeit direkt wirksam, vor allem tastmässig, hinsichtlich einzelner Organe auch visuell” (Hua 14/239). Among various manners of the Other’s bodily givenness in the oriented sphere, we can single out a particular phenomenon, i.e., “hand-shaking.” It is by means of explicating this phenomenon that we can, as I will demonstrate, properly account for the similarity issue.

To begin with, to shake hands with another person is obviously different from touching one’s own right hand with one’s own left: at the very least, we do not have the unique double-sensation that only happens when we put our own hands together. However, when we shake hands with another person, we do have something *prima facie* too prevalent to be ignored. To stretch out my hand already signals a gesture of hospitality: I am “greeting” you, be it willingly or otherwise; I am not evading or eschewing meeting you. When coming into contact with you, I can by shifting my attention find the normal series of sensing and sensation. I feel that I am sensing the warmth, texture and tenderness of your palm. In the meantime, I also feel that I am being gripped, firmly or not, by you. I am subject to something that can neither be derived from me nor can be reduced to me. I find in my own sphere of tactual

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26 See Husserl’s own words, “a subject who solely has the visual sense cannot at all have the appearing lived body” (Hua 4/150[158]).

27 De Warren (2009, p. 235ff), to be noted, has a different use of this phenomenon.
experience an “intruder,” an encroachment, in and through which I am revealed to myself as being encroached upon by a foreign subject, another person, whilst I am also revealed to myself as a subject greeting the very foreign subject. However, the encroachment does not “degrade” or devalue me into an object, nor do I objectify the other person by grasping his hand, as Sartre would suggest in his analysis of the “look.” Indeed, two physical hands belonging to two anonymous persons do not engender an encounter as such. Still, the givenness of the Other’s body remains asymmetric to that of my own body: the Other’s subjectivity is revealed to me by means of my being gripped by the Other, whereas my own subjectivity is immediately given or felt from “within,” in a somatological way, so to speak. I can never stand on a par with the Other insofar as the Other’s subjectivity is not as immediately and originally given to me as is my own subjectivity. The Other’s subjectivity is in principle “invisible” to me, yet not in the same way as my own subjectivity is “invisible” to me. I directly live in and through my lived body, while I can only experience the Other’s lived corporeality in a mediately way, e.g., by being touched or caressed by her (Cf. Levinas, 1969, p.257-58).

To make the issue concise: I experience in the handclasp not only similar physical determinations of the Other’s body, such as softness of the skin, the shape of the palm, and warmth of the body, all of which I can find similar correspondence to in or on my own body. More importantly, I experience the Other’s subjectivity or interiority by virtue of my being held or encroached upon by the Other. The lived aspect of the Other’s body is originally present and necessarily given such that the handclasp can be reckoned as handclasp. My shaking-hands-with a stationary statue is not a genuine form of handshaking; it is at best a derivative form.

In some manuscripts, Husserl characterizes the form of concrete encounters, like the handclasp, as an encounter that happens at the same level of ego, rather than as an encounter that happens through the objectifying gaze where my own ipseity and the Other’s alterity come into constant conflict or “war,” as it were, and where either my ipseity or the Other’s alterity would ultimately degenerate into a form of pure objectivity or anonymity. In Husserl’s view, this is not the primal case of encounter, i.e., the encounter within the oriented sphere. Instead of denying the Other’s alterity primordially, my intentional relation with her stays open to her very alterity: as Husserl writes,
“the human as an experiential object is always and necessarily a face-to-face ego, a Thou (opposite-Ego, Other, alter), appresented according to the equal level [Ebenbild] of ego, subject of an opposite lived-body” (Hua 14/78; italics altered; cf. Hua 1/125[94]).

“The direct engagement, or better, ‘touching,’ primordial contact [Konnex] between I and Thou comes into being in the primordially experiencing empathy: we have the primordial experience of standing-face-to-face with each other [Einander-gegenüberstehens]” (Hua 14/166-67).

To recapitulate, Husserl’s consideration of the similarity issue undergoes significant development between the years 1914/15 and 1926/27, along with a change of focus from visual modality to tactual modality. Accordingly, Husserl not only ponders upon the physical similarity between one’s own body and the foreign body and seriously considers the difficulties therein, but he also illuminates a genuine form of similarity that mainly explicates the sense in which the Other’s lived corporeality is given in similar modes, and the sense in which such modes should also be discriminated from the modes of one’s own bodily givenness. As we shall see shortly, only with the second conception of similarity can Husserl’s account of empathy be truly motivated.

3. Sense-transfer and the Other’s body

In the last section, we spelled out the sense in which the Other’s body is given in similar ways with one’s own body. The Other’s lived corporeality [Leibkörper] is not merely given as a physical entity but rather as “a second lived body.” One might object that, if the Other’s body is already given as “a second lived body,” is it necessary to adopt an account of sense-transfer, so as to explain “how we perceive the Other’s body as animated”? It would seem to beg the question, simply because we presuppose what we are about to prove: the animation of the Other’s body is already presumed as the explanation (i.e., sense-transfer) begins. However, I believe it makes good sense to carry out a further move. A phenomenological explication is not only concerned with the “what” of its subject matter but is, more importantly, by and large oriented to the “how” of its subject matter, i.e., how something originally presents itself to an intending subject. With regard to the “what” of the Other’s body, Husserl
himself is very consistent, as he constantly proclaims: “eine Grundvoraussetzung ist: Der fremde Leibkörper ist ähnlich meinem Körperleib” (Hua 13/270; my italics). The difficulty, nonetheless, consists in clarifying the “how” problem: how our empathic perception is motivated by the implicit play of similarity or, better, how we perceive a foreign body as animated. Thus, the difference between the “what” and the “how” is quite straightforward. The rest of this chapter focuses on the latter problem along with a re-examination of Alfred Schutz’s critiques.

In the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl is deeply occupied by the problem of the Other at large, ranging from the objection to solipsism, the problem of the passive constitution of empathy, to higher orders of intersubjectivity, such as the establishment of community, society and ultimately human history. Among them, the constitution of the foreign body through sense-transfer is normally conceived of as Husserl’s proto-model of empathy, i.e., how one can empathize with others’ conscious life through analogizing apperception. Husserl’s own intent, I think, is more specific: that is, how we can phenomenologically make intelligible the sense of the Other’s body as animated (Cf. Hua 1/151[122], 153[124]), while the other’s conscious life as a whole belongs to “the higher psychic sphere” (Hua 1/149[120]).

Husserl’s argument proceeds through three steps or, better, his argument includes three interwoven aspects. In ordinary perceptual experience, I always find

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28 Generally speaking, I am in line with David Carr with regard to the constitutional problem of the Other in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. The main concern in the fifth Meditation is neither a metaphysical problem, i.e., the problem of whether or not other minds exist at all, nor is it an epistemological problem, i.e., the problem of justifying within oneself the belief of the Other’s existence. To be sure, neither of them is of primal interest to Husserl. The existence of alter ego is already given, although in the status of being “bracketed,” and the experience of alter ego is de facto and thus needs no further justification (Hua 1/150[121]). The phenomenological task therefore is rather to make “phenomenological sense” of alter ego’s being-for-me-ness and the manner in which alter ego is given or fashioned in my subjective life (Cf. Carr, 1987, 45ff; Hua, 1/120[87-88]). For Husserl, to make “phenomenological sense” of the Other is the most pertinent and difficult task (Cf. Hua 1/122[90], 150[121]).

29 Among many critics of Husserl’s theory given in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Alfred Schutz still enjoys high credit not only because of its first systematic examination of Husserl’s theory but also because of his “mundane” alternative to Husserl’s transcendental approach to intersubjectivity. For a fuller analysis of both Husserl’s transcendental approach and Schutz’s mundane alternative, see Zahavi (2001, p. 22ff).

30 Klaus Held, by contrast, thinks that Husserl’s argument consists of four steps, including “passive pairing” as the preliminary step; see Held (1972, pp. 33-34). This somehow becomes a standard view in the literature. So far as analogizing apperception is concerned, I think it can be fully articulated
the Other’s body “in flesh and blood” [leibhaftig], a body that bears similar features to my own: it has rhythmically dynamic limbs, a physiognomic face, and somatic conducts (Cf. Hua 1/139[109]). And this body, from the very outset, is a body belonging to another Ego rather than mine: “if we stick to our de facto experience, our experience of someone else as it comes to pass at any time, we find that actually the sensuously seen body is experienced forthwith as the body of someone else” (Hua 1/150[121]; cf. 1/122[90], original italics). But here serious questions already arise. First, why do I just single out the human body as my empathic object rather than, say, a swimming fish or flying bird that is more or less an ego-like being? Related to this is the question: what if the perceived body turns out to be a mannequin or wax figure that perfectly resembles a real person? In other words, shouldn’t there be a motive for taking the Other’s body to be a human body? Second, suppose that I do have the motive, then how can I within my own-most sphere experience the Other’s body as animated or, better, in what kind of manner is this animation given to me? Third and most importantly, suppose that I do perceive this body as animated, would such a perception rather turn out to be a solipsistic illusion such that the body is actually a duplication of my own? That is, how can I maintain the self-Other differentiation in and through this particular apperception? To be sure, I can fantasize to myself that I am now standing over there, where the Other is presumably possessing, but how can I then legitimately claim that the body belongs to a foreign ego other than mine?

Indeed, we do need a motivation. One may suggest that this motivation is of the same kind as the actual perception of an object’s currently given profile, which motivates subsequent perceptions of other unseen profiles (Cf. de Preester, 2008, p.135). Despite its seeming cogency, this suggestion is not sufficient for the motivation of perceiving the Other’s body as a human body, because, by definition, one may simply move around the Other’s body without taking its egoic feature into consideration. Thus, the motivation must be anchored somewhere else. As said earlier, Husserl himself takes bodily similarity to be the enabling condition of empathy (Hua 14/281; cf. Hua 14/131): as he writes, “ich habe, wenn ich einen fremden Leib, eine fremde Hand als Hand „sehe“, ein äusseres Ding ähnlich meiner Hand in gewisse
Stellung derselben, [...] und das alles ist durch die Ähnlichkeit motiviert als Analogon” (Hua 14/163; cf. Hua 1/140[111]). It is by the similarity inherent in my perceptual experience of the Other’s body that I am motivated to “see” or take the Other’s hands as groping hands, feet as walking feet, and the sequence of her movement as something indicating an “internal” kinaesthetic series (Hua 1/148[119]).

One might still be skeptical enough to ask whether or not this account of similarity will result in the unfailing focus on human others alone and thus rule out empathy with other forms of animate life, say, non-human living beings (Schutz, 1970a, p.64). If this were the case, as Schutz argues, then Husserl’s theory of empathy would “prove impossible to explain how it happens that this and that body appearing in my primordial sphere comes to be construed as the body of fish or as the body of a bird, i.e., as belonging to an ‘ego-like being’ living ‘in’ it” (ibid). It would be at least a theoretical handicap, if not a total failure, if Husserl could not provide something positive about animal life.

As I have argued, the similarity thesis is concerned with the similar modes of bodily givenness rather than with physiomorphic resemblance (Cf. Hua 15/173). Thus, the problem is not whether we can conceive of animals as living beings; it is rather that, if the similarity thesis as proposed here were missing, could we still establish an empathic relation with these non-human living beings? Husserl thinks we could not. Husserl considers a similar case in an early manuscript, when he considers whether it is possible to empathize with non-terrestrial, human-like beings. He seems to be convinced that, if these beings were like us – mundane human beings – i.e., if they were perceived in similar ways as we perceive ourselves, then “a relation of empathy would be very well conceivable” (Hua 13/218). However, “if they and we had completely different senses such that fundamental conditions of the possibility of empathy were not fulfilled” (ibid.), i.e., if the similarity condition were after all missing, then we would simply lack the chance to recognize them as animate beings, be they human-like or non-human. Husserl proceeds to claim that, it is only on the basis of the proposed similarity that one can bring about real empathic contact with the foreign ego in the broadest sense (Hua 15/102, 103).

Still, the question remains open as to how we come to perceive the Other’s body as animated. Throughout the years, Husserl’s experimental formulations of the issue suffer a form of inconsistency, as we have previously touched upon. However,
he constantly insists that we accomplish this form of perceiving-as, which in Römpp’s view is in fact a sort of “interpretation” (Römpp, 1992; chapter IV.1),\textsuperscript{31} by virtue of our kinaesthetic capacity, according to which our perception is inherently bound with the possibility of converting a spatial “there” into an absolute “here”, i.e., the possibility of going beyond the present standpoint to a potential standpoint from which the world is viewed accordingly (Hua 1/146[116]). In other words, the subject, properly conceived, is intrinsically a self-transcending subjectivity in the sense that “every experience points to further experiences that would fulfill and verify the appresented horizon” (Hua 1/144[114]).

With regard to the perception of the foreign body, it is clear that it is always given in the mode of “there,” in contrast to my lived body, which is given in the mode of “here.” Importantly, my empathic perception is intrinsically articulated by a motivational structure, according to which I could always move toward the Other’s spatial position and appropriate what she would view or orient according to her somatic “here,” as if I were there, perceiving the same entities and me myself. That is, when I perceive the foreign body, my bodily mobility allows me to simultaneously make present to myself the Other’s perspective in an “as-if” manner. Better still, I quasi-take over the Other’s embodied perspective when I actually perceive her body. To perceive the Other’s body, to be sure, is first and foremost to “perceive” at the same time the Other’s embodied perspective to which my body and the surrounding world manifest within a regulated appearance system (Hua 1/146[116-17]; cf. Carr, 1987, p.57; 2009, pp.105-06). Husserl operates with various terms to address the unique intentional feature of this quasi-perspective-taking\textsuperscript{32}: to mention a few, Hingehen, Hineinbewegung, Hineinversetzung, Hineindenken, and Hineinphantasien. As this word-building already implies, these terms are at their core related to or rooted in kinaesthetic mobility. Husserl takes this quasi-perspective-taking to be the “departing point of a theory of empathy” (Hua 14/163), because only by such an intentional act can we make present [vergegenwärtigen] to ourselves what the Other

\textsuperscript{31} I will come back with a more detailed analysis to the issue of perceiving-as or the as-structure of perception in chapter 4.2.

\textsuperscript{32} This view is by no means foreign to Husserl (see, e.g., Hua 14/499, 527). I will specify the sense of this quasi-ness in more detail in chapter 3, in the context of Husserl’s theory of empathic intentionality.
would perceive from her perspective and thereby make sense of the Other’s absolute
“here,” her kinaesthetic sensations, and her primordial world – the lived aspect of her
body (Hua 14/163, 1/146[117]). To be sure, they are perceived in a manner principally different from the way I experience my own lived body. In Husserl’s
words, it is *ap*-perception rather than perception in the normal sense: “I do not
apperceive him as having, more particularly, the spatial modes of appearance that are
mine from here; rather, […] I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance
like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is” (Hua
1/146[117]).

Husserl thus defines sense-transfer at this point: “the assimilative apperception
becomes possible and established, by which the external body over there appropriates
analogically from mine [lived body] the sense of lived body; and consequently the
sense, the lived body of another world, analogous to my primordial world” (Hua
1/147[118], 1/143[113]). Husserl also characterizes sense-transfer as “apperceptive
transfer” and “analogizing apperception” so as to signal subtle differences involved in
this one single sense-transfer: for one thing, sense-transfer is in nature an ap-
perception; for another thing, it is based on similarity and thus shall be aptly
categorized as an *analogical* or *analogizing* apperception.

There are, as Schutz points out, fundamental difficulties in analogizing
apperception. First, what is the intentional feature of the analogizing apperception,
given that it is definitely an intentional act? Is it the same intentional sense-giving as
is conceived of in *Ideas I*, i.e., is it a noetic activity activating or ensouling some
lifeless or meaningless stuff (Cf. Hua 1/148[119]; Schutz, 1970a, p.61-2)? Schutz
seems to argue that this is the case, given that he explicitly assumes that the perceived
foreign body is an inanimate corpse or *Körper* (ibid., pp.69-70), and that sense-

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33 In German, it is quite clear that both terms refer to the same phenomenon: “da in dieser Natur und
Welt mein Leib der einzige Körper ist, der als Leib (fungierendes Organ) ursprünglich konstituiert ist
und konstituiert sein kann, so muß der Körper dort, der als Leib doch aufgefaßt ist, dieser Sinn von
einer apperzeptiven Übertragung von meinem Leib her haben.” And “es ist von vorherein klar, daß nur
eine innerhalb meiner Primordinalsphäre jenen Körper dort mit meinem Körper verbindende
Ähnlichkeit das Motivationsfundament für die analogisierende Auffassung des ersteren als anderer
Leib abgeben kann” (Hua 1/140; original italics).

34 Actually, this is the only place where the term “sense-giving” [sinngebenden] appears within the
context of sense-transfer.
transfer turns out to be an intentional activation by which “I bestow the sense ‘living body’ and more particularly ‘living body other than mine’” upon the foreign physical organ (Schutz, 1970a, pp.61-2). Along this line of interpretation, one can indeed accuse Husserl’s account of empathy as being intellectualist in spirit (Cf. Barber, 2010). A second difficulty consists in the verification question, i.e., how can one justify that the analogizing apperception is not a delusion in that it is not a “putting oneself into the Other’s position” (Schutz, 1970a, p.64; cf. Theunissen, 1986, p. 71, 75)? In other words, how can one maintain the self-other differentiation in and through analogizing apperception? Schutz seems to hold that Husserl’s theory ultimately leads to a form of replacing the Other with oneself, because analogizing apperception, in Schutz’s picture, is a “solipsistic experience” (Schutz, 1970a, p.69) where there is no transcendental clue into what genuinely belongs to the Other (Schutz, 1970a, p.65).35

Let us put aside whether or not it is correct to depict Husserl as a solipsist, and focus on the intentional feature of analogizing apperception, so as to decide whether or not it is a form of sense-giving. As said above, sense-transfer is not an independent mentalization that has nothing to do with the functioning body. Quite the contrary, sense-transfer is better understood as a form of quasi-perspective-taking, an implicit kinaesthetic capacity that is interwoven with empathic perception and that makes it possible to make sense of the foreign perspective. As in the case of normal external perception, the kinaesthetic capacity is motivated by a pre-given series of appearances to such an extent that a possible “other” perspective upon the perceived is also posited along with the first person perspective. What makes kinaesthetic capacity unique in other-perception is that the posited possible “other” perspective is cashed in by the Other’s body: it becomes embodied by the Other’s actual body. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that the perception of the Other’s body is essentially doubled in that, by quasi-perspective-taking, I not only experience a foreign Other but also experience that I am being perceived by the foreign Other. I see the Other seeing me in her perspective: “I see the Other sees me.” It is in the following line that, I believe, Husserl sets the tone of the whole investigation at the opening of the fifth Meditation:

35 Schutz’s own argumentation is a bit tortuous; see Schutz (1970a, pp.64-67).
“I experience them [foreign lived bodies] at the same time as subjects for this world, as experiencing it (this same world that I myself experience) and, in so doing, as subjects experiencing me too, even as how I experience the world and others therein” (Hua 1/123[91]). In short, empathic perception of a foreign subject is first and foremost characterized as a perception of her embodied perspective. Husserl seems to think that only by such quasi-perspective-taking can one come to recognize the Other’s authentic perspectivity. It is also clear at this nexus that analogizing apperception is not an inference through analogy [Analogieschluß] but a perceptual experience through and through (Hua 14/494, 1/141[111]). By means of analogizing apperception, we directly “see” the Other’s body as animated.

Is analogizing apperception, then, a process of sense-giving? The answer is both yes and no, depending on how the term “sense-giving” is understood. For one thing, Schutz clearly holds that sense-giving is by all means a kind of sense-creation by which one endows the foreign physical body with the sense of “lived body” [Leib]; in this case, analogizing apperception is of course not sense-giving. A more charitable reading, however, would render the term “sense-giving” as a form of “sense-explication,” a form of making plain how the Other’s lived corporeality is fashioned in our own experience, if we do experience the Other (Cf. Hua 1/122[90]). In this sense, analogizing apperception is indeed sense-giving, because it is the outcome of concrete phenomenological analyses.

Moreover, can analogizing apperception maintain the self-other differentiation? In other words, how can we make sure that we truly recognize an authentic foreign perspective rather than projecting or reduplicating our own perspective into the Other? This question is relatively easy to answer, if we correctly appreciate the feature of bodily index, i.e., one cannot be simultaneously “here” and “there” (Hua 1/148[119]; cf. chapter 1.2). When perceiving the Other’s body, I somatically remain “here” and cannot simultaneously take over the Other’s perspective in the literal sense for, otherwise, the Other’s perspective would be reduced to mine and “it would be merely

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36 See Husserl’s own words: “ich bin leiblich hier, Zentrum einer um mich orientierten primordialen Welt. Damit hat meine gesamte primordiale Eigenheit als Monade den Gehalt des Hier, und nicht den irgendeines und so auch jenes bestimmten Dort, der sich in irgendeinem einzusetzenden Ich kann und ich tue abwandelt. Eines und das andere schließt sich aus, es kann nicht zugleich sein” (Hua 1/148; original italics).
a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same” (Hua 1/139[109], 1/144[114]). It is by such a conception that the character of alterity finds its genuine root. The Other’s perspective is recognized or fashioned in egoic experience without being “totalized” into the egoic sphere; in other words, close scrutiny of embodiment shows that the Other’s perspective is neither reducible to nor is it a derivable form of the egoic perspective: it belongs to a foreign subject.

To be sure, Husserl himself further develops this line of argument in his research manuscripts, wherein he considers the forms of conflict or dissent (Hua 4/79ff), and possible forms of empathic experience with animals by means of “deconstructing” [abbauen] normal empathy (Hua 14/67ff). For now, we shall be satisfied with the discussion up to this point, insofar as Husserl’s proto-mode of empathy, i.e., the perception of the foreign lived corporeality, is concerned.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued for the embodied nature of empathy by means of systematically articulating Husserl’s theory of embodiment and its fundamental relation to his theory of empathy. By doing so, I not only provided a comprehensive analysis of the self-constitution of one’s own lived body, but also showed that such a thorough self-constitution serves as a trustworthy springboard from which to understand the foreign body and the foreign perspective in terms of the Other’s embodied “there” in particular. As I demonstrated, the lived body plays an indispensable role in ordinary perception; more importantly, its full-fledged constitution and two-fold manifestation in particular primally mediate our empathic understanding of foreign bodily givenness. According to Husserl, the foreign body is first and foremost not experienced as a merely physical, lifeless entity, but as a unique kind of psycho-physical unity from the very outset. Or, in Husserl’s own terms, the foreign body is genuinely experienced as “a second corporeality [KörperLeib].”

As I also spelled out in detail, Husserl’s proto-mode of empathy is articulated by a form of analogizing apperception. As I argued, this apperception is better understood as a form of “quasi-perspective-taking” that kinaesthetically enables the empathizer to take over the foreign perspective whilst maintaining the self-other differentiation. According to Husserl, the “quasi” character of empathy characterizes a special kind of mediacy in empathy or empathic intentionality. That is, empathic
intentionality is neither as immediate as thingly perception nor is it mediated in the sense that the Other’s lived experience is in principle perceptually inaccessible. Empathic intentionality, for Husserl, consists of a particular intentional fusion of both mediacy and immediacy. Nonetheless, how this quasi-ness shall be understood remains largely untouched; and I will take up this issue in chapter 3, wherein I develop in great detail the significance of the quasi-ness in question and tackle the problem of empathic intentionality. As I will show, empathic perception is in nature a form of quasi-perception that is underlined by, unlike the uni-directionality in thingly perception, a unique kind of bi-directionality.
Chapter Two
Contextualized Empathy
– Hetero Affection and Empathic Adverence

One of the important insights from chapter one consists in the finding that empathy has to be originally situated within the oriented sphere, where empathy takes on a genuine form of interpersonal encounter, i.e., the face-to-face I-Thou engagement. In other words, empathy thus understood is essentially characterized by the feature of situatedness; that is, empathy is carried out within a concrete circumstance, a somehow articulate contextualization. This is, however, not as trivial as to say that one perceives another person within a specific social setting, say, having a chat with a colleague in the work place. The crucial point, as I will develop in this chapter, lies in the fact that empathic contextualization anonymously stays in the background yet significantly contributes to interpersonal understanding. More specifically, the context in question always already pre-delineates a sort of ambience in which empathizer and empathizee come into contact and, thereby, serves as the framework for the meaning of the interpersonal encounter.

Let us look at an example for the sake of illustration. Suppose that you are hanging out with friends in an uproarious pub. The light alcoholic aromas casually stir up discussion: the masculine triumph of the Dutch men after their last loss to Spain in South Africa, 2010, and so forth. At some point, your attention cannot help being drawn to a certain corner, as if you were noticing something amazing, something stirring there and glimmering, as it were. Your conversation with friends goes well, yet you just cannot stop attending to that little corner. You find therein a person sitting straight, beaming with an irresistible gleam. The closer you look, the more detail you find: it is a young lady, who has slightly curly silvery hair, fair complexion, ocean-like blue eyes and so on. And you even “read” from her face that she is now enthusiastically talking with her fellows, perhaps also about the World Cup in Brazil.

In this regard, a straightforward question arises: how do you come to notice that particular person, picking her out from the confusing hubbub in the first place? It seems plausible that you just by chance glance at the girl and are attracted by her charming demeanor. But even in this case, how do you pick her out instead of
someone else? Why this person and not another? It seems that the young girl must have somehow stood out from the rest of the bar, so that you can single out this particular person in the first place, as if she were shining out from the background like a brilliant color on a blank drawing board. In other words, that person must have already issued some kind of enticement, so that your regard can be pulled towards her. Indeed, without such a prominent salience, she is just as inconsequential as other strangers and remains in the blind spot of your intentional radar. In this sense, we can refine the question in this way: how does that person become salient in your perceptual field in the first place, before you pay heed to her presence? Or, better, how does the Other’s pre-thematic presence in the oriented sphere enter thematic focus, so that he or she can be “looked at” or examined more closely? To be sure, only within the scope of thematic focus can one subsequently enact a more cognitive “mind-reading” so as to propositionally explicate how that person is likely feeling, say, “enthusiastic.”

This modus of empathic relation, as Husserl suggests, reveals a substantial stratum of our concrete experience with others; as he writes, “die Situation der wechselseitigen aktuellen Einfühlung kann noch verschiedene Modi haben. […] Es kann auch sein, dass Andere, während ich mit irgend etwas, mit einer Sache oder einer Person, beschäftigt bin, als Menschen in meinem Wahrnehmungsfeld da sind – ich bin nicht auf sie gerichtet, bin nicht in expliziter Einfühlung in sie, in ihr personales, leibliches Sein mich speziell einlassend, ihren ausdrücklichen Bekundungen einzeln verstehend hingegeben” (Hua 15/471-72). According to Husserl, this “implicit” empathy is that in which we are already in contact with others and that upon which higher or more cognitive forms of empathy can have a foothold. Implicit empathy, to be sure, is by no means an empty or insignificant kind; on the contrary, it is already charged with meaning that is first and foremost afforded by the specific situation, a meaning that is triggered by the Other’s pre-thematic emergence.

The pivotal question, above all, consists in how we should account for this sort of implicit empathy. What does the empathic genesis look like? Or, better, how should we conceive of the Other’s pre-thematic emergence in the perceptual field? To answer these questions, we need to consider the constitutive factor of both affection and contextualization. As Husserl elaborates, the Other must have exerted an allure upon the ego so that the ego could after all advert to the Other’s pre-thematic
givenness; that is, actual empathic experience is preceded by the Other’s affecting force, by means of which the Other can stand out from the contrasting context in the first place. This stratum of empathic experience, according to Husserl, consists in a form of passive genesis, whereby the ego passively receives the Other’s pre-predicative enticement without actively directing its thematizing regard at the Other. As I will further explore, the analysis of the Other’s pre-thematic givenness is not only an important contribution to Husserl’s theory of empathy but, more importantly, it illuminates a fundamental aspect of our empathic experience, i.e., the constitutive function of the Other’s affection and of empathic contextualization.

In order to unfold the significance of the empathic context, I will explicate Husserl’s analysis of affection and attention in his *Analysen Zur Passiven Synthesis* (1918-1926) and other research manuscripts. By doing so, I will develop two theses: first, the Other’s passive emergence consists in the Other’s affective force within a specific situation (section 1). Second, implicit empathy encompasses two interwoven factors, i.e., the Other’s triggering affection and the ego’s motivated response, or hetero-affection and egoic advertence. Implicit empathy thus understood contains a peculiar form of intentionality, i.e., feeling, or affectual, intentionality, by means of which the ego pre-predicatively engages with the Other’s pre-thematic presence (section 2). In light of the above analysis, I will give a new account of “associative pairing” in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* and thereby specify a proto-social institution of the self-Other relation at the level of passive constitution (section 3).

1. Affection and the Other’s situated emergence

The emergence of the Other is not *ex nihilo*. Instead, the encounter with the Other necessarily takes place within the oriented sphere, wherein both the ego and the Other are first and foremost given as incarnate subjects. This incarnation feature not only suggests the importance of embodiment but also points to the embedded nature of empathy; that is, due to its embodied nature, the interpersonal encounter has to be situated within a certain sphere where people come into face-to-face interaction in the genuine sense. Nevertheless, the questions how and to what extent the situatedness of the encounter contributes to interpersonal understanding remained largely untouched in the previous chapter. A close examination of this situatedness will quickly reveal the role played by the affective force, by and through which the Other’s pre-given
presence becomes discernible in the first place. As Husserl insists, “wenn ich anfange, habe ich schon „Vorgegebenheiten“. Ohne dass ich Natur als konsequentes theoretisches Thema machte und mache, ist sie doch beständig für mich da, von ihr aus gehen beständig Affektionen aus” (Hua 14/439; cf. Hua 11/164). In this sense, the phenomenon of affection and, correlativey, its situatedness deserve careful analysis, so that we can work out the significance of affection and situatedness with regard to the passive constitution of the Other.

1.1 The up-rise of affection: Contrast in situatedness

To begin with, the guiding clue of Husserl’s analysis of affection lies in the question of how something pre-given in the perceptual field comes into relief, or how something becomes more prominent from within the rest of the perceptual field and then develops into a determinate object that one can examine, explicate, judge and evaluate. Husserl’s analysis leads him to the realm of passivity where, far before one singles out a certain object as such, the object has already stirred one’s perceptual experience in one way or another. Let us once again look at the previous example: the person must have some special “scent” or element that is either so intriguing or striking that it triggers the interest of advertence. That particular element not only draws one’s attention to the person’s futural series of conduct but, more importantly, it accentuates that very person in one stroke, as if her presence drowns out all other voices and figures herself all at once in the perceptual field (Cf. Hua 11/155[203]).

With regard to this sort of passive emergence, we can differentiate at least two stages or strata (Cf. Hua 1/§38, 1/129[98]). On the one hand, there is a stratum

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37 One should note that Husserl’s usage of “passivity” has different meanings in different contexts. As many commentators have already pointed out, two kinds of passivity can be found in Husserl. On the one hand, there is a primary passivity taking place in streaming conscious life, where one can further discern three species of primary passivity that involve no egoic activity: 1) the self-temporalization of the conscious stream, 2) the protention or being-directed-ahead-ness of perception, as well as the retention or sinking-into-the-past-ness of perceptual experience, and 3) the affection or affective force that comes from the object’s side in the process of sense-constitution. On the other hand, Husserl also considers habitus as a form of passivity, in that acquired and sedimented experience passively contributes to the formation of familiarity and typicality by means of passive association. For further discussion, see Held (1972), Holenstein (1972) and Schutz (1970b). For recent works on this issue, see, e.g., Montavont (2000), Steinbock (2004), and Biceaga (2010).

38 Steinbock (2004) argues that a more fine-grained stratification can even be discerned within both realms of activity and passivity (see also Hua 11/64[105], 9/130).
wherein the person carries on talking with her fellows, eliciting one’s interest, rivaling for one’s attention, without one in any sense participating in or focusing on that person. On the other hand, there is a second stratum wherein the person stands out in one’s perceptual field, so that she catches one’s eye, so to speak, and makes one shift one’s attention from chatting with one’s friends to examining that person, e.g., figuring out the color of her hair, the mood she is in, and so forth. Husserl designates these two strata with two terms, respectively. He describes the latter case as a form of “active intention,” by which the ego is attentively thematizing a certain object, “becoming merely cognitively aware in perceiving” (Hua 11/52[93]); by contrast, he characterizes the experience in the first case as an instance of “passive intention,” in and through which something lying in the background has not yet been thematically explicated or determined as such, whilst it is nevertheless intended or experienced in the sense that the ego is merely living through its enticement without noticing it (ibid.; Hua 11/84[127-28]). To be sure, this is a sort of living through without any volitional or purposeful comparing, identifying, judging or valuing (Hua 4/213[224-25]).

But, before further exploring essential features of passive intentionality, let me say a few words about the founding relation between passive and active intentionality. Husserl holds that active intentionality necessarily presupposes passive intentionality — “insofar as a functioning ego can only exist if it has a possession, and only insofar as the possession must first affect it, to which the ego then reacts: all activity of the ego presupposes affection” (Hua 4/338[349]; cf. Hua 9/209). That is, the ego must have already been stimulated or attracted by the intentional correlate, before he can actively direct his intentional regard at that object. Without the state of being stimulated or attracted, the ego simply lacks the motivational basis to yield to the occurrence of sensuous givenness or, furthermore, to take up an endorsing position, let alone the basis to verify such sensuous givenness. As Husserl states in the lecture courses on Transcendental Logic (1920/21),

“passivity is what is in itself first, because all activity essentially presupposes a foundation [Untergrund] of passivity as well as an objectlike formation [Gegenständlichkeit] that is already pre-constituted in it” (Hua 31/3[276]; cf. Hua 1/ 112[78], 11/54[94]).
It is in this context that Husserl introduces the phenomenon of affection. With a careful disclosure of affection’s genetic process and structure, he develops a detailed analysis of becoming aware of that which is pre-constituted in pure passivity. “Jedes Ich-tue ist Bezogensein des Ich auf ein Etwas, das ihm bewusst ist. Und bewusst muss schon dem Ich etwas sein, damit es sich ihm überhaupt zuwenden kann, und ohne Zuwendung ist keine Betätigung in Beziehung auf dieses Etwas. Die Zuwendung setzt voraus Affektion, aber affizieren kann wieder nur etwas, das bewusst ist, nur das kann auf das Ich einen grösseren oder geringeren „Reiz“ üben” (Hua 14/44). In short, affection must precede and motivate egoic comportment so that the ego can turn towards something external, something foreign. In what follows, I shall work out the genetic condition of affective force and the structure of affective relief.

First of all, it is paramount not to conflate affection with causal stimuli (be they visual or auditory) (Steinbock, 2004, p. 24). Husserl’s interest is not in a sensualist theory that considers external stimuli as isolated and meaningless stuff, and that conceives of sense-constitution as a matter of orchestrating such lifeless or non-qualitative material. On the contrary, Husserl holds that “sheer sense data – and at a higher level, sensuous objects, such as things, that are there for the subject yet are there free of [any] value – are abstractions. Nothing can be given that does not touch our emotions.” According to Husserl, what comes into relief is already charged with significance in that what exercises an affective force is efficacious not only with regard to a meaningful context or what I call situatedness, but also with regard to the experiencing ego it elicits. In this sense, affective relief comprises two inseparable

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39 See Husserl’s words, e.g., “diese identische Ichpol, das Zentrum der Affektionen und Aktionen (auch Reaktionen), ist für sich selbst da, und für ihn ist, wie alles Ichfremde, so auch alle „eingetretene“ Affektion und Aktion als etwas, das selbst wieder dieses selbe Ich affizieren kann” (Hua 14/28). In his book, Self-Awareness and Alterity (1999), Zahavi makes a further distinction between self-affection and hetero-affection.


41 MS A VI 26, 42a. Quoted from Lotz (2007, p. 40), see also Hart (1992, pp. 88-89). Interestingly, Levinas shares the same observation, as he writes, “pure receptivity, in the sense of a pure sensible without any meaning, would be only a myth or an abstraction”(Levinas, 1987, p. 77), and “the meaning precedes the data and illuminates them” (ibid., p.78).
correlata (Hua 11/38[77]). On the one side, affection designates an enticement or allure [Reiz] that is emanating from the thither part of the object; on the other side, affection also involves an egoic tendency, a tendency of complying with and responding to what is luring and, correlatively, a tendency of position-taking, be it either taking-up the allure or disregarding it (Hua 11/148-49[196], 11/75[118]).

One, then, may ask, how does affective force come into relief? Or, better, how does something lying in the background become prominent in the first place? Husserl believes a “favorable condition” must be satisfied, so that the affective force can come to the fore. Husserl clearly insists that prominence has to be situated in and intermingled with the perceptual whole. An isolated hyletic datum is hardly conceivable, nor can it give rise to attractive pull either. As the German term “Abgehobenheit” suggests, prominence entails a contrast with the surrounding environment so that something is “lifted” from out of its context. If something is to affect us and to draw our attention, it must stand out from others in its difference and heterogeneity. To be sure, contrast can more easily attract our attention than similarity and homogeneity, and it plays a more fundamental role in the formation of affection and affective relief. As Husserl observes, so long as there is an affective force in the impressional sphere, contrast “as the most original condition of affection” must have already been at work (Hua 11/149[197], 158[206]), and “affection is now a function of contrast” (ibid.). In short, that which affects must be different enough from the rest of the impressional sphere, so that it can after all “capture” the ego’s interest. In other words, “it is not the stimulus itself which determines the magnitude of attractive force it exerts on the ego, but rather its ‘relative’ height of contrast with respect to the other hyletic stimuli present in the field at any given moment” (Mishara, 1990, p. 38).

This sort of contextual contrast, to be noted, does not amount to an active comparison between different sensuous particularities, given that no egoic activity has yet been enacted. On the other hand, the contrast in question is not an in-itself delineation between different sensuous fusions either, such as that between a shade of green that is on the verge of being a shade of blue. To be sure, however clear the in-itself delineation may be, it does not necessarily constitute a contrast insofar as it does not necessarily “step” into the intentional field. As Husserl’s analysis shows, contrast in the most original sense consists in the variable weight or magnitude of the affective
force exerted by the respective sensuous particularities, because only those that have already more or less affected the ego may entail a difference for the ego.

Let us take a look at Husserl’s favorite example in this regard:

“a melody sounds without exercising any considerable affective force, or if this should even be possible, without exercising any affective allure on us at all. We are occupied with something else, and the melody does not affect us for instance as a ‘disturbance.’ Now comes an especially mellifluous sound, a phrase that especially arouses sensible pleasure or even displeasure. This particularity does not merely become affective for itself in a living manner; rather, the entire melody is accentuated in one stroke to the extent that it is still living within the field of the present” (Hua 11/155[203]).

How should we explain the occurrence of the mellifluous tone? First, it seems unlikely that it is an egoic effort that singles out the particular tone, since the ego has not even been attentive to it. Second, it is also untenable to suggest that the mellifluous tone itself stands apart from the melody and obtrudes upon one’s conscious life. Were this the case, it would be difficult to explain why it is this particular tone (instead of another) at this particular moment (instead of another) (Waldenfels, 2010; cf. chapter 2.2.2). Husserl’s insight is that “what is constituted for consciousness exists for the ego insofar as it affects me, the ego” (Hua 11/162[210]). It follows that the two terms of contrast have already exerted affective force, and that the affective force of one term is stronger than that of the other, or that, in this case, one affective force fosters or propagates into the other. This becomes even clearer if we develop Husserl’s example a bit further. The music I am listening to plays against a background where other sensuous data, e.g., the breathing of my colleagues, the footsteps from the corridor, and the odors of fruit peels in the trashcan, also radiate a stronger or weaker eliciting power, striving to penetrate into my intentional arc, rivaling for my attention. As Husserl puts it, “all of this takes place at the same time, and insofar as we turn to it alone, listening to it, the song wins out”

42 The original German seems even more straightforward: “für das Ich ist bewusstseinsmässig Konstitiertes nur da, sofern es affiziert.”
That is, the affective force of the music overshadows or drowns out other affective forces to the extent that it alone dominates my thematic focus and occupies my interest. Husserl employs terms such as “weight”, “intensity” and “degree” to describe these competing affective forces in the impressional sphere; as he writes, “initially every concrete, particular constituted thing, everything that is constituted in relief for itself and not constituted first through affection, necessarily exercises an affection to some degree or other” (Hua 11/161[209]). With this explication at hand, it is reasonable to say that, apart from the actual affective force of, say, the music, those forces that have not yet become prominent are by no means affectively neutral in the living present; quite the contrary, they are also charged with significance in terms of “the tendency toward affection” (Hua 11/149[196]), and they can become prominent once the necessary favorable conditions are fulfilled. In other words, the series of notes within the melody must have already been pre-affectively organized or orchestrated into a somewhat articulated figuration or Gestalt before it can be “elevated” into affective givenness.

In this regard, we arrive at one of the central theses in Husserl’s analysis of affection; that is, the perceptual field as a whole is charted by various levels of affective forces and, in this sense, it is somehow arranged in accordance with the distribution of stronger or weaker affective strength. As Husserl writes, “any kind of constituted sense is pre-given insofar as it exercises an affective allure, it is given insofar as the ego complies with the allure and has turned toward it attentively, laying hold of it” (Hua 11/162[210]).

The distribution of affective forces, according to Husserl, is not a fixed one, because an essential feature of affective force consists in its “constantly altering affective relief” (Hua 11/164[212]). That is, the affective force of what is prominent at one moment can either fade away, remain as it is, or become augmented at another;

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43 “Dass zunächst jedes konkrete einzelne, jedes in Abhebung für sich und nicht erst durch Affektion Konstituierte notwendig in irgendeinem Grade affiziert.”

44 Here lies a related problem: how should we understand the threshold between what is pre-affectively pre-given and what is affectively given? Husserl’s analysis of affection touches upon the question of the motivational root of affective givenness in the pre-affective background, yet he leaves the threshold question open. For further discussion of the threshold question and how Husserl’s treatment of it differs from the empirical psychology of “the absolute threshold” in the 19th century, see Mishara (1990, p. 40ff).
and, correlatively, what is not yet prominent can step into the forefront once the favorable condition is fulfilled (Cf. Hua 11/417[512]). As should be clear, nothing absolutely affectively inert can suddenly jump into the fore, nor can one single affective force remain permanently prominent in the perceptual field. As Husserl puts it, “we stand in a relativism of affective tendencies” (Hua 11/150[197]). On the one hand, the weight of the same affective force can fluctuate when there is a change in situation (Hua 11/168[216]). As Husserl writes, “an affection that is currently weak will become strong by means of a radiating affection that awakens. Conversely, a strong affection can become week when the conditions upon which this strong affection depends are accordingly altered” (Hua 11/163[211]). For instance, the mellifluous melody may recede into the background if someone suddenly interrupts me, and the interruption is so strong that it simply depresses or inhibits the previously efficacious prominence. On the other hand, this relativism, as Husserl concedes, is by and large due to the (pre-)egoic interest at play at a given moment, be it 1) a current interest, 2) a habitual interest related to sedimented experiences, or 3) some extreme contrast that wins out over all other interests. 45 To illustrate, if I take an advanced training course in badminton and hope to reinforce my badminton skills, then the strategies of setting up rallies and the subtle techniques of actualizing them will be the most attractive since they are of immediate relevance to my thematic interest or, in Husserl’s words, they “belong to the activities of the actually vivid and professional interest” (Hua 15/54). And, if I am watching a badminton tournament, and am by chance a badminton player, then the players’ exquisite net-plays will be more attractive than if I had known little about badminton. That is, the net-plays “remind me of my habitual interest” (Hua 15/54-55). However, if there is a severe disturbance, such as a sudden blast of sound, it might simply break in and drown out all other competing contrasts, before I can make any sense of it (ibid.; cf. Hua 11/150[197]).

At this point, we can articulate the structure of affective relief. As Mishara suggests, this structure is characterized by a dynamic topology of the surface contrast in the impressional sphere. When a sensuous particularity is prominent, it protrudes from out of other particularities and penetrates into the ego’s thematic focus in a

45 See Husserl’s words, eg., “der Seinshorizont ist Interessenhorizont” (Hua Mat 8/35). See also Zahavi (1999, pp. 119-120) and Waldenfels (2004).
given moment; it culminates in dominating the rivaling or competing affective forces. The prominent affective force forms the peak of affective relief, whereas other pre-given and less prominent particularities “form the valleys and the background relative to the ‘raised saliency’ [Abhebung] of the more prominent figures” (Mishara, 1990, p.39). The distribution of the affective force thus makes up an affective topology of the impressional sphere, which at each moment “could be mapped topologically, charted or graphed, with respect to its own unique affective relief pattern of relative contrasts” (ibid.).

A further consequence of the explication so far consists in the fact that we can now articulate “the lawful regularities of the structure of the concretely living sphere of the present” (Hua 11/158[206]). That is, the perceptual field is articulated by a background and foreground structure in accordance with the distribution of pre-affective and affective forces. As Husserl’s own metaphor indicates, pre-affective force is not “nothing” to consciousness; rather, it just arrives at the “antechamber” of consciousness, constituting the tacitly pre-given background of consciousness. By contrast, the particular affection [Sonderaffektion] of what is prominent renders the ego attentive, and makes up the current thematic scope or foreground of consciousness. As Husserl writes:

“in every living present that is looked upon universally, there is naturally a certain relief of salience, a relief of noticeability, and a relief that can get my attention. In this case, we accordingly distinguish between background and foreground. The foreground is what is thematic in the broadest sense. The nil of salience is found in a potentially considerable vivacity of a conscious having that does not, however, arouse any special responsive tendency in the ego, does not make it to the ego-pole” (Hua 11/167[215]).

“In the sphere of the present: distinction between affective background and foreground. In the affective foreground: distinction between the
thematic sphere – what the ego has grasped and has held onto (possibly still holds onto) – and the unthematic sphere” (Hua 11/411[512]).

To paraphrase, in my current intentional room, I am perceptually surveying or presenting what has already been affectively arranged or orchestrated. Nevertheless, I can only direct my attentive regard towards one single object that constitutes my perceptual core, whilst the adjacently given objects horizontally linger around, as it were, without my attentively explicating them. These lingering or environing objects, nevertheless, issue relatively stronger affective forces than those that are pre-given either in the kinaesthetical far-sphere in the present or in the memorial past, as in forgetfulness (Hua 11/171[220]). This does not mean that the latter group of pre-given affective forces is completely affectively null – namely, that the objects therein have no impact on the current perceptual experience; instead, Husserl argues that these objects nonetheless implicitly structuralize or inform the ongoing worldly experience in such a way that they are emptily presented in connection with the current perceptual presentation of the thematic object (Hua 11/75[117]).

To briefly recapitulate, Husserl’s analysis shows that what comes into prominence is always charged with significance and that different affective forces are distributed with various levels of strength in the oriented sphere. It is in this sense that the passive emergence of something foreign in general is by necessity constrained and pre-delineated by its very situatedness. To this extent, not only does the context always implicitly stay in the background but, more importantly, it genetically provides the scaffolding for the meaning of genetic emergence. Implicit empathy, as I will unfold below, also falls within this genetic scope.

46 It is worth noting that this result comes surprisingly close to one of Aron Gurwitsch’s main findings in his magnus opus, The Field of Consciousness (1962/2010), where he divides the conscious field into three constitutive segments: theme, thematic field, and the unthematic or marginal field (Bégout, 2007, p.23). However, whereas Gurwitsch believes that such differentiation is due to changes in the mental “eye,” Husserl clearly holds that the orchestrating structure of the perceptual field has to be traced back to a deeper substratum, namely, the distribution of the affective forces of what is pre-given in passivity.

47 See Husserl’s own metaphoric expression in Erste Philosophie II: “zum Sinnegehalt , mit dem der Raum dieses Zimmers in der Wahrnehmung wahrgenommener ist, gehört das räumliche plus ultra, und gehört der Vorraum mit den bekannten Säulen, Treppen usw. Das ist nicht explicite, in ausdrücklichen Einzelakten bewußt, es ist nicht von vornherein in der Einheit eines farbenreichen Bildes vor unserem geistigen Auge; und das um so weniger, als das Leerbewußtsein und von ihm herkommende Affektionen Voraussetzungen sind für die Möglichkeit eines vollen, und dann anschaulichen Gegenstandsbewußtseins” (Hua 8/147; original italics).
1.2 Pre-thematic encounter and passive constitution of the Other

The foregoing discussion is highly relevant to our understanding of the Other’s passive emergence within the oriented sphere, since it makes clear for the first time the essential constituents of such an emergence, i.e., affection and its situatedness. More specifically, the oriented sphere is fundamentally linked to and articulated by the structure of affective relief, insofar as the oriented sphere is the most immediate surrounding world [Umwelt] where all sorts of beings have already been passively pre-given and where something can present to conscious life in the first place. In this regard, an obvious question arises: is the Other first and foremost given by means of exerting affection upon “me”? If that is the case, in what sense does the interpersonal encounter take place in a meaningful situatedness? And, correlatively, to what extent does such situatedness play a constitutive role in the interpersonal encounter?

To answer these questions, we can firstly take a look at Klaus Held’s classic paper, “Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie” (1972). Here, Held raises a central question in respect to the phenomenological explication of our experience of others: “zu suchen ist dasjenige konkrete Bewußtsein, in dem positional ein Mitfungieren in gleicher Gegenwart kommt, nicht mehr und nicht weniger. Von einem solchen Bewußtsein war aber schon die Rede. Es war die fremderfahrende Appräsentation, in der ein gleichzeitig mitfungierendes Subjekt zwar unthematisch, aber positional mitbewußt wird” (Held, 1972, p. 45; cf. Hua 15/461-62).

Held seems to address at least two points: on the one hand, the simultaneously co-existing other subject in the concrete encounter must have already been apprehended in an unthematic or pre-thematic way; on the other hand, the thematic or positional appresentation of the other subject is genetically founded and motivated by the pre-thematic apprehension of that subject to such an extent that the pre-thematic experience can be brought into theoretical conceptualization. As Held argues, the most original form of empathic experience is not thematic in fashion; that is, I do not act “as an uninvolved observer” when I am, say, shaking hands with a friend (ibid., p.46). The most genuine forms of interpersonal relationships, such as love, friendship, dialogue, conflict, collaboration and so forth, above all, do not amount to a thematic explication of other people; on the contrary, we unthetically or pre-reflectively live
through these relationships, engage with others, and interact with them in these mundane affairs. This does not entail that we can never take an interested stance; we do perform this type of act, but only on occasions when these relations “collapse” and disturb the automaticity of our living experience [das lebendige Erlebnis] such that we need to examine what has gone wrong. In other words, this artificial and cognitively oriented stance toward others is more so a derivative form of rather than a paradigm for our everyday encounter with others (Hua 4/183[193]). To be sure, in most cases, we share our social life with neighbors, spouses, and family members, cooperate with fellow members of a shared social class or union, and so forth. In the concrete circumstances of the social world, “we live with one another, talk to one another, shake hands with one another in greeting, or are related to one another in love and aversion, in disposition and action, in discourse and discussion” (Hua 4/183[192]).

We lead our social life in such a significantly smooth fashion that we may not even be aware of how significant this smoothness is. In the same vein, Held concludes, “die originäre Gestalt der Erfahrung des Anderen nicht seine Thematisierung, sondern das Mitbewuβthaben seiner als des anonymen Mitsubjekts in der gemeinsamen Welterfahrung ist” (Held, 1972, p. 47). And this original form of empathic experience lays the groundwork for higher orders of social understanding, that is, “jegliches unthematischen Miterfaßtheit eines mitfungierenden Ich in einer Appräsentation eine thematische Erfaßtheit dieses Ich zugrundeliegen müsse” (ibid., p.48).

In connection to this, Held believes that a transcendental theory of foreign experience [Fremderfahrung] is genetic in nature, 48 because “an archeological recovering and interpretation” (Hua Mat 8/23) of our conscious life will show that interpersonal experience traces back [zurückgehen] to an intentional stage where “the emergence of the co-subject” precedes “the activity of the ego.” In other words, the thematic consciousness of the Other “from its own side presupposes passive constitution of the co-subject” (Held, 1972, p.50). If this is so, then what does the pre-thematic encounter look like? And how does the passive constitution of the Other proceed in the constitutional analysis of the Other’s alterity? As Held admits, these

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48 For further discussions on various layers of Husserl’s transcendental theory of intersubjectivity, see Lee (2002) and Sakakibara (2008).
questions require “a fully new task in contrast to Husserl’s analysis of analogizing apperception” (ibid., p.50), and we shall take them up in the following discussion.

In light of the previous exposition of affective relief, it naturally follows that, at the most originally passive level, the Other’s pre-thematic givenness to me should be understood in terms of his or her affecting me before I re-cognize or thematize him or her as a foreign subject. As a supplementary text written in 1927 shows, Husserl began at this point to conceive of different levels of empathy in respect to different modes of thematization, and he distinguished between thematic and pre-thematic empathy with regard to different modes of the Other’s givenness (Hua 14/438-39). 49 This line of thinking culminated in his later “ground-laying” project “Phenomenological Anthropology” (1932), as demonstrated in the following passage:

“Erfahrung kann Erfahrung in irgendeinem Interesse sein, und so auch die einfühlende Erfahrung. Alles, was zur Aktualisierung des Interesses gehört, ist bei jedem Akt aus dem Interesse primär oder sekundär thematisch: ich bin darauf gerichtet, im prägnanten Sinne bin ich auf das primär Thematische gerichtet. Erfahrung kann auch ausserthematische Erfahrung sein, und dann bald im vermittelnden Übergang zu thematischer Erfahrung, in solche wirklich überführend, bald schon auf dem Wege dazu, aber ohne wirklich dahin zu führen ” (Hua 15/461).

In other words, empathy “out of thematization” is pre-thematic in kind, and it paves the way for thematizing empathy (Hua 14/439). Pre-thematic empathy, as Husserl further defines, “hat den Charakter des Anrufenden, des Reize auf das Ich Übenden” (Hua 15/462). That is, the Other must have already affected me to the extent that his or her appeal can initiate a counter-act [An-tun], e.g., hearing-to [Hinhören], looking-

49 To be noted, as of 1920, Husserl had already hinted at this distinction by making a similar differentiation between “genuine empathy” and “ungenuine empathy.” As he writes, “die uneigentliche Einfühlung ist die passiv assoziative Indizierung einer fremden Subjektivität, die eigentliche <Einfühlung> das aktive Mittun und Mitleiden, sich ichlich Motivieren-lassen, aber auch im Untergrund den inneren Motivationen Nachgehen statt den Assoziationen” (Hua 13/455). To paraphrase, genuine empathy is an active form of empathizing with others by actively making use of one’s own experiences, knowledge and intellectual capacity, so as to achieve a better understanding of others in a certain circumstance. By contrast, ungenuine empathy is a prior and motivating experience of the Other, without “subsequently reflecting” [nachkommenden Reflexion] upon such a passive or pre-thematic encounter. In this period, Husserl was still “trapped” in a Lippsian way of thinking by comparing empathy with recollection. See also Yamaguchi (1982, pp. 88-89).
to [Hinsehen], addressing-to [An-reden], and so forth. And these counter-acts clearly share the same intentional structure of turning-to [An-wenden] (Hua 15/462, 474). It is in and through the soliciting affective relief and its correlated responding act [antwortende Tätigkeit] that the Other’s pre-thematic presence becomes manifest in the first place, even though the Other’s pre-thematic appeal may fade away, if, for instance, it does not fall within the scope of empathic interest (Hua 15/462).

As Husserl further explains, the Other’s pre-thematic affective relief is intrinsically “unarticulate” [Undeutlichkeit] or “vague” [Unklarheit] (Hua 15/462). However, this feature of unarticulatedness does not entail that the Other is a faceless or anonymous being, nor does it imply that the Other’s affective relief is from the start mute or meaningless. What Husserl attempts to emphasize is that the affective encounter with the Other has not been precisely determined or prescribed in the sense that the exact meaning of the Other’s conscious life has not yet been subordinated to propositional articulation and analysis (Cf. Waldenfelds, 2007, p.23). Nonetheless, the Other’s affective emergence is always charged with significance, and the Other to whom I respond has already bestowed its weight or meaning on the appeal I turn to. It is within this meaning-context that I can further spell out the precise explanation and predication of the Other’s mental life.

Husserl’s analysis goes even further. Affective relief not only concerns the Other’s pre-thematic givenness in the passive sphere but, more importantly, it leads to the problem of the sense-constitution of the foreign subject. With a careful examination of the latter problem, we can more precisely see the significance of contextualization with regard to the Other’s sense-constitution at the passive level.

In Analysen Zur Passiven Synthesis, Husserl maintains that sense-constitution presupposes affection in that what is constituted as such, i.e., as the Other, must have exerted a stronger or weaker allure before the execution of constitution. As Husserl states, “only when the affection beginning with one or more points is propagated as an actual affection under the conditions of concrescence and of contrast, and potentially under the condition of affect – only then does a new formation of unity first come about” (Hua 11/152 [199-200]; cf. Hua 11/153[201]). After all, what is affectively

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50 See the original German, “erst wenn sie sich affektiv gebildet haben, erst wenn die Affektion von einem oder mehreren Punkten aus als wirkliche Affektion sich fortgepfändet hat, unter den Bedingungen der Konkreszenz und des Kontrastes und unter eventuellen Gemütsbedingungen - erst
neutral or null cannot be given to consciousness, much less be constituted as a sense-unity. Accordingly, the Other’s presence can never penetrate into my conscious life unless he or she has affected me before being constituted as a unity with sense, i.e., as an alter ego. In this case, the Other’s affective force on the ego comes prior to, and serves as the condition of, the constitution of the alter ego as such.

However, this line of reasoning becomes dubious once we raise questions such as “isn’t it the case that the Other can only affect me, if he or she has already been constituted as such a unity?” That is, if the Other is not yet a primal unity in the most primitive sense, how can the Other exert affective force upon me at all? To be sure, something that has not yet fused or merged into a robust form of integration seems unlikely to exert any level of affection; or, better, it is so diffused that it can hardly attract any interest, like a drop of milk that fully diffuses in water. Therefore, the Other as an affectual source must have already gained some sort of unity. On the other hand, the Other as a foreign subject, as another being-for-itself, does not consist in any of one’s egoic accomplishments. More specifically, if we assume that the Other is from the very beginning defined as “another” autonomous subject who holds sway over his or her lived body to the same degree as I hold sway over my own, and who perceives the world according to his or her own embodied “here” – which is for me an embodied “there” – in the same way as I perceive the same world from my own embodied “here,” then it seems that the Other as alter ego is by definition independent of any accomplishment of my intentional constitution. In other words, the sense-unity of the Other as alter ego comes prior to, and serves as the condition of, his or her actual affective force on me. Husserl himself recognizes the latter possibility by pointing out that there are “unconditionally necessary fusions that are carried out in a fixed lawfully regulated manner under all circumstances, namely, in such a way that we would have to consider that even if affection were to be everywhere functional, no matter to what degree, it could not exercise any special accomplishment on the formation of unity” (Hua 11/159[207-08]). In short, the sense-constitution of the
Other as alter ego is independent of affection; yet, the Other has already been constituted such that he or she can impose an affective allure upon me.

Thus, we seem to face a vicious circle; that is, sense-constitution of the Other presupposes the Other’s affective relief, whereas it is equivalently conceivable that the Other’s affective relief in turn presupposes that the Other has already been constituted as a sense-unity such that it could exert an affective force on me in order to be constituted (Cf. Yamaguchi, 1982, p.45; Steinbock, 1995, p.154). Husserl himself obviously notices the circularity with regard to the sense-constitution and affective relief of what is foreign [Ichfremd] in the broadest sense (Hua 11/153[201], 159-60[207-08]), and he admits that this question is “difficult to answer.”

This circularity proves pivotal for understanding not only the significance of empathic contextualization but for understanding Husserl’s constitutional theory of the foreign subject as well. Working from a different perspective, Michael Theunissen (1965/1986) warns us that Husserl’s constitutional theory of the Other inevitably leads to a logical predicament in that the Other as a self-constituting subject is constituted by another self-constituting subject, i.e., the transcendental ego. Thus, how can we make the following phenomenologically intelligible, namely, that the transcendental ego constitutes a foreign ego that is at the same time constituting and constituted (Carr, 1987, p. 52; Theunissen, 1986, p. 161ff)? If Husserl’s constitutional theory of the Other cannot get rid of the circularity problem — which Theunissen believes Husserl cannot — then his transcendental approach to the Other can hardly get off the ground and, thus, a different approach, such as Schutz’s “mundane” or Buber’s I-Thou communicational approach, must be adopted.

As far as I can see, however, it would be too quick to accept the conclusion that Husserl’s constitutional theory of the Other is in nature characterized by logical circularity, and the quick substitution of other approaches for Husserl’s theory might

51 For further discussions, see Steinbock (1995, p. 155ff), Bégout (2000, pp. 188-198), and Biceaga (2010, pp. 38-41).

52 To do justice to Theunissen, his argument is mainly based on a Schutzian reading of Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception. Furthermore, Theunissen seems to also employ a particular interpretation of the operative concept, “constitution,” that is, he seems to think that “constitution” in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology amounts to “creation.”

53 For more details on this, see Zahavi (2001), Theunissen (1986) and, most recently, Lee (2006).
largely underestimate and overlook some profound implications of Husserl’s transcendental approach. The logical predicament in question is “harmless” if its underlying base is taken into proper account. That is, we need to consider once again the problem of reduction, the methodological stance that serves to delineate the realm of the self and that of the Other in the first place. The result of reduction is a coin with two sides. On the ‘heads’ side, the Other and all her constitutional accomplishments are deliberately excluded from the ego’s authentic sphere, and the exclusion *eo ipso* results in a “transcendental Robinson” (Held, 1972, p.49); on the ‘tails’ side, what authentically belongs to the Other and her intentional accomplishments for the first time receives a phenomenological explication and, hence, the genuine boundary between that which is one’s own and that which is alien, or between the self and the other, gains a phenomenological explanation (see chapter 5). In this sense, phenomenological investigation in terms of “reduction” is indeed carried out in a zig-zag fashion (Cf. Hua 6/59[58]).

With regard to reduction in passive constitution, Husserl writes: “in our consideration of the lowest genetic level we formulate the problem in an abstract manner that is necessary for a systematic [phenomenology of] genesis: We do so as if the world of the ego were only the impressional present and as if transcending apperceptions arising from further reaching subjective lawful regularities did not play any role at all, as if there were no modes of knowledge acquired in the life of the world, aesthetic and practical interests, values, and the like” (Hua 11/150[197-98]). In other words, what is genetically subsequent, such as concepts, predicative knowledge or sedimentation, must be put into parentheses such that we can illuminate the underlying layer of the original accomplishment [Urstitfung] of passive constitution. To this end, such an abstract reduction results in a twofold achievement: it not only sheds light on how affective relief brings about the Other’s pre-thematic presence, but it also makes it possible to differentiate the Other’s pre-thematic presence into actual-affective and pre-affective presence (Cf. section 1.1).

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54 See Husserl’s own testimony, “it is endemic to the nature of the situation that we can only speak of these lower levels if we already have before us something constituted in activity, ready-make; and if we abstract from activity, then the lower level is at first unavoidably and essentially still indeterminate, so that we can also have the purity of understanding the accomplishment of the lower level only with the successive investigation into the higher level” (Hua 31/3[275]).
The latter result is crucial for our understanding of the circularity problem. The Other’s affective emergence is not achieved *ex nihilo* but rather has already been pre-delineated by the surrounding world [Umwelt] to such extent that the Other’s pre-affective presence is above all a pre-given in the surrounding world, a world characterized by some intrinsic features, such as familiarity and acquaintance (Hua 11/162[210], 15/466; Held, 1972, p.47). In this sense, prior to the Other’s being constituted as such, the Other is always already charged with some sense. As Husserl insists in this regard,

“das Fremde, das *jetzt in erste Kenntnisnahme kommt oder kommen* soll, ist nicht ein ohne weiteres dem konkreten Stil nach Verständliches, ohne weiteres erfahrbar wie das schon Bekannte, im ersten Blick empirisch apperzipiert mit einem Erfahrungshorizont, der ohne weiteres aktualisierbar ist und Kenntnis schafft. Vielmehr ist das Fremde zunächst unverständlich Fremdes. Freilich, alles noch so Fremde, noch so Unverständliche hat einen Kern der Bekanntheit, ohne das es überhaupt nicht, auch nicht als Fremdes, erfahren werden könnte” (Hua 15/432; italics added; cf. Hua 1/113[80]).

Husserl is clearly aware of the complexity of understanding a foreign subject and rejects the idea that we can know another person as fully as we do upon first seeing her. To know the Other, as Husserl’s stresses, is by necessity to know her within an affectual context, which by itself gives rise to a certain sense-constraint of the knowing in question. To use Gibson’s phrase, the empathic context is a sort of ecological “niche,” from which the Other emerges. It is by means of the empathic context that we come into robust acquaintance with the Other, i.e., the “core” of empathic knowability. In Husserl’s words, the Other’s contextual emergence elicits the ego’s attendance, so that “the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here, striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object” (Hua 11/148-49[196]). We may confirm, specify, amend, or even negate our previous understanding; the most important point nonetheless is that such confirmation, specification, amendment and even negation can only apply to that
which is derived from the genetically first acquaintance, the understanding oriented and afforded by the empathic context.

In this regard, we can opt for a “dialectic” solution to the circularity problem (Cf. Bégout, 2007). On the one hand, the Other’s pre-affective presence, prior to its actually affecting me, is charged with some sense, “[pre-]given to us without and prior to our becoming attentive; and yet, [it] has at least affected us to some degree” (Hua, 11/153[201]; 31/5[277]). Nonetheless, this some sense is pre-given insofar as it is vaguely pre-configured by the empathic context (Hua 11/124[170]) or, better, it is non-articulately determined by the correlated context. On the other hand, the Other’s indeterminate sense as alter ego can only become actualized or consummated on the condition that it is in the affective relief or, in Husserl’s words, that “the ego complies with the allure and has turned toward it attentively, laying hold of it,” and that, thereby, the indeterminate sense “has emerged from the obscurity [Dunkel] of passivity; it has become something grasped” (Hua 11/162 [210]; Hua 31/5[277]). If the affective condition were not fulfilled, then the indeterminate sense of the Other as alter ego would remain at the threshold of our wakeful consciousness; and, if the condition of the indeterminate sense were not fulfilled, then the Other would never affect us at all, because without even the weakest form of acquaintance [Bekanntheit] I am simply short of the means or the chance to get to know the Other.

In short, despite presenting a seemingly insurmountable impasse, the circularity problem forces us to dive even more deeply into the phenomenological Sache. The result consists in a better understanding of the Other’s passive constitution from out of the surrounding world. As Gurwitsch once insightfully observed, “what occurs and is imposed are rather pre-scribed by the situation and its own structure itself; and we do more and greater justice to it the more we let ourselves be guided by it, i.e., the less reserved we are in immersing ourselves and subordinating ourselves to it” (Gurwitsch, 1979, p. 67).

2. Empathic advertence and passive intentionality

We have so far explained the Other’s pre-thematic givenness in passive constitution. However, there is a correlated yet largely untouched issue with regard to Husserl’s constitutional theory of the Other, i.e., the passive intentionality inherent in passive empathy. More specifically, critics worry whether Husserl’s theory of
intentionality can do justice to the particular mode of the Other’s givenness. Given that Husserl’s paradigmatic theory of intentionality is characterized as “consciousness of something as something,” would it be the case that by intentionally appropriating the Other “as Other,” the genuine alterity of the Other is simply integrated into a community of “known” sense and thereby deprived of its genuine alterity (Waldenfels, 2007, p.22-23, 72ff)? In other words, would it be the case that in the very process of appropriation the Other is ultimately rendered an indifferent object instead of an alter subject? With further scrutiny of the phenomenon of affection, I believe this is not the case. Husserl’s analysis of passive constitution not only helps to explicate the pre-thematic encounter with the Other but also provides a new form of intentionality that is faithful to both the Other’s genetic emergence and to the Other’s alterity in her appearance or “epiphany” in Levinas’ sense.

Husserl holds that the Other’s affection leads to an egoic counter-part, that is, the affective pull is the correlate of egoic advertence (Hua 9/209; cf. Hua 1/133[80], 14/529), which forms a sphere of primary sensibility (Hua 4/Beilage XII.2). Husserl’s pivotal insight is that this sensible advertence comprises a peculiar form of intentionality, “an unauthentic one, since affective allure has no ‘intention toward’ in the proper sense, for which the ego is required, but there is already a ‘presentation-of [Vorstellung von],’ an apperception” (Hua 4/335). As I will explicate, this form of intentionality is better understood as a kind of pre-predicative intention through which the ego rudimentarily comports itself toward the surrounding world without thematizing it and, in this sense, it is pre-objectifying rather than objectifying, as is the case in the paradigmatic form of intentionality evident in active consciousness (section 2.2). In this regard, passive intentionality is at the fundamental level carried out in kinaesthetic comportment (section 2.1). By illustrating how this is so, I will unfold the sense in which passive intentionality is essentially a form of corporeal and affectual feeling that serves as a dispositional condition for turning toward the Other.

2.1 Passive intentionality and bodily kinaesthesia

Husserl’s analysis of affection surely brings the issue of the lived body into new light. To be affected in the literal sense means to undergo or live through an affective allure and, at the most passive level, the undergoing or living-through is obviously carried out by the lived body (EU, 83[79]). It is in and through the lived
body that one undergoes an affective allure and may comply with it. Husserl himself clearly sees the lived body in this connection as a “suffering body” and the subject as a “suffering subject.” “Das Ich [...] je nachdem als „ich leide durch“ (bin affiziert durch), „ich empfinde da“, „ich erfähre jenes,“ „ich leide im Empfinden Lust oder Unlust, bin passiv angezogen (streбend), bin streбend affiziert von“” (Hua 14/30). Following the same vein, Husserl thinks that the lived body is more than a turning point between, or a union of, the psychical and physical (see chapter 1). He gradually probes into the “underlying ground” [Untergrund] of the lived body in connection with a primitive form of corporeal exposure through which the corporeal subject not only practically comports itself toward the world but can also be passively forced, informed or addressed by what is foreign [Ichfremde] (Cf. Hua 4/335).

From the 1920s onwards, Husserl begins to speak of the full concretization of subjective life, i.e., the monad. As he conceives of it, the monadic ego at the living present serves as the functioning center [Funktionszentrum] of its conscious life, a functioning center that not only emanates an intentional ray but also serves as the passageway through which non-egoic affective force shines in. Accordingly, the functioning ego has two dimensions with respect to its living present. On the one hand, it is active in the sense that it is the ego that thinks, wills, evaluates, and judges; on the other hand, it is passive in the sense that the ego also undergoes external affective forces, “suffers” in the experience of pain or pleasure, and is motivated by these hetero-affections. In Husserl’s words, “der Ichpol ist, was er ist, nicht Träger, nicht Substrat für Affektion und Aktion etc., sondern eben Ich, Einstrahlungspunkt, Funktionszentrum für Affektionen, Ausstrahlungspunkt, Tätigkeitszentrum von Tätigkeiten, von Akten” (Hua 14/30). Stated differently, the egoic pole is at the same time the identifying backdrop underlining all egoic activities and the initial openness to foreign affective force. In this regard, it is worth noticing that to the depth of egoic life belongs a primary form of alterity that the ego cannot do away with; that is, the ego in its full concretization is essentially bound with what is foreign, something radically different from what belongs to or is familiar to the ego. Alterity,

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55 See also, “dem aktiven steht gegen über das passive Ich, und das Ich ist immerfört, wo es aktiv ist, zugleich passiv, sowohl im Sinn von affektiv als rezeptiv - was wohl nicht ausschließt, daß es auch bloß passiv sein kann” (Hua 4/213).

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therefore, serves as a structural component that consummates subjective life in so far as it is that through which the ego has already distanced itself from itself in that, as Husserl sees it, it promises the possibility of approaching something principally new and foreign. The ego in this sense is from the very outset “„in“ seinen sich richtenden Akten, sich richtend ins Ichfremde, das affizierte” (ibid.).

The lived body is directly relevant to Husserl’s reformulation of transcendental subjectivity. The latter should not be merely conceived of as a form of purified self-streaming or self-temporalizing conscious life; rather, at the very ground of the transcendental realm lies a functioning body, a functioning center of action and affection. As early as in *Ideas II*, Husserl already hinted at this point by alluding to the lived body as “the dark underlying ground” of the passive sphere (Hua 4/222[234]) and, in this capacity, the lived body declares itself to be the “natural side” [Naturseite] of transcendental subjectivity (Hua 4/281[294]). Thus, transcendental subjectivity is not aloof from “natural” occurrences but rather, in and through its natural site, it is intrinsically embedded among them (Hua 14/311; cf. chapter 1.2.1).

Then what kind of constitutive role does the lived body play in the sphere of passive constitution? Furthermore, to what extent does this constitutive role contribute to passive intentionality? In his article, “The Problem of Passive Constitution,” Landgrebe suggests that, at the lowest level of passive constitution, the lived body as a constituting organ serves as the “passive structural element” of transcendental subjectivity (Landgrebe, 1981, p. 62). That is, related to the advent of the affective pull are tendencies of bodily movement, by which I can, pre-reflectively and kinaesthetically, either yield to them or resist heeding them. Consequently, the hetero-affective allure will either fall into or lie outside of the scope of my currently wakeful consciousness. At the living present, “the lived body is mediating and so are the tendencies related to it, tendencies to grasp, lift, push, resist, strike, etc.” (Hua 4/282[295]). Husserl also describes this kinaesthetic tendency as a form of receptivity. To corporeally undergo affection by no means entails complete impotency of the lived body; on the contrary, to receive and undergo the affective allure already presupposes a minimal form of corporeal spontaneity or, better, receptivity, as the lowest form of egoic spontaneity or activity (Hua 4/335). As Husserl puts it, “it is a mere receiving of a pre-constituted sense, and further explicating, judging already presupposes this sense” (Hua 31/41[313]).
By corporeal receptivity, however, Husserl not only claims that the lived body re-acts to the affective allure, e.g., the body musclely contracts when a mosquito stings it. More importantly, the lived body as such already pre-delineates and delimits the paths according to which it can react accordingly. To illustrate, let us look at one of Husserl’s examples:

“while taking an evening stroll on the Loretto Heights a string of lights in the Rhine valley suddenly flashes in our horizon; it immediately becomes prominent affectively and unitarily without, incidentally, the allure having therefore to lead to an attentive turning toward” (Hua 11/154[202]) .

The reason why the actual turning toward does not take place, according to our elaboration, is mainly because the light string is not conspicuous enough to divert the walker’s attention from other affective forces, e.g., the thoughts running through his mind, the birds’ chirping in the woods, or even his desire to simply indulge in his stroll. Nonetheless, what is at stake is the operative function of the lived body, i.e., “a passive kinaesthesis that alters the sensuous-associative field, which functions as the background for what I am attending to thematically” (Lotz, 2007, p.45). The way in which I react to, say, the sudden break-in of a squirrel into my consciousness is qualitatively different from the way in which I react to a string of disturbing lights. The difference, to be sure, is not rooted in a mental decision but is largely due to a sort of corporeal “norm,” in that passive kinaesthesis, prior to any attentional deviation, has already been at work to such an extent that it has pre-delineated the paths that the lived body normally follows. In this sense, we can claim that, far before active reflection takes place, corporeal receptivity is already “the first disclosure of the world” (Landgrebe, 1981, p. 61).

As Husserl further confirms, corporeal receptivity thus understood is “the founding presupposition for the possibility of the specific ‘spontaneity’ of the ego, that is, for making possible the position-takings of the ego” (Hua 11/358[441]). In other words, when an affective ray shines in, the ego correspondingly or “responsively” reacts with one position-taking, be it either taking up the affective allure or simply neglecting it. The lived body thus in itself delimits the alternatives such that it can proceed this way or the other. As Landgrebe suggests, the lived body as such has genuine “leeway” [Spielraum] in that it can act either way but can only
act in a constricted way (Hua 14/283). That is, the lived body is at once an opening and a limitation of possibilities; as Lotz aptly puts it, “I cannot simply do ‘something or other,’ or act ‘somehow’; rather, action, movement, and expressions of drives are only possible because they are already pre-delineated, guided in a typical fashion, and to this extent limited or restricted. Thus, the leeway of being-able-to simultaneously delimits and opens” (Lotz, 2007, p. 48). In this regard, the lived body can be seen as a regulating configuration of receptivity and spontaneity, passivity and activity, and it primitively structuralizes our worldly experience (Claesges, 1964, p. 129).

2.2 Passive intentionality and pre-objective advertence

As indicated, related to affective force is the noetic tendency of advertence, a tendency of position-taking, whereby one either regards or disregards the affective force at hand. And such a position-taking is already is “picking out” one specific affective force and attending it thematically. The question then arises: why do I advert to this rather than another affective force, and why do I advert in this way rather than in another? In short, why is one position-taking preferred or privileged over others? By closely examining these questions, we can glean another feature of passive intentionality, i.e., its pre-objectifying feature.

As have been made clear, prior to corporeal advertence, affection has already stirred our ongoing experience in one way or another, and the affective force at hand must be more conspicuous than anything else in the rest of the situation so that it can trigger egoic advertence. Indeed, egoic advertence is a motivated advertence and needs a motivational basis: “to be motivated is to be affected by something and then respond to it” (Zahavi, 1999, p.116). Yet, is conspicuity alone enough for the actualization of advertence? In other words, if conspicuity is “sufficiently strong,” can

56 In a similar register, Waldenfels points out that attention is an original phenomenon (Urphänomen): “the phenomenon of attention starts from the following act: whenever something appears, it is the case that rather this appears and not something else and that it appears in this way and not in another” (Waldenfels, 2010, p.2; cf. Waldenfels, 2004, p.237ff). Lotz accuses Husserl of overlooking the question “why I turn toward something,” by arguing that, in his analysis of affection, Husserl neither considered the correlation between affection and advertence, nor the evaluative feeling involved in the actual advertence. This criticism, however, is not completely fair. Although Husserl did not fully tackle the problem of feeling, he did mention the “co-original phenomena” of Gemüt and Gemütsbewußtsein in passing in his lecture courses, Analysen Zur Passiven Synthesis, and he returned to this issue and discussed it extensively in the 1930s. These research manuscripts are now published in Husserliana Materialen, volume 8 (2006).
it in turn make me branch off from my current thematic interest? For instance, if the volume of the music from my headphones is constantly raised, it will at some point become so strident that it troubles my eardrums, e.g., they really hurt, and I may then have to pay attention to the volume of the music. In this case, conspicuity must be presupposed such that it triggers an ensuing advertence, for otherwise I simply do not have the motivational basis, and it follows that I will not turn toward this particular affective allure, i.e., the disturbing volume. In other words, conspicuity is necessary for advertence.

Further analysis, however, shows that conspicuity alone is only a necessary condition; it has to be supplemented by a sort of “dispositional propensity” so that actual advertence can after all take place. Consider the previous example. One may suggest that the reason why the particular volume attracts me most is that it crosses over a discernible and measurable acoustic threshold such that it causes me to react, e.g., by lowering the volume. In this mode of understanding, the volume is nothing other than a “pure sensory datum” that can be quantitatively detectable yet has nothing to do with “me,” the listener under affection. However, this suggestion leaves open two fundamental questions: first, if we assume this suggestion, then we will face an absurd situation, i.e., “it would be completely impossible to understand why the loudness of the sound could not just be continuously raised without ever producing a reaction on the part of the cogito; during the process, the I would remain indifferent, accepting the gradually increasing level of sound until at some point, the eardrums would simply burst” (Lotz, 2007, p.54). And second, even if it is true that there does exist some detectable psychological threshold, the threshold as such comes posterior in that it already presupposes that the advertence has already taken place, i.e., I have turned toward this particular volume such that the volume itself becomes manifest and can thereby be detected. In other words, the threshold thesis still falls short of the question as to why I have adverted to this rather than that volume.

To tackle the last question, Christian Lotz suggests that we need to consider the “qualitative” or subjective dimension of affective relief. As said earlier, affective force is always imbued with significance or weight, which in turn can only make sense in respect to an experiential dative, a tacit cogito, so to speak. Furthermore, to turn toward something necessarily entails that it is in itself simultaneously a turning-away-from [Abwendung] something else. “As a consequence, affective contact can
only be grasped in terms of an inclination and a disinclination of the I that is affected here, repelled there” (Lotz, 2007, p.52; cf. Waldenfels, 2010). That is, the weight of the affective force ultimately refers back to a “weighting” of the ego, although not a cognitive weighting. In Analysen Zur Passiven Synthesis, Husserl briefly indicates that the weighting in question correlates with a dispositional propensity, in which the privilege of one affective force over others ultimately finds its footing. As he writes: “insofar as the enticement as such means an affection on the ego, which from the perspective of the ego corresponds to a being-drawn, a ‘propensity’ lies in the enticement itself” (Hua 11/46[86]).

However, what does the propensity amount to, and how can we make it phenomenologically intelligible? As Lotz observes, Husserl himself is far from being clear and consistent. Husserl occasionally understands propensity in terms of Gemüt or Gemütsbewußtsein, and he believes that it is as original as affection insofar as it “already plays its constant role in the passivity of the life of consciousness” (Hua 31/4[277]). In other places, however, he characterizes propensity as being a layer of conscious feeling [Fühlen], which “shows itself as a new kind of intentionality” and serves as the transitional path of advertence (Hua 31/5[278]). These characterizations already imply severe questions. First, what is the precise relation, as well as distinction between “Gemüt” and “Fühlen”? Second, if terminological difference is of less importance, a more difficult question seems to be how we can adequately describe the phenomenon of feeling. Husserl sometimes equates “feeling” with a property pertaining to the object side⁵⁷; at other times, he holds that feeling after all belongs to the sphere of subjective life, as previous citations show.⁵⁸ Regarding the latter point, a third question is already in place: if feeling is termed as a new kind of intentionality, then what kind of intentionality is it? Is it founded on the objectifying

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⁵⁷ See, e.g., “it belongs to everything hyl<etic>, as [something] existing for the I, that it contacts the I in feeling, which is its original mode of existing for the I in the living present. Feeling – being determined by feeling – is nothing other than what from the side of the hyle is called affection. Positive and negative feeling – positive and negative affection” (MS E III 9, 16a; cited from Lotz, 2007, p.50).

⁵⁸ See also, “Man kann aber nicht sagen: Vor der Zuwendung ist das hyletische Datum und hat einen Lustcharakter, welcher es ist, vermöge dessen er meine Neugier erweckt, als ob die Lust noch einmal ein Datum wäre, das affizierte” (Hua Mat 8/324).
kind of intentionality, as Husserl pervasively conceives of it as being?\textsuperscript{59} If this were the case, the phrase “new kind of intentionality” would simply be puzzling and self-contradictory. Or does Husserl amend his conception of “feeling,” or “feeling intentionality,” as Steinbock renders it, in the scope of genetic phenomenology to such an extent that he ultimately reaches the view that feeling is not founded on objectifying intentionality but a new and \textit{sui generis} kind of intentionality, i.e., a pre-objectifying intentionality? These questions surely deserve a more fine-grained analysis. In light of genetic analysis, I tentatively opt for the interpretation that feeling intentionality should be understood as pre-objectifying, although Husserl might be right to insist that “pleasure without anything pleasant is unthinkable” and the feeling of pleasure indeed “demands a relation to something pleasing” (Hua 19/404[108]). Yet, this does not force us to equate this “something” with “something definite” or “something determinate,” as Husserl does in the fifth \textit{Logical Investigation} (ibid.). At the level of affective relief, the provoked noetic feeling is far from being a perceptual “presentation” [Vorstellung] as such, and it does not have a proper “object” standing against it. Correlatively, what is affecting is at best something object-like or comprises phases of the object during the constitutional process. To be affected is to be affected by \textit{something which is not yet constituted as an object} (Zahavi, 1999, p. 120). For instance, the painful feeling in the case of hearing the music’s volume increase is discriminably different from the painful feeling in the case of painstakingly searching for the composer of the annoying tone.\textsuperscript{60} In the latter case, we can reasonably infer that a determinate object, i.e., the articulated tone, has already been singled out, and the painful feeling as an accompanying experience must be built

\textsuperscript{59} As Lee (1998) demonstrates, Husserl held this position from the period of \textit{Logical Investigations} to the 1910s. Actually, Husserl seems to rarely abandon this position; for instance, as he says in the lecture courses on “Transcendental Logic” (1920-21), “if an objectivating consciousness is already at hand, if an object is, so to speak, already instituted, a feeling consciousness can be built upon it and can enter into a particular relation with it, into a relation that only a consciousness relating to another consciousness can enter” (Hua 31/6[279]). For further discussion, see Melle (1989).

\textsuperscript{60} Husserl talks about a similar example in \textit{Erste Philosophie II}, where he compares the aesthetic experience of a blossoming flower with a botanist theoretical examination of the flower. As Husserl admits, in the first case, affective enjoyment of the flower’s beauty dominates the overall experience – i.e., feeling intention [Gemütsaktion] serves as the “primal performance” [Hauptvollzuge] and function as the founding stratum of sensuous, affective perception (Cf. Hua 8/100-01).
upon the presentation of that object. By contrast, such a specific object is missing in
the first case, since what is affecting is, to be sure, still at a stage of drawing my
attention, prior to and without my objectifying it.\textsuperscript{61} Hence, what is at stake is that,
although affective feeling is teleologically bound to an “instinctive desire of
objectivation” (Hua Mat 8/331), it is nevertheless different from objectifying
intentionality in kind and precedes such objectifying activity.

Pre-objectifying feeling is, as Husserl indicates, a co-original moment of
affective relief in that it plays an indispensable role in the continuous variation in
weight of different affective forces (Hua 11/150[198]). Genuinely understood, feeling
as a state of being affected is hardly a neutral or indifferent corporeal state; that is, it
is not devoid of inclination. On the contrary, feeling is from the outset determined by
a kind of “evaluative” feature, namely, to have a feeling in one affective status is to
have either a positive or negative feeling. As Lotz puts it, “every affection is linked
with a feeling that passively privileges one affection, lending it priority over others”
(Lotz, 2007, p.50). As Lotz further points out, pre-objectifying feeling needs to be
differentiated into two interwoven aspects: one regarding the noematic side, the other
the noetic side: “on the one hand, a feeling that is directed toward the experienced
value of the object in question as a value-object that contacts and affects me is
involved; and on the other hand, a feeling that is linked with the striving itself, which
lends the latter a positive or negative character, is also involved” (Lotz, 2007, p.51).
To be sure, these “feelings” should not be taken as “two” separate or independent
feelings; rather they are two different facets of one and the same feeling. For instance,
when I am hearing the increasing volume, my painful feeling becomes constantly
intensified. Nonetheless, I can still distinguish between the \textit{annoying} pitch – the
value-laden tone – and the \textit{stinging} sensation in the eardrums – the negative feeling.
This can be clearly seen in a passage from the C-manuscripts:

“Änderung des Datums kann eintreten und eine damit Hand in Hand
gehende stete Änderung der Intensität der Affektion und davon

\textsuperscript{61} In the C-manuscripts, Husserl hints at such a distinction: for instance, “wie steht es nun mit den
anderen Gefühlen, die schon besondere hyletische Daten auszeichnen, und dann wieder Gefühle, die
von besonderen Objekten und Objektgattungen eigentümlich erregt werden, z.B. eine
„entzückende“ Farben- oder Tonkonfiguration (Harmonie)” (Hua Mat 8/324).
funktionell bestimmt die Intensität des Genusses, d.i. eine mir unangenehme Veränderung. Die Veränderung kann aber auch zu einer Steigerung der Lust, des Genusses führen, auch zu einem Auf und Ab in Steigerung und Minderung; wobei aber das Auf und Ab selbst wieder angenehm sein, genossen sein kann, und es kann im Auf und Ab ein Aufsteigen am kommenden, zu erwartenden Auf statthaben usw.” (Hua Mat 8/321-22).

To paraphrase, the variation in affective force can of course reach a stage where it becomes pleasurable or repulsive, and this variation goes hand in hand with undergoing a variation in the feeling at hand, be it either pleasure or nausea, respectively. What truly matters is the fact that it is the variation of the noetic feeling that ultimately leads to an actual advertence, be it a turning-toward or turning-away-from. The increasing volume becomes so strident that my negative feeling of it drives me away from it. In this regard, by shedding light on the deeper dimension of striving and valuing feeling, we can answer the following “why” questions: why I advert to this particular affective allure rather than to another, and why one affective force has a privilege over others. Properly speaking, the valuing feeling serves as a transitional path by which I either take up the affective allure or inhibit the advertence. At the most basic level, the valuing feeling plays a decisive role in the preference of one affective force over others, and ultimately results in the advertence to that particular enticement, i.e., this rather than that affective allure. In short, the noetic feeling serves as the supplementary condition for the actual advertence; as Husserl explicitly states: “die Motivation vom sinnlichen Gefühl geübt: Es affiziert das Ich und affiziert es in Tendenz zu einem „ich bewege“, damit Hand in Hand gehend Steigerung und Minderung des Gefühls und, je nachdem es positiv oder negativ ist und dabei in Zunahme oder Abnahme nach diesen Richtungen, inhibiert es die Bewegung, steigert sie oder mindert sie etc.” (Hua 14/452; italics added).

This result is crucial for a further determination of passive intentionality, i.e., its corporeal feeling. That is, corporeality is not only a kinaesthetic norm that pre-delineates the paths by which the ego comports itself toward the world; more importantly, it is a dispositional condition for the actual advertence to the Other in that its corporeal feeling is already charted with the rudimentary valuing or weighting
of hetero-affection. Thus, actual empathic advertence, the “ich bewege,” is ultimately rooted in and motivated by this primal sphere of sensibility, i.e., the sphere of corporeal feeling. It is in this regard that we can genuinely talk about a form of affectual engagement with others. The Other’s appeal is, at the genetic level, accompanied by a corporeal inclination, a corporeal “like” or “dislike,” so that the Other’s appeal can be ultimately registered in egoic conscious life. In this sense, empathic advertence, namely the ego’s responding to or “answering” the Other, is already a form of position-taking at the affectual level, insofar as advertence ultimately depends upon the status quo of corporeal feeling.

In this regard, we can identify another aspect of the question we started with. It is clear that corporeal feeling serves as the deciding element in turning toward this instead of that person, of adverting in this instead of that way. It immediately follows that empathic advertence is not arbitrary; that is, the turning-toward this affective appeal necessarily entails a turning-away-from other foreign appeals. At the rudimentary level, the empathic response thus understood comes at the cost of turning down other foreign appeals, as it were. Seen concretely, empathic advertence toward the Other is, in terms of corporeal feeling, already a response to this rather than that affection, a response to this rather than that call, an answer to this rather than that appeal. Empathic advertence thus understood consists of a rudimentary form of position-taking or proto-ethics in the form of corporeal valuing or weighting. The position-taking at stake in this sort of proto-ethical feeling intentionality is, we can say, the genetic ground of establishing a phenomenological ethics, a phenomenology of Wert-nehmung.62

3. Awakening as a primary form of empathy: an initial clarification

It is now a received view that Husserl actually develops two fundamentally different approaches to the problem of the Other in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, one static and the other genetic. With regard to the latter approach, Husserl’s key intent and concepts therein are as notorious as they are controversial. Among them, a crucial question, as well as difficulty, is how to interpret the particular phenomenon of

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62 To my knowledge, Bernet (1994) seems to be the first to point to the ethical dimension of feeling or feeling intentionality; Waldenfels (2007) and Lotz (2007) later respectively address the same issue in the wake of Levinasian ethics.
associative pairing [Paarung], which according to Husserl is the axis of the passive constitution of the Other. Thus far, I have deliberately kept silent about this. In this section, I do not aim for a full-scale analysis of the problematic but hope to preliminarily locate it within the scope of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and thereby provide a new interpretation of it in light of Husserl’s later project, “Phenomenological Anthropology” (1932) (Hua 15/Nr.29).

3.1 Associative pairing: a preliminary clarification

Historically speaking, Husserl’s usages of the concept, “Paarung,” appeared in different contexts: one usage appears in 1910/11 in relation to his attempt to capture the idea of proto-society between two Leibnizian monads, i.e., “monads with windows” (Hua 13, Beilage XVIII; cf. Hua 14/295), and the other usage appears in 1920/21 in relation to discussion of genetic association (Cf. Hua 11, §28). In 1926/27, these two lines of conception converge when Husserl tries to find a “genetic” solution to the difficulty haunting the similarity problem (Hua 14/523ff; cf. chapter 1.2.2). This results in Husserl’s first explicit, but nonetheless sketchy, formulation of associative pairing in the fifth Cartesian Meditation in 1929, where the phenomenon of “pairing” is mainly discussed along with the analysis of analogizing apperception. These formulations are, however, not Husserl’s final words, and he developed a more convincing account of associative pairing in his “Phenomenological Anthropology” project in 1932. Husserl believed that, by means of a radical exploration of pre-thematic empathy, we could spell out the phenomenological significance of social institution, i.e., a proto-social communication established by means of associative pairing between hetero-affection and egoic advertence. To be noted, Husserl’s conception of associative pairing is far from systematic; yet, we can nevertheless somehow discriminate a related development in his thinking about the phenomenon of “social pairing” in his later writings.

Thus, it makes good sense to first clarify the term in question. As Husserl explicates, analogizing apperception “intentionally refers back to a layer of primal institution [Urstitzung]” that amounts to the original pairing (Hua 1/141[111], 142[112]), i.e., a primal form of passive synthesis in contrast to higher orders of 63 The earliest appearance of the concept, “Paarung,” is in the first Logical Investigation (Hua 19/46).
synthesis, such as reproduction, comparison and identification. As Husserl defines, the characteristic feature of associative pairing consists of two intertwined components:

1. Two pieces of sensuous data are intuitively given to consciousness by means of their prominence in passive genesis (Hua 1/142[112]). As clear as this may already be, the two pieces of data must be prominent in and through their affective relief.

2. The two different instantiations of affective relief establish [begründen] a unity of similarity and are thereby constituted precisely as a pair (ibid.). In other words, due to the affinity or homogeneity between the two pieces of data, e.g., the red color shared between two red triangles, a form of similarity is instituted and the correlata of the similarity come into a pair (Hua 11/132[178]).

One then may ask what kind of association characterizes the original pairing. In the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl’s answer seems not to be consistent. He tries to illustrate this phenomenon with the example of a child’s ontogenetic acquaintance with scissors; but this attempt implies that associative pairing is a “re-productive” one, and this connection is, at face value at least, reminiscent of the Lippsian theory of empathy insofar as associative pairing and thus sense-transfer as well refer back to the genetically first experience of something.

Further analysis, however, can still bring out the genuine sense of associative pairing. Actually, Husserl distinguishes three kinds of association from one another: (1) instituting or awakening association versus re-productive association, which further includes (2) backward association, such as recollection, and (3) forward association.

64 See Steinbock’s example: when climbing on a rock face, a man comes across a protrusion halfway up his ascent that “suddenly distinguishes itself from all others” because it is charted by another climber who has just left white powder on the protrusion. This white powder not only becomes especially prominent in itself but, more importantly, “it also ‘pairs’ in a transference of sense with another white protrusion, and then simultaneously calls forth a series of protrusions into its nexus” (Steinbock, 2004, p.29).

65 See some of Husserl’s own formulations, e.g., “seine [Körper des Anderen] Erscheinungsweise paart sich nicht in direkter Assoziation mit der Erscheinungsweise, die mein Leib jeweils wirklich hat (im Modus Hier), sondern sie weckt reproduktiv eine ähnliche, zum konstitutiven System meines Leibes als Körper im Raum gehörige Erscheinung. Sie erinnert an mein körperliches Aussehen, wenn ich dort wäre” (Hua 1/147).
association, such as prediction. According to Husserl, instituting association is phenomenologically primary, and is that by means of which he distances himself from the old psychological doctrine of association, i.e., re-productive association, prominent in the literature of his time. By instituting association, Husserl means an intentional encroachment [Übergreifen] that is set into motion once two correlated pieces of data exert affective force and become prominent in the first place; it is then that, through such an intentional encroachment, a “living mutual self-awakening, a mutual intertwined over-laying” between the two pieces of data takes place. To be sure, such self-awakening must proceed in the impressional or living present instead of in past or future consciousness (Hua 11/123[168]). In other words, one datum evokes the prominence of the other such that the two pieces of data coincide either partially or completely with each other, and they accordingly institute a form of similarity or “sameness” between themselves without the ego’s cognitive participation (Hua 1/142[113]). This is clearly different from what happens in re-productive association, which comes into play when an identical and re-identifiable object has already come into being. That is, re-productive association takes place against the background of the living present, and it is carried out by means of calling on recollection. In this sense, re-productive association genetically rests upon instituting association, insofar as the latter lays the groundwork for the former, i.e., it brings about the similarity or sameness between the two pieces of data that can be re-productively compared and identified. As Husserl holds, re-productive association, such as recollective reminding, presupposes a “bridging term,” i.e., something that is already instituted as similar, in order for something present to re-call something in the past (Hua 11/123[168]).

We can accordingly make a further distinction between instituting and re-productive association. Whereas re-productive association takes place in memory, namely, something in the present consciousness re-awakens something in the past or future consciousness, instituting association is operative in retention of the primary impression, that is, awakening affection does not go into the past but remains in the

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66 See, e.g., “wir finden bei genauer Analyse wesensmäßig dabei vorliegend ein intentionales Übergreifen, genetisch alsbald (und zwar wesensmäßig) eintretend, sowie die sich Paarenden zugleich und abgehoben bewußt geworden sind; des näheren ein lebendiges, wechselseitiges Sich-wecken, ein wechselseitiges, überschiebendes Sich-überdecken nach dem gegenständlichen Sinn” (Hua 1/142).
living present, and, in one unitary consciousness, it adheres, or pairs with, another affection that is *adjacently* similar, or the same.

3.2 Associative pairing: the reciprocity of the pre-predicative encounter

But what gets paired in the genetic process of associative pairing? What are the two pieces of correlated data exerting affective force? In the context of §51 in *Cartesian Meditations*, one may well claim that they are one’s own and the Other’s body in their respective physical appearances. Indeed, the physiomorphic similarity between one’s own and the Other’s body is too apparent to be ignored. This line of interpretation is, however, problematic. For one reason, the similarity thesis in Husserl does not concern outward resemblance but similar modes of bodily givenness (see chapter 1.2.2); for another, it is inappropriate to talk about physiomorphic similarity at the level of passive constitution, so long as the Other’s corporeality has not been constituted as such and is far beyond the scope of affective emergence.

Ichiro Yamaguchi instead proposes that associative pairing is nothing but the correlation between the somatic “here” and “there,” because corporeal kinaesthesia is essentially bound with the possibility of “being there” where the Other currently is (Yamaguchi, 1982, p. 97; cf. chapter 1.1.2). Thus, Yamaguchi conceives that the “if I were there” is neither a recollection or a future state of the ego – it is neither a “previously there” nor is it a “futurally there”; rather, it is an immediately pairing perception, a situational apprehension of the co-existence, of the simultaneity, of both lived bodies in the living present, although there already exists a distinction between here and there (ibid., p.97-98). Yamaguchi is clearly highlighting two points: first, associative pairing is not re-productive and, hence, it does not amount to associative pairing in terms of memory. Second, the kinaesthetic system plays a crucial role in the constitution of the Other’s corporeal “there,” i.e., the Other’s embodied perspective of the shared life-world. As Yamaguchi further explains, the correlation between the somatic here and there is not only a reflective explication; more importantly, it is, due to bodily mobility, an “operative” [funktioniert] moment of empathy. In other words, whenever a foreign subject enters my perceptual field, I am already implicitly aware [erlebt] of my own “anonymous embodied self,” and of the differentiation between my own being and that of the foreign other, before I actively reflect upon the differentiation in question. In Yamaguchi’s eyes, such a corporeal pairing is a “pre-
reflective consciousness of the distinction between here and there and of the acquainted modes of corporeal appearances [pertaining to the lived body]” (ibid., p.98; my translation).

Yamaguchi is definitively right to point out that associative pairing constitutes a pre-reflective correlation between the somatic here and there. One may wonder, however, how the Other’s embodied “there” manifests itself in the first place. Isn’t it the case that such a correlation already presupposes that the Other is already present in the perceptual field, standing “over there”? Isn’t it the case that such an associative pairing needs to be substantiated by a more original layer, i.e., the Other’s genetic emergence? I think this is indeed the case. Husserl later on observes, “Voraussetzung: wechselseitiges aktuelles Füreinander-dasein, wechselseitig einer des anderen Innesein. In dieser Situation „wende ich mich an ihn“” (Hua 15/471). In other words, the Other’s givenness in the mode of being there presupposes that the Other’s pre-givenness has already affected me to the extent that “I turn toward him.” Husserl seems also address this point in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, when he writes, “in dem uns besonders angehenden Fall der Assoziation und Apperzeption des alter ego durch das ego kommt es erst zur Paarung, wenn der Andere in mein Wahrnehmungsfeld tritt” (Hua 1/143; italics added). As Husserl elaborates, such a breaking-in first and foremost proceeds in terms of affective prominence [abgehoben] (ibid.), and the Other’s prominent emergence can subsequently awaken or motivate a kinaesthetic possibility such that “it brings to mind the way my body would look, ‘as if I were there’” (Hua 1/147[118]). According to our previous analysis, there is always an intentional correlation between affective allure and kinaesthetic advertence; that is, to the Other’s affectual approach belongs a correlated response – an endorsing position-taking or “an answering comportment [„antwortende“ Verhalten]” (Hua 15/476).

This form of intertwinement, as Husserl believes, institutes a primary form of communication [Mitteilung], or communicatio in its literal sense (Hua 15/473). This is a primal form of partaking or engaging, as he more explicitly writes,

“aller Sozialität liegt zugrunde (zunächst in Ursprünglichkeit der aktuell hergestellten sozialen Aktivität) der aktuelle Konnex der Mitteilungsgemeinschaft, der blossen Gemeinschaft von Anrede und

Properly speaking, associative pairing is more than the mere correlation between the corporeal here and there, because such a correlation may remain too formal to lay the groundwork for the concrete interpersonal encounter, namely, an encounter wherein mutual addressing and responding take place. In light of genetic analysis, the Other’s incarnate “here” is surely more than a spatial position located over against mine; the Other’s being there “for” me is already a form of affecting me, appealing to me, and addressing me, such that the affecting, appealing and addressing are from the start imbued with significance. And, conversely, as the person being affected, appealed to and addressed, I have to react in an appropriate attitude [Stellungnahme], e.g., by “answering yes” in either verbal or non-verbal expression (Hua 15/476). Thus, we can conclude by saying that associative pairing is, genuinely speaking, a correlation between the Other’s incarnate affectivity and the ego’s kinaesthetic advertence.

With these clarifications, we can come back to a thesis presented at the opening of this chapter, i.e., the pre-thematic encounter is in nature situated in the surrounding world. Husserl designates the sphere of passive pre-givenness as a pre-predicative sphere, in contrast to a predicative sphere, where the ego’s cognitive activity, such as judicative statement-making and evaluation, is pervasively involved (EU, §15). In the pre-predicative sphere, the Other’s affective emergence has not been brought into thematic explication, yet we can still articulate the genetic structure of such a pre-predicative encounter, namely, it comprises a mutual awakening in and through which the Other’s affective pre-givenness can be presented to consciousness and thereby trigger a counter or responding act [Antun]. With either of the intertwined correlata missing, it would be meaningless to talk about this sort of pre-thematic engagement: while affection necessarily precedes advertence, it would be rendered null or would not penetrate into wakeful consciousness, were there no ensuing advertence. Reciprocity or, better, the sort of proto-social institution established by means of reciprocity, is an intrinsic feature of such a pre-predicative encounter.
4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that a pre-themed stratum of empathy genetically precedes, and serves as a condition for, the thematic explication of empathy and, in so doing, I articulated the genetic structure of pre-themed empathy by means of explicating the structure of affective relief and passive intentionality involved in empathic advertence. An important outcome of my analysis was the finding that the Other’s initial manifestation is already present within an affectually articulated context, and that this empathic context affords the interpersonal understanding with robust meaning in the first place. In other words, interpersonal understanding is first and foremost made possible and delimited by the corresponding environment [Umwelt]. It is within this thematic scope that we can see that pre-themed empathy comprises a peculiar form of intentionality. That is, passive intentionality is primarily carried out by the operative body and takes on the form of feeling, or affectual, intentionality. In other words, the Other’s affectual relief elicits, on the side of the ego, a corporeal status, i.e., a feeling propensity, so that the ego can take a stance toward the Other in the first place – the ego responds to the Other’s affectual appeal.

With these results, I hope to have illuminated some new aspects of Husserl’s theory of empathy. Contrary to many commentators would think, Husserl’s theory of empathy is not ego-centric or conceptualist by and large, nor does it ignore the role played by sociocultural, habitual and historical elements. That is, it is not a theory of accessing others’ mental lives by indifferently observing other people and by referring back to and resting upon egoic activity. As I showed, Husserl always strives for a phenomenologically trustworthy way of describing the original appearance of the Other; in connection with this attempt, he especially draws our attention to the phenomena of passivity and affectivity, so that he can bring to the fore the Other’s affectual emergence. As I hope to have addressed, the human encounter consists of manifold layers and dimensions, and pre-themed or pre-predicative empathy serves as the underlying ground of and contributes a significant part to the interpersonal understanding.
Before exploring the main theme of the current chapter, i.e., the problem of empathic intentionality, we shall refresh some fundamental insights elaborated upon in chapter one. As I argued, the full-fledged or twofold constitution of the lived body is not only essential for an account of bodily self-awareness but also for a radical explication of the Other’s bodily constitution. For Husserl, the Other’s body is not firstly conceived of as a merely physical organ, to which a second reality – a psychological state – is subsequently attached or attributed. Rather, the Other’s body is first and foremost perceived as a foreign lived corporeality [Körperleib] that shares with one’s own body a similar manner of twofold manifestation. For Husserl, the perception of the Other’s body as a lived corporeality is accomplished through a unique sense-transfer, whereby the sense of one’s own lived body is transmitted to the Other. In this sense, Husserl characterizes empathy as a form of analogizing apperception, which is, as I suggested, better understood as a sort of quasi-perspective-taking that inherently takes root in one’s own bodily mobility.

The proposal of quasi-perspective-taking may well shed light on a largely neglected aspect of Husserl’s theory of empathy, namely, the operative function of bodily mobility with regard to empathic perception; however, the issue of quasi-perspective-taking itself has not yet been fully cashed out. As I will argue, the quasi character of empathic perception has given rise to an increase in the prevalence of Lippsian interpretations of Husserl’s theory of empathy, according to which Husserl’s theory of empathy is underlined by recourse to egoic recollection (Held, 1972; Theunissen, 1986) or egoic potentiality (Kozlowski, 1991) and, thus, on this reading, his theory of empathy is no better than a refined version of Lipps’ theory of empathy (Sawicki, 1997; Schloßberger, 2005). On this interpretation, Husserl’s theory of empathy falls short of demonstrating how the ego can arrive at a genuinely alter ego instead of a duplicate of one’s own ego. In other words, Husserl’s theory of empathy cannot account for the true alterity of the Other.

However, I believe that this line of interpretation and criticism principally mistake the main tenor of Husserl’s theory of empathy. By revealing the underlying
intentional structure of empathic quasi-ness, i.e., the structure of empathic Vergegenwärtigung, I will show why Husserl’s theory of empathy is in nature a perceptual account of the Other, according to which we can make present the Other’s alterity without impoverishing it (Fink, 1966; Römpp, 1989). By doing so, I will develop the thesis that empathic intentionality is, instead of being uni-directional, bi-directional in that it is at once directed at both the Other's sensuously given body and the Other’s non-sensuously given subjectivity (Cf. Hua 13/340).

In order to fully shed light on the type of empathic intentionality in question, in section one, I will analyze Stein’s (and Husserl’s) exposition of empathic perception so as to situate it in the constellation of various intentional acts. According to Stein (and Husserl), empathy is a unique form of perception that is neither reducible to external perception simpliciter nor derivable from other forms of intentional acts, such as recollection, expectation and pure imagination. Thus, empathic perception also differs from other empathic experiences at higher levels, such as predicative explication and moral concern. In short, empathy is a sui generis form of foreign perception.

In section two, I will examine Husserl’s first approach to empathic intentionality by means of analogizing empathy with recollection – a form of Vergegenwärtigung. In line with the Lippsian interpretation of Husserl’s theory of empathy, I show why such an approach is undermined by several difficulties, e.g., the difficulty of account for the Other’s temporally simultaneous being and genuine alterity. On this approach, Husserl’s theory of empathy can only develop an account of a duplicate of one’s own ego but cannot account for the Other’s alterity. Hence, it falls theoretically flat.

In section three, I will examine Husserl’s second approach to empathic intentionality by analogizing empathy with image consciousness – Husserl’s paradigm of Vergegenwärtigung. I will sketch out the main features of Husserl’s image theory and point out the complicated role of intentionality at stake therein. That is, the intentionality in question is unitarily directed at three different intentional objects. According to this model, I show how Husserl’s perceptual theory of empathy can provide a phenomenological account of the Other’s alterity, or its non-sensuous givenness, in and through its corporeal givenness. Consequently, in section four, I will elaborate upon this result by spelling out the quasi character of empathic
intentionality, and show that empathic intentionality thus understood is essentially twofold.

1. Preliminary remarks on empathic perception

1.1 Terminological provision

Husserl’s theory of empathy has a lot to do with his intentional analysis at play in various acts and, through this analysis, he is able to uncover the unique form of empathic intentionality. According to Husserl, intentional acts can be divided into two categories: Gegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung. Roughly speaking, by Gegenwärtigung, Husserl means that the intentional object is given in its “flesh and blood” [leibhaftig]; e.g., the coffee mug I am currently perceiving is present to me in its “flesh and blood.” Only external perception and its horizontal field fall within this category (Hua 9/94, 11/96[140]). By contrast, those intentional acts whose object does not appear in the mode of “flesh and blood” belong to the category of Vergegenwärtigung, which includes recollection, expectation, image consciousness, and pure imagination (Hua 11/§17; Brough, 2005). The intended object of these acts does not appear as intuitively as in external perception; instead, it manifests through something else and, thus, it may only appear in a vague and sometimes completely empty manner (Hua 11/36, 13/222-23). For example, when I remember a trip to Cologne, I may also remember the astonishing first sight of Cologne’s Cathedral. Although the Cathedral as recollected is actually absent from my perceptual field, I can nevertheless somehow have an intuition of it again, “much as if I were seeing it through a sort of thick fog” (Hua 23/202[240]). I should immediately emphasize the

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67 Husserl’s technical distinction can be strictly divided into three, rather than two, categories—namely, Entgegenwärtigung, Gegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung — with regard to the different layers of intentional acts. What is unique about Entgegenwärtigung, or de-presentation, is that, according to Fink, it takes place in the passive sphere of inner time consciousness. More specifically, both retention and protention are forms of self-de-presentation in the sense that they “slide away” from the living present [lebendig Gegenwart] and, thus, they constitute a moment of the self-distantiation, or differentiation, that serves as a structural element in every perception and that engages subsequent recollection or expectation (Fink, 1966, § 9). Briefly speaking, we can say that perceptual activity as such is never bound with the presence; rather, it is intrinsically pre-delineated by de-presentation, i.e., its retentional and protentional dimension. Furthermore, this kind of self-differentiation [Entgegenwärtigung] engenders higher orders of intentional acts (i.e., Vergegenwärtigung) that intend something non-present or absent within the stream of wakeful consciousness, such as recollection, expectation, image consciousness or, our current theme, empathy (Hua 6/189, 6/532; Fink, 1996, p.42). For a more detailed exposition of the relationship between Entgegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung, see Fink (1966).
fact that Vergegenwärtigung thus determined is not necessarily a reproduction of a past experience, as in the case of recollection. Vergegenwärtigung can also be an original act, as in the case of image consciousness, in which the painting hanging on the wall originally manifests without referring to any past experience of the same painting (Hua 11/72[114]; 23/476[565]).

The first difficulty that arises in relation to Husserl’s account of empathic perception concerns terminological translation. We can find various suggestions in respect to translating the term, “Vergegenwärtigung”: e.g., representation (Marbach, 1993), re-presentation (Brough, 2005), and presentation (Embree, 1993). Occasionally, David Carr literally renders it as “to render present” (Carr, 1987, 2009). Although there are good reasons to choose one of the listed terms, I will henceforth uniformly render Vergegenwärtigung as “presentification” so as to capture, albeit awkwardly, Husserl’s intent. Meanwhile, I reserve “presentation” for “Gegenwärtigung” so as to differentiate it from other technical terms, such as “presentation” [Vorstellung/Präsentation] and “representation” [Repräsentation].

A second difficulty is also obvious: where should we place empathy between these two categories? Is it a sort of presentiation, as the term “empathic perception” strongly connotes? Or is it a form of presentification, since what is empathized with, i.e., the Other’s mentality, is not given in the flesh and blood? Or, is empathy a blend or fusion of these two kinds of intentional acts? If so, how should we understand such a unique form of intentional fusion? For the sake of gaining a better overview of the matter at hand, let us take a look at Edith Stein’s account of empathy, which is substantially akin to Husserl’s in the constellation of presentiation and presentification.

1.2 Empathic perception: presentiation and presentification

To begin with, Stein’s doctoral dissertation, Zum Problem der Einfühlung (1917/2008), is not only one of the earliest systematic works on empathy but, more

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68 For a similar differentiation between empathy and other intentional acts, such as perception, recollection, image consciousness, and signitive consciousness, see Zahavi (2010). Zahavi makes such a comparison with regard to its intuitiveness character of these acts’ content or correlata. By contrast, I am more concerned with the intentional feature that differs empathy from other types of intentional acts (i.e., presentation and presentification), so as to characterize the act character of empathic experience and to unearth the unique form of empathic intentionality.
importantly, her robust distinction between empathy and other intentional acts serves as a lucid guide for our clarification of empathic intentionality. Following Stein, we can faithfully describe “the distinct modes of [empathic] givenness and ultimately reveal the founding relationships therein” (Stein, 2008, p. 13).

Then, is empathy a presentiating perception *simpliciter*? Consider this example. A friend tells me a terrible story about how he has lost his dear brother, and I am well aware of his pain. But am I aware of this pain simply by externally perceiving it “in’ his pain countenance,” e.g., his pale and distorted face (Stein, 2008, p.14)? Stein holds that it is not the case. When one perceives a temporal-spatial object, the object is “originally there” in the sense that the object is “bodily” [leibhaftig] present in the perceptual field. Moreover, the object is given in a certain orientation with regard to the perceiving body in such a way that the perceiver can always further determine the object, e.g., by bringing the unseen sides into authentic intuition. Empathy, however, does not meet either condition: the painful state of the friend is not as originally given as a physical entity, and the painful state as such cannot be brought into authentic intuition by walking around his body (Hua 13/51-2). Therefore, “empathy itself as an experience of [foreign] lived experience does not have the character of external perception” (Stein, 2008, p.15).

The last conclusion, however, does not entail that the empathic act does not have the character of “originality” (ibid.). As Stein argues, although the empathized mental state is neither presentiated in its “flesh and blood,” nor in a certain orientation, empathy is an original experience nevertheless, insofar as “the painfulness as such is originally given” in the Other’s countenance (ibid.). While Stein’s terminology is perhaps confusing, what she tries to highlight is still clear. That is, the empathized mental state is indeed originally appresented in and through the Other’s facial expression, yet not in the same way as a physical object is originally perceived. Put differently, “the originally given expression […] embodies [darstellt] the [foreign] psyche as something co-given [Mitgegebenes], as a now existing actuality” (ibid.). In this regard, Stein seems to vacillate between denying empathy as a presentiating act and admitting that empathy, “which co-experiences the expressed psyche with the corporeal expression, must somehow be designated as external perception” (ibid.).

If empathy is after all not a genuinely presentiating perception, then is it a presentifying act through and through? At first sight, Stein seems to hold this position,
when she compares the empathic act with acts that “do not intend their object as bodily present but only presentify it” (ibid., p.16), namely, acts of recollection, expectation and pure imagination. Upon a closer look, however, it becomes evident that Stein’s position is also ambivalent.

On Stein’s view, the act of recollection proceeds in such a way that what is recollected “was once bodily present” (ibid.). For instance, the Cathedral I remember cannot be manifest in its flesh and blood, because my currently remembering would otherwise no longer be a recollection but a genuine perception. The Cathedral can appear to me only in a manner that indicates that it lies in the temporal past, whereas the remembering act itself is in the temporal present. This temporal distance further determines the non-originality of recollection, and of expectation, as well. As Stein observes, “the current non-originality refers back to the originality of a past moment, which itself has the character of ‘now’” (ibid.). Although there is no such temporal distance between the imagining act and the imagined object (or the imagery, in Husserl’s sense), imagination as such is characterized by a similar non-originality, insofar as the imagery hovers before the experiencing subject, as if revolving around a kind of core Gestalt or idea, and insofar as it is elusive and obscure in one way or another. As Stein sees it, the content of these presentifying acts is not as original as that of the actual lived experience (ibid., p.18).

In this regard, empathy does resemble presentifying acts, because empathy is “non-original with regard to its content, if we firmly hold onto the content as such rather than taking it as a ‘co-givenness’ with an original givenness” (ibid., p.19). To paraphrase, if we single out the empathic correlate, i.e., the Other’s mental state, then we have to admit that it is characterized by phenomenal invisibility; that is, no matter how well aware I am of my friend’s pain, I just cannot “see” the pain as such, much less can I experience it in the same way as my friend himself experiences it. At best, “I ‘read it through the face’ of the Other” (ibid.). Hence, the empathizing act is non-original, insofar as its intentional correlate is concerned. As Stein concludes, this content is a lived experience belonging to the Other, and I can only comprehend it in a similar way to how I recollect the content of my own past experience (ibid.).

However, Stein rejects that the empathizing act thus understood is an act of presentification through and through. Unlike recollection, expectation or imagination, the empathic act is mediated by and intertwined with genuine perception of the
Other’s corporeal expression (ibid., p.20). In other words, notwithstanding the invisibility of the empathized content, e.g., the friend’s pain, I do genuinely perceive the friend’s “pale and distorted face” in and through which his pain is disclosed, i.e., the pain becomes originally “visible” through bodily expression. As Stein states, when I empathize with another subject, “jedes andere Subjekt hat Originarität, obwohl ich diese Originarität nicht erlebe, seine ihm entquellende Freude ist originäre Freude, obwohl ich sie nicht als originäre erlebe” (ibid.; my italics).

1.3 Empathic perception as intentional fusion

The above having been said, how, then, should we understand Stein’s account of the empathic act? Or, how should we understand the ambivalence evident in Stein’s account. I think it is better not to exaggerate the ambivalence in question. For Stein, empathy is neither a purely perceptual act nor a purely presentifying act. It would be hasty to favor either proposal simply because it would otherwise “look like an arbitrary mixture of varying intuitions” (Dullstein, 2013, p.343), i.e., a mixture of the perception of the Other’s corporeal expression and the mental representation of the Other’s psychic state. The difficulty Stein faces does not consist in reconciling her own cognitive or “representational” view of empathy with her supervisor’s (Husserl’s) perceptual account (ibid.); rather, it consists in trying to gain a more rigorous grasp of the complex phenomenon that is the Other’s sensuous manifestation “in its greatest essential entirety” (Stein, 2008, p.14; cf. Hua 13/252-53). As indicated, Stein’s real

69 Arguably, Stein’s position was highly influenced by Adolf Reinach’s lecture courses, Introduction to Philosophy, given in 1913, when Stein had just started studying phenomenology with Reinach in Göttingen. The second chapter of Stein’s dissertation, which we have thus far been considering here, seems to be an elaboration of Reinach’s lecture notes. For instance, Reinach writes, “[die] Frage [ist] dann, was faktisch vorgeht, wenn wir fremde Erlebnisse wahrnehmen. 1. Zuerst konstatieren wir: [Das] fremde Erlebnis hat hier [seine] Selbsterscheinung. Vergegenwärtigung der Trauer kann z.B. übergehen in Selbsterscheinung; aber beides [ist] verschieden … 2. Es ist nicht nötig, [daß] die Sympathiegefühle meinerseits [vorhanden wären]. [Ein] Trauererlebnis auf meiner Seite braucht nicht vorzuliegen … Fremde Trauer [ist] schon erfaßt, wenn ich dadurch angesteckt werde. 3. Fremde Erlebnisse [sind] nicht so direkt zu erfassen wie eigene. [Der] Gegensatz zwischen Fremdheit und Eigenheit von Erlebnissen [wird hier] verwechselt mit [dem] Gegensatz zwischen Mittelbarkeit und Unmittelbarkeit ihrer Erfassung. Ich erfaße fremde Trauer durch etwas (Gebärde o. dgl.) hindurch, aber [als] ein Selbstgegebenes. [Das fremde] Erlebnis erscheint in etwas anderem, durch etwas anderes hindurch: indirekte Selbsterscheinung, durch Physisches vermittelt. Aber [ein] Schluß liegt nicht vor” (Reinach, 1989, p.391-2). As one of Husserl’s students in Göttingen, Reinach was reasonably familiar with Husserl’s initial distinction between presentation and presentification in Logical Investigations, which presumably served as a guideline of Reinach’s discussion of empathic perception in his lecture courses. This also explains the reason why Stein’s exposition is fundamentally akin to Husserl’s.
merit rests on the fact that she reveals the irreducible interplay between the invisibility of the Other’s subjectivity as such and the visibility of such subjectivity in and through corporeal expression or, in Husserl’s words, between “the perceptually non-appearing” of the Other’s subjectivity and “the originally perceptual appearance” of the corporeality that conveys it (Hua 13/47, 14/234). Accordingly, empathic perception seems to straddle the fence between presentation and presentification, and to be characterized by both originality and non-originality, to such an extent that empathic perception is better understood as an intentional fusion of presentation and presentification.

Husserl seems to agree upon the last point, when he writes, “in gewisser Weise erfahre ich […] auch die Erlebnisse des Anderen: sofern die mit der originären Erfahrung des Leibes in eins vollzogene Einfühlung zwar eine Art Vergegenwärtigung ist, aber doch den Charakter des leibhaften Mitdaseins begründet. […] Das Eigentümliche der Einfühlung ist es, daß sie auf ein originäres Leib-Geist-Bewußtsein verweist, aber als ein solches, das ich selbst nicht originär vollziehen kann” (Hua 4/198). That is, Husserl consistently holds that empathy is a sort of foreign perception [Fremdwahrnehmung], insofar as the foreign body is concerned. Indeed, the Other’s lived body is, strictly speaking, directly given in the perceptual field within the oriented sphere. Yet, empathy is essentially distinctive from genuine external perception, because the Other’s own lived experience as such is not directly given in a perceptual way. In Husserl’s words, empathy bears the intentional accomplishment of presentification, “through which I as an ego have another alter ego, in the manner of perceptual consciousness of that subject’s existence in persona” (Hua 8/134). In other words, empathy is an intentional act where both presentation and presentification constitutively overlap, thereby, granting empathy “a more complicated and radically new kind of intentionality” (Hua 5/55; cf. Hua 1/135), or “the highest complicated intentionality” (Hua 1/140); I will more fully unfold how this is so in section 4.

2. Empathic intentionality: Husserl’s first solution

Having spelled out the location of empathy within the constellation of intentional acts, let us now turn to Husserl to further determine the particular kind of intentionality that characterizes empathic intentionality. To begin with, Husserl’s
theory of empathy is characterized by his methodological use of analogy. Throughout his lifelong effort to clarify the nature of empathic perception, he proposed two main strategies or arguments of doing so, one that analogizes empathic perception with recollection and the other that analogizes it with image consciousness. We can find the first proposal, first and foremost, in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* (Hua 1/§50, §54). Admittedly, Husserl’s account of recollection is fundamentally different from a psychological one, yet Husserl’s seemingly systematic recourse to recollection engenders serious difficulties and incurs fierce criticism (Held, 1972; Kozlowski, 1991; Theunissen, 1986). By contrast, the second proposal has scarcely been mentioned except in so far as it is taken to be a supplement to the first. A systematic reexamination of both proposals is in need not only because it will show how significant the second proposal is in comparison with the first but, more importantly, it will also enable us to unveil the peculiar nature of empathic intentionality in question. In this section, I mainly focus on the first proposal and reserve the second for section 3 and 4.

2.1 Husserl’s analogy of empathy with recollecting presentification

One can readily find the recourse to recollection in Husserl’s account of analogizing apperception, which is intrinsically characterized by “wie wenn ich dort wäre.” According to Held, the phrase “wie wenn ich dort wäre” is open to two readings: first, one may conceive of it as a kind of “fictive consciousness” in that one phantasizes oneself into the Other’s place “there,” “as if I were there” [als ob ich dort wäre] understood in the subjunctive mood (Held, 1972, p. 35) and, thus, the body would be a lived body if I were “there.” However, the body “there” is, contrary to the fact, not an actual lived body, because, “in reality, I remain here with regard to the presently there” (ibid.). The second reading takes “wie wenn ich dort wäre” to be a sort of “intentional capacity” in that one can think of either of the following two cases, i.e., one was there once or will be there at some point in the future, thereby rendering the body “there” a lived body “when I am there” [wenn ich dort bin], understood in terms of temporal modality (ibid.). In this case, “being there” is an intrinsic possibility of one’s own “being here,” even though the “being there” (be it either an earlier or later “there”) is, nonetheless, not *simultaneous* with one’s own existence “here” (ibid.). Thus, Held points out that Husserl actually mingles together two essentially
different alternatives: “das ‚wie wenn‘ ist die doppeldeutige Verquickung eines die Irrealität anzeigenden ‚Wie‘ (im Sinne von ‚als ob‘) mit einem ‚wenn‘ von temporaler Bedeutung” (ibid.).

In this regard, three criteria need to be satisfied, so as to make analogizing apperception fruitful: 1. the simultaneity of the Other’s “being there” with one’s “being here,” 2. the reality of the Other’s “being there,” and 3. the self-other differentiation, or the Other’s alterity. Accordingly, neither of the two readings succeeds: on the first reading, one can apperceive the body “there” as a lived body, whose somatic “there” is simultaneous with one’s own somatic “here,” yet only to the extent that the body “there” is an as-if or fictive lived body; on the second reading, however, one does apperceive the body there as a lived body in reality, i.e., not a fictive one, but such an apperception is undermined by a fundamental temporal distance insofar as one cannot, by definition, arrive at an apperception of the body there in its temporally simultaneous being with “me.” More importantly, both readings fail to maintain the self-other distinction, because, on both readings, the Other’s body thus conceived is, to be sure, one’s own fictively or temporally modified body. For these reasons, Held argues that Husserl’s equivocal combination of the two alternatives is a tactical means of overcoming the deficits in either reading. However, the two types of consciousness, i.e., the as-if consciousness and recollective consciousness, are so inconsistent that they cannot work together; hence, Husserl’s strategy misses its mark (Held, 1972).

Held’s distinction helps to develop a clearer understanding of the nature of analogizing apperception. Before we can reexamine Husserl’s seeming equivocation between the two readings and Held’s critical assessment of such equivocation, we need to look in greater detail at the scope and problems of the second reading. Two existing lines of argument can be found both in Husserl’s theory of empathy and, typically, in Lippsian criticisms of it: one functions by recourse to the potentiality of recollection and the other by recourse to actual recollection.

On a strong interpretation, Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception is by nature rooted in one’s past experience of a similar object, or event, on a similar occasion and, thus, it is underlined or determined by the actual recollection of one’s own past experience. For instance, Husserl begins his exposition of analogizing apperception by comparing it with recollection, so as to illustrate what analogizing
transference, the vehicle of analogizing apperception, means (Hua 1/§50). On Husserl’s general account of intentional life, all intentional accomplishments are grounded on a layer of intentional *habitus*, which further shapes and informs foregoing experience. Hence, what I’ve experienced does not turn into inconsequential ash in the memorial past, but serves as a “primal instituting” [Urstiftung], to which subsequent experience constantly refers back. For good reasons, “each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense” (Hua 1/141[111]). As Husserl exemplifies, when a child, who has previously seen a pair of scissors, comes across a new pair, he can immediately understand their function [Zwecksinn]. Although this “understanding” needs not be an explicit reproduction, comparison or inference (ibid.), it nonetheless implicitly employs recollection, insofar as it is the memory of past experience that affords and articulates the sense of further experiences of a similar thing. As Husserl claims, “insofar as there is pre-givenness, there is such transference” (ibid). Obviously, this form of analogizing apperception is typified and informed by personal history (Hua 1/113); and its associative reference to this history, on Husserl’s view, is a basic fact [Grundtatsache] of conscious life (Hua 13/345). This is an “a priori regulation of genesis” which prescribes “what must have preceded in the past (in a typical manner), and thereby a future of the same type may occur” (Hua 13/346). Empathy, of course, falls under this regulation.

The last point becomes clear in the process of analogizing apperception. When I see another physical body in a spatial “there,” on this line of interpretation, the similarity of the Other’s body with mine reminds [erinnert] me of my own body that is governed by a living subject, i.e., my own ego. As Husserl puts it, the manner of the Other’s bodily appearance “awakens reproductively a similar appearance included in the system constitutive of my lived body as physical body” (Hua 1/147; cf. Theunissen, 1986, p. 66). As stated above, I do not need an “explicit reproduction” in order to revitalize my past experience of being there. Yet an implicit reproduction has to be in place so that the Other’s similarly bodily appearance can *elicit* my memory: “it brings to mind my physical outlook, ‘when I was there’ [wenn ich dort wäre]” (Hua 1/147; cf. Theunissen, 1986, p.67). On Held’s second reading, the Other’s bodily appearance reminds me of my physical outlook *that I had when I was there*. In this
sense, analogizing apperception “is rooted in the backward reference to one’s own primal corporeality [Urleiblichkeit]” (Hua 8/63). For this reason, Theunissen holds that analogizing apperception amounts to a form of referring back to one’s memory, which, more precisely speaking, is just another name for putting oneself in the Other’s place. In Husserl’s words, “I put myself in the place of the other subject, and by empathy I grasp what motivates him and how strongly it does so, with what power. And I learn to understand inwardly how he behaves, and how he would behave, under the influence of such and such motives, determining him with such and such force, i.e., I grasp what he is capable of and what is beyond him” (Hua 4/274[287]; cf. Theunissen, 1986, p.75). According to this picture, analogizing apperception is self-anchored or -centered, on the fact that the Other’s body that one can apperceive is no more than what one can experience from within oneself, or from within one’s memory, in particular.

In this regard, so it seems, Husserl compares analogizing apperception with recollection. I can only bring my past experience into the present by means of recollection, or better yet, recollective presentification, so that I can relive my past experience once again in such a way that what is recollected, i.e., the past experience, is characterized as an intentional modification of the past “now” [vergangene Gegenwart] (Hua 1/145). As Husserl confirms, “wie meine erinnerungsmäßige Vergangenheit meine lebendige Gegenwart transzendiert als ihre Modifikation, so ähnlich das appräsentierte fremde Sein das eigene” (ibid.; Hua13/266; my italics). Husserl expresses this point more generally in Erste Philosophie II:

“ganz analog sage ich mit gutem Rechte: mein transzendentales Ich ist mir allein ursprünglich gegeben, nämlich aus ursprünglicher Selbsterfahrung, fremde Subjektivität ist mir im Bereich meines eigenen selbsterfahrenden Lebens, nämlich in selbsterfahrenden Einfühlungen, mittelbar, nicht ursprünglich gegeben, aber doch gegeben, und zwar erfahren. So wie Vergangenes als Vergangenes ursprünglich nur gegeben sein kann durch Erinnerung, und künftig Kommendes als solches nur durch Erwartung, so kann *Fremdes als Fremdes* ursprünglich nur gegeben sein durch Einfühlung” (Hua 8/175-76; original italics).
We should be careful at this point: Husserl is not claiming that it is simply because we can remember our own past that we can also empathize with the Other. In active recollection, according to Husserl, we can discern two features: the recollected object and the past perception wherein the recollected object was originally perceived. It is by means of recollecting the past perception that we can recall the object presently perceived at that very moment. “By recalling the perception, memory also recalls the way in which the object appeared when it was originally presented” (Brough, 2005). Hence, the recollected object can once again come into conscious life, i.e., the present now of recollecting, in some definite way. The pivotal point for Husserl is that the recollecting act must posit an ego to which the recollected perception was ascribed: a posited ego was perceiving the object and bearing the conscious stream at that very moment. The posited ego, to be sure, is a past ego; hence, it differs from and transcends the presently recollecting ego. As Husserl puts it, “wenn ich mich in die Vergangenheit hineinversetze und vergangene Erlebnisse ‘wieder’ durchlebe, so enthält das Erlebnis ein eigentümliches Doppel-Ich: das Ich der Gegenwart, das aktuelle Ich, Träger des fließenden Jetzt, und das vergangene Ich, das widervergegenwärtigte, Träger des fließenden vergangen Jetzt” (Hua 13/318). Indeed, the posited or recollected ego is one’s own ego, i.e., an own ego in the past; yet it is also an other and transcendent ego, insofar as it is temporally distant from the currently recollecting ego. In other words, it is a modification of one’s own ego. In this sense, Husserl thinks that the Other’s ego can also be conceived of in an analogous way: analogizing apperception is a type of presentification similar to recollective presentification, through which one makes present to oneself an other ego, a foreign being, inasmuch as one makes present to oneself a past ego, an immanently other ego. In this sense, the Other’s ego is a modification of one’s own ego, and the Other’s body one’s own body (Hua 1/144). 70

Following this line of thinking, one may ask whether Husserl achieves the goal he sets analogizing apperception to accomplish, i.e., whether Husserl fully

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70 See also Sokolowski (1974, p.148): “in his writing on the problem of other minds, Husserl will use the two-track structure of remembering as an analogy to describe how other minds can be present to my own. He will be able to claim that even a single consciousness transcends itself, since in its present station it can re-present a prior portion of its own life; analogously, and with the appropriate qualifications made, it is possible for a consciousness to entertain within itself the presence of another minds’ life.”
accounts for the Other as an other subject. Theunissen critically holds that Husserl falls short of the target, given three problems analogizing apperception faces. First, analogizing apperception is characterized by theoretical mediacy “at the level of the perception of the alien body, through my body, and at the level of empathy, through the own I” (Theunissen, 1986, p. 145, 81). Accordingly, I apperceive the Other’s bodily “there” by means of referring back to my past or futural being “there,” and I apperceive the Other’s perspective on the world by means of adopting the Other’s literal point of view by putting myself in her position and, thereby, turning such a foreign perspective into something authentically my own. In short, whatever I apperceive in the spatial “there” turns out to be precisely what I myself have put there: “that which I empathically experience in him is through and through my own soul, or my own ego” (ibid., p.71, 75). The second problem that analogizing apperception faces is that, inasmuch as it is understood as an analogue of recollective presentification, it turns out to be an internal modification of egoic life (ibid., p.151), insofar as the Other’s body as apperceived is a modification of one’s past body, the Other’s ego one’s past ego. In this respect, “the experience of my past and future on the part of my present is the ‘original norm’ for my experience of the Other,” and my own ego is both the “original norm” for the Other and the source of the experience of the Other (ibid.). Third and finally, my past experience draws a boundary, by means of which empathy can and can only reach from within. In other words, analogizing apperception is “a lapse into the past” (ibid., p.158). As Theunissen criticizes, even though this lapse into the past enables one to apperceive the Other’s body as a lived body, and the Other as another ego, it strips the Other of her alterity and, therefore, falls short of maintaining the distinction between self and other. In short, Husserl’s account of empathy takes one’s own experience to be the utmost model of the foreign

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71 To be noted, on Theunissen’s view, Husserl’s theory of empathy, according to which empathy is understood as a form of “analogizing apperception,” is rooted in “the thesis of the essential mediacy” (Theunissen, 1986, p.110), which at different layers of constitution can be differentiated into three types: 1. the mediacy of unpresentable apperception, i.e., the original first person givenness to the Other; 2. the mediacy of analogizing apperception that refers back to one’s own body; and 3. the mediacy of the natural world, wherein the I encounters the Other (ibid., 145). In this context, I only focus on the second type of mediacy because it is the ground upon which empathic perception is carried out, on the one hand, and upon which Theunissen establishes his other two critiques of Husserl’s account of analogizing apperception, on the other. For a further critique of this line of argumentation, see Schloßberger (2005).
experience and cannot accounts for the genuine, phenomenal features that makes the Other a foreign subject (ibid., p.159).

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According to the strong interpretation of Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception, as laid out thus far, certain weaknesses in Husserl’s argument give rise to typical misgivings and may ultimately result in a theoretical dead end. However, this line of interpretation is overly critical in that, on the one hand, Husserl’s suggestion to make room for the influence of past experience upon current conscious life seems perfectly cogent; on the other hand, it is inappropriate to exaggerate the influence of one’s own past experience by referring or even reducing all possible experience to it, a stance from which Husserl clearly does not sufficiently distance himself. Upon closer look, this line of interpretation overestimates the role of recollection while underestimating the constitutive role played by one’s own body. Careful examination of the lived body in analogizing apperception will open the door to a new line of interpretation, a second and weaker one that can save Husserl from the difficulties presented by the strong interpretation. On the weak interpretation, Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception relies on one’s own kinaesthetic mobility by which one can exchange one’s position for the Other’s, so that one can take over the Other’s embodied perspective in the mode of “there,” without reference to any past or futural experience of “being there.” Thus, analogizing apperception is characterized by a kind of intentional potentiality. This line of interpretation is alluded to by Husserl in §53 of Cartesian Meditations and in his early research manuscripts (1914/15), and is later further developed by Kozlowski (1991).

As we demonstrated in chapter one, the interpersonal encounter has to be situated in the oriented sphere, where I am the center of orientation in terms of my somatic “here,” and the Other is accordingly a somatic “there.” The lived body always already plays an operative role with regard to the constitution of the Other’s body in the mode of “being there,” insofar as the “there,” strictly speaking, can only be a “there” with reference to my somatic “here.” As Husserl confirms, “mein körperlicher Leib hat, als auf sich selbst zurückbezogen, seine Gegebenheitsweise des zentralen Hier; jeder andere Körper und so der Körper des Anderen hat den Modus Dort” (Hua 1/145-46). Furthermore, the lived body as a mobile body inherently has a motivated
possibility of moving over “there”; that is, the presently “there” is an inherent possibility of my bodily being here, it is a constitutive part of how I orient myself from the bodily “here.” “Ich kann meine Stellung durch freie Abwandlung meiner Kinästhesen und im besonderen des Herumgehens so ändern, daß ich jedes Dort in ein Hier verwandeln, d.i. jeden räumlichen Ort leiblich einnehmen könnte” (Hua 1/146).

Hence, the lived body is presented in a fundamental “two-fold manner” (Hua 13/259): it is always internally (ap-)perceived as the central point of orientation in the mode of “here,” whilst it at the same time bears an external appearance since one can exchange one’s spatial position for any other spatial position one desires. An important result, according to Husserl, is that the first person perspective from “here” is from the outset a plural perspective in that my present perspective, from which I perceive an object, entails another simultaneous perspective, from which the same object is perceived from “there”:

“zu jedem Ding konstitutiv nicht bloß die Erscheinungssysteme meines momentanen Von hier aus gehören, sondern ganz bestimmt entsprechende jenes Stellungswechsels, der mich ins Dort versetzt” (ibid.; italics altered).

In short, the lived body as a “perceiving and functioning corporeality” not only constitutes an oriented surrounding world but also serves to constitute the Other’s body as a lived body within this oriented world. Accordingly, the “wenn ich dort wäre” that is inherent in analogizing apperception is better transcribed as “ich dort sein könnte,”72 which first and foremost presupposes “the possibility of free movement, of self-transposition from ‘here’ to a ‘there’” (Kozlowski, 1991, p. 126).

In an early manuscript written in 1914/15, Husserl thinks that only by clarifying the nature of the functioning body can we make intelligible the transcendental condition of possibility for the constitution of the Other. More

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72 Husserl occasionally takes the consciousness that characterizes “ich dort sein könnte” to be a kind of phantasy [Umfingierung]. For instance, he writes, “mein Leibkörper bewegt sich: er ändert ja seinen Abstand von den andern Dingen. Ich fingiere nun, wie ich ‘aussehen’ würde, wenn ich mich so bewege. Ich fingiere mir, wie ich dabei vom Dort aussehen würde. Ich fingiere ‘mich’ dabei als Beschauer, dorthin versetze ich mich (was in der Vorstellung einem Hinausbewegen gleichkommt), und zu dem Dort gehören dann die betreffenden äusseren Erscheinungen von meinem Körper” (Hua 13/262; cf. Hua 15, Beilage XXXIII). Still, the consciousness that characterizes “ich dort sein könnte” is not necessarily a kind of phantasy, see discussions below.
specifically, the consciousness that characterizes “wenn ich dort sein kann” results in a “duplication” of the ego into a presently kinaesthetically given ego on the one hand and an ego “transposed” into the “there,” on the other hand. In other words, it enables a kind of ego-splitting [Selbstspaltung]: “um sich an einem beliebigen Ort als ein sichtbaren Gegenstand denken zu können, muß man den eigenen Leibkörper gedanklich ins dort versetzen und zugleich hier als Wahrnehmungsorgan behalten” (ibid., 128). 73 For Husserl, this consciousness at least illustrates “the possibility of two subjects with two bodies,” i.e., the possibility of a second embodied subject in the “there”-mode (Hua 13/263). The nature of bodily kinaesthesis provides the basis for the constitutional condition of the Other. This does not mean that the possibility of the Other lies within the subjective realm of the ego; at best, such a constitutional condition highlights the fact that only with a well-functioning lived body can I apperceive a foreign embodied subject. As Husserl suggests, suppose that I had no body and that I were a purely spiritual being. I would thus lose both my bodily center of orientation and, thereby, the mechanism by which I come to conceive of a “there” in the first place. Consequently, as Husserl believes, “I cannot, therefore, see any other body or other human beings” (Hua13/267).

However, this line of thinking raises a concern about whether the lived body thus conceived amounts to a solipsistic body, and whether the subject, insofar as it is merged [verschmolzen] with the lived body, amounts to a solipsistic subject. Kozlowski argues that it does, for mainly two reasons. First, the ego’s center of orientation is a null-point, an absolute “here,” from which the subjective perspective is the unique [einzig] one. Secondly, the subject cannot exist outside of herself and, thus, cannot gain any spatial distance from her own lived body (Kozlowski, 1991, p.129). Therefore, the solus subject thus conceived has no way out, i.e., “it cannot think of any other perspective” (ibid.); rather, it can only have its own unique and solipsistic perspective. Thus, the consciousness of “being there” cannot arise from within a solipsistic subject but has to originate from pre-given social experience. As Kozlowski further argues, “im Sozius-Bewußtsein entsteht erst die Möglichkeit, sich selbst von außen vorzustellen. […] Erst wenn ich mir dies veranschauliche, kann ich

73 Husserl also talks about “ego-splitting” in the case of image consciousness (Cf. Hua 23/467[556]).
den potentiellen Standpunkt meiner äußeren Sichtbarkeit erreichen. Somit kann ich mich selbst gedanklich an die Stelle des dort seienenden Menschen versetzen" (ibid., p.130). In short, the possibility of adopting the foreign perspective seems to take root in pre-given sociality, rather than in the ego’s functioning corporeality.

The concern outlined above, however, is actually not that troublesome, if we gain a better understanding of the nature of the embodied perspective. For one thing, the absoluteness of the orientating “here” does not imply its singularity, nor is the first person perspective the only possible perspective. The absoluteness of the “here” as the subject’s center of orientation means, at best, that the embodied subject can only view the world from her own perspective here and now. Another important point of clarification is that, as Husserl admits, the consciousness that characterizes “ich dort sein könnte” is somewhat self-contradictory, “eine wiedersprechende Vorstellung” (Hua 13/263) because, whenever I adopt such a perspective, I am nevertheless still bound to my lived body in the here and now. In this sense, indeed, I cannot step outside of myself. But this does not exclude the possibility of my moving over there, of my taking up a different perspective. It is an intrinsic possibility of my subjectivity that I can have different perspectives on the world. In this sense, an intrinsic alterity – a foreign perspective that has to be granted to a foreign subject (Cf. chapter 1.1.2) – is implicitly at work in my embodied worldly experience.74

Bearing these clarificatory remarks in mind, we need to pose one more question, i.e., how can we arrive at the apperception of “an actually existing Other”? Husserl proposes a more or less “logical” solution, which unfolds in two steps. First, the embodied subject as it is fully articulated encompasses at once the bodily here and the possibility of being there. It is from this genuine possibility that one can find the way from authentic egoity to the apperception of the Other. That is, “die Gesamtheit der Vorstellungen ‘als ob ich dort wäre’ ein Gefüge der miteinander ‘unverträglichen Möglichkeiten’ bildet” (Kozlowski, 1991, p. 138). As indicated, the consciousness that characterizes “ich dort sein könnte” is a sort of self-contradictory consciousness

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74 For a similar point, see De Warren (2008, p.217): “the ‘self-alienation’ or ‘alterity’ that I become for myself within the primordial constitution of time-consciousness (due to the ‘de-presentification’ of consciousness itself through retentional modification inaugurates the possibility of any form of givenness; on the basis of this ‘primary alterity’ that I become for myself, other forms of alterity are rendered possible.”
in that it involves two “inconsistent possibilities”: to be here and to be there at the same time. For Husserl, only one of the two possibilities can be actualized at any given time: I can only be here in such and such a way at a certain temporal point; that is, I can neither be simultaneously here and there at the same time, nor can I be simultaneously, say, “angry and not angry” (ibid.). In short, “Ich kann a priori nicht hier und dort zugleich sein” (Hua 13/264).

According to the second step of Husserl’s solution, the above inconsistency disappears if the aforementioned self-splitting is at work: I can be here in such and such a way but not at the same time in such and such a different way, yet the bodily “there in such and such a different way” can be attributed to a second and similar ego. In Husserl’s words, “die Fiktion des hinausgerückten Ich und sein äußeren Erscheinung von meinem Leib her verliert das Widersprechende, wenn das Ich eben nicht das aktuelle, sondern ein zweites ist, dessen kinästhetische Mannigfaltigkeiten in seinem zweiten Leib lokalisiert sind etc.” (Hua 13/265). To paraphrase, one cannot at the same time actualize both possibilities, i.e., that of being here and of being there, and that of being angry and not angry. However, both possibilities can be simultaneously actualized if the “being here in such and such a way” and the “being there in such and such a different way” are distributed to two different bodies or egos.75 In Husserl’s words, “hier und dort kann ein Gleiches sein, ich hier, und ein gleichen und dann auch ein mehr oder minder bloß ähnliches Ich dort” (Hua 13/264).

In this vein of thinking, Husserl believes that we can arrive at a genuine alter ego by means of analogizing apperception, and his investigation of the lived body reveals the possibility for a transition from one’s own ego to the foreign ego. That is, by clarifying the nature of bodily mobility, we can ultimately unfold the transcendental condition of possibility for apperceiving the Other, even prior to any factual experience of a foreign subject.76 As Husserl puts it, the consciousness that characterizes “ich dort sein könnte” prescribes the manner in which a foreign subject can be given and the manner in which a foreign subject can have the manifest kinaesthetic appearance (Hua 13/265). “Zum Leib im Dort gehört aber vermöge der in

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75 See Kozlowski (1991, p.139), “an arbitrary object can have no contradicting features at the same time,” but “two objects can [nonetheless] simultaneously possess these contradicting features.”

76 To be noted, the same line of argument can also be found in Zahavi (2001), especially p.45ff.
der Nullabwandlung erwachsenden Vorstellungsweise eine kinästhetische Mannigfaltigkeit ‘im Dort’” (Hua 13/257; my italics). As Husserl states in §53 of Cartesian Meditations,

“der Andere ist appräsentativ apperzipiert als Ich einer primordialen Welt bzw. einer Monade, in der sein Leib im Modus des absoluten Hier, eben als Funktionszentrum für sein Walten ursprünglich konstituiert und erfahren ist. Also indiziert in dieser Appräsentation der in meiner monadischen Sphäre auftretende Körper im Modus Dort, der als fremder Leibkörper, als Leib des alter ego apperzipiert ist, denselben Körper im Modus Hier, als den, den der Andere in seiner monadischen Sphäre erfahre” (Hua 1/146).

This solution, upon closer examination, turns out to be somewhat lacking. The main concern, as stated earlier, is whether and how we can come to be conscious of “an actually existing Other.” Analogizing apperception in the form of “ich dort sein könnte” succeeds in revealing the transcendental condition of possibility for the constitution of the Other, only insofar as the Other thusly constituted amounts to a transcendental Other or, better, a possible Other inherent in the first person experience. As Husserl realizes, the transcendently possible Other is still far from being a concretely existing Other. “Wenn ich einen fremden Leib verstehe und mir das fremde Empfinden, Wahrnehmen, Denken, Fühlen etc. klarmache, so habe ich Vergegenwärtigungen von Erlebnissen, denen ich nicht bloss Möglichkeit, sondern Wirklichkeit zumesse” (Hua 13/297, 443; my italics). Furthermore, analogizing apperception thus formulated does not constitute psychological empathy in that it does not provide us with the concrete import of others’ mental states. Put differently, we can apperceive another body in the spatial there as a lived body corresponding to a possible foreign ego, yet we can go no further because we gain no insight into, say, the others’ pain. As Kozlowski observes, “versetzt man sich im Raum in den Körper dort, so kann man sich lediglich diejenigen Wahrnehmungen und Erscheinungsverläufe vergegenwärtigen, durch die sich die von dort aus erfahrene Welt darstellt. Auf diese Weise läßt sich aber nicht der Sinn und der konkrete Inhalt des Denken, Wollens, Füllens usw. von anderen Menschen erreichen” (Kozlowski, 1991, p. 131;
my italics). In other words, even on the weak interpretation does analogizing apperception still fall short of what it aims to disclose: the actually existing Other.

Let us recapitulate the respectively strong and weak interpretations of Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception against Held’s threefold criteria, i.e., the simultaneity, reality and alterity conditions. These two lines of interpretation are not incompatible, but they should be distinguished from each other nonetheless, because they each focus on two significantly different dimensions of the constitution of the Other: the strong interpretation is concerned with one’s actual memory as a reservoir, which allows for and articulates the sense of foregoing foreign experience, whereas the weak interpretation appeals to one’s own intentional potentiality as a requisite for elucidating the transcendental condition of the constitution of the Other. But both interpretations partially fail, because neither of them fully meets the criteria in question: the recourse to actual memory meets the reality condition while failing to satisfy the simultaneity condition, whereas the recourse to intentional potentiality meets the simultaneity condition but fails to satisfy the reality condition. Husserl seems to gradually become aware of the inherent difficulties of drawing a general analogy between empathy and recollection, as a text written in 1920 most clearly documents:


However, one may wonder whether Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception can succeed in truly accounting for the experience of the Other, if the two lines of interpretation are combined together. I think it would not. As argued earlier, a phenomenological investigation of empathic perception first and foremost aims for a faithful description of the Other’s sensuous manifestation in its entirety. A hybrid of both interpretations would not bring us any closer to the phenomenon at stake but
may just impede our understanding of it. For this reason, we need to shift our attention to Husserl’s second proposal and carefully examine how far it can take us.

2.2 The alterity of the Other: a preliminary reflection

At this point, let us take stock of Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception. Together with the development of his thinking concerning empathic perception, Husserl seems to become aware of some of the difficulties involved in analogizing apperception. As Husserl admits, our encounter with another subject is an encounter with a co-subject [Mitsubjekt] in her co-presence [Mitgegenwart]. The primary case of empathic perception is that in which the Other simply stands in a certain orientation to “me,” has immediate contact, tactual or otherwise, with “me,” and thus confronts “me” in her embodied presence. In this empathic encounter, I do not primarily concern myself with whether or not the Other is a possible human subject; on the contrary, the Other is a real person, a fellow human being whom I come across in ordinary social life. As Husserl observes, the apprehension of the Other is “the apprehension of this person hic et nunc, who dances, who laughs and chats with satisfaction, or who discusses science with me, and so forth” (Hua 4/240). More generally speaking,

“da ist auch jeder Andere (jedes andere ego) transzendental strömend Gegenwartsein, in mir konstituiert als strömend mitgegenwärtige Subjektivität, die konkret selbst ist strömend lebendig konkrete Gegenwart. […] Der Andere ist in mir mitgegenwärtig” (Hua 15/XLVIII).

In light of Held’s criteria, we can understand the Other’s co-present being in a full-fledged manner. On the one hand, the Other’s co-presence entails the simultaneity of her and one’s own being in the living present [lebendige Gegenwart]. Only in this sense can the Other be on par with one’s own conscious life in the very same living present: the Other’s being can be reduced neither to a past nor a future that may turn out to be one’s own past or future. This simultaneity of being is not only significant for Other-constitution as such, but it is also crucial for world-constitution in that, as Husserl sees it, “Mitsein von Anderen ist untrennbar von mir in meinem lebendigen Sich-selbst-gegenwärtigen, und diese Mitgegenwart von Anderen ist fundierend für weltliche Gegenwart, die ihrerseits Voraussetzung ist für den Sinn aller
Weltzeitlichkeit mit Weltkoexistenz (Raum) und zeitlicher Folge” (Hua 15/XLIX) 77. On the other hand, the Other’s co-presence is more than a constituting function that the Other possesses, for the Other in question is a concrete Other, another subject whom I meet in the street, whom I communicate with, and with whom I may live together in a certain relation of, say, love or hatred, peace or conflict (Hua 14/191; cf. Hua 4/183[192]; Stein, 2008, p. 21).

In short, Husserl clearly holds that a phenomenological theory of the Other needs to do justice to the simultaneity of the Other’s being and mine in my perceptual field, as he puts it, “die Koexistenz einer Mehrheit von Subjekten besagt zunächst „Gleichzeitigkeit“” (Hua 14/103). The two aspects of the Other’s co-presence, as Georg Römmp points out, account for the genuine alterity of the Other: the Other is not experienced “in Gestalt seiner zeitlichen Konstituiertheit” but rather as another “absolutes konstituierendes ego” in the living present (Cf. Römmp, 1989, p.142). 78 Husserl occasionally conceives of this absolutely constituting Other in the living present as a transcendent being par excellence, as he makes explicit in Erste Philosophie II:

“was sich in einer Subjektivität nur durch Appräsentation, nicht aber durch Wahrnehmung konstituieren kann, das ist ihr auch nicht mehr immanent, weder reell immanent noch ideell immanent. All solche Transzendenz, all solches Überschreiten und Hinausgehen einer Subjektivität über sich selbst beruht auf Einfühlung […]. Hier ist die allein eigentlich so zu nennende Transzendenz, und alles, was sonst noch Transzendenz heißt, wie die objektive Welt, beruht auf der Transzendenz fremder Subjektivität” (Hua 8/495, n.2; my italics).

The pivotal and difficult task of articulating what empathic perception means, therefore, consists in accounting for the particular transcendence pertaining to the

77 See also, “die Andersheit fremder Personalität wird also nicht nur verständlich durch die temporale Begrifflichkeit, sondern sie fundiert geradezu die Phänomenalität der Zeit” (Römmp, 1989, p.136).

78 See also, what a phenomenology of the Other clarifies is “ein Fungieren in einem zweiten absoluten Hier, das gleichzeitig mit meinem absoluten Hier in einem von meinem Hier aus wahrgenommenen Dort anwesend ist” (Held, 1972, p.37).
Other and its particular mode of givenness, in contrast to that of other external beings, such as animals and plants. In Husserl’s eyes, a transcendental theory of empathic perception should clarify “the distinction of the mode of being of things and of other human beings and the difference of their transcendence” (Hua 8/483). This leads us to the next section, in which we will tackle the particular way in which the Other is given and, thereby, shed light on the particular type of empathic intentionality operative in empathic perception.

3. Vergegenwärtigung and image consciousness: a second analogy

Husserl begins comparing empathic perception with recollection in 1914/15, the same period during which he comes to consider image consciousness as a significant alternative. In his first systematic effort to explore “die besondere Weise der Vergegenwärtigung, die Einfühlung heisst” (Hua 13/288, text No. 10), Husserl hopes to elucidate what empathic presentification means by means of unveiling the nature of presentification as such, i.e., that of pure imagination. Following this line of thinking, Husserl works tirelessly to gain a better understanding of the peculiar mode of presentification inherent in image consciousness, so as to shed light on the intricate problem that lies therein. Even though the analogy with image consciousness will recede from the spotlight and give way to the more prevalent alternative discussed above, namely that of recollection, it never vanishes from the course of Husserl’s subsequent thought on empathic presentification but constantly resurfaces at those critical nexuses where he develops some decisive insights into the problem at stake.79

Husserl’s image theory, to be sure, is not an independent investigation that can be separated from the rest of his phenomenological work. As Bernet (1988) points out, most of Husserl’s individual investigations are developed hand in hand with his work on other subject matters, and his analysis of image consciousness serves as a sort of “matrix” by means of which his analysis of other phenomena, e.g., signitive intentionality,

79 We can find various texts dedicated to the analogy between empathy and image consciousness. These texts are somehow scattered in Husserl’s voluminous research manuscripts; for the most important ones, see, e.g., Hua 13, text no.10, no. 13; Hua 14, text no. 8, Beilage XXIV, text no.28, no. 30; Hua 23, text no.12, Beilage XXXVIII, no.16; and Hua 20-2, text no.4, no.6, no.11. And more importantly, see Hua 1, §55, and Hua 4, §56, section H.
gains stronger and stronger strength.\textsuperscript{80} Husserl’s keen interest in works of art and engagement with image consciousness in particular are not incidental but of philosophical relevance for his life-long endeavor.\textsuperscript{81} As the posthumous publication of \textit{Husserliana 23} documents, Husserl’s first work on image consciousness [Bildvorstellung] dates back to as early as 1898, two years before the publication of \textit{Logical Investigations}. More importantly, Husserl’s incessant analysis of image consciousness not only paints a picture of “the philosopher at work” but also proves to be philosophically fruitful in that it clarifies some of “the difficult and often perplexing positions he takes elsewhere in his work” (Brough, 2005). For instance, as Marbach (1989; chapter 5.1) and De Warren (2009; chapter 4) demonstrate, Husserl’s illuminating discussion of image consciousness decisively renews our understanding of inner time consciousness in general, and of retentional intentionality in particular. It is by means of his subtle exploration of the image that Husserl convincingly paves the way for revealing the twofold intentionality inherent in inner time consciousness, i.e., longitudinal and latitudinal intentionality.\textsuperscript{82}

In the same vein of thought, I believe Husserl’s image theory is also indispensable for a better understanding of empathic intentionality, to such an extent that Husserl’s fine-grained theory of image consciousness can definitively shed light on the intentional structure and accomplishments operative in our ordinary empathic experience. That is, image consciousness as a peculiar form of presentification serves

\textsuperscript{80} See Husserl’s own words, “wir finden innig eins mit den Wortlauten ein Bedeutungsbewußtsein, analog innig eins, wie wir im Bild das Abgebildete finden oder im Bildbewußtsein in Deckungseinheit das Bewußtsein des Abgebildeten: und dabei Moment für Moment Deckung, abbildende Momente – abgebildete Momente” (Hua 20-2/126).

\textsuperscript{81} In his famous letter (1907) to the Austrian poet, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Husserl compared the phenomenological attitude with the artistic or aesthetic one. As Husserl admitted, the “aesthetic look,” as it was formulated in von Hofmannsthal’s book, \textit{Kleine Dramen}, served as a constant and important stimulus for his thought concerning phenomenological reduction. “The phenomenological look is, then, closely related to the aesthetic look in ‘pure’ art; but, of course, it is not a look in order to enjoy aesthetically, but to research, to discover, to constitute scientific affirmation of a new (philosophical) dimension” (Briefwechsel, 7/135). For a further elaboration, see Bernet (2012), especially, p.567.

\textsuperscript{82} See also Sokolowski’s observation: “Husserl’s new analysis of remembering and imagining allowed him to resolve the vexing problem of how retentional consciousness works. But he did not immediately apply his new principles to the description of actual, non-presentational experiencing. There was a period of time in which he had established the two-track structure of memory, but still thought a kind of phantasm or present datum was needed for ‘primary memory’ or retention to apprehend” (Sokolowski, 1974, p. 152).
as a good candidate for explicating the meaning of a similar presentifying consciousness, i.e., empathic perception. For Husserl, image consciousness and empathic perception share a fundamentally similar intentional structure, because both of them, in contrast to other forms of presentification (e.g., recollection or pure imagination), constitute a peculiar form of “perceptual presentification” (Hua 23/476). The analogy between empathy and image consciousness, however, does not mean that the two intentional acts are entirely the same: they do not coincide with each other in all aspects. As I will demonstrate, empathy differs from image consciousness in some important aspects. Despite such differences, however, I want to highlight and uncover the sui generis form of empathic intentionality through an indirect approach, i.e., through the explication of the peculiar intentionality at play in image consciousness.

3.1 Husserl on image consciousness

As stated above, for Husserl, image consciousness serves as the paradigmatic form of presentification. His analysis of it covers a rather wide range of the visual arts, e.g., photography, fine art, sculpture, and theatrical drama; he also occasionally even refers to moving pictures, at a time when the very initial instruments of filmmaking had just came into being (Hua 23/[61][66]). The critical difference between image consciousness and genuine perception – straightforward external perception – consists in their noematic features. In genuine perception, the intentional regard is directed at one and only one object, for instance, the coffee mug at hand, whereas, in the case of image consciousness, the experiencing subject essentially apprehends “a stratified intentional object” (De Warren, 2009, p.147), which is unitarily composed of three indispensable objects: 1. the image-thing [Bildding], 2. the image-object [Bildobjekt], and 3. the image-subject [Bildsujet] (Hua 23/19[21]). Let me elaborate upon this through the use of Edmund Munch’s famous painting, The Scream (1893).

Obviously, the painting is made out of physical things, such as paint, the canvas the paint is applied to, and the wooden frame the painting is framed by. These material things are as tangible as are other perceptual objects and, together, they comprise the very physical painting that is hanging on the wall, beside an illuminating

83 What Husserl refers to are the Stroboskop (stroboscope) and Kinematographen (cinematography), whose depicted images move. The instruments were invented in the early 1890s.
lamp, for instance. The painting has a material support, which can be torn in pieces, or otherwise ruined (Hua 23/19[20]); however, even though its support is material and, thereby, unfortunately perishable and damageable, without such a support, the painting can have no grounding in reality. In this sense, the image displayed by the painting is “a physical thing, as thing painted and framed canvas, as this imprinted paper, and so on” (Hua 23/19[20]). Thus, the image as an image-thing not only physically bears the image, but also serves to “awaken” or “instigate” our awareness of the image-object. For this reason, the image-thing is in its own right more than a material thing in that, on the one hand, the image-thing anchors the image in the physical and intersubjectively accessible world and, on the other hand, the image-thing engenders and indicates an image that transcends or surpasses the physicality or materiality of the image-thing. The framed image-thing, according to Husserl, functions as a kind of transmitting path by which, or a “window” through which, one sees through the physical into the non-physical or imagery world (Hua 23/121[133]).

My attention, to be sure, is not primarily directed at the image-thing, the physical substratum of the image; rather, the proper correlate of my image consciousness is the imagery object that is appearing in such and such a way by means of its determinate coloration and form (Hua 23/19[20]). I see the skeletal being in the foreground. The somehow distorted face, i.e., the protruding eyes, empty and dark nostrils, and the painfully yelling mouth, indicates that it is barely human. In the background is a streaming flow of blue and grey, in strong contrast to the burning reddish sky. In Husserl’s words, I see through the image-thing into the image, the image-object proper (Hua 23/26[28]). The image-object arises when I “see into,” or “see through,” the image-thing. In Munch’s painting, I do not simply see a little figure of a skull-like human face, about a foot and a half high, tinted in black and grey, but rather “the form” of a depressed human of “superhuman size” (Hua 23/44[48]). In this sense, the image-object “directly and genuinely appears” (ibid.).

It is the intentional accomplishment of “seeing-into” that gives rise to the appearance of the image-object and that thereby makes image consciousness unique. In genuine perception, I immediately perceive the object, e.g., the coffee mug sitting to my left: it manifests through horizontal adumbration, from this or that side. I see nothing other than the coffee mug in the series of coffee mug appearances. It is literally this coffee mug through and through. By contrast, the image-object is a
perceptual appearance that emerges through something else, i.e., the image-thing, and that points to, again, something else, which is itself not present in the current perceptual field. In Munch’s *The Scream*, the image-object refers to the depicted person in the depicted landscape, i.e., the real landscape somewhere in Norway of which the painting is an imagery delegate. Moreover, the image-object also differs from what appears in pure imagination. When I imagine myself seeing, e.g., a unicorn, I do somehow intuit the unicorn in this or that protean formation [Gestalt]. It constantly varies in form, color, fullness of detail and vivacity (Hua 23/59[64]). Meanwhile, my pure imagination proceeds in such a way that I am also aware of the fact that the imagined unicorn is not taken to be an actually existing entity (Hua 23/149[173], 360 [432]). In pure imagination, I have no concern about whether the imagined object is “real” or not; I am indifferent to its mode of existence. In other words, the imagined object is a “neutralized” or “as-if” object (Hua 23/247[303]; cf. Hua 23, text no.15, §d). In this regard, the image-object seems to share such a neutral, or as-if, character in that whether it exists or not is not of my primary interest, i.e., I am not interested in whether the skeletal human is someone who “really” existed in the past (Hua 23/506[607]; cf. Marbach, 1989). That being said, however, the image-object intrinsically differs from the imagined object, insofar as the former is anchored in the image-thing and is, therefore, stable in form, color, and intensity and fixed in physical space and time (Hua 23/60[64]). By contrast, the imagined object has no such anchor in reality. In short, the image-object resembles both the perceptual object and the imagined object to the same extent as it differs from them.

These two key differences between image consciousness and pure imagination or genuine perception are crucial for the intentional structure of the image-object. The image-object is the intentional correlate of image consciousness, and it is in a sense a perceptual object (Hua 23/506[607]). Indeed, I *truly* see the image-object in the painting, yet it appears in a fundamentally different way from other perceptual objects. In the strict sense, the image-object is an ontologically “in-between” phenomenon: it

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84 The neutrality of the imagined object, according to Husserl, also distinguishes pure imagination from illusion or hallucination in that, in the latter cases, the illusionary or hallucinatory object is taken to be a “real” object, whereas there is, in reality, no such object at all. Therefore, the imagined object is not in conflict with its surrounding reality, whereas the illusionary or hallucinatory object will be annulled once it is compared, and revealed to be in conflict, with reality (Hua 23/490[585]).
is a perceptual object, an object of genuinely intuitive presentation [Gegenwärtigung]; in the meantime, its perceptual givenness is essentially modified or altered (Hua 23/26[28]), insofar as the image-object as such is an imagery [bildlich] or spiritual [geistig] being, a perceptual “appearing” [Schein], or “figment” [Fiktum] of perception. As Husserl explains: “ein Fiktum durchaus in leibhafter Gegebenheitsweise, in einer Leibhaftigkeits-Erscheinung erscheint, genau in dem Sinn wie ein Wahrnehmungsobjekt, und doch Fiktum ist” (Hua 23/580).

As indicated above, the image-object refers to a depicted object, namely, the image-subject (Hua 23/20[22], 24[25]), e.g., the real landscape that corresponds to the depiction. Upon closer look, the image-subject is not “present” in image consciousness in the sense that it is actually absent in the perceptual field: it is “perzeptive-visuell nichts da ist” (Hua 23/372). Nonetheless, it is emptily intended and made visible through the image-object: “the image object makes intuitable what, indeed, is not identical to it but is more or less like it or similar to it in content” (Hua 23/30[31]). In this sense, we do see the image-subject in the image in a somewhat “emasculated” manner in that the image-subject is not as full and complete as the corresponding (depicted) object in its full flesh. For its own part, the image-subject can be something that actually existed in the past, that exists now at another location, or that will exist in the future; and it can also be something non-existent, namely something that has never existed and will never do so, e.g., the image-subject in Raphael’s paintings of the Madonna. Hence, the image-subject thus understood is something that is present in its inherent absence, “something non-present [that] can appear and consequently be rendered present in image” (Hua 23/56[61]).

At this point, we can draw at least two corollaries form the foregoing analysis of image consciousness that not only determine the remarkable “depictive function” of the image but also illuminate the intentional structure of image consciousness (Hua 33/17). First, image consciousness is characterized by a sort of twofold “intentional conflict”: on the one hand, it is characterized by “the conflict between the image as image-object appearance and the image as physical image thing”; on the other hand, “there is the conflict between the image-object appearance and the presentation of the

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85 See the original German: “ein Nichtgegenwärtiges erscheinen und in weiterer Folge bildlich dargestellt werden kann”
The image-object is entwined with it or, rather, partially coinciding with it” (Hua 23/51[55]). To paraphrase, my image attention first and foremost regards the image-object, whilst I also have a minimal or peripheral consciousness of the image-thing. But I cannot simultaneously intend the two objects, the image-object and -thing, as the proper thematic object. When I regard the image-object, and appreciate how affectively thrilling and aesthetically beautiful Munch’s painting is, the image-thing necessarily recedes into the background. Otherwise, the image-thing itself impedes the course of image-appearing and makes itself the prominent object, making, e.g., the thinness of the stroke, or the combination of colors, the focal point of my attention. Properly speaking, the image-object simply “triumphs” in image consciousness (Hua 23/46[50]): the appearance of the image-object overshadows or “suppresses” the appearance of the image-thing (Hua 23/75[82]). The image-object, to be sure, appears in the physical surroundings due to its material substrate, but it itself is not a part of them (Brough, 2005); the image-object transcends, as it were, the image-thing. This crude conflict between reality and the imagery is significant in two regards: due to this conflict, the image-object is neither severed from reality, nor is it rendered a mundane being. As Husserl puts it, the image-object and -thing play “hide-and-seek with each other [in] the peaceful and clear consciousness of imaging” (Hua 23/41[44]).

Furthermore, my intentional experience of the image-object is in conflict with that of the image-subject, insofar as “the disparity in resemblance” between the appearing image and the depicted object is at work (Hua 23/31[32]). As indicated above, the image-object alludes to the image-subject by means of resemblance, yet this resemblance can never be complete. The skull-like human face, for instance, appears smaller than the real human; the color of the appearing face is different from that of the warm and tender skin one would expect a human face to have. Even in a very accurate portrait, e.g., a photograph, the disparity still remains: “the actual person moves, speaks and so on; the picture person is a motionless, mute figure” (Hua 23/32[33]). “Should there be perfect likeness in every aspect,” Husserl postulates, then “it would have to feel to us as if the object itself – the full and complete object –
were there in it” (ibid.). 86 In this sense, image consciousness is no longer image consciousness in the proper sense but turns out to be a genuine perception through and through. As soon as the discrepancy between the real object and the image-object collapses, the depictive function of the image breaks down, and the appearing image cannot present something else as something present. 87 In this sense, the intentional conflict that differentiates image consciousness from genuine perception or pure imagination firmly establishes that the image-object is neither a genuinely perceptual object nor a pure phantasy, and it thus functions as the foundation of image consciousness.

Having thus far outlined the first corollary that one may draw from an analysis of image consciousness, namely, that twofold intentional conflict functions as the foundation of image consciousness, let us now turn to the second corollary, which stipulates that the image-object belongs to a particular realm that is reducible neither to physical reality, as in the case of genuine perception, nor to the purely spiritual or “ideal” world, as in the case of pure imagination. In Husserl’s words, the image-object “therefore forms a separate region of objects that is the as-if counterpart of the [actual] world and of all possible worlds” (Hua 23/565[679]; my italics). The as-if or quasi-world is an ontologically in-between world, in which the object “straddles the visibility of the perceptual image-thing and the invisibility of the ‘spiritual’ image-subject” (De Warren, 2009, p. 148). 88 In this vein of thought, we can conclude along with Bernet (2012) that image consciousness is essentially a particular type of consciousness that makes the invisible visible, and renders the absent present. We should reflect upon this point a bit further, so as to gain a better understanding of the intentional accomplishment of image presentification and the constitutive function of the otherness of the invisible or absent.

86 See the full quote: “wir fühlen uns dem Gegenstand so nah, als wärern wir mit ihm in Wirklichkeit eins, als stände er uns wirklich gegenüber. Ja gewiss: Er ist wahrhaft vergegenwärtigt, wir schauen ihn „selbst”” (Hua 23/32).

87 As Husserl asks, “fehlte der Wiederstreit, wie könnte die Erscheinung etwas anderes vorstellen als Gegenwärtiges” (Hua 23/56)?

88 See Husserl’s own words, this region of the image-object is actually a region of “teils realen, teils idealen ‘geistigen Objekte,’ Gestaltungen des ‘objektiven Geistes’” (Hua 4/239).
3.2 The intentional fusion of presentiation and presentification

The image is a peculiar phenomenon that points beyond itself to something else; accordingly, image consciousness surpasses its intentional regard and aims at something other than the image-object (Hua 23/27[28]). As Husserl puts it, “image consciousness has a tinction that confers on it a sense [Bedeutung] that points beyond its primary object” (Hua 23/26[27]). In this regard, we can say that image consciousness is by necessity “a doubling of consciousness as image consciousness and subject consciousness” (Hua 23/32[33]), namely, *it is at once a consciousness of the image-object and of the image-subject*.

The question, then, is how the two seemingly different and discrepant consciousnesses can work in harmony with each other? Furthermore, do the two forms of consciousness share the same intentional characteristics? Husserl maintains that they are not of the same intentional character (Hua 23/27[28]), because, as argued earlier, consciousness of the image-object is perceptual in kind, whereas that of the image-subject is not perceptual but presentifying. Put differently, the former of consciousness presentiates its object in the “flesh and blood,” whereas the latter presentifies, or intends, its object in its absence.89 The question, to be sure, concerns what would happen were “the depicted object [to be] independently constituted by one act and the image by a second and separate act” (Hua 23/27[28]). Were this to be the case, we would in one case have an object presented as a perceptual object and, in the other case, a second object presented as a phantasized object. And even were we to try to combine the two distinct objects, we would not succeed in making them one single image in the proper sense. “At best,” as Husserl argues, “we would have a consciousness of relation between the objects established by comparison; that is, a consciousness that the one object is similar to the other” (ibid.). But such a consciousness of relation by no means constitutes image consciousness. For this reason, Husserl believes that image consciousness is not comprised “of two separate apprehension experiences on the same level that [are] merely held together by some

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89 See, e.g., “das abgebildet Objekt voll und ganz vergegenwärtigt ist” (Hua 23/32).
bond or other” (ibid.). Instead, in one single act of image consciousness, the two types of intentional act have to be “intimately interwoven” [ineinander geflochten] in such a way that they not only simultaneously intend two different objects in two different ways but also unitarily constitute the image as a whole, e.g., this painting of *The Scream*. In Husserl’s words, “the spiritual sense is, by animating the sensuous appearances, *fused* [verschmolzen] with them in a certain way instead of just being bound with them side by side” (Hua 4/238[250]).

How, one may ask, does image consciousness accomplish this task? The decisive achievement of Husserl’s analysis is that image consciousness is at once a presentiating and presentifying act, an intentional fusion between presentation and presentification, such that the presentiating act simultaneously furnishes the ground for the presentifying act, which, by means of the image-object, intends the *other, non-present* object (sujet). “The perception together with its existential thesis is sheer substratum for the grasping of what is spiritual” (Hua 4/239[251]). In this sense, the seeing of the depicted image-subject is executed in and through the seeing of the image-object, which, again, is based on the seeing of the image-thing as an image-object (de Warren, 2009, p.149). Although these three types of seeing do not coincide with each other (because each of them corresponds to a distinctive object), they are nonetheless concurrent with, and nested within, each other in such a way that they unitarily constitute image intention (ibid.). In Husserl’s words,

“das Gegenständliche gilt nicht als Gegenstand für sich, es gründet sich darauf eine Ähnlichkeitsrepräsentation als eine neue Auffassungsweise, welche die Beziehung zum Bildsujet gibt” (Hua 23/27).

“Die Anschauung vom Bildobjekt *weckt* eben ein neues Bewußtsein, eine Vorstellung von einem neuen Objekte, das mit dem Bildobjekt als ganzem […] innere Verwandtschaft, Ähnlichkeit hat. Diese neue Vorstellung liegt nun aber nicht neben der Vorstellung des Bildobjekts, 

90 See Husserl’s words, “but even here it holds that the spiritual is not a second something, is not an appendix, but is precisely animating; and the unity is not a connection of two, but, on the contrary, one and only one is there” (Hua 4/239[251]).
sondern deckt sich mit ihr, durchdringt sie und gibt ihr in dieser Durchdringung den Charakter des Bildobjekts” (Hua 23/31; my italics).

To paraphrase, image consciousness is so unique that, in it, two different sorts of intentional acts (Gegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung) overlap with each other and work together so that it can at once intend a perceptually present object and a perceptually absent object

Accordingly, image consciousness has “a second and different sort of intentionality” (Hua 10/52[54]), due to the intentional fusion of presentiation and presentification. To be noted, perceptual intentionality is characterized by immediacy in that the object intended is directly grasped and held within the perceptual field and what is intended is the object as such. By contrast, presentifying intentionality is necessarily mediate insofar as it can only make present its object by means of the medium of apprehending the image-object. Hence, it is in nature a mediated intentionality. Concretely speaking, image consciousness is inherently comprised of a twofold intentionality that is characterized by the feature of, as it were, intentional immediacy and mediacy. As Husserl notes at times, image consciousness is characterized by an “indispensable distance” (Hua 23/550): “so sagt das Bewußtsein der „Distanz“ (das der graduell wechselnden Unklarheit oder das des Andersseins, als das Bild selbst es darstellt) dies, daß ich eben ein „Bild“ habe in dem Sinn, daß ich einen vorschwebenden Gegenstand habe und, durch ihn hindurch, […] den Gegenstand selbst bestimmt vorstellig habe” (Hua 23/556).

3.3 Tangible alterity

On the basis of its intentional conflict between the image-thing, -object and -subject, and the twofold intentional fusion of presentiation and presentification, image consciousness is, therefore, a consciousness of something else [ Anderssein], something absent from, and invisible in, the current perception of the image. This means that other-being, or alterity, is precisely accessible in and through this peculiar form of perceptual experience. It is at this nexus that we need to examine more carefully the particular role of otherness, as it is so fundamental to image consciousness and presentification in general.
The first question we need to ask is whether such otherness can be done away with. Can image consciousness still subsist without its implicitly referring to the depicted object? Husserl explicitly holds that it cannot: “if the conscious relation to something depicted is not given with the image, then we certainly do not have an image” (Hua 23/31[32]). More generally speaking, the question is not whether the presentifying act will remove the Other’s alterity; rather, the real phenomenological question concerns how we can presentify the alterity of the other its most authentic givenness and, in this connection, how we can give a faithful description of such givenness, i.e., the Other as given. As Husserl continues, such genuine alterity “ist gegeben durch jenes eigentümliche Bewusstsein der Vergegenwärtigung eines Nichterscheinenden im Erscheinenden, wonach das Erscheinende sich vermöge gewisser seiner intuitiven Eigenheiten so gibt, als wäre es das andere” (Hua 23/31; my italics). Thus, the presentifying act presents to us a genuine form of otherness without reducing it to something strictly perceptual.

In his prize-winning essay, “Vergegenwärtigung und Bild: Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Unwirklichkeit” (1930), Eugen Fink points to the same Sache: “dabei vermag die Vergegenwärtigung die temporale Ferne des Ferngehaltenen nicht zu tilgen und es im Modus der Originarität erscheinen zu lassen, sondern das Vergegenwärtigte hat diese Ferne noch in sich, so zwar, daß dadurch das ganze Phänomen wesentlich bestimmt ist” (Fink, 1960, p. 24; cf. Sokolowski, 1974, p.149). To paraphrase, the aim of the intentional accomplishment of presentification not only makes present what is absent, or renders visible what is invisible, in a definite mode of originality; more importantly, this making-present does not jeopardize the constitutively indispensable “distance” or alterity of what is absent but secures it, to be sure. This result cannot be emphasized enough when it comes to the subsequent discussion of empathic perception and its sui generis intentionality.

4. Vergegenwärtigung and the twofold nature of empathic intentionality

In light of the previous exposition, I believe that empathic perception is fundamentally akin to image consciousness rather than to recollective consciousness. Whereas recollection is an intrinsically regressive form of consciousness, empathic perception, as well as image consciousness, is an originally progressive form of consciousness, in that it intends something externally transcendent, i.e., the foreign
subject in the fullest sense. Moreover, recollection is a reproduction of what has already taken place, a reliving of past experience; by contrast, empathic perception and image consciousness authentically confront what is taking place in the living present, or originally presentifying what is simultaneously co-present [Mitgegenwart]. “Durch die Mittel der Kunst werden Anzeigen geschaffen,” as Husserl realizes in 1920, “tritt das mir Gemässe oder Nichtgemässe hervor” (Hua 14/187). That is, the analysis of image consciousness provides the proper ground for investigating the intentional structure of empathic perception. This reorientation in focus on image consciousness will enable us to work out Held’s second reading of Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception, as well as Husserl’s second solution to empathic perception—what he terms as “empathic presentification” [einfühlende Vergegenwärtigung] (Hua 8/174, 14/10, 14/162, 15/242, 15/357; cf. 1/§55).

4.1 Husserl on empathic presentification

On Held’s second reading of Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception, “wie wenn ich dort wäre” actually means “als ob ich dort wäre” in the subjunctive sense: one phantasizes oneself into the Other’s place “there,” as if I were there. Hence, empathy is actually a fictive form of consciousness by which one puts oneself into the Other’s mental shoes: it is an “as-if” presentation [Vorstellung], “a quasi-positional presentification, in which I present to myself that the physical body there were (in the subjunctive sense) my lived body” (Held, 1972, p. 38; cf. Clark, 2009). On this reading, Held argues, Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception “must fail,” because “this presentification therefore cannot result in an apperception of an actually co-founding [mitfungierenden] Other” (ibid.).

Held’s assessment is, as will be made clear, partially misleading. On the one hand, he is right in pointing out the “as-if” [als ob] or quasi character [Gleichsamkeit] of presentification. On the other hand, he overestimates the role of phantasy or fictive

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consciousness in empathy, because he overlooks the fact that the quasi, or as-if, character of presentification, i.e., empathic presentification, needs not be fictive, as in the case of image consciousness. That being said, how, then, should we understand empathic presentification without conflating it with mere phantasy?

Let us begin with Husserl’s more or less systematic formulation in §55 of *Cartesian Meditations*. I think Husserl’s third argument for analogizing apperception is implicitly at play here, yet we can only spell out its full significance in light of his theory of image consciousness. After outlining the two strategies of analogizing empathy with recollection (Cf. chapter 3.2), Husserl seems to be very uncertain about whether analogizing apperception thus formulated can truly secure or maintain the cardinal distinction between “here” and “there,” between one’s own primordiality and that of the other; and he asks, “aber wie kommt es, daß ich überhaupt von demselben Körper sprechen kann, der in meiner primordianalen Sphäre im Modus Dort, in der seinen und für ihn im Modus Hier erscheint” (Hua 1/150; my italics)? Are they separated by a so-called “mythical” abyss [Abgrund]? Or, is the differentiation between “here” and “there,” between self and other, merely a postulation? As I have shown in section 2, Husserl can only hypothesize the existence of such an abyss by recourse to recollection. In order to unpack, and, thereby, gain a better understanding of, the issue at stake, we need to shift our thematic focus to our guiding clue [Leifladen], i.e., the de facto empathic experience. Husserl suggests, “so finden wir, daß wirklich der sinnlich gesehene Körper ohne weiteres als der des Anderen erfahren ist, und nicht bloß als seine Anzeige für den Anderen” (ibid.). That is, only a precise explication of the operative intentionality inherent in empathic experience can disperse the clouds that are obstructing our clear view of the enigma (ibid.).

That being said, how, then, do we perceive a human being [geistigen Lebenwesen] after all, asks Husserl in *Ideas II*, after discussing the manner of appearance of certain abstract entities, such as words or works of fine art [Kunstwerk], for instance. In a concrete scenario, such as talking with a friend or watching a friend dance, is he or she apperceived as a combination [Verbindung] of two realities, i.e., the reality of physical being and that of spiritual being (Hua 4/240, 241)? Husserl thinks that this is not the case. Like the peculiar seeing-into that takes place in image consciousness, “ich sehe den Menschen, und indem ich ihn sehe, sehe ich auch seinen Leib. In gewisser Weise geht die Menschenauffassung durch die Erscheinung
des Körpers, der da Leib ist, hindurch. Sie bleibt gewissermaßen nicht beim Körper stehen, sie richtet nicht auf ihn ihren Pfeil, sondern durch ihn hindurch – auch nicht auf einen mit ihm verbundenen Geist sondern eben auf den Menschen” (Hua 4/240).

To paraphrase, while my intentional regard is not directed at the Other’s physical body, it is nevertheless by means of and through this physical body that my intentional regard is directed at the Other qua human person. My intentional regard would never reach the Other’s subjective being had the sensuous appearance of the Other’s physical body not been pre-given at all. The Other’s physical appearance, thus, serves as “the founding substratum [Unterlage] that constitutes the Other’s corporeality” (Hua 4/240) and, furthermore, as the sensuous support [Anhalt] for the manifestation of the Other’s subjective being (Hua 4/241). As Husserl argues elsewhere, despite being a unitary act, empathic perception is nevertheless characterized by twofold, or bifurcated, intentionality: the Other’s corporeal appearance serves as the starting point – terminus a quo – from which empathic intentionality is guided towards the end point, or terminus ad quem, of the empathic regard, namely the Other’s inner conscious life as thereby expressed through her corporeal appearance (Cf. chapter 4.2). That is, the Other’s corporeality functions as a “passageway” [Übergang], by means of which empathic perception shifts its focus from the Other’s exteriority to the Other’s interiority or, better, from the Other’s expressive bodily appearance to the Other’s expressed conscious life.

In other words, empathic perception is essentially akin to image consciousness in that it is a sort of “seeing into” [Hindurchsehen], by which we see through the physical body into what is subjective or spiritual in such a way that the subjective or spiritual “saturates [durchdringt] the physical whole” (Hua 4/238[249]). The Other’s body, as “a lived body through and through” (Hua 4/240), functions as a sort of “window” through which we originally see into the Other’s psyche, through which we live in the sense of the Other’s psychical life and comprehend it (Hua 4/236[248]). To put it differently, in empathic perception, our thematic interest is primarily in the Other’s subjective life, e.g., in the Other’s state of being in or experiencing pain; yet,

92 For a similar point regarding Husserl’s account of signitive consciousness, see Melle (1998, p. 176): “der Zeichenempfänger soll mit seiner Aufmerksamkeit nicht beim Zeichen selbst verweilen, sondern das Zeichen nur als Brücke zur, als Hinweis auf die Bedeutung gebrauchen; er soll sich vom Zeichen fortleiten lassen zur Bedeuten.”
this thematic interest by no means entails that the Other’s physical appearance is not given at all. Suppose that “the foreign corporeal body lacks the style of organism.” If this is so, as Husserl speculates, “then that body simply lacks the capacity to experientially indicate an animation [Beseelung] belonging to it. The Other’s psychic life then ceases in principle to be experienceable” (Hua 9/108[82]). Therefore, the physical body must have, however peripherally, been genuinely perceived so that one can (ap-)perceive it as a lived body, in the same way as one must have genuinely perceived the image-thing so as to be able to (ap-)perceive the image-object. Nonetheless, the physical appearance of the Other, or the image-thing, for instance, “is precisely what I am not focused on” (ibid.). In this respect, Husserl argues that the unitary corporeal [leiblich] appearance of the Other can be phenomenologically articulated or differentiated into a manifold series of indispensable moments. As he states in an otherwise elusive passage,

“ist eben die Auffassung eines Dinges als Mensch […] eine solche, welche mannigfaltige, aber ausgezeichnete Momente der erscheinenden körperlichen Gegenständlichkeit beseelt, dem Einzelnen Sinn, seelischen Inhalt gibt und wieder die schon beseelten Einzelheiten nach den im Sinn liegenden Forderungen zu höherer Einheit verknüpft und zuletzt zur Einheit des Menschen” (Hua 4/241, my italics; cf. Hua 4/243).

Hence, according to our previous exposition, we can distinguish between two essentially interwoven instances of “seeing” inherent in empathic perception: the first “seeing,” namely that of “seeing” the Other’s subjective being, is based upon, and nested within, a second “seeing,” namely that of “seeing” the Other’s physical body as a lived body. As Husserl explicitly states,

der physischen Erscheinung, das Wort Erscheinung im engsten Sinn genommen” (Hua 23/99-100; my italics).

“Die Menschen-Auffassung, die Auffassung dieser Person da, ist nicht Auffassung eines an den Leib gehefteten Geistigen sondern die Auffassung von etwas, das sich durch das Medium der Körperscheinung vollzieht, die Körperscheinung wesentlich in sich schließt und ein Objekt konstituiert” (Hua 4/240; my italics).

At this point, we need to consider these two sorts of “seeing” more carefully so as to spell out their founding relationship on the one hand and their constitutive function with regard to human apperception on the other. For one thing, one may ask whether the two sorts of “seeing” should be seen as two separate acts that can only be brought together in juxtaposition (Hua 4/237[248], 241[253]).

As in the case of image consciousness, Husserl maintains that this is not the case. We simply do not see the image-thing as one part of an act of image consciousness and the image-object as another, nor do we put them “next to each other” as if “either part could also exist for itself in abstraction from the form that binds them” (Hua 4/237[249]). Phenomenally speaking, we unitarily see the image-object in the image-thing, whilst implicitly being aware of the intentional conflict between the seeing of the image-thing and the seeing of the image-object. The same point, as Husserl holds, applies to empathic perception:

“alle psychischen Momente, alles, was zur Persönlichkeit als solcher gehört, ist indirekt eingelegt, zumeist durch leere, in die Einheit der Wahrnehmung eingeschmolzene Intentionen. Wir werden aber doch nicht sagen, nur durch leere Intentionen ließen sich Akte vergegenwärtigen, es gebe von ihnen eine eigentliche Anschauung in Form einer angemessenen Vergegenwärtigung nicht” (Hua 23/100).

93 As Husserl himself asks, “verhält es sich so oder analog im Falle der Einstellung auf ein Geistiges, ist es ein dem erscheinenden Leiblichen in ähnlicher Weise wie ein physischer Teil einem anderen Teile Angeknüpftes, achte ich darauf, ohne das Leibliche eben mit zu beachten” (Hua 4/237).
In other words, empathic perception proceeds in such a way that our perception of the Other’s physical being and that of the Other’s subjective being are not juxtaposed side by side but fused [verschmolzen] in an intentional unity (Hua 4/238).94

Elsewhere, Husserl conceives of such an intentional unity as constituting a type of “functioning community” between presentation and presentification (Hua 1/150). More specifically, the Other’s physical body is genuinely perceived in that it is this physical being, in the strictest sense, that exists in the flesh and blood, localized in space, with a certain orientation. Meanwhile, the Other’s subjective being, which signifies the physical body as lived body, cannot be genuinely perceived but rather presentified, insofar as, to be sure, it falls outside of the genuinely perceptual realm (Hua 23/99). Thus, empathic perception is “eine durch Assoziationen mit dieser, der eigentlichen Wahrnehmung, verbundene Vergegenwärtigung, aber eine solche, die in der besonderen Funktion der Mitwahrnehmung mit ihr verschmolzen ist. Mit anderen Worten, beide sind so verschmolzen, daß sie in der Funktionsgemeinschaft einer Wahrnehmung stehen, die in sich zugleich präsentiert und appräsentiert, und doch für den Gesamtgegenstand das Bewußtsein seines Selbstdasein herstellt” (Hua 1/150). It is in this sense that empathic perception is in nature an intentional fusion of two essentially different acts, i.e., Gegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung, through which we unitarily intend the Other as a person as such. Accordingly, we can noematically discriminate two constituent factors of the empathic correlate from each other, i.e., “the genuinely perceived body” and “the not genuinely perceived yet nevertheless co-existing subjective being” (Hua 1/150-51). As stated earlier, these two constituent factors should not be treated as if they were two independent entities that are only joined insofar as they are juxtaposed to each other; rather, the perceptually given body supports and provides an anchor for the non-perceptually given mental life, whereas the latter saturates and penetrates the former. They are two discernible aspects of one unitary phenomenon; that is, body and spirit originally form a “comprehensive unity” (Hua 4/236[248]).

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94 The same idea can be found as early as in the first Logical Investigation, where Husserl talks about two indispensable elements signitive consciousness — the intuitive presentation of the sign’s physical substrate and the meaning intention of its referent — which together form a “tangible connectedness” (Hua 19/36). Understood in this way, the signitive consciousness is an “intimately unitary consciousness” (Hua 20-2/32). For further discussion of this matter, see chapter 4.
In short, empathic perception functions by means of a twofold intentionality that is \textit{at once} unitarily directed at the Other’s physical and subjective being (Cf. section 1.3 and section 3.2). For this reason, as Husserl argues in \textit{Erste Philosophie II}, empathic perception is at the same time characterized by both immediacy and mediacy; to illustrate this, I quote the following at length:


By means of the above line of argumentation, Husserl holds that empathy is nothing but precisely the apprehension of the Other as a person; as he puts it, it is not the apprehension of a pure spirit that is fastened or annexed to a pure body. On the contrary, empathy is the apprehension of the Other’s mental life that manifests itself through the medium of his or her physical, bodily appearance (Hua 4/240, 244; cf. Hua 1/153).95

4.2 The quasi character of empathic presentification

Having cashed out the nature of the complex intentional fusion at play in empathic perception, we can further determine the concrete meaning of empathic presentification and dissect the intentional accomplishment it brings about. Around

95 Consider, e.g., a similar statement from Husserl: “gegeben also sind Andere erstens direkt durch Einfühlung und in ihr ihre Wahrnehmung etc., ihr erweitertes wirkliches und mögliches Feld. Dadurch habe ich Vergegenwärtigung modifizierter Art – die Einfühlungen” (Hua 15/244).
the year 1926/27, Husserl seems to become more and more specific about the nature of empathic presentification and conceives of it, in line with image consciousness, as a type of “as-if” or quasi perception, in that we do perceive the Other’s subjective state but only to the extent that we perceive it in an as-if manner.

As I suggested earlier (Cf. chapter 1.3), Husserl’s theory of analogizing apperception is better understood as a “quasi-perspective-taking,” mainly because to perceive the Other’s body as a lived body is tantamount to perceiving the Other as if from her embodied perspective, i.e., the foreign center of orientation. In this sense, empathic perception first and foremost presentifies [vergegenwärtigen], or takes over, the Other’s perspective, in the as-if manner, “as if I were there,” namely in such a way that my own body and the surrounding world manifest themselves accordingly insofar as they become oriented to the taken-over “here.” In Husserl’s words, in perceiving a foreign body, “es wird mitgeweckt die Vorstellung, „als ob ich leiblich dort wäre“, […] daß mein Körper in der Abwandlung dieses ähnlichen Körper dorthin versetzter Leib ist und bezogen auf die unweltliche Erscheinung von dort” (Hua 14/498-99). However, this quasi-perspective-taking, as indicated, is far from an actual perspective-taking because, similar to how I need not become angry in the least when I see anger in the Other’s face, I need not in the least actually “live in” the Other’s perspective when I sensuously perceive his or her corporeal body (Hua 23/99). In this regard, Husserl thinks that quasi-perspective-taking can be understood as a kind of quasi-living-with, insofar as we do make present [vergegenwärtigen] the Other’s psychical states without actually living in these states. As Husserl argues, quasi-perspective-taking involves adopting a sort of “as-if attitude” (Hua 14/186, 15/427), in which “wir unter dem Titel des Hineinversetzens in den Anderen mit ihm sind, durchleben wir ein quasi-Leben geradehin und eine quasi-Reflexion, durch die das Subjektives des Anderen und der Andere selbst als Subjekt für die Gegebenheitsweise seines Objektiven thematisch wird” (Hua 15/427; original italics).

Husserl illustrates this point with an example. Suppose you come across someone walking over a puddle, which the Other’s “eyes” are somehow “directed” at. You not only perceive the Other’s corporeal body but, more importantly, her “perspective” of the puddle, i.e., she is now regarding it. Husserl believes that, in and through such bodily perception, a presentation [Vorstellung] of “as if I were there” has also been awakened or provoked, to the extent that “als ob ich dort wäre als Ich
dieses Leibkörpers und mich bewegt gegen diese Wasserlache, meine Augen auf sie gerichtet, als ob ich sie sähe, und nun selbstverständlich weiche ich aus, *das ist im Als-ob vorgezeichnet*” (Hua 14/499; my italics). In other words, I do not simply perceive a body over there, behaving in such and such manner, with such and such an outlook; more importantly, I also at the same time perceive the Other’s intentions, insofar as they are illustrated, or realized, through a series of related bodily movements (Cf. Hua 15/446). That is, I perceive the Other’s perspective, as it is embodied in and through his or her outward behavior; or, better, my perception of the Other’s corporeality is at the same time a perception of the Other as a subject for this world, that experiences it from a particular perspective (Hua 1/123[91]).

With the help of this example, we can discern two aspects of empathic presentification. First, I intuitively see the Other’s corporeal body that stands there in “perceptual actuality with a determinate style” (Hua 14/499.), whilst having a concurring presentification of the Other’s perspective of the surrounding world. Second, the concurring presentification affords or gives rise to a “quasi-signification” [quasi-Bedeutung] that “discloses a horizon of sense and of my further bodily conducts ‘as-if I were there’” (ibid.). As Husserl observes at this point, “diese vergegenwärtigende Vorstellung unterlegt also der körperlichen Äusserlichkeit eine Innenbedeutung, aber nur die meines abgewandelten leiblichen Seins und Ichbewußtseinslebens, meiner abgewandelten Wahrnehmungen vom Umweltlichen usw. ‘von dort aus’” (ibid.).

At this point, let us now examine whether this line of argument meets Held’s trifold criteria: 1. the simultaneity of the Other’s being; 2. the Other’s real being; and 3. the maintenance of the self-other differentiation. Indeed, if one considers the form of empathic perception that has thus far been outlined, and understood as the perception of a co-subject in the co-present, empathic perception certainly satisfies criteria 1 and 2. Held is worried, nevertheless, about whether the quasi-ness character of empathic presentification would yet again render the Other an impoverished figment of a solipsistic dream, i.e., whether empathic perception would, thus, turn out to be an act of egoic fiction and could therefore not maintain the self-Other differentiation. I think this needs not be the case, one reason being that empathic perception does not solely consist in presentification, but is rather an intentional fusion of presentation and presentification; and it is by means of the intentional
accomplishment of such fusion that one can gain a sense-horizon of the Other’s subjective being. Another reason why the quasi character of empathic perception needs not be fictive is that, as already argued, one needs not actually put oneself in the Other’s conscious life when empathizing with him or her. In this sense, such quasiness only captures, as it were, the intentional structure of empathic perception. Husserl, with the help of his image theory, explicitly arrives at this point:

“steht der Andere für mich perzeptiv da und also so urteilend. [...] Die Vergegenwärtigung ist aber nicht reproduktiv, obschon sie Vergegenwärtigung. Darstellung ist, sie ist also nicht Phantasie, geschweige denn „bloße Phantasie,“ sondern hat ihre Aktualität” (Hua 23/431; cf. Hua 14/489-90).

In short, empathic perception is neither a form of reproductive presentification, as Theunissen and Kozlowski argue, nor is it a type of phantasizing consciousness, as Held suggests. On the contrary, empathic perception is an original act directed at the Other in such a unique way that it comprises an intentional fusion of two different kinds of intentional acts, i.e., presentation and presentification, and it functions by means of a twofold intentionality that is at once directed at the Other’s physical and subjective being.

4.3 Husserl’s analogy of empathy with image consciousness: a stocktaking

Before concluding this section, let us take stock of what has been said thus far. As has been argued, empathic perception is structurally akin to image consciousness, insofar as both acts share the same kind of intentional accomplishment that makes present what is absent and renders visible what is invisible. If this is so, then, it is natural to ask what the foreign body shares in common with the image, and in what sense the two particular entities are on par with each other. In short, what is the difference between the two?

In some passages, Husserl thinks that the foreign body and the image do function at the same level, in that they serve as the support or affordance [Anhalt] for something else that manifests in and through them. In the case of the image, the image-thing bears, and thereby awakens or instigates, the appearance of the image-object, which again makes present the depicted image-subject. Similarly, the physical
body bears, and thereby anchors, the Other’s subjective or psychical being in reality and conveys the latter in and through bodily expression.

Furthermore, this insight makes it possible for Husserl to consider the similar expressivity at stake in both cases. The image conveys or expresses what is depicted by means of its more or less articulate content. Hence, the expressive relation between the image and what is depicted is an intrinsic one in that what is referred to by the image can only be that which is depicted by resemblance; otherwise, the depictive function of the image simply collapses. As Husserl proposes and Merleau-Ponty later on iterates in his own words (1942/1967), the image bears a “sensuously experienced form [Gestalt]” in which “the spiritual sense expresses itself” (Hua 9/111). As Husserl further observes, the spiritual sense “in seinem oft sehr vielgliedrigen geistigen Aufbau, hat sein Gegenbild in dem Aufbau der Formungen und Gliederungen der sinnlich erfahrenen Körperlichkeit, in der er sich ausdrucksmäßig verkörpert” (ibid.) In the same vein of thought, Husserl holds that the same kind of expressive relation is also operative in bodily expression: “das eben ist die Weise des Ausdrucks, des fortlaufenden und dabei stimmend-bestätigenden Ausdrucks” (Hua 9/112), so that what is expressed is not juxtaposed with that which expresses but is rather fused with and evinced by it (Hua 9/111). In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the foreign body is by no means sterile but rather saturated with a “figurative sense” in such a way that the Other’s subjective or psychic states are expressed in and through bodily gesticulation (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p.200).

However, Husserl later (1922) comes to argue that, however close the foreign body and the image come together, the foreign body is by no means an image. According to Husserl’s standard model, the image is a depictive phenomenon in that it depicts [abbilden] or re-presents [repräsentieren] something else by means of similarity; for instance, a portrait of my mother outlines her face in greater or lesser detail. The portrait itself, nonetheless, is a portrait of my mother; it refers to something other than itself. By contrast, the foreign body is for itself—it “belongs” to the Other him- or her-self; in other words, the foreign body, to be sure, does not refer to something other than itself and is, therefore, not an “image” in the sense defined above. For this reason, Husserl holds that “der fremde Leib wird als Leib verstanden,
5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I focused on the problem of empathic intentionality by means of examining the two analogies Husserl draws between empathy and recollection, on the one hand, and image consciousness, on the other. I outlined two readings of Husserl’s analogy of empathy with recollection and pointed out that, in each reading, Husserl’s argument falls short of satisfying three criteria: 1. the simultaneity of the Other’s being, 2. the Other’s real being, and 3. the Other’s alterity. In short, Husserl’s strategy of analogizing empathy with recollection leads to a dead end.

However, I think Husserl’s second strategy of analogizing empathy with image consciousness succeeds in meeting the three criteria. In order to demonstrate how it does so, I provided an exposition of Husserl’s account of image consciousness and, thereby, spelled out his second conception of empathic perception in terms of “empathic presentification.” I showed that, like image consciousness, empathic perception is articulated by a complex form of intentional fusion, in which empathic perception is at once a *presenting* and *appresenting* act. In this manner, empathic perception unitarily grants experiential access to the co-subject in the co-present without negating the very alterity that makes the co-subject other. Accordingly, empathic perception has a complex form of twofold intentionality, which is at once directed at the Other’s physical and subjective being – although we can reflectively discriminate the difference between the two sorts of directedness. In this sense, empathic intentionality is also characterized by intentional immediacy, in that it presentiates the Other in the flesh and blood, and intentional mediacy, in that it makes present the Other’s subjective perspective in such a way that quasi-takes over the Other’s perspective in an as-if manner.

While the analogy between empathy and image consciousness illustrates certain theoretical similarities, and helps precisely to shed light on the nature of empathy, as I emphasized earlier, this analogy does not entail that empathy and image

96 See also, “das, was ich wirklich sehe, ist nicht ein Zeichen und nicht ein bloßes Analogon, in irgend einem natürlichen Sinne ein Abblid, sondern der Andere; und das dabei in wirklicher Originalität Erfaßte, dies Körperlichkeit dort, das ist der Körper des Anderen selbst” (Hua 1/153).
consciousness can be conflated with each other, nor does it mean that their intentional correlates (i.e., the Other’s corporeality and the image) are essentially the same. There are important aspects that differentiate empathy from image consciousness. As Stein argues, empathic perception is a *sui generis* form of intentional action that can neither be derived from nor reduced to other acts, such as genuine perception, recollection and imagination. That is, empathic perception is a complex act, and image consciousness, as I hope to have demonstrated, serves as a good candidate to elucidate the nature of such complexity. With this analogy, we can gain a better understanding of the nature of our complex empathic experience on the one hand and its intentional accomplishment on the other.
Chapter Four
Indication and Bodily Expression

In this chapter, I primarily focus on the problem of the Other’s bodily expressivity and its role in empathic understanding. More specifically, I investigate in what sense bodily behavior counts as bodily expression and to what extent bodily expression contributes to and thereby facilitates empathic understanding. For this purpose, I consider two critical texts, namely, the first *Logische Untersuchung* (1900) and its *Neufassung* in 1914, together with some of Husserl's research manuscripts from the 1920s. By doing so, I spell out a constitutive account of bodily behavior with regard to the Other's expression: the Other’s bodily behavior is intrinsically meaningful and outwardly discloses the Other’s mental life. I further argue that the Other’s bodily behavior thus conceived plays a crucial role not only in Husserl’s account of empathy but also in our everyday empathic understanding.

As shown in preceding chapters, Husserl’s account of empathy and his constitutional theory of the other’s (lived-)body in particular involve some fundamental difficulties and have been seriously criticized by many authors. Not surprisingly, attention has been mainly drawn to the constitutional problem of the Other’s body, whereas relatively little consideration has been given to a highly related issue, i.e., that of bodily expression.⁹⁷ Husserl holds that a constitutional analysis of the foreign body immediately sheds light on the issue of bodily expression, and argues that the foreign body is an “expressive unity” in the first place (Hua 4/236). That is, the Other’s “harmonious behavior” is itself saturated with meaning (Hua 4/238), and serves to constantly fulfill empathic intentionality (Hua 1/144).

Nonetheless, Husserl’s own thought on bodily expression undergoes a significant revision when he changes his early view in the first investigation, and develops a new account from 1914 onwards. Opinion differs insofar as the cause of the revision is concerned (Bernet, 1988; Flynn, 2009; Heinämaa, 2010). The main reason, Heinämaa argues, consists in Husserl’s refinement of his understanding of

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⁹⁷ The only exception, to my knowledge, is perhaps Georg Römpp (1992; cf. Chapter 4). I will come back to Römpp’s interpretation in the first section.
embodiment in Ideas II. Although Husserl’s new account of the lived body is indeed relevant to his new account of bodily expression, I think the decisive factor proves to be his revision of indication. Furthermore, by exploring the underlying motivation for the revision, we can work out two different sorts of hypotheses with regard to bodily behavior, and dissect the reason why we should opt for Husserl’s later hypothesis instead of the earlier one, i.e., the constitutive instead of the collateral hypothesis regarding the Other’s bodily behavior in respect to her bodily expression.

In order to fully cash out the main purpose of this chapter, in section 1, I spell out Husserl’s first account of indication and his early hypothesis of bodily behavior within the context of the sign. I demonstrate that, first, indication thus conceived is in nature a contingent indication in that the indicator has only a contingent relation to the indicated; and, second, insofar as it is reckoned as an indication of the Other’s mental life, bodily behavior is also a contingent indicator and thus a dispensable accompaniment of the Other’s mental life. Accordingly, the Other’s bodily behavior is a collateral physiological phenomenon of the Other’s mental life that lacks substantive meaning.

In section 2, I focus on Husserl’s revision of indication. I analyze the internal relation between the indicator and the indicated in this account, i.e., the intentional tendency and meaning structure rooted in the indicator. I argue that this significant shift in focus from contingent to intrinsic indication results in a substantially new account of bodily expression. That is, the Other’s bodily behavior is now conceived of as a meaning-laden constituent of the Other’s expression. And I further explicate the sense in which the Other’s behavior is an “expressive unity,” and serves to make manifest the Other’s psychic states.

In section 3, I substantiate the constitutive account of bodily behavior by drawing upon Husserl’s research manuscripts and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of (bodily) expression. I suggest that bodily behavior thus conceived is better characterized as a metastable structure (Landes, 2013) that is both a self-motivating system and a self-fulfilling continuum. By doing so, I will, in line with Waldenfels (2000, 2004), further specify the constitutive elements of bodily expression, and articulate some central features of Husserl’s Gestalt theory of bodily expression.
1. Indication and bodily expression in I. *Logische Untersuchung*

It is well known that Husserl frames the question of bodily expression within the context of the sign, and takes facial countenances, bodily gestures and behaviors to be instances of mere indication. Following the argument in the first investigation, Husserl holds that bodily behavior understood as mere indication does not constitute expression as such, and he thereby downplays the role of bodily behavior in conveying the Other’s expressive meaning. One may suspect whether such a strange exclusion of bodily behavior from the realm of expression takes root in Husserl’s “privileged example of the sign” (Derrida, 2011, p. 4). A careful reading, however, shows that such a conception of bodily behavior is not only in accordance with Husserl’s theory of the sign, but it is also a consequence of the underlying presumptions Husserl operates with in respect to bodily behavior. It is the latter aspect that I primarily focus on in this section.

1.1 Indication and expression

With his opening words to I. *Logische Untersuchung*, Husserl criticizes the traditional and conventional conception of the sign for mixing up two of its essentially different functions; in Husserl’s words, “every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has ‘meaning’ [Bedeutung], a ‘sense’ [Sinn] that is ‘expressed’ through the sign” (Hua 19/30[183]). For instance, a traffic sign may denote [bezeichen] the existence of a sharp curve to the right in the road ahead, but the sign itself does not necessarily have any inherent expressive meaning or sense, e.g., the sense that “it is dangerous to drive fast.” Therefore, Husserl believes that there are two sorts of signs: indicative signs, such as animal footprints, scientific notes [Kennzeichen], marks [Merkzeichen], or even memory aids, such as a knotted handkerchief, which merely fulfill the indicative function; and expressive signs, such as speech [Rede] or statements [Aussage], the two examples Husserl exclusively refers to, which fulfill both the indicative and meaning functions [Bedeutungsfunktion] (ibid.).

Hence, according to Husserl’s definition, the difference between indication and expression consists in the meaning function that “characterizes the expression” (ibid.), namely, the function that makes a sign a “meaningful” [bedeutsam] expression, especially in the communicative sense. For instance, the following string of letters, “m-o-s-q-u-i-t-o”, may denote a certain word that bears that particular combination of
letters. The literal pronunciation of the string of letters, however, does not “express” anything, but only indicates the existence of the word. In this case, “m-o-s-q-u-i-t-o” only fulfills the indicative function and, thus, it is not an expressive sign – the word “mosquito” itself. In contrast, the same string of letters, once articulately spoken as “mosquito,” constitutes a word and succeeds in referring to the animal “mosquito,” thereby fulfilling the meaning function as well. In Husserl’s words, verbal expression not only serves as an indication of the speaker’s mental life insofar as words are “signs of the ‘thought’ of the speaker” (Hua 19/40[189]), but it also bears a “meaning-intention” [Bedeutungsintention] through which the speaker animates the indicator and “make[s] it be an expression of something” (Hua 19/38[188]).

As Husserl further explicates, expression can be descriptively delineated into two intertwined aspects: 1. the physical aspect, namely, the articulate series of letters, written symbols, or other sensible signs, that comprise the physical substrate of the expression; and 2. the psychic aspect, namely, the meaning act that bestows meaning or sense on the physical, and thereby constitutes an expressive relation with the intended object (Hua 19/43-44[191-92], 19/38[188]). This distinction proves to be pivotal for our entire analysis. In the first investigation, Husserl holds that it is due to [vermöge] its meaning-intention that “expression is more than a merely verbal sound [Wortlaut]. It means something, and insofar as it means something, it relates to its object” (Hua 19/44). In other words, physical signs remain as indications insofar as they lack meaning-intention; that is, a word ceases to be a word or remains a “mere sound pattern [Lautgebilde],” when our interest exclusively stops at its sensuous data [Sinnliche] (Hua 19/40-41[190]). By contrast, words become expressions once they are animated by a meaning-conferring [Bedeutungsverleihenden] subject, for instance, the speaker of “mosquito” (Hua 19/44[192], 45[193]). As Husserl confirms, it is this meaning-conferring act that constitutes “the most essential core” of expression (Hua 19/45[193]), because only by means of such a meaning conferring act can the speaker ensoul or animate the physical sign and, moreover, point to the meant object, regardless of whether the object is emptily or intuitively intended (Hua 19/44[192]).

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98 See the original text, “vermöge dieser letzteren Akte ist der Ausdruck mehr als ein bloßer Wortlaut. Er meint etwas, und indem er es meint, bezieht er sich auf Gegenständliches.”
Thus, expressive consciousness is comprised of two sorts of acts, i.e., the intuitive presentation of the physical aspect and the sense-bestowing act. As Husserl contends, “both are ‘lived through,’ the presentation of the word and the sense-giving act: but while we experience the former, we do not live in such a presentation at all, but solely in enacting its sense, its meaning” (ibid.). Whereas the physical, or merely indicative, aspect of expression just serves to awaken a sense-conferring act in ourselves, and to guide our intentional regard to what is intended, the meaning-conferring act makes the expressive sign point to [hinzeigen] the intended object. In Husserl’s words, “zum gesprochenen Wort, zur mitteilenden Rede überhaupt wird die artikulierte Lautkomplexion (bzw. das hingeschriebene Schriftzeichen u.dgl.) erst dadurch, daß der Redende sie in der Absicht erzeugt, „sich“ dadurch „über etwas zu äußern” (Hua 19/39; my italics). In this sense, a speaker articulately “reads” out the word “mosquito,” and thereby expresses his or her hic et nunc mental state, i.e., the mental state of referring to the animal called mosquito. 99 According to Husserl, it is also by means of subjective animation that actual communication can take place at all. That is, the hearer or the addressee can now consider the word “mosquito” as an indicative sign on the one hand and as a meaningful expression on the other (ibid.).

The explication so far is open to the interpretation that expressive consciousness thus conceived consists in a mere aggregate of the two aspects – the presentation of the physical sign and the meaning-endowing act – as if they were two independent acts that were just simultaneously given in signitive consciousness (Hua 19/45[193]). Husserl explicitly rejects this interpretation; as he says, “they rather form an intimately fused unity of peculiar character” (ibid.). 100 As explained above, the expressive sign directs the intentional regard from object A (i.e., the physical or indicative sign) to the expressed object B, say, the referent, mosquito. However, this does not mean that we have a presentation of the object A, and a second presentation of the object B, and then lump both presentations together by some sort of “hidden

99 As Husserl insists, expression as such can be structurally discriminated into three aspects: the sense-filling act; the expressive act, or intimation between the speaker’s utterance and his mental state; and the expressed object, or referent. While the two “functions” of expression, i.e., animation and reference, are two separate terms on Husserl’s account, they nevertheless refer to two descriptive aspects of one unitary act (Cf. Hua 19/§12-14).

100 See the original text, “sie bilden vielmehr eine innig verschmolzene Einheit von eigentümlichem Charakter” (my italics).
psychological coordination” (ibid.). As Husserl points out, such a lumping-together does not render the presentation of object A an “expression” of the presentation of object B. For instance, the fact that I read out the word “mosquito,” and see an actual mosquito on the wall, for instance, does not make the former an expression of the latter. As Husserl insists, expression is “the experiential unity between the sign and what is signified [Bezeichnetem]” (Hua 19/45).

That being said, Husserl’s own argument still runs the risk of being misinterpreted in this way, as we will soon see below. For now, it suffices to point out that, for Husserl, the indicative function and the meaning function of expression can be separated in such a way that the meaning function is independent of the indicative function. The meaning function alone essentially serves the expressive purpose. As Husserl writes, e.g., “expressions display their meaning function even in solitary life, where they no longer function as indications” (Hua 19/31; cf. Hua 19/§8). In other words, the meaning conferring act is actually independent of the physical and indicative sign, insofar as the indicative sign as such remains “meaningless” [sinnlos], if no meaning conferring act is enacted, and insofar as it becomes “meaningful” [sinnvol] or “sense-vitalized” [sinnbelebt] if, “in addition to [neben] the indicative function” (Hua 19/30; my italics), it is also animated by a sense-bestowing subject.101

This conclusion, as we will see in section 2, undergoes substantial revision in Husserl’s 1914 text.

In the first investigation, Husserl is obviously more interested in the issue of expression than in indication, yet the tentative exploration into expression outlined above should nevertheless suffice for the purposes of our forthcoming analysis of indication, an issue which deserves significant consideration not only because it is “the pervasively common” (Hua 19/32[184]) or “ubiquitous” element (Hua 19/31) in

101 To be noted, J. N. Findley renders the original text “nämlich Zeichen im Sinne von Anzeichen […] drücken nichts aus, es sei denn, daß sie neben der Funktion des Anzeigens noch eine Bedeutungsfunktion erfüllen” as “[f]or signs in the sense of indications do not express anything, unless they happen to fulfill a significant as well as an indicative function.” Unfortunately, the translation of the geographic “neben” into the conjunctural “as well as” technically blurs the issue at stake. Clearly, by using “neben,” Husserl is emphasizing the fact that meaning function and indication function are two distinct terms, to such an extent that meaning intention and indication intention are taken to be two independent acts in signitive consciousness; yet this emphasis is missing in the English translation. This becomes even more prominent if we compare this passage with a passage written in 1914: “das Bedeuten ist nicht ein zweites Bewußtsein neben dem ersten, es ist […] ein mit dem Bewußtsein der Wortlautung innig einiges Bewußtseins” (Hua 20-2/32; my italics).
signitive consciousness as such, but also because a careful study of indication in the first investigation reveals why Husserl privileges the meaning-conferring act, and ultimately excludes bodily behavior from the realm of expression as such.

As previously said, each sign is a sign of something and, thus, an indication of what it denotes [bezeichnen]. As Husserl explains, the key feature of indication consists in its motivational structure: to say that an entity serves to indicate something else amounts to saying that “one’s belief in the existence of the indicator motivates the same person’s belief in the existence of what is indicated.” To use Husserl’s own example, in the case of seeing smoke, Husserl thinks that the indicative relation [Anzeige] therein can be articulated in the following way:

“my belief that there is smoke motivates my second belief that there is a fire somewhere; or in short, the existence of the smoke indicates to me the existence of the fire.”102

As Husserl adds, this motivational structure captures the “descriptive unity” between two beliefs, i.e., “between the judging acts, in which the indicating and the indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker” (Hua 19/32). In this sense, as Husserl states, the motivational structure of indication reveals the very “nature of the indicative relation [Anzeige]”, according to which “certain things may or must exist, because some other things have been given” (Hua 19/32).

We can develop three working constraints of this motivational relation. First, as Husserl suggests, the motivating indicator must be “sensible” or “real.” Thus, imaginary entities or phantasma, such as imagined words in inner speech, cannot serve the indicative function. It is in this connection that Husserl writes, “daß die Überzeugung von dem Sein der einen von ihm als Motiv […] erlebt wird für die Überzeugung oder Vermutung vom Sein der anderen” (Hua 19/32). This characterization leads to another point, namely, that the indicated has to be physically heterogeneous to and thus other than the indicator: they “are foreign to each other”

102 See Husserl’s own words, “in these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actually knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects of states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other” (Hua 19/32/[184]).
(Hua 20-2/73, 84). It is because of this discrepancy between the indicating being and the indicated being that an indicative relation can exist after all; otherwise, they would just be one and the same thing, e.g., smoke would be just another name for fire.

The second constraint of the motivational relation is that it can only be a probable or contingent one. According to Husserl, this indicative contingency takes root [Entstehung] in psychological association. To be noted, Husserl’s definition of such association is clearly different from the traditional one. As he writes, “ruft A das B ins Bewußtsein, so sind beide nicht bloß gleichzeitig oder nacheinander bewußt, sondern es pflegt sich auch ein fühlbarer Zusammenhang aufzudrängen, wonach eins auf das andere hinweist, dieses als zu jenem gehörig dastellt” (Hua 19/36; my italics).

In other words, this “tangible connection” [fühlbare Zusammengehörigkeit] facilitates a directional shift in the intentional regard at play in indication, redirecting it from the indicator to the indicated (Cf. Depraz, 1995, p. 130; Kern, 1973, p. XXIV). As will be made clear in section 2, Husserl will later develop a new phenomenological account of this tangible connection at play in indication, thereby building upon the brief consideration of the issue of association that may be found in his first investigation, where he is still entangled in a folk-psychological understanding of it, and simply assumes that the association in question is in nature either conventional, as in the conventional association between a flag and a nation or ethno-group, for instance, or inductive, as in the inductive association between smoke and a fire (Cf. Depraz, 1995, p. 174). It is for this reason that, in his earlier work, Husserl thinks that “die Überzeugung von Sein des einen diejenige vom Sein des anderen empirisch (also in zufälliger, nicht in notwendiger Weise) motiviert” (Hua 19/34; my italics).

More specifically, with the givenness of the indicator, we can only presume that the indicated may also exist: “der eine zugleich für den anderen Zeugnis ablegt, die Annahme, daß er gleichfalls Bestand habe, empfiehlt”(Hua 19/37).

This brings us to the third and final constraint of the motivational relation between the sign and that which is denoted by it, namely, that, indication is characterized by a rather extrinsic and loose relation between the indicator and the indicated (Bernet, 1988, p. 6). The indicative sign itself bears no necessary link to

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103 For a more detailed treatment of the issue of association, see E. Hollenstein (1972). For the same issue in Husserl’s theory of empathy, see Depraz (1995), chapter 3.
what it indicates. For instance, when I see smoke, I may thereby further believe that there is a fire somewhere; yet I do not necessarily foster such a belief, because the smoke itself may also be an indication of, say, an explosion. As Husserl concedes, to talk of indication in this sense is “not to presuppose a definite relation to considerations of probability” (Hua 19/35[186]), for even the talk of probability leads to an “assured judgment” that seems to have no place in indication.

Moreover, this characterization of the loose relation between indicator and indicated implicitly results in Husserl’s thesis that the indicative sign is intrinsically deprived of meaning. For one thing, the extrinsic being of the indicative sign in relation to what it indicates makes it impossible for the indicative sign, “dem Zeichen für sich” (Hua 19/46), to fulfill the indicative function, unless it is “nur bei den willkürlich und in anzeigennder Absicht gebildeten” (Hua 19/31). For the same reason, the arbitrariness of the indicative relation prevents the indicator from being a meaningful “expression” of the indicated. It is in this regard that we need an “additional” and subjective meaning-conferring act so as to “bridge” the two terms. For another thing, the indicative sign undergoes an essential modification when it is imbued with meaning, so that “der Charakter seiner Vorstellung total geändert” (Hua 19/46). More specifically, our intention is no longer directed at the indicative sign, but “geht ausschließlich auf die im sinngebenden Akt gemeinte Sache” (Hua 19/47). The meaning-conferring act triggers the transfer of intentionality from the indicative sign to the signified object, or referent. It is in the meaning-conferring act that the signified object comes to the fore, so to speak. In short, expressive meaning [Bedeutung/Sinn] consists not in the indicative sign, but in the meaning-conferring act.

To conclude, Husserl’s theory of the sign in the first investigation prioritizes the function of the meaning-conferring act, i.e., the subjective accomplishment, and takes the indicative sign to be nothing other than what it is, e.g., the smoke that rises from the fire means nothing other than what it looks like, and the traffic sign alerting drivers to a sharp turn in the road ahead is nothing other than a yellow sheet of metal with black marks on it. These two theses prove to be crucial both for Husserl’s conception of the foreign bodily behavior in the first investigation and for his subsequent revision in 1914.
1.2 Bodily behavior as a form of indication

In light of the previous exposition, we can now introduce Husserl’s working hypotheses of bodily behavior, and explain the reason why he ultimately expels bodily behavior from the realm of expression. To recapitulate, Husserl’s definition of expression forces him to deem speech [Rede], or other communicative signs, as the sole examples of genuine expression and, thus, to exclude facial countenance and gestures, “which involuntarily accompany speech without communicative intent, or those in which a man’s mental states achieve understandable ‘expression for his environment, without the added help of speech’” (Hua 19/37).

As the passage quoted above indicates, Husserl distinguishes between two sorts of bodily behaviors: 1. bodily movements that one involuntarily makes whilst speaking and 2. those that gain expressive significance by means of their specific context. As Husserl further explains, these two sorts of bodily behaviors qua bodily behavior have no meaning. In the first case, the bodily behavior in question is merely a collateral phenomenon, and is thus deprived of communicative meaning. For instance, one blushes when one says something embarrassing. But the involuntary blushing does not amount to saying that “I mean to express that I feel ashamed when I say this shameful thing.” The blushing bears no communicative weight, if we can basically grasp the Other’s shame by means of speech, namely by means of what is said. Likewise, in the second case, the bodily behavior is meaningless because it lacks a tangible connection (Hua 19/36), or “phenomenal unity” (Hua 19/37), between the expressive outlook and the expressed content. For instance, one blushes when one breaks one’s word in front of a friend. Although blushing may betray the fact that one feels awkward, it does not itself deliver any meaning, e.g., “I feel sorry for breaking my word.” Indeed, we can recognize that one feels awkward with the help of that particular bodily behavior; yet this recognition does not entail that blushing is itself caused by, or is the same as, the mental state of feeling awkward. In either case, as Husserl insists, there is no intrinsic relation between the bodily behavior and the emotional state: “in ihnen [Äußerungen] teilt der eine dem anderen nichts mit, es fehlt ihm bei ihrer Äußerung die Intention, irgenwelche „Gedanken“ in ausdrücklicher Weise hinzustellen, sei es für andere, sei es auch für sich selbst, wofern er mit sich allein ist” (Hua 19/37-8).
In this regard, Husserl operates with the first hypothesis that bodily behavior or externalization [Äußerung] is merely a sort of collateral, physiological phenomenon, and that bodily behavior thus understood is constitutively unimportant for the communication of inner thought. In short, bodily behavior itself is deprived of meaning and thus bears no expressive function.

It naturally follows that bodily behavior is weak in meaning and that, on the basis of either convention or induction, it serves as a sort of indication. In Husserl’s words, “daran wird nichts geändert dadurch, daß ein Zweiter unsere unwillkürlichlen Äußerungen (z.B. “Ausdrucksbewegungen”) zu deuten und daß er durch sie über unsere inneren Gedanken und Gemütsbewegungen mancherlei zu erfahren vermag” (Hua 19/38). Yet, even in the case of interpretation, the Other’s bodily behavior itself still lacks meaning and thus counts as mere “indication” (ibid.). We may think that blushing is a sign of feeling awkward, given that blushing would be otherwise unintelligible in that specific circumstance, i.e., not being able to fulfill a promise. In other words, the interpretation of one’s bodily behavior as such does not make such behavior “expressive”; at best, the involuntary bodily behavior just indicates some sort of emotional state, e.g., blushing indicates that one is feeling awkward.

In this regard, Husserl operates with a second hypothesis that the Other’s bodily behavior at best serves as an indication of a certain emotional state. Bodily behavior, therefore, shares with other indicative signs the same sort of motivational relation: the belief that the Other’s particular bodily behavior exists psychologically motivates the belief that the Other’s mentality exists. Put differently, the existence of foreign bodily behavior is a kind of empirical evidence, suggesting that the foreign body belongs to another conscious creature. However, this evidence proves to be contingent in kind. It follows that one can never be certain that someone else is actually feeling awkward on the basis of observing him or her blush.

Obviously, a peculiar kind of “parallelism” between the physical and the psychical is at work in this account, as Husserl realizes around the year 1908 (Hua 13, Beilage III). As he writes, if we consider the implications of the indicative relation between the body and the mind, then, “at the end of the day, we must have no ground to stay in empathy, nor the ground to apprehend the physical body as a lived body” (Hua 13/7). More specifically, according to such an account, what we can perceive is only a “changing group of physiological appearances” (ibid.), which in itself has no
further implication for the Other’s conscious life. Hence, this account gives rise to a straightforward and serious question, “nun, ein Leib entsteht, ein organischer Leib für ein Bewußtsein. „Wo kommt nun das Bewußtsein her“ für diesen Leib, woher seine „Seele“ (ibid.)? On the account in the first investigation, Husserl would have to consistently infer that no absolute evidence supports that the supposition that Other’s mind exists.

Five years later (1913), Husserl develops a dramatically different view about the Other’s body, and its expressive function, when he writes, “der Mensch ist in allen seinen Bewegungen, Handlungen, in seinem Reden, Schreiben etc. – Mensch! Er ist nicht eine bloße Verbindung, Zusammenknüpfung eines Dinges, genannt Leib, mit einem zweiten, genannt Seele. Der Leib ist als Leib durch und durch seelenvoller Leib, jede Bewegung des Leibes ist seelenvoll, das Kommen und Gehen, das Stehen, Sitzen, Laufen, Tanzen, Sprechen etc.” (Hua 13/69; see also Hua 4/96). But why does Husserl so explicitly reject the parallelism thesis that he implicitly held in the first investigation? More importantly, how can Husserl still talk about the lived body as an indication of the Other’s mental life when he thinks that mimic movement as such is “expression of the spiritual” (Hua 13/64, 65; Cf, Römpp, 1992, 67ff; and Depraz, 1995, §14)? Georg Römpp suggests that the personalistic attitude as it is developed in *Ideas II* makes room for the understanding of the Other’s (lived-)body as an “expressive unity” and, therefore, on this reading, the Other’s (lived-)body as such constitutes a form of expression itself (Römpp, 1992, p. 50; Cf. Heinämaa, 2010). However, the question then arises: is it possible to conceive of the lived body as an indication after all, if Husserl’s account of indication remains the same as in the first investigation? Isn’t it contradictory to insist that the foreign body is at the same time both expressive and indicative? Or, alternatively, is it the case that Husserl’s new conception of the expressive body as an indication takes its root in his new conception of the indication? If it is, then what is Husserl’s new account of indication and, accordingly, bodily expression? I will take up these questions in section 2.

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104 For instance, see Husserl’s words in 1914, “die Einfühlung. Die einheitliche Apperzeption, in der sinnliche Datenkomplexe und Veränderungen von solchen Komplexen aufgefasst werden als „Zeichen“ für das fremde psychische Leben” (Hua 20-2/68).
1.3 Problems in Husserl’s account of indication and bodily behavior

As I have pointed out in passing, Husserl’s account of indication faces some intrinsic difficulties, and the application of such an account to bodily behavior causes even serious problems. I think such problems are ultimately rooted in Husserl’s initial, yet inadequate, phenomenological analysis of the signitive act. More specifically, the descriptive distinction between the material and the indicative aspect, and, further, between the physical and the psychical aspect, of the sign provides the first insight into the mode of givenness of the sign. Noetically speaking, a sign has a material aspect, comprised of its visual, acoustic or, even, tactual features, and an indicative aspect, i.e., the indicative relation [Anzeige], or reference [Hinweisung], to something other than the sign itself. In the first investigation, Husserl thinks that, by itself, the material aspect does not serve the indicative function. Namely, the sensuous form of the sign does not serve to indicate anything. Thus, the indicative relation consists in something other than the sign’s sensuous form; i.e., the sign must bear an indicative purpose. Noetically speaking, however, unitary sign-consciousness requires a second and distinctive form of meaning-intention [Bedeutenintention] so as to furnish the indicative sign with meaning. The material aspect of the sign by itself has no meaning at all, and it requires subjective animation so as to be rendered meaningful.

However, despite providing a first insight into the mode of givenness of the sign, Husserl’s purely descriptive distinction between the material and the indicative aspect of the signitive being, doesn’t seem to be able to fully explore the constitutive and founding relation between these aspects. In this regard, Derrida is quite right in pointing out that, in his characterization of the loose relation between indicator and indicated, Husserl downplays the material aspect of indication, and overplays the role of subjective accomplishment (Derrida, 2011, p. 29). For this reason, Husserl does not grant the material aspect with any constitutive function with regard to its expressive meaning. The signitive material itself remains what it is, i.e., it is merely visual, auditory or tactual matter. Conversely speaking, meaning, or the meaningful content of expression, on Husserl’s account, exclusively takes root in the meaning-

105 See also Husserl’s own reflection upon this point: “mein Ausgang war gewesen, ob jeder Akt ausdrückbar sei. [...] Ob das „Bedeuten“ nur in Akten gewisser eingeschränkter Gattungen sich vollziehe oder nur in objektivierenden Akten – doxischen” (Hua 20-2/4; Cf. Hua 20-2/14).
intention or meaning-conferring act. Accordingly, the intuitive presentation of the material aspect and the meaning-conferring act are in fact two adjacent [neben] yet separate and independent acts within signitive consciousness. This conclusion, contra Husserl, obviously undermines the phenomenological insight that the presentation of the material aspect and the meaning-conferring act are in nature so fused together that they constitute a “felt or experienced unity.” In short, on this reading, they do not comprise the founding relation that Husserl takes them to be in.

As a guiding presupposition, this reading of the loose relation between indicator and indicated, forces Husserl to work with two distinctive hypotheses with regard to the Other’s bodily behavior: 1. the Other’s bodily movements are merely a concomitant yet dispensable phenomenon of the Other’s conscious life, and 2. they only fulfill the indicative function with regard to communicating anything substantive about the latter. Following these two hypotheses, Husserl conceives of a rather extrinsic and somewhat counter-intuitive connection between the body and the mind, according to which there is no intrinsic, necessary conjunction between outward gestures and inner emotions (Heinämäa, 2010, p. 6). In other words, the Other’s body as such is deprived of expressive meaning and, thus, it is also separated from, and in opposition to, the Other’s mind. For this reason, Husserl thinks that we have to appeal to an additional “interpretation,” so as to ascribe “meaning” to the Other’s bodily behavior, despite the fact that we do say in ordinary speech that we intuitively “see” someone’s anger or happiness (Hua 19/41).

Consequently, such an account of bodily behavior inevitably gives rise to serious skepticism regarding other-minds, i.e., regarding whether or not other minds exist. The indicative relation between the body and the mind shares the same sort of motivational relation: my belief that the Other’s body exists motivates my second belief that the Other’s mind also exists. As we have seen, such a motivational relation is in nature conventionally or inductively contingent. By perceiving the Other’s bodily movements, we can only judgmentally infer that there is probably a psychic subject orchestrating such movements; but we can by no means have the absolute evidence necessary to support the claim that the Other’s mind exists. Thus, to follow Descartes, one may wonder whether the human being observed from the window is actually a coat rack that is donning a hat and cloak and has been programmed to move in a humanlike way (Cf. Hua 13/7). Even in the context of a face-to-face conversation,
on this argument, one may still wonder whether the Other’s mind exists, because the spoken words, or the facial contortion, for instance, can only function as instances of indication for the interlocutor in the strictest sense and, thus, they do not necessarily prove the existence of the Other’s mind.

On Husserl’s account in the first investigation, foreign bodily behavior is merely a sensuous complex of acts that provides no genuine information about the Other’s mental life. It follows that, as the perceiving subject, if I am only aware of a person’s outward behavior, say, his writhing and moaning, I will not be able to tell the difference between actual pain, and the phony pain of a friend playing a trick on me. That is, my perception of his writhing and moaning indicates to me that he is in pain, or I believe so in any case; but the indicated pain, by definition, could be a false one. Hence, to paraphrase Overgaard (2011, p. 11): even in the case wherein my perception happens to be correct – my perceptual experience of it is open to doubt. I am perceptually aware of his bodily movements – his writhing and moaning – but I am surely not perceptually aware of his pain as such. It is in this regard that, if it is indeed possible to have access to the Other’s mental life, we need to take an “additional” step, by, for instance, cognitively interpreting, or drawing an inference from such sensuous data, as Husserl suggests.

This skeptical scenario makes us wonder whether Husserl’s account of foreign bodily behavior can do justice to our actual foreign experience, and whether this account is essentially at odds with Husserl’s famous refutation of skepticism in Ideas I (1913) and the fifth Cartesian Meditation (1929) (Cf. De Warren, 2009, chapter 5; see also chapter 1.3). As I have demonstrated, the skeptical worry about our access to the Other’s mental life springs from Husserl’s theory of indication; hence, in what follows, we will examine more closely Husserl’s revised theory of indication, as well as his new account of bodily behavior, so as to see whether he can ultimately fend off the challenge of skepticism.

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106 In line with Michael Martin (2006), Søren Overgaard (2011) distinguishes two types of other-minds skepticism from each other, i.e., Cartesian skepticism and Humean skepticism. On his account, Cartesian skepticism is concerned with the fundamental possibility that, from the experiencing subject’s point of view, we cannot distinguish a situation in which our perception of the Other’s mental life is veridical from a hallucinatory situation in which we only seem to have experience of the Other’s mental life. By contrast, Humean skepticism is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and whether it can provide true information about the Other’s mental life. For further discussion of other-minds skepticism, see Rudd (2003).
2. Indication and bodily expression: a revision

As Bernet (1988) and Melle (1998, 2002, and 2008) have pointed out, Husserl’s account of sign and expression underwent a significant and far-reaching revision around the year 1914. As documented in the second book of Husserliana 20, Texte für die Neufassung der VI. Untersuchung. Zur Phänomenologie des Ausdrucks und der Erkenntnis, (henceforth referred to as his “1914 text”), Husserl works out a more adequate consideration of the two descriptive aspects of the sign, and develops a more fine-grained account of signitive givenness: first, he argues that the indicative sign is itself a self-transcending being in that it is intrinsically bound with an “obligatory” tendency that characterizes the nature of genuine signs; and, second, he offers a more convincing account of the “tangible connection” that characterizes the complex significative act, i.e., the unity of “Mit-etwas-ein-anderes-Meinen” (Hua 20-2/13). As a result, Husserl now takes meaning [Bedeutung] to be an indispensable and intrinsic constituent of the indicative sign. These findings, as I argue, pave “the pertinent way” (Hua 20-2/4) for a “tight” version of indication and, in this regard, prove influential for a positive account of foreign bodily behavior, according to which, the Other’s bodily behavior is intrinsically saturated with the Other’s mental life [Geist], and meaningfully discloses the latter.

2.1 Indication revised: the genuine sign as a “passageway”

As we have seen in the previous section, in the first investigation, Husserl drew a clear-cut distinction between the indicative sign and the expressive sign, and he classifies those signs that do not fulfill the meaning function of expression as indicative signs. Thus, artificial signs, such as flags, traffic signals and knotted handkerchiefs were taken to be merely indicative; in other words, they were “devoid of meaning.” By contrast, in his later work, which we will be considering in this section, Husserl draws a subtler distinction between mere signs, such as animal footprints, and genuine signs, which include both artificial and linguistic signs. 107

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The crux of Husserl’s later theory consists in his realization that genuine signs per se have an “obligatory tendency” [Sollenstendenz] and that their meaning is pre-predicatively or -propositional articulated.

Let us illustrate what this means by analyzing Husserl’s exemplar of genuine signs, i.e., storm signals (be they natural entities, such as clouds, or artificial entities, such as vanes). According to the first investigation, this signal only serves to indicate the existence of a storm somewhere, yet the signal itself bears no meaning whatsoever about what is about to take place (Hua 20-2/51). According to his later work, however, the storm signal not only fulfills the indicative function, but it also “has an expressing meaning” (Hua 20-2/52). The signal in itself brings to the fore a correlated state of affair [Tatsache] in the sense that it signifies [signalisieren], or refers to [hinweisen], that state of affair, e.g., that a hurricane is coming from the north, so people should stay indoors. Thus, we do not see the storm signal as a merely physical entity, in which we may have no interest; instead, we immediately see, or notice, the state of affair that the signal makes present. “Das Zeichen drücke dasselbe, nur nicht in Worten aus, oder das Zeichen bedeutet, es sagt, daß [z.B., “ein Sturm aus NO ist im Anzug”]” (Hua 20-2/53; my italics). In this sense, indicative signs (including linguistic signs) per se have inherent meaning, in and through which they manage to express and refer to correlated states of affairs. For this reason, genuine signs are distinguished from mere or natural signs [bloße Anzeichen] (Cf. Bernet, 1988, pp. 5-6), such as animal footprints in the sand, which only denote “the existence of a quarry” (Hua 20-2/51), for instance, yet “say” nothing about the state of the quarry.108

This new difference between mere and genuine signs proves to be crucial: for one thing, Husserl now thinks that non-linguistic signs, such as storm signals, knotted handkerchiefs and flags, are also intrinsically bound with a meaning element and that they thus have an expressive function that was solely attributed to communicative speech in the first investigation. For another thing, Husserl now offers a phenomenological account of the constituents of genuine signs by means of

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108 Husserl is himself a bit hesitant to fully commit to this point, as he thinks that animal tracks may “look” different to an experienced hunter: whereas, for non-hunters, the tracks indeed just denote the existence of a quarry, an experienced hunter can discern, e.g., the type of animal that made the tracks and how far away the quarry is (Hua 20-2/93, 539). At this point, Husserl seems to blur the distinction between mere signs and genuine signs.
extensively refining his conception of 1. the motivational relation that leads one to believe that because the Other’s body exists so, too, must its mind; 2. the descriptive differentiation between the physical and the subjective aspect of indication; and 3. the tangible connection between the expressive outlook and the expressed content that characterizes the complex significative act.

To begin with, Husserl introduces a key feature of the phenomenological structure of the motivational relation alluded to above, i.e., the obligatory tendency according to which the indicator directs the intentional regard towards the indicated, and it is due to this development in his account of the motivational relation that Husserl can now rectify the failings of psychological association and account for the existence of the Other’s mental life, beyond any doubt, something that was previously an impossibility – given the presumed contingent nature of the evidence that foreign bodily behavior provides. Husserl thus defines the new version of motivation:

“im Bewußtsein der Anzeige ist ein sukzessiver Übergang vorgezeichnet: Das Sein von A steht anschaulich da oder ist sonst wie erfasst. Und von da aus geht ein „Hingewiesen“-Sein, ein Zug, eine Tendenz auf das „also ist B“ oder auf das B-Sein als angezeigtes” (Hua 20-2/79; my italic. See also Hua 20-2/81, 83).

As Husserl further indicates, this tendency has to be “matter of fact” [sachlich], namely, it is rooted in the indicator (Hua 20-2/79, 80, 81) and, thus, it springs forth from [ausgehend] and is glued to [anhaftend] the indicator (Hua 20-2/72, 97, Nr.10). When I see the storm signal, I do not by myself turn my intentional regard toward what the signal signifies. On the contrary, upon its appearance, the signal itself draws or points me towards what is at stake, i.e., the state of affair [Sachverhalt] that, for example, “the storm will soon be upon us.” In this sense, the significative sign serves as a passageway [Übergang] or medium [Medium] by and through which the signified state of affair is embodied and made originally perceptible (Hua 20-2/134). In other words, the significative sign is itself intrinsically bound with some sort of “will” [Willkür] or “obligatory power” [Sollen] that compels the perceiver to redirect his intentional regard from the sign itself to the state of affair. Accordingly, the significative tendency has a second characteristic, i.e., it is impositional: “da liegt also eine von mir ausgehende und zu mir […] hingehende Zumutung” (Hua 20-2/83). We
normally heed [folgen] the impositional tendency in such a way that we turn to [hinweisen] what the signal signifies (Hua 20-2/92), e.g., the fact that a storm is coming soon; in fact, we may even need to make a special effort to surmount or contravene [überwinden] the real pull of this tendency, so that we can free ourselves from its impositional constraint (Hua 20-2/92-3, Nr.7). These two features of the obligatory tendency at work in the motivational relation, i.e., its fundamental relation to the indicator and its impositional nature, become all the more prominent in the case of someone ringing a doorbell: the ring at the door not only denotes that there is a guest at the door; more importantly, it demonstrates its impositional nature insomuch as it urges, or one could even say obliges, the host to pay attention to what it signals. As an invitational signal [Aufforderungssignale], the doorbell registers a “please,” “Ich bitte aufzumachen” (Hua 20-2/56), so much so that it elicits, or even requires, a corresponding answer, i.e., opening the door.

Therefore, the motivational relation inherent in genuine signs is no longer an empirical and contingent one; instead, the indicator functions as an internal “bridge” [Brücke] with the indicated (Hua 20-2/73). More specifically, the existence of the indicator no longer fosters a second belief in the perceiver that the indicated also exists; rather, as the passageway between the indicated and the perceiver, the indicator directly embodies what it indicates and, in this sense, it originally discloses the signified state of affair. In the case of the storm signal, it is also clear that, according to Husserl’s revised conception of motivation, the indicator is no longer in a loose and extrinsic relation with the indicated; rather, due to its obligatory and impositional character, the indicator itself points to the state of affair embodied therein – it is intimately intertwined with the latter.

In accordance with the above revisions, Husserl also accordingly refines his understanding of the two descriptive aspects of the sign: on this new reading, the material aspect is no longer inconsequential and dispensable with regard to the expressed meaning, whilst the subjective aspect is no longer overarching and paramount with regard to meaning constitution. In other words, Husserl now grants the material aspect a constitutive role in that it now serves as the bearer or vehicle of the expressed meaning. In this regard, Husserl arrives at a more faithful description of the genuine manner of signitive givenness:
“jedes Zeichen hat, wie ohne weiteres ersichtlich, eine gewisse Doppelseitigkeit. Wir unterscheiden phänomenologisch (das ist, wenn wir uns einen Ausdruck zu intuitiver Gegebenheit bringen und beschreiben, was wir an ihm wesensmäßig finden): 1) den bloßen Wortlaut, die erscheinende äußere Gegenständlichkeit, die als Zeichen fungiert; 2) das, was eben das Wort „Funktion“ phänomenologisch besagt: der phänomenologische Überschuss, der darin besteht, dass „mit“ dieser erscheinenden Gegenständlichkeit „etwas gemeint“ ist, dass sie Träger ist einer „Bedeutung“ (Hua 20-2/25; my italics).

“Das Bedeuten ist nicht ein zweites Bewußtsein neben dem ersten, es ist […] ein mit dem Bewußtsein der Wortlautung innig einiges Bewußtseins” (Hua 20-2/32; my italics).

In contrast with the first investigation, meaning-intention [Bedeuten] is not an “additional” [neben] and independent subjective act that modifies the indicative sign; it is, rather, an intrinsic element of unitary significative consciousness. In Husserl’s words, “anzeigende Zeichen haben auch eine „Bedeutung“. Sie weisen hin auf Angezeigtes, das also in einer mit dem Zeichen im Hinweis verbundenen Vorstellung vorstellig ist: und diese Vorstellung kann wechseln und behält dabei dieselbe „Bedeutung“ (Hua 20-2/78; my italics). That is, Husserl now not only thinks that the material and the meaning aspect are two descriptive facets of the same entity but, more importantly, he also thinks that the two aspects are fused together to such an extent that their co-functioning constitutes a peculiar sort of significative being.

109 See Husserl’s own words, “im „normalen Vollzug“ des Einheitsbewußtseins leben wir gemäß dieser Tendenz, die aber nichts neben dem Wortlautbewußtsein ist, sondern Oberschicht eines eigentümlich fundierten Bewußtseins, einer Meinung, die nicht direkte, sondern eben fundierte und mittelbare, den Durchgang durch das Wortbewußtsein fordernde ist” (Hua 20-2/134; my italics).

110 See also, e.g., “es [Zeichen] hat eine ausdrückende Bedeutung, es bringt eine Meinung zum Ausdruck, es bezeichnet etwas, wobei es auch in seiner normalen Funktion Anzeichen für etwas ist” (Hua 20-2/52). Nevertheless, the term “meaning” here should not be overplayed. In the first investigation, Husserl is more concerned with the logical or predicative sense of “meaning” in respect to its logical truth. By contrast, Husserl now thinks that the intrinsic meaning of genuine signs should be distinguished from the logical and predicative meaning of “categorical expression” (Hua 20-2/53), insofar as the former is vaguely articulated (Hua 20-2/78, 118-19) and grammarless (Hua 20-2/53). It should also be noted that, as the quote shows, Husserl is somewhat inconsistent in his use of his new terminology. Whereas in some texts, he clearly distinguishes Anzeichen (mere signs) from Bezeichnung (genuine signs) (Hua 20-2/51ff), in others, he still uses them interchangeably.
In fact, the material and the subjective, or meaning, aspects are so intimately intertwined that Husserl sees them as comprising a constitutive and founding relation. In his structural analysis of the sign, which bears a structural affinity with that of the image (Hua 20-2/124, 126, 135, Nr. 6; Cf. chapter 3.3), Husserl conceives of the material basis of a sign as a sensuous substrate that solicits [erregt] or awakens [erweckt] significative meaning (Hua 20-2/85, 133-34) and that, thereby, originally makes present or embodies the signed “content” [Inhalt] or subject matter [Sachlage], of the object (Hua 20-2/78). As in image consciousness, our intentional interest can either focus on the sensuous complex or the thematic subject matter; nevertheless, we normally perceive them as a whole [Ganze], or unity [Einheit], in such a way that our intentional regard penetrates through the sensuous givenness into the thematic subject matter (Hua 20-2/60). In Husserl’s words, “so liegt im Zeichenverhältnis […] ein Verhältnis vor, in dem das Zeichen „als bloßer Durchgang“, als „Mittels“, als thematisch Ungemeintes mit einer Sollentendenz ausgestattet ist, in ein thematisches Meinen des B überzuführen. […] Also ein Sachfremdes ist im Blick, kommt zur Daseinserfassung” (Hua 20-2/84). To paraphrase, the significative intention does not reflect upon the sensuous givenness of the sign, but it sees through it in such a way that it sees the sensuous sign as an original presentation [Darstellung] of the thematic subject matter (Hua 4/237). In this regard, Husserl also distinguishes between two sorts of intentional termini in significative consciousness: the *terminus a quo*, from which the material aspect A constitutively functions as a passageway [Überganges] “into the thematic B-consciousness” (Hua 20-2/83) and the *terminus ad quem*, wherein significative intention ends with the thematic content B, i.e., the signified state of affair (Hua 20-2/91, and Nr.7).

To be sure, these two termini inherent in significative consciousness do not entail that they are two separate and somewhat independent terms, as Husserl already

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111 See also, e.g., “in der Wortlauffassung und im Vollzug des Wortes liegt also ein wesentliches *Plus*. Und wir verdeutlichen uns dieses *Plus*, wenn wir an einen parallelen Fall erinnern, an den Fall des Bildbewußtseins. […] Im“ Bild sind wir der Sache bewußt, der Blick geht „durch“ das Bild hindurch auf das im abbildenden Bewußtsein (der fundierten Bewußteinsschicht) Bewußte” (Hua 20-2/134-35). In an even explicit acknowledgment, Husserl writes, “wir finden innig eins mit den Wortlauten ein Bedeutungs bewußtsein, analog innig eins, wie wir im Bild das Abgebildete finden oder im Bildbewußtsein in Deckungseinheit das Bewußtsein des Abgebildeten: und dabei Moment für Moment Deckung, abbildende Momente – abgebildete Momente” (Hua 20-2/126).
points out in the first investigation. On the contrary, the two termini are essentially nested within each other so that they form a twofold unity, or fusion, *par excellence*: “eine Einheit einer Apperzeption ein A mit einem B verbindet derart, daß A behaftet ist mit einer „Hinweisintention“, einer Übergangsintention gegen B hin, darin zu ruhen” (Hua 20-2/93, 134; cf. chapter 3.3). And Husserl goes so far as to claim that, under this conception, speech is “eine Einheit von sprachlichem Leib und sprachlicher Seele” (Hua 20-2/134, 25) and that “in einem Schlag Wort und Bedeuten eins sind, ohne Abstand” (Hua 20-2/105-06). Accordingly, the “tangible connection” considered in the first investigation is also reformulated in his later work, wherein Husserl defines it as a unity of consciousness with such a characteristic way of presentation that it in principle comprises a “twofold delineation” [Zweigliedrigkeit]: “das ist der Umstand, daß der Wortlaut der Sache fremd ist, während das Bild die Sache „darstellt“” (Hua 20-2/136).

To conclude, Husserl’s new conception of the sign is substantially different from his reading of the loose version relation between indicator and indicated in the first investigation. Now, Husserl sees an intrinsic and intimate relation inherent in significative indication: genuine signs *per se* bear an obligatory tendency that impositionally directs the intentional regard from the sensuous formation of a sign to its thematic subject matter. Put differently, instead of merely denoting the existence of the indicated object, the genuine sign now originally discloses the state of affairs pertaining to its indicated object – it signifies the latter. Hence, genuine signs serve as a delivering “passageway” in a twofold sense: first, they bear a kind of vaguely articulated pre-predicative meaning, in and through which they originally render present and intuitable the signified state of affairs, as if they were rudimentarily fabricated “texts”; second, they constitutively function as a path, or “transparent envelope,” through which one can originally “see” the enveloped thematic content (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 167).112

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112 See the full quote from Merleau-Ponty, “the human signification is given before the alleged sensible signs. A face is a center of human expression, the transparent envelope of the attitudes and desires of others, the place of manifestation, the barely material support for a multitude of intentions. This is why it seems impossible for us to treat a face or a body, even a dead body, like a thing. They are sacred entities, not the ‘givens of sight.’”

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2.2 Bodily behavior as genuine indication

As stated earlier, in the first investigation, Husserl initially operates with two correlated hypotheses in respect of foreign bodily behavior, i.e., the collateral and indicative hypothesis. However, Husserl will later opt for a “completely new” view of foreign bodily behavior, which is illustrated in the following passage written around April 1914:

“wenn ich meine psychischen Erlebnisse mit leiblichen „Äußerung“ begleite, so lebe ich meinen Akten, und zudem erlebe ich, sei es auch in Einheit damit, gewisse Empfindungsgruppen, die zu den leiblichen Äußerungen gehören, eventuelle fasse ich sie dunkel als Gesichtsbewegungen, Handbewegungen, etc. auf. […] Wenn wir den anderen sehen und „in“ seinen leiblichen Erscheinungen sein Seelisches miterfassen, so haben wir schon ein Zweierlei, aber eine Zweheit in der Einheit. Wir sehen die leiblichen Äußerungen und durch sie sehen wir „mit“, als sich in ihnen bekundend, das Geistige. […] Wir sehen ihn, wir verstehen ihn, wir sehen seinem Blick, seinem Mienenspiel etc., den Zorn, Hass an” (Hua 20-2/72-3; my italics).

In the first investigation, Husserl holds that “collateral” [begleitend] bodily movement is by definition meaningless and is, thus, not an instance of expression as such. However, as of 1914, as the text quoted from above demonstrates, Husserl clearly holds the opposite view: collateral bodily movement is intrinsically “expressive” [bekundend]. At this point, one may wonder why Husserl revises his view so dramatically that he ultimately holds a substantially different view? What are his reasons to opt for the latter view, instead of the former?

The leitmotif for Husserl is how we should conceive of the constitutive relation between the psychic and physical aspect of foreign behavior (Hua 13/7, 69; cf. Melle, 2008, p. 8). Is the Other’s psychic life separated from, and then “externally combined” with, the perceptually given physical aspect, i.e., the Other’s outward behavior (Hua 4/237[248], 14/331)? Or should we think of the givenness of the foreign body in the same way as we now conceive of that pertaining to genuine signs, i.e., as the givenness of a particular twofold unity (Hua 4/238[250], 14/329-30)? In
the “1914 text,” Husserl offers two lines of argumentation by which to establish that the two descriptive aspects of foreign behavior in question, namely the psychic and the physical, are connected by an intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, relation.

The first line of argumentation Husserl presents considers the constitutive function of bodily movement with regard to its possible meaning. Descriptively speaking, we can only intuitively perceive changes in the Other’s physiological appearance, e.g., his face turns red, his limbs begin to shake, and his tongue begins to rattle. But do these sensuous acts constitute nothing more than a dynamic mosaic of physiological data (Hua 13/7)? In other words, are they nothing more than involuntary and dispensable phenomena that we can ultimately do away with when we empathize with the Other? If this is the case, then, when seeing the Other blush, we do not originally see her shame. Hence, we cannot help wondering what that blushing is supposed to “mean.” More generally speaking, we need to interpret sensuous content so as to know its possible meaning. Even in the case where the Other frankly conveys her true mental state, we can still only see a series of tongue and muscle movements, or hear a sequence of sound bites in the strictest sense (Hua 20-2/69). Once again, we are forced to consult our own somatological and phonological knowledge so as to decipher the meaning of the visual and auditory input in question.

However, the foregoing account of bodily movement and its relation to meaning is too simplistic and misleading. On a closer look, collateral sensuous appearances are somehow “organized complexes” from the outset (Hua 20-2/68) and, thus, they are unitary in kind (ibid.). Bodily behavior, therefore, comprises a temporally extended series of corporeal variations that consist of multiple components [Bestandstück] (ibid.). In this sense, each phase resonates and coheres with other phases in such a way that, together, they constitute “an organized formation [Bildung]”. In Husserl’s words, facial expressions, bodily gestures, and even spoken utterances all comprise “their own articulation and intonation” (Hua 20-2/69, 102). Accordingly, these physiological phenomena are more than just a series of discrete and unrelated actions. On the contrary, the bodily behavior is coordinated by “its spatial arrangement, its rhythm, and the rhythm of its intensities” (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 10). That is, the temporal and spatial continuity that characterizes bodily movement constitutes the internal structure of bodily behavior, which can thus be said to have in itself a tempo and typicality (Cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p.125). “Dieser Leib ist nicht eine der
sinnlichen Formen, sondern eine bei allem vielfältigen Wechsel solcher Formen sich durchhaltende Einheit der Zusammengehörigkeit” (Hua 20-2/113-14). As Husserl emphasizes, “das alles in einer gegliederten Einheit der Apperzeption. Das Äußere wird erfasst, und es wird das Sensationelle und Psychische mit apperzipiert, und der Zug des Interesses geht normalerweise von außen nach innen, derart daß durch die Mannigfaltigkeit des Äußeren hindurch die Auffassung in das Innere geht” (Hua 20-2/69.; my italics). In short, every moment of bodily externalization [Äußerung], be it voluntary or not, is unitarily delineated by its Gestalt and is, thus, intrinsically intertwined with its meaning. As Husserl concludes in 1924,


Husserl thinks that bodily behavior thus conceived comes close to being a genuine sign in a twofold sense: on the one hand, bodily behavior is actively produced insofar as it is rhythmically gesticulated and, thus, stamped with a salient Gestalt. In this sense, Husserl refers to bodily behavior as a “mimic sign” (Hua 20-2/99), or “special indication” (Hua 14/328, 66, 13/436). Even in the case of involuntary gestures, Husserl no longer holds that they are meaningless physiological configurations. Instead, he now grants involuntary gestures an indispensable “interiority, a primordial field of ‘I move’” (Hua 14/327). More specifically, affective states, such as anger, grief and fatigue (Hua 20-2/99), are no longer hidden and opaque; rather, akin to Edith Stein (2008, p. 68), Husserl thinks that these affective states “discharge” [entladen] themselves in a definite way in and through bodily externalization: “aus dem Zorn „fließt“ diese Äußerung: sie liegt nicht daneben bloß assoziiert, sondern sie „geht hervor“” (Hua 20-2/103, 73, 104, Hua 14/332; my italics;). On the other hand, bodily behavior is intrinsically intertwined with and articulated by a meaning constituent in the sense that its rhythmic gesticulation, or
“kinetic melody,” as Merleau-Ponty says, is meaningful and thus serves an expressive function [Bekundung]. In other words, each phase of bodily movement coheres with the others in such a way that together they reveal the Other’s psychic state; thus, bodily movement as a whole gives rise to and affords expressive meaning. In Husserl’s words, “das Mienenspiel zum Beispiel, es ist eine freie leibliche Betätigung und wird als solche erfasst, und daran knüpft sich erst die Miterfassung von Gemütsbewegungen, von Vorstellungen etc., die sich mit solchen Bewegungen „exprimieren“” (Hua 20-2/69). Bodily movement thus conceived indicates the psychic state disclosed therein (ibid., Hua 14/327).

Nevertheless, one may still ask whether rhythmic bodily movement discloses a corresponding psychic state. As Husserl points out, it is always possible that someone pretends to be happy without actually being so (Hua 20-2/70; cf. chapter 4.1.2). If this is the case, then how should we account for the particular kind of expressive, or founding, relation between the Other’s psychic state and bodily behavior? In answer to this question, Husserl puts forward his second line of argumentation as to demonstrate that, given the established twofold unity between the psychic and the physical aspects of foreign behavior, they cannot bear an extrinsic relation but must be connected intrinsically.

Husserl now sees an important characteristic of bodily behavior, namely, that it in itself bears the same sort of obligatory tendency as genuine signs do (Hua 20-2/100). More specifically, the Other’s body is originally given in the perceptual field: it walks, sits, stands, and even dances with a particular manner (Hua 13/64); and it acts in such a characteristic way that, similar to genuine signs, it wakens a tendency that directs the perceptual regard [Blick] from the sensuous content to what is indicated therein. To use an example from Husserl, upon hearing an angry cry, the intentional tendency “weist auf den durch den bildlich vorstelligen Zorn bezeichneten wirklichen Zorn hin, und darin liegt das nun „durch“ die ganze Bildlichkeit Gemeinte” (Hua 20-2/100). To paraphrase, the vivid manifestation of anger first causes us to notice the anger itself; only subsequently or derivatively can we raise questions as to whether or not the semblance of anger reveals “actual” anger. To describe the manifestation of anger as anything other than the mere appearance of anger simply begs the question. To reiterate, as empathizers, we “see through” [hineinschauen] the meaningful constellation of bodily movements in such a way that we originally “see”
the Other’s indicated psychic state, i.e., her anger, for example (Hua 20-2/69). In a pivotal passage in *Ideas II*, quoted below, Husserl discusses the nature of what this unique way of “seeing through” exactly means (Hua 4, §57):

“in gewisser Weise geht die Menschenauffassung durch die Erscheinung des Körpers, der da Leib ist, hindurch. Sie bleibt gewissermaßen nicht beim Körper stehen, sie richtet nicht auf ihn ihren Pfeil, sondern durch ihm hindurch – auch nicht auf einen mit ihm verbunden Geist, sondern eben auf den Menschen” (Hua 4/240; cf. Hua 20-2/69, 70).

Let us further explicate what this “seeing through” means. Husserl thinks that this particular way of seeing is, genuinely speaking, dependent on the manner of foreign expression – i.e., it is a perception *according* to the foreign expression. I do not come to see the Other’s anger by putting myself in the Other’s shoes, imagining how I would experience my own anger were I in the same situation. Rather, the anger that I see is that which *is* in accordance with the particular manner of the Other’s behavior: “sehe ich den anderen, so „sehe ich ihm“, wenn er so schreit, „an“, daß er zornig ist” (Hua 20-2/103-04, 73; my italics). My seeing the Other’s anger is not a matter of how I would feel if I were in the Other’s position, nor is it a matter of how I interpret this particular behavior. The crucial point, according to Husserl, is that the manner of foreign bodily givenness determines the way in which we primarily experience the Other – we perceive the Other *according to* how the Other appears to us (Cf. Alloa, 2007, chapter 4; Merleau-Ponty, 2003). In this sense, Husserl writes:


At this point, Husserl can readily refute the reading that the two descriptive aspects of bodily behavior, namely the psychic and the physical, are related extrinsically. Insofar as Husserl conceives of bodily behavior, it is obviously saturated with meaning and serves an expressive function: “die Leiblichkeit überhaupt ist in gewisser Weise „Ausdruck“, Expression” (Hua 20-2/69, 4/320, 325, 14/327). As
Husserl argues in *Ideas II*, the psychic aspect is by no means a secondary entity “attached” to the physical one, as if two different things were put together *partes extra partes* (Hua 4/238). Genuinely speaking, the psychic “durchdringt „beseelend“ das physische Ganze in gewisser Weise” (ibid.). In this regard, Husserl is careful to draw a pertinent terminological distinction: the two aspects are not “linked” [Anknüpfung, Verknüpfung, Verbindung] together, like two independent entities lumped side by side [Nebeneinandersein] (Hua 20-2/62, 124, 134, 4/238-39); instead, they “overlap” [Deckung] (Hua 20-2/124), or are ultimately “fused” [Verschmelzung] (Hua 4/238) with, each other such that each aspect is essentially indispensable to and dependent upon the other. In Husserl’s words, “das Geistige nichts Zweites ist, nicht Angebundenes ist, sondern eben beseelend; und die Einheit ist nicht Verbindung von zweien sondern eins und nur eins ist da” (Hua 4/239, 14/331-32). Therefore, foreign bodily behavior as it presents itself to perceptual experience is neither purely physical nor purely psychical (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p.127). To talk about the purely psychical or merely physical involves an element of reflective abstraction (Hua 4/183, 14/425), which, to be sure, according to Husserl, already presupposes a pre-given “expressive unity” (Hua 14/236; cf. Römpp, 1992, p.50). Given the foregoing analysis, namely that foreign bodily behavior is neither merely physical nor purely psychical, and that the psychic and physical aspects of foreign behavior are intrinsically rather than extrinsically related, Husserl can now save himself from the threat of other-minds skepticism, which thus loses any argumentative footing it may previously have had. 113

As Merleau-Ponty will later insist (Cf. Waldenfels, 2000, p.93), Husserl suggests that the expression of twofold unity that characterizes bodily behavior is the first and most primordial event that all empathic experience ultimately refers back to. As he writes, “die erste, ursprüngliche Kundgabe: Das doppelseitige (außen- und innenseitige) „ich bewege“ indiziert durch die Äußerlichkeit die Innerlichkeit. Ist dadurch der „Andere“ ursprünglich erfahren und Kommunikation hergestellt, so kann absichtlich Erzeugung von subjektiven eigenleiblichen Bewegungen zu absichtlicher Kundgabe von Innerlichkeiten dienen” (Hua 14/328; cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p.125). In this sense, upon seeing an angry or threatening gesture, “I do not perceive the anger or

113 For a Wittgensteinian and more elaborate dispute of other-minds skepticism by emphasizing the role played by expression, see Rudd (2003) and Overgaard (2007).
threat as a psychological fact hidden behind the gesture, I read the anger in the gesture” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p.190).  

As we have elaborated above, Husserl’s operative hypotheses of bodily behavior are in accordance with his particular conception of indication, and ultimately stem from his initial consideration of its two descriptive aspects, namely the physical substrate and the psychical surplus. Husserl’s refined account of these two aspects, and their “twofold unities” [zweierlei Einheiten] (Hua 4/243), allows for a far-reaching conception of expression in a broad sense, including bodily expression of course. In Husserl’s words, “we have here a fundamental analysis embracing all spiritual objects, all unities of body [Leib] and sense [Sinn], hence not only individual humans but also human communities, all cultural formations, all individual and social works, institutions, etc.” (Hua 4/243 [255]; cf. Hua 4/341, 20-2/35).

To conclude, Husserl abandons the collateral hypothesis of the first investigation in favor for the constitutive thesis that foreign bodily behavior is in itself a meaningful constituent of the Other’s expression and primordially reveals the Other’s mental life. That being said, he nevertheless still keeps the indicative hypothesis, albeit a substantially different version of it. In the first investigation, the relation between indicator and indicated is presented as extrinsic and loose in nature; by contrast, Husserl now argues that this indicative relation is an intrinsic and intimate one, i.e., it is a “twofold unity of the indicator and the indicated” (Hua 14/332). As a result, these newly developed insights not only illuminate some crucial dimensions of Husserl’s theory of foreign expression; more importantly, they also allow for a faithful description of our \textit{de facto} foreign experience. In this regard, Husserl writes:

“die leiblichen „Zeichen“, die der „Einfühlung“ dienen, haben darin Analogie mit sprachlichen Zeichen, daß Systeme von „Zeichen“

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{See Scheler (2008, p. 260) for a similar argument: “we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception,’ for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a ‘complex of physical sensations,’ and that there is certainly no sensation of another person’s mind nor any stimulus from such a source, I would beg him to turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts.”}
\end{footnotesize}
einheitliche Mannigfaltigkeiten, auf seelische Einheiten in der Mannigfaltigkeit hindeuten. Sie haben natürlich keine Bedeutung im logischen Sinn; freilich sind sie aber insofern nicht signa, als sie mit dem, was sie andeuten, einig sind in der Einheit der Apperzeption. Sie konstituieren Einheiten der sachlichen Zusammengehörigkeit, sie konstituieren ja die reale Einheit Leib-Seele” (Hua 20-2/129-30, 73; my italics).

At this point, we can revisit the question we started with concerning the cause of Husserl’s changing thought regarding foreign bodily behavior. Some commentators suggest that Husserl’s reasons for developing a new account of bodily expression, as it is first and foremost articulated in Ideas II, can be attributed to “a change in his understanding of embodiment” (Heinämaa, 2010, pp. 2, 7). Furthermore, this new account of embodiment, in turn, sheds light on “indication” [Anzeige], a term which Husserl drops after his consideration of it in the first investigation (Depraz, 1995, p. 174). As Heinämaa argues, only after Husserl has developed an account of the manifold meaning of the body as physical, sensuous, and perceiving body can he arrive at a new conception of expressive phenomena. As far as I can see, neither observation is true. Although Husserl’s systematic account of bodily expression is more or less consistent from 1914 onwards, and we can find numerous corresponding statements between the “1914 text” and Ideas II, it does not necessarily follow that this account is historically due to his refining the way in which he thinks about embodiment. As I have demonstrated, contra Natalie Depraz, Husserl’s revision of the indicative relation decisively sheds light on the constitutive and founding relation between the material and psychic aspects of both signs, and of, ana logon, human bodies. It is in light of this insight that Husserl can ultimately claim that the foreign expressive body shares with genuine signs the same sort of “twofold unity” (Hua 4, §57): it comprises a complex unity of material substrate and spiritual meaning, whereby consciousness penetrates and permeates its physical being into the correlated

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115 A detailed historical examination of this question easily exceeds the scope of the current work. Instead, I restrict myself to a systematic analysis of Husserl’s new account of indication and its relevance to his new account of foreign expressivity. It seems evident to me that, judging from Husserl’s research manuscripts on “intersubjectivity,” the “1914 text” under consideration proves pivotal both for Husserl’s developed account of indication and the foreign bodily expression.
psychical being. For the same reason, I think the expressive function [Kundgabe/Ausdrucksfunktion] or, better, the “internal relation between the expression and the expressed” (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p.121), that Husserl finds in genuine signs, serves as a helpful exemplar, with which to convincingly articulate the peculiar expressivity of the foreign body. This is neither to say, however, that Husserl naively conflates the human body with the sign, nor does it mean that Husserl takes the sign to be the privileged criterion of all other phenomena, as Derrida famously accuses him of doing in Speech and Phenomena. Rather, as Bernet (1988) points out, Husserl’s analysis of an individual phenomenon is always carried out within the context of a number of other phenomena, and it is this simultaneous exploration into other subject matters that contributes to his constantly gaining new insights that are so wide in scope and so comprehensive in nature. In this vein, Husserl’s more fine-grained analysis of indication proves to be an informative tool for him to use when working on the complex phenomenon of foreign bodily expression and spelling out some of its fundamental characteristics.

3. Bodily expressivity and its metastable structure

We can draw at least two important theses from the last section: first, foreign behavior per definition is a genuine “passageway” in and through which the Other originally reveals herself; and, second, foreign behavior is intrinsically stamped with a unitary Gestalt and, thus, has its own meaning structure. In this section, I substantiate these insights by drawing together Husserl’s research manuscripts and Merleau-Ponty’s account of bodily expression. I suggest that foreign behavior thus conceived is better understood as a metastable structure, i.e., it is a varying form [Gestaltung], according to which the salient type of bodily behavior in question remains intact through a spectrum of deviations. For instance, the behavioral configuration of being happy varies from person to person and from one occasion to another in the same person, yet the behavioral type of being happy remains the same. For this reason, we can perceive this and that person as being happy, and perceive the same person as being happy now and then, despite the fact that the behavioral configuration of being happy differs from case to case. Following Merleau-Ponty, we can spell out the constitutive elements of Husserl’s robust Gestalt theory of foreign bodily expressivity.
3.1 Bodily expressivity and its paradoxical logic

As elaborated upon earlier, Husserl develops his theory of indication so substantially that he ultimately abandons his conception of foreign bodily behavior in the first investigation and opts for a completely new one from the year 1914 onwards. On Husserl’s new account, foreign behavior is neither an inert organic complex wherein, nor a transparent “cloth” behind which, the foreign mental life manifests itself. That is, foreign behavior in itself takes on a sort of ambiguity; it is a transferring passageway, an intentional Übergang, which, due to its peculiar formation is itself a form of genuine signification. As Merleau-Ponty later argues, the essential feature of foreign bodily behavior is, as it were, that it is constituted by the following paradox: “behavior is not a thing, but neither is it an idea” (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 127; Waldenfels, 2000b). In short, Husserl’s new and robust Gestalt theory of foreign behavior provides important insights into what is at stake here, i.e., the paradox inherent in and constitutive of foreign bodily expressivity.

As Waldenfels (2000) points out, this paradox is an aporia that lies at the very outset of bringing something into pure expression (Hua 1/77). For one thing, if we postulate that bodily behavior is among other things completely meaningless, and in this sense fully mute, then any interpretation thereof would amount to attributing a meaning to such behavior that would be essentially alien to it. We may thereby risk contaminating the original state of the bodily behavior itself, because we simply interpret it as meaning something other than what it actually means. For another thing, if we conversely postulate that bodily behavior itself constitutes the entirety of expressive meaning, and in this sense exhausts the Other’s mental life, then bodily behavior just effaces the Other’s genuine alterity by rendering it fully accessible. In other words, on this account, the Other’s mental life is as fully accessible to us as are physical entities and, thus, it simply loses the peculiar transcendence that differentiates it from the latter. However, neither of the above postulations seems

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116 To be sure, in his important contribution, “The Paradox of Expression,” Waldenfels is primarily concerned with the issue of linguistic expression. Yet, as he also points out, the paradoxical structure inherent in expression is so prevalent that it also applies to bodily expression (Waldenfels, 2000, p.92).

117 See Husserl’s own words, “der Anfang ist die reine und sozusagen noch stumme Erfahrung, die nun erst zur reinen Aussprache ihres eigenen Sinnes zu bringen ist” (Hua 1/77).
correct, since each of them is at odds with our *de facto* experience: firstly, bodily behavior is more than a mosaic of sensuous data and, secondly, while the Other is in principle accessible to us (otherwise we would have no basis from which to even talk about the Other), there are certain elements of the Other’s mental life that are entirely hidden from us (Hua 1/144).

Thus, we seem to face an impasse when we try to account for the “relation between the actual expression and what is to be expressed” (Waldenfels, 2000, p.91), i.e., between the expressive body and the mental life expressed therein. There seems, thus, to be a fundamental discrepancy between these two terms, due to which the expressive body is not identical in nature with the mental life expressed therein, and one’s mental life cannot be reduced to mere behavioral components. In other words, the paradox of foreign expressivity ultimately consists in the accessibility of the foreign mentality. Namely, the Other’s expressivity can be reduced to a series of neither purely empirical nor purely spiritual components. In this regard, as Overgaard most aptly captures,

“we have two sets of seemingly conflicting intuitions about the accessibility of the mental lives of others. On the one hand, we are inclined to think that it is wrong to claim, as Cartesian dualists would have to do, that the minds of others are essentially inaccessible to direct experience. But on the other hand, we feel that it is equally wrong to claim, as behaviorists and others have done, that the mental lives of subjects are completely accessible to an outside spectator” (Overgaard, 2007, p. 5).

The two extreme postulations are indeed at odds with our *de facto* experience. Yet, as Waldenfels argues, they also originate in the ambiguity of the real expressive event, i.e., an event that is better characterized as a “neither-nor:” “der Leib is zweideutig in dem Sinne, daß er weder Geist noch Natur, weder Seele noch Körper, weder Innen noch Außen ist” (Waldenfels, 2000a, p. 42; cf. Waldenfels, 2000b, p. 94). Put differently, living expression is an event of inbetween-ness: it can to a greater or lesser extent proximate either of the above mentioned extreme postulations, yet it cannot amount to either of them (Waldenfels, 2000b, p. 92.). To be sure, we do, at least sometimes, intuitively see someone else’s anger characteristic behaviors, such as
clenching one’s fists or gnashing one’s teeth. Nonetheless, these directly perceptible phenomena cannot, in principle, fully express the psychological meaning of such anger, e.g., the motivation of the anger as the Other experiences it.

Hence, one of the key difficulties a theory of foreign bodily behavior must tackle consists in how to account for these two seemingly conflicting intuitions. One approach is, as Husserl proposes and practices, to focus on the particular expressive phenomenon at hand, so as to carefully work out its distinctive mode of givenness. And I believe that with regard to the foreign expression Husserl’s robust Gestalt theory does shed light on the discrepancy between the expressive body and the mental life expressed therein, insofar as Husserl, and, later, Merleau-Ponty as well, provides a compromise between the two extreme postulations presented above that not only does justice to the expressivity of the foreign mental life (Waldenfels, 2000, p.95) but also accommodates the important insights garnered from both sets of intuitions (Overgaard, 2007, p.5), without falling into the pitfalls of either of the above postulations. It is in this regard that, as Merleau-Ponty points out in The Structure of Behavior, we need to work out the constitutive elements of the ambiguity inherent in the foreign bodily Gestalt (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, pp.127, 137).

3.2 Bodily expressivity and its constitutive elements

Waldenfels (2000) demonstrates that, in his different works, Merleau-Ponty deploys four interdependent “operative concepts” to articulate the nascent expressivity of expressions in such a way that does not reduce expressivity to a series of either strictly physiological components or exclusively spiritual content. Insofar as its nascent being is concerned, expression is embodied. In order to do justice to this nascent expressivity, foreign expressivity as such must itself be accounted for in such a way that it neither disintegrates into heterogeneous fragments nor loses its integrity in another way by being subsumed into a forged unity, i.e., a unity between the two Cartesian entities, the body and the mind (Waldenfels, 2000, p.95).

The first operative concept is “deviation (déviation, écart), which refers to the manner in which expression functions within a spectrum of possible deviations. As argued earlier, bodily expression is temporally extended and rhythmically structured in such a way that it develops a spatiotemporal form, or behavioral type, that maintains its integrity, regardless of any variations in appearances the particularly
bodily expression in question may undergo. In Waldenfels’ words, bodily expression thus conceived may be understood as a “coherent deformation”: “the event of expression vacillates between the relatively new and the relatively old, depending on whether the deviation holds up a pre-given frame or modifies and bursts open this frame” (ibid. p.95). Husserl believes that it is ultimately this establishment and, thereafter, preservation of a characteristic behavioral type that provides the “essential substratum [Unterlage]” that hypostatizes the initial expression. Given what has been said, we primordially perceive according to the characteristic whole, instead of the sensuous content, of the particular bodily expression at play; in this sense, we do perceive the Other’s embodied expressive state, yet perceive it as the expression of a particular type (Cf. Hua 20-2/62). The crucial point is perhaps not the fact that bodily expression is more or less deformed, but that it is deformed coherently (Landes, 2013, p. 20). Thus, expressive meaning can accordingly sustain changes in its sensuous expression: “a mere [sensuous] alteration of this form obviously does not alter the meaning” (Hua 20-2/54). Nevertheless, should the contrast between a characteristic behavioral type and its deformed bodily expression be so obvious that the deviation in question bursts open the frame, and thus essentially trans-forms, the behavioral type, the expressive meaning will also change in turn. In the context of the expressive event, Waldenfels argues that these transformations have a “limit value” (ibid., p.95), not only because they are rare cases but also because they are delineating cases that distinguishes one behavioral type from another.

The second operative concept Merleau-Ponty makes use of is “translation”. To paraphrase Waldenfels, foreign bodily expression can be described as a movement of “translation,” in that it brings inner experience into external definition, or provides psychic content with physical texture, just as “speech and writing mean to translate an experience which is first made into a text by the word experience itself calls forth” (ibid., p.95). However, similar to foreign bodily expression, translation itself shares the same kind of paradoxical structure: if translation is sufficiently alien to the original text, then it actually turns into a kind of creation that bears little connection with the original text; and, if translation perfectly overlaps with the original text, then it is no longer a translation but simply the original text itself. In either case, the translation in question is not genuine, for it is either too distant from or too close to the original thought to truly translate it, namely, to interpret and communicate the
general meaning of the original through a different medium. Hence, in order for translation to work, the target language must be able to deliver and convey the original text in a genuine sense – namely, it must bear a sufficiently meaningful relation to the original so as not to simply ‘create’ a second text, without thereby destroying or dissimilating the constitutive discrepancy between the two – namely, it must be sufficiently distant from the original so as not to create a mere duplicate of it. In the same sense, bodily expression serves as a non-adequate revelation: foreign behavior genuinely expresses the Other’s mental life, yet in such a way that the Other’s mental life remains an irreducible surplus, something that can never be exhausted by or exhaustible in bodily expression. Thus, as Waldenfels aptly states, “just as translation leads from a source language to a target language without closing the abyss between the two, expression converts the alien into one’s own, without effacing the alienness” (ibid.).

The third operative concept is “après coup [Nachträglichkeit],” by which Waldenfels means that “the event of expression precedes itself” and that “present and past do not follow one another but are entangled within one another” (ibid.). Together with these two phases, we can draw two characterizations of bodily expression. First, bodily expression is spatiotemporally extended and rhythmically structured in such a way that, as stated earlier, each phase progressively affords the ensuing phases and, conversely, retrospectively illuminates the preceding phases (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p.87). In this sense, a simple slice of bodily expression does not constitute expression, nor does a compilation of various slices of bodily expression. To reiterate an earlier point, bodily expression is a self-resonating continuum, in which each phase is indispensable to and dependent upon other phases. As Merleau-Ponty defines it, the expressive Gestalt is not a mere sum of its parts; rather, it is a perceptual whole in which its parts function in an interrelated way such that each part is determined by its position in the unitary whole (ibid., p.144). The second characterization of bodily expression that one can draw from Waldenfels’ third operative concept is that bodily expression thus conceived is a holistic event in that the previous phases are co-present and entangled with the present phases and, thus, further predict the phases that are yet to come. The past is not quite absent, just as the future is not quite the present. To follow Husserl, bodily expression is a concrete instantiation of original temporality; it is an intertwinement par excellence of retentional expression, present expression and
protentional expression (Cf. ibid., p.107). Only in this temporal manner can we find that bodily behavior is a form of expressive gesticulation that is “gifted with an internal unity” (ibid., p.130). In this regard, we can say that foreign bodily expression as such is the first event, or the first givenness, which is granted a “figurative signification”; only in and through this most primordial expression can the Other reveal herself in the first place.

The final operative concept is “excess,” or transcendence, insofar as “what comes to expression is sketched in the movement of expression itself as an ‘excess’ of what is intended” (ibid., p. 96). As shall be made clear, this excess is twofold. On the one hand, bodily behavior in itself transcends mere sensuous data: “it draws the body into psychological and communicative orders” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 127). Meaning saturates the body and is thus an “essential plus” (Hua 20-2/134). On the other hand, expressing behavior deciphers mental life, yet never in a complete way. The expressed mental life remains a “void,” as if it is, to return to our example of translation, the original text that can never be fully present in the target language. Bodily expression reveals the Other’s psychic state in horizontal openness: “here is always a non-determinate horizon of the not yet ‘expressed’ interiority” (Hua 20-2/70). We can always interrogate the Other a step further, so that we can gain a further explication and determination of her mental states. Thus, in affinity with image consciousness, the paradoxical logic of expression is characterized by an ontological inbetween-ness (Cf. chapter 3.3.1): it is neither pure idea nor mere thing, neither nothing nor everything; to do justice to its unique expressivity, we can say that, in its nascent state, bodily expression is a salient and detectable Gestalt that self-sustains and self-transcends through various deviations.

In short, these four interdependent dimensions of expressivity help to clarify the Sache that foreign bodily expressivity is a field of “transiting synthesis” (Hua 1/144). As Landes (2013) suggests, the expressive phenomenon is perhaps better characterized as a “metastable structure.” To quote Merleau-Ponty, “there is form/Gestalt whenever the properties of a system are modified by every change brought about in a single one of its parts and on the contrary, are conserved when they all change while maintaining the same relationship among themselves” (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 47). Accordingly, two bodily expressions of the same characteristic behavioral type can have the same meaning, yet not necessarily have the same
appearance. And, given the fact that we perceive a given bodily expression according to its characteristic type, we can perceive foreign behavior as having the same meaning, without necessarily needing to consider all the possible, subtle differences of the particular expression in question (ibid., p.168). The expressive body, in this sense, commences with and comes to fruition in its own unitary Gestalt through its fluent and harmonious gestures.

To briefly conclude, I believe that Husserl’s (as well as Merleau-Ponty’s) Gestalt theory of bodily behavior can shed light on some of the fundamental features of foreign expressivity. The foreign body should not be read as a merely sensuous complex, a contingent indication of the Other’s mental life, as Husserl does in a Cartesian spirit in the first investigation, nor should it, conversely, be taken as providing transparent access to the Other’s mental life, as if we could fully read the latter by means of observing the former, as behaviorism implies. Instead, and if we try our best to do justice to how the phenomenon is given in perceptual experience, we can readily see that foreign bodily behavior is characterized by certain unique features: it is first and foremost perceived as forming a characteristic, or behavioral, type, which is itself saturated with expressive meaning, and it is characterized by an expressive structure par excellence – its textured physiognomy is the awakening and delivering substrate wherein the expressed mental life is originally disclosed. To reiterate, the foreign body and the foreign mind are not in a partes extra partes juxtaposition but, de facto, a unity of complex expression. As Merleau-Ponty (1963, p.156) rightly emphasizes, as a “vital phenomenon,” foreign bodily behavior can neither be “integrally translated in physico-chemical relations” nor can it be “reduced to the condition of an anthropomorphic appearance.” Concretely speaking, foreign bodily behavior is an ontologically sui generis entity, an “in-between” being that is essentially characterized by its unique “twofold unity.”
Chapter Five

*Alter-ation, Reduction and Ethics*

In the preceding chapters, I have extensively explored central aspects of empathy, e.g., embodiment, contextualization, empathic intentionality, and bodily expressivity, by means of largely consulting Husserl’s research manuscripts on intersubjectivity. An important result of this effort, as I hope to demonstrate, consists in a systematic renewal of Husserl’s theory of empathy. More specifically, I think Husserl’s genuine contribution to the problem of empathy, despite the seemingly insurmountable difficulties, rests upon his in-depth analysis of concrete empathic experience. For instance, as I have demonstrated in chapter one, Husserl argues that only by a radical investigation of our own embodied experience can we convincingly claim that subjective life is already intersubjective in nature,\(^{118}\) and can we thereby also find a trustworthy springboard for elucidating the *how* of the Other’s bodily givenness. That is, the full-fledged constitution of our own body is necessarily comprised of indexicity, mobility, and orientation; and it is in light of this constitution that we can legitimately investigate the sense in which the Other’s body functions as another center of orientation. Husserl’s analysis, furthermore, brings to the fore the intentional accomplishment of the empathic act. Our empathic intention, to be sure, is not uni- but bi-directional in kind. Due to such intentional bi-directionality, our empathic regard neither reflects upon the Other’s merely physical being nor focuses entirely on the Other’s purely psychic being; instead, what we originally experience is the unique “expressive unity” of the Other as a person. With these individual analyses, I believe Husserl’s theory of empathy helps to illuminate the multi-dimensional nature of the empathic act.

Nonetheless, it may seem surprising to critical readers that I have rarely, at least not explicitly, touched upon the methodic issue in Husserl’s phenomenology, i.e., the principle of reduction. It is well known that, in addition to the transcendental

\(^{118}\) Husserl’s own statement is of particular importance in this regard, see, e.g., “perhaps reduction to the transcendental ego only seems to entail a permanently solipsistic science; whereas the consequential elaboration of this science, in accordance with its own sense, leads over to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity and, by means of this, to a universal transcendental philosophy” (Hua 1/69[30]).
reduction, Husserl introduces the primordial reduction so as to lay the ground for the entire project of intersubjectivity. Despite its fundamental importance, Husserl’s own account of the second reduction proves to be controversial. We can find two main lines of criticism in the literature. On the one hand, many commentators reproach Husserl by arguing that the primordial reduction ultimately results in an unfavorable solipsism. The primordial reduction, so it seems, suspends all intentionality directed at the Other and thereby abstracts or reduces all intentional experience to the purely immanent sphere. What is put in methodic “parenthesis,” and thus thematized for the phenomenologist, is the ego’s actual and potential subjective experience, experience that is neither related to the Other nor presupposes the constitutive accomplishment of the Other (Hua 1/124[93], cf. Hua 13/79, 408ff; Hua 4/78ff). The primordially reduced ego is, as a corollary, solus ipse, a “transcendental Robinson” (Held, 1972, p. 49). In this context, we are immediately faced with several questions: how can such a solipsistic ego constitute an alter ego in such a way that the latter does not derive its meaning from the solipsistic ego? In other words, how can a genuine form of intersubjectivity get off the ground within the confines of solipsism? Isn’t it the case that such a solipsistic reduction prevents all contact with the Other in the first place?

On the other hand, a related problem concerns whether the ego, after carrying out the primordial reduction, can transgress or overpass the borders of the egoic sphere. On one interpretation, the primordial reduction is nothing other than a “Cartesian-phenomenological reduction” (Theunissen, 1986, p. 57); accordingly, the purpose of the reduction in question is to secure a point of certainty, which serves as a solid ground for the deduction of the Other. The difficulty, however, precisely rests upon how the Cartesian standpoint secures real contact with the Other. Isn’t it the case that the reduced ego, by hypothesis, needs to appeal to its own subjective experience?

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119 In this regard, as Schutz (1970a, p. 60) points out, there is a closely related question concerning whether such a primordial reduction can be radically carried out. More specifically, it is obvious that I, as the transcendental ego, experience a common world, a world that is instituted essentially together with other subjects, a world that has a meaning “for everyone” (Hua 1/124, 6/166). This world, after the primordial reduction, is retained as my intentional correlate in the properly purified egological sphere. But how can the accomplishment of other subjects be “purified away,” or how can the primordially reduced sphere be “purely” one’s own, if other-ness is precisely the condition for the institution of the intentional correlate? The same line of critique, with a different perspective and formulation (consider: ‘albeit formulated from a different perspective’), can also be found in Kozlowski (1991, p. 144ff).

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in order to develop a true relation with the Other? If this is the case, then the Other thus constituted is at best an analogue of the reduced ego, and there seems to be no path from the immanence of the ego to the transcendence of the Other. For these reasons, some commentators hold that Husserl fails to account for the genuine sense of the Other’s alterity, and that his theory of intersubjectivity essentially serves as a camouflage for egology.

Indeed, these questions are crucial for Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity. Many commentators hold that, however promising Husserl’s transcendental project may seem, he fails to sufficiently account for these methodological questions, and his phenomenology as a whole is built on shaky ground – the unfavorable solipsism that underpins the constitution of both intersubjectivity and, ultimately, objectivity. In this regard, these questions deserve careful discussion. Yet I also think that these questions are in fact misguided in that, however critical they may seem, they are based on a problematic reading of the primordial reduction. As I will show below, many commentators overemphasize the Cartesian motif of the primordial reduction, and overlook its transcendental function and scope, namely the theoretical import of the primordial reduction. If the transcendental reduction is designed to “put into question” the naïve acceptance of the Other’s existence, then we need to accordingly ask the following question: what is the primordial reduction supposed to “put into question” with regard to the problem of the Other? Given that the naïve acceptance of the Other’s existence has already been “switched off” by the transcendental reduction, what is the methodic purpose of the primordial reduction? Following these guiding questions, we can differentiate the primordial reduction from the transcendental reduction and, furthermore, analyze its transcendental function and scope.

As I will argue, the primordial reduction concerns a largely neglected issue, i.e., it serves to dissect the Other’s co-constitutive functions in respect to both the ego’s self-constitution and the constitution of intersubjectivity as such. As a close reading will reveal, the primordial reduction not only differentiates the genuinely egoic sphere from the foreign sphere, but this differentiation also provides the egoic point of entry, or the “site,” for the genuinely original appearance of the Other’s. That is, the Other appears to “me,” the primordially reduced ego, as she herself is, namely prior to any possible egoic modifications that the empathic act may effect. To this end, the primordial reduction, in contrast to the transcendental reduction, is designed to
suspend the ego’s explicit and implicit acts, as well as intentional accomplishments, so as to shed light on how the Other is given to intentional life as she “primordially” appears. In this vein, I think we can further identify an ethical dimension inherent in the primordial reduction, insofar as it reveals an existential facticity – the Other’s presence not only confronts the ego in empathic relation, but it also places the ego under moral exigency, the exigency of engaging with and responding to such presence.

In order to unfold the main theme of this concluding chapter, I will in section one lay out some of the basic insights developed in previous chapters. As I have shown, empathy is an interpersonal encounter situated in the oriented sphere, wherein I as one center of orientation reckon with the Other as another center of orientation. In this sense, the Other is taken to be a genuinely alter Ego, a Thou. The fact that the interpersonal encounter is situated in the oriented sphere also provides the basis for clarifying the function of passive affectivity, whereby the Other’s passive manifestation issues an affective allure that, by turn, triggers empathic advertence. The Other’s affection, on Husserl’s account, serves as the catalyst for empathy. It is within this context that Husserl introduces the primordial reduction so as to account for the manner in which the Other functions as a co-subject.

In section two, I will analyze the transcendental function and scope of the primordial reduction by means of unpacking its two interlocked aspects: first, the primordial reduction serves to delineate the genuinely egoic sphere from the foreign sphere; second, it serves to shed light on the Other’s co-constitutive functions, insofar as it “puts into question” all egoic accomplishments and pinpoints to what extent the Other, in and through empathic experience, alters the ego. The second aspect, as I will demonstrate, has been largely neglected, even though it makes it possible, for the first time, to elucidate the implicit, ethical motive of Husserl’s theory of empathy.

In section three, I will substantiate this ethical implication by drawing on Levinas’ theory of “putting into question.” I will argue that the primordial reduction cannot be radically motivated from within but has to be existentially motivated by the presence of the Other. That is, a radical self-critique has to be initiated by foreign interpolation, e.g., by the Other’s questioning gaze. Thus, the primordial reduction, understood as a genuine form of self-reflection or -critique, leads to the existential facticity that, once put in front of the Other’s interrogating gaze, the ego is bound by a moral exigency – the exigency of responding to the Other’s primordial emergence.
1. Self-constitution and Other-constitution: a recapitulation

1.1 Empathy as orientated encounter

As I have explicated in chapter one, the genuine form of empathy has to be situated within the oriented sphere, in which I am the center of orientation in terms of being the somatic “here” and the Other is another center of orientation in terms of being the somatic “there.” This basic schema demonstrates not only the constitutive significance of embodiment in empathy but also illustrates a phenomenological form of interpersonal relationships, i.e., the “I-Thou” relation that appears in the form of the “here-there” relation. This basic insight needs further elaboration and substantiation.

To begin with, my lived body is first and foremost experienced as a Leib, an ontologically privileged entity that I as an experiencing subject can neither distance myself from nor step into. I do not, properly speaking, possess a lived body, but I am the lived body: I live in and through it. Thus, it is clear that the self-constitution of the lived body belongs to original self-experience or, in Husserl’s words, to the egoic immanent sphere. It is precisely for this reason that Husserl holds that, even after the transcendental and primordial reductions, the transcendental ego still experiences the body as a lived body [Leib] (Hua 1/128[97]). The lived body serves as “the essentially founding stratum” of continuous world-experience (Hua 1/127[96]) and, thus, it stands out as “the unique Object that is not merely a physical thing but a lived body, the unique Object within my abstractive world-stratum to which I, in accordance with experience, ascribe fields of sensation, the unique Object in which I immediately rule and govern” (Hua 1/128[97]). This insight cannot be emphasized enough, because the fact that the lived body is first and foremost experienced as a lived body determines that the primordially reduced sphere shall be characterized as an oriented sphere.

120 This point can originally be found in Nietzsche, who explains that “Leib bin ich ganz und gar und nichts sonst,” in “Von den Verächtern des Leibes” of Also Sprach Zarathustra. For further discussion, see Waldenfels (2007), Lecture V, “Bodily Experience between Selfhood and Otherness.”

121 Some commentators argue that the primordially reduced sphere is, contrary to what Husserl believes, actually “naturalistic” if we run through Husserl’s hypotheses and argumentation (Reynaert, 2001; J. Smith, 2011). Thus, it either follows that the primordially reduced sphere constitutes a homogeneous space or that the constitution of the primordially reduced sphere presupposes a homogeneous space. Either way, Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is naturalistic in spirit. However, this line of critique misses the central point of Husserl’s account of the primordial reduction in that it overlooks the
Therefore, in the primordial sphere, the Other has to be characterized as an another center of orientation, insofar as he or she is primordially oriented with regard to the ego’s indexical “here.”

The oriented nature of the primordial sphere has a critical consequence that I want to address here. More specifically, the Other as another center of orientation already decentralizes the transcendental ego in and through the concrete encounter. As Sartre vividly illustrates in *Being and Nothingness*, when I see a man passing by a bench in a public yard, my experience of the yard is at the same time fundamentally altered in that the entrance of the Other “regroups” my spatial orientation. I am still the center of spatial orientation: the lawn is on my left, the statue is two yards away from me, and so forth. However, the Other makes me as one of the centers, rather than as the center, of spatial orientation and thereby establishes a unique kind of personal relation with me. As Sartre puts it, “everything is in place; everything still exists for me; but everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of a new object [the Other]. The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting” (Sartre, 2003, p. 279). Thus, the encounter with the Other always already co-constitutes my own worldly experience. It is in this sense that Husserl explicitly states, I not only experience the Other as a peculiar object in the world but also “at the same time as a subject for the world, as experiencing it and, in doing so, experiencing me too” (Hua 1/123[91]; italics altered).

In this regard, we can immediately notice two points. First, the Other’s decentralization should not be conceived of as an outcome of the ego’s transcendental constitution. On the contrary, the decentralization is essentially inherent in the encounter, and it precedes any thematization of that encounter. Put differently, the decentralization is one of the determining elements of our ordinary intersubjective experience, and the task of phenomenological explication is precisely to work out “the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego” (Hua 1/122[90]). Second, the Other’s constitutive significance of the lived body and its implication with regard to the operation of the primordial reduction.
decentralization already functions as a co-constitutive element of both the ego’s worldly experience and, correlativey, the ego’s self-experience at the pre-thematic and -reflective level. On a closer look, as an embodied subject, I am never so at home with myself as solipsists would assume. Instead, whenever I perceive a spatial object, I always already implicitly refer to the transcendental Other, to the foreign perspective of that perceived object (Cf. chapter 1.1.1; Zahavi, 2001, chapter 2.4). Given that the horizontal adumbration of a spatial object demands that the ego take into consideration a much more extensive perspective than its own, a foreign center of orientation is already in play throughout my worldly experience and, thus, as transcendental subjectivity, I always act within an intersubjective network. As Husserl points out in an early manuscript of the fifth Cartesian Meditation, it is only by means of radicalizing the phenomenological reduction that we can bring to light the “co-constituting life” of the Other (Hua 15/49), or the way in which foreign subjectivity decentralizes the egoic center of orientation.

1.2 Empathy as affective encounter

As I explicated in chapter two, the thesis that empathy takes place within the oriented sphere has a further theoretical consequence than what was just outlined above. That is, the Other’s emergence is first and foremost contextualized in a meaningful situation, wherein the Other first exerts an affective allure upon the ego before the latter discerns or thematizes the being of the former. In other words, at the level of passive genesis, the Other has affected the ego to such an extent that the Other’s pre-given presence has already substantially charted or delineated the affective topology of the empathic sphere – the Other is the most prominent affective force in the encountering surrounding.

Affection, therefore, is one of the most central elements of the interpersonal encounter. The Other must have somehow exerted a sufficiently strong affective force upon the ego so that it can be singled out in the first place. To put it conversely, the ego must have been affected in such a way that it turns toward the Other’s appeal or allure or, as Levinas puts it, responds to the “call” of the Other that is communicated in the face-to-face encounter. It is in this regard that the issue of affection presents phenomenological analysis with a twofold challenge: the passive emergence of the Other requires a more cautious and fine-grained analysis than it has previously
received on the one hand, and the co-constitutive function of the Other’s affective force needs further clarification on the other.

As I have demonstrated in chapter 2.1.2, thorough analysis of the origin of affection, I reveal that the Other’s emergence within the oriented sphere is primarily charged with affective significance, and that the Other exerts such original affective force upon the ego prior to any egoic intentional activity. The affective force from the thither side of the Other serves to trigger the ego’s intentional advertence. Strictly speaking, it is the Other who has already bestowed affective weight or meaning on the appeal I turn to. As Waldenfels observes, “everything that appears as something has to be described not simply as something which receives a sense, but as something which provokes sense [and] as something by which we are touched, affected, stimulated, surprised and to some extent violated” (Waldenfels, 2007, p. 74; original italics). In the same sense, the egoic response to the Other is first and foremost a passive receiving or undergoing of the Other’s affective force such that the interpersonal encounter is somehow pre-predicatively delineated and determined by the presence of the Other. This conclusion is of the utmost importance for our current interest: the Other’s co-constitutive function at the passive level consists in pre-predicatively addressing the ego and thereby inviting the ego to respond to or turn towards [Zuwendung] the Other’s appeal, by means of An-tun, Hin-hören, Hin-sehen, An-wenden and so forth (Hua 15/462), all forms of responding par excellence (Cf. chapter 2.2; Hua 15, text Nr.29). As we shall see shortly, the terminological reference to the way in which the Other “addresses,” or “invites” a response from, the ego is not accidental; rather, the use of such terms sheds light on the Other’s peculiar givenness at the level of passive genesis and, at the same time, helps to illuminate the ethical dimension of the passive constitution of the alter ego.

This clarification of the Other’s co-constitutive function opens a new range of questions. As Husserl occasionally suggests, the Other’s affective allure pertains to our implicit or passive intentionality (Hua 1/123[91]), the character of which calls for a wholly different analysis. In Husserl’s eyes, we need to introduce a reduction simply for the sake of passive constitution, so as to phenomenologically capture the genuine manner of passive givenness (Hua 11/150). The difficulty of doing so consists, above all, in the fact that I, the transcendental ego, am always already involved with the Other in such a way that I take a position toward him or her, e.g., I like or dislike that
colleague, or feel sorry for that poor man. “Each ‘I’ is not merely an ego-pole but an ‘I’ with all its accomplishments and accomplished acquisitions” (Hua 6/187[183]). How can I, by means of phenomenological reduction, suspend my own intentional activity so as to “get back to” (reducere) the most original phenomenon [Urphänomen]? In any case, I can only point back to the primal encounter with the Other in a retrospective and devious way, or I can only have access to the passive constitution of the Other after the Other has already come into prominence (Cf. Waldenfels, 2010). As Husserl points out in the C-manuscripts, we need a sort of “archeological re-covering and interpretation” (Hua Mat 8/23), by which to identify the living present where the Other’s meaningful emergence precedes all egoic activity. Only in this way can we do justice to the particular manner of the Other’s passive givenness, a co-subject living together with me at the deepest level of the living present. As I will demonstrate, this methodic concern, this vigilant circumspection and surveying of the Other’s primordial phenomenality as such, is ethical in nature precisely because such a radical operation serves best to uncover one of the key features of the original experience of the Other – the existential exigency of responding to the Other’s pre-given presence.

1.3 The manner of givenness of the Other: a constitutional problem

In the previous discussions, I clarified the sense in which the Other is “there-for-me” (Hua 1/124[92]): the Other is not merely another physical entity over there, localized in the spatiotemporal world; more importantly, the Other’s “thereness-for-me” [Für-mich-da], concretely speaking, consists in its ability to decentralize my egoic center of orientation and to, given its passive affectivity, trigger empathic advertence. In this sense, the task of phenomenology as a “truly radical philosophy” (Hua 6/188[184]) is to ultimately explicate the genuine form of alter-ation that the Other effects upon me, the philosophizing ego, insofar as the Other decentralizes my somatic “here” and affectively calls me into response. Empathy, in its most original sense, is first of all a form of alter-ation, through which “[my ego] is thrown out of that middle point of the world that it occupies in its transcendental originality and that Husserl, on the plane of the primordial world, names ‘the central here’” (Theunissen,
Hence, if “the noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the Other” (Hua 1/§43) indeed means something, then its sense is substantiated by the Other’s co-constitutive functions in the first place. Thus, the task of a phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity, as Husserl sees it, is nothing but to make intelligible the noematic-ontic mode of the Other’s givenness.

It becomes clear that what Husserl is interested in is neither the fact that the Other is over there, and behaves in this or that manner, nor the question of how the existence of the Other is secured by the transcendental ego’s Cartesian certitude regarding the Other’s existence (Cf. Carr, 1987, p. 45ff). Instead, what Husserl tries to bring to light is the sense in which the Other exists there for me, i.e., the Other’s most original manner of givenness for me (Hua 6/186). For Husserl, a transcendental theory of empathy is not a psychology of the Other, nor a metaphysics of the Other; on the contrary, it is precisely transcendental in that it is a rigorous process of sense-explication. As Husserl considers in Crisis, “the obviousness of: ‘There stands a man, in this social group of persons well known to one another,’ must be resolved into its transcendental questions” (Hua 6/187[183]; cf. 6/184[180], 208[204]). A few pages later, Husserl further points out,

“it is naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common misunderstanding, to seek to attack transcendental phenomenology as ‘Cartesianism,’ as if its ego cogito were a premise or set of premises from which the rest of knowledge (whereby one naively speaks only of objective knowledge) was to be deduced, absolutely ‘secured.’ The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it” (Hua 6/193[189]; original italics).

In the same vein, Husserl’s phenomenology does not seek to “establish” the existence of the Other by means of deducing it from the realm of apodictic subjectivity;\(^{123}\)

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\(^{122}\) See also, e.g., “if one attends to the distinction between things as ‘originally one’s own’ and as ‘empathized’ from others, in respect to the how of the manners of appearance, and if one attends to the possibility of discrepancies between one’s own and empathized views, then what one actually experiences originaliter as a perceptual thing is transformed, for each of us, into a mere ‘representation of’ [Vorstellung von], ‘appearance of,’ the one objectively existing thing” (Hua 6/167[164]).

\(^{123}\) For further discussion, see Overgaard (2002). Some commentators hold that Husserl’s primordial reduction is nonetheless somewhat Cartesian in character, since it provides a means by which to give
rather, it starts with the concrete experience of the Other as a “transcendental clue,” and proceeds to understand the genuine manner of the Other’s givenness. The central questions are, therefore, how the Other exists for me and how its co-constitutive functions affect me. Only by properly understanding the how of the Other’s existence do we gain firm ground to analyze its what, namely its constitution, i.e., it is only after in-depth consideration of the above questions that we can proceed to analyze the Other’s manifestation according to how he or she primordially appears. To paraphrase Overgaard (2004, p. 36): the fact that we encounter someone else in our surrounding world does not necessarily entail that we already understand how we empathize with him or her, much less that we grasp how the co-constitutive functions of the Other, as another embodied subject for him- or herself, have already been executed prior to our egoic activity. Thus, the constitutional problem of the Other in its due sense is to understand the Other’s “active constituting intentionality” (Hua 1/124[92]). With these clarifications in hand, we can further explore the nature and scope of the primordial reduction and flesh out its fundamental existential motivation. This line of pursuit, as we shall see shortly, will readily bring into sight the ethical dimension of both Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and primordial reduction, in particular.

2. Husserl on the transcendental and primordial reductions

2.1 Husserl on the transcendental reduction

As we have made explicit, Husserl’s approach to the Other starts with concrete empathic experience and investigates the way in which the Other primordially appears in conscious life. This assessment immediately poses a series of questions. First of all, in what sense is the transcendental approach different from a, say, psychological approach to the Other? Isn’t it the case that cognitive science better studies how the mirror neuron system works when one perceives other people’s actions (Cf. Gallese, 2001, 2003, 2010)? If cognitive science can, at the end of the day, account for the multi-facets of human interaction, then what secures transcendental phenomenology
as a *sui generis* scientific investigation? If the transcendental theory of empathy is not first concerned with the underlying psychological mechanism that enables us to perceive others, then what serves to differentiate the transcendental approach from the psychological one? As Husserl sees it, we need to perform an artificial abstraction from, or restriction of, our natural assumptions of other people, so that we can “transform,” or render the concrete experience of the Other into the “guiding clue” of a transcendentally purified investigation (Hua 1/122, 6/187). It is in this regard that Husserl introduces the method of transcendental and, furthermore, primordial reduction,\(^\text{124}\) through which we can address the constitutional problematic of the Other (Hua 6/260). Thus, it is crucial to specify the genuine function and scope of the transcendental and primordial reductions, and to identify the means by which Husserl progresses from the transcendental to the primordial reduction. By doing so, we can also fend off some misunderstandings.

As stated earlier, in my ongoing social life, I am already involved with the others in one way or another. For instance, I am a member of a social community, a bearer of a specific cultural and historical heritage. Even when I come across a complete stranger, I already perceive him or her in a meaningful way, within a meaningful context, according to which, for instance, I (mis-)identify him or her as coming from a certain ethnic background. In short, my experience of others takes place within a context of cultural and historical sedimentations, constituent factors of my personal habitus, which comprises, among other features, possible theoretical knowledge of other minds. The personal, cultural, and scientific knowledge of others surely eases our everyday social interaction and is thereby, in a sense, tone of the most important components of our social life. However, on Husserl’s account, it is precisely such theoretical constructs that lead to the naïve and dogmatic comprehension of others that we need to suspend, so as to begin a phenomenological investigation of our subjective experience of other people in the first place. In Husserl’s words, we need to “search for, with upmost care, the prejudicelessness

\(^{124}\) In the current context, I shall not go into detail about the difference between Husserl’s use of the *epoché* and that of reduction, but will simply take them as synonymous, because differentiating between the two does not impact the overall argument in this chapter. For a careful analysis of the function and scope of the *epoché* and reduction, see Overgaard (2004), chapter 2. I will also not go into detail about the various types of reduction Husserl considers within the body of his work; for the latter, see Kern (1962), Drummond (1975), and Zahavi (2003), chapter 2.
[Vorurteilslosigkeit] and to keep our undertaking free of alien interferences” (Hua 1/137[134]), so that we can arrive at the “self-evidence” of our original intuition of other people. Put differently, our analysis should not presuppose nor be led by any pre-understanding or prejudice regarding the Other’s existence. Instead, we should stick to our intuitive experience that precedes and lays the ground for natural scientific researches. We should, in short, refrain from making use of unjustified dogmatic opinions of the issue at stake, so as to survey as originally as possible how the Other manifests itself in conscious life. Such an abstraction from our dogmatic opinions is, in Husserl’s eyes, “a withholding of natural, naïve validities and in general of validities already in effect” (Hua 6/138[135]).

This abstraction from all scientific and pre-scientific positing of the Other, however, does not entail an “exclusion” [Ausschaltung] of the Other (or the world in general), even though some of Husserl’s formulations seem to suggest the contrary (Hua 1/126[94], 134[104], 171[145], et passim). More precisely, the systematic dismissal of the natural dogmatism concerning the Other’s existence, once properly understood, does not mean that all scientific and pre-scientific achievements are “given up” or swept away in favor of a purified sphere of subjective immanence in the Cartesian sense (Cf. Hua 1/59[19], 6/139[136]). As Husserl constantly insists, the suspended achievements remain intact and continue to be operative in the natural life; and the philosophizing phenomenologist can at any time, with an “enlightened” apprehension, get back to the natural life and make use of these achievements (Hua 6/214[220]). However, they must be temporally put in “parenthesis” so that what is at stake – the how of the Other’s manifestation – can be thematized in the first place (Hua 3/159). In other words, the performance of the transcendental reduction does not lose anything, nor does it impair anything; on the contrary, it considers the Other as he or she originally appears, thereby opening up a new dimension of theoretical interest (Hua 6/139[136], 147[144]). As Husserl sees it, the reduction results in a transcendental attitude, “according to which everything previously existing for us in straightforward consciousness is taken exclusively as ‘phenomenon,’ as a sense meant and undergoing verification, purely in the manner in which, as correlate of uncoverable constitutive systems, it has gained and is gaining ontic sense [Seinssinn].”
Thanks to the transcendental reduction, whereby we suspend the naïve acceptance of the validity [Seinsgeltung] of the Other’s existence (ibid.), the Other as such becomes a genuine theme for transcendental inquiry.

An immediate outcome of transcendental reduction, as indicated, is the significant finding that the Other, despite all her practical and theoretical predicates, becomes the intentional correlate of various acts, such as perception, recollection, imagination, valuation, judgment, and so forth. “What I acquire by it [reduction] is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of ‘phenomena’ in the (particular and also the wider) phenomenological sense” (Hua 1/60[20-1]). Hence, the transcendental thematization of the Other, as it were, amounts to a systematic clarification of the Other in intentional correlation to the experiencing subject. By means of such reduction, wherein one “traces back” [zurückziehen] from the naïve acceptance of the Other’s existence to the founding experience of the Other, we find the ultimate source of the meaning and legitimacy of the Other’s existence (or of the world, in general) (Hua 6, §35, p.135ff, 6/143[140] 1/65[28]). The Other as appearing phenomenon is, in this sense, precisely that which “makes possible whatever has for me sense and validity as ‘true’ being – definitively decided or definitivelydecidable being” (Hua 1/59[19]). In other words, through the gate of the transcendental reduction, we are now in “the new world of pure subjectivity” (Hua 3/260), wherein the Other originally appears. To be noted, even though the transcendental reduction dispels the naïve acceptance of the Other’s existence and transforms the Other into an intentional correlate of the experiencing subject, this does not mean that the Other thus becomes an intrinsic element of egoic life. Nor does the reduction mean that the transcendence of the Other is reduced to egoic immanence.

125 See the original, “die transzendentale Einstellung ist ja immer und bleibt vorausgesetzt, der gemäß alles vordem geradehin für uns Seiende ausschließlich als Phänomen, als vermeinter und sich bewährender Sinn genommen wird, rein wie es als Korrelat der zu enthüllenden konstitutiven Systeme für uns Seinssinn gewonnen hat und gewinnt.”

126 See also, e.g., “imperturbably I must hold fast onto the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me – in respect of its ‘what’ and its ‘it exists and actually is’ – is a sense in and arising from my intentional life, becoming clarified and uncovered for me in consequence of my life’s constitutive syntheses, in systems of harmonious verification” (Hua 1/123[91]).
so much so that the alterity of the Other is reduced to the ipseity of the ego. On the contrary, the purpose of the transcendental reduction is precisely to investigate the sense in which the Other is a unique transcendent being and, furthermore, the sense in which the Other’s transcendence is different from that of other physical entities (Hua 8/483; cf. 1/65[28], and chapter 3.2.3). It is by means of exploring the pure conscious life that I, the philosophizing ego, can explicate the transcendent sense of the Other’s “being there for me,” the genuine cogitatum of my empathic cogito. As Husserl frequently reiterates, when the transcendental reduction is correctly performed, the Other “becomes a first intentional heading, an index or guideline for inquiring back into the multiplicity of manners of appearing and their intentional structures” (Hua 6/175[172]; cf. Hua 1/122, 6/187).

It should be emphasized that, even if the Other becomes an intentional correlate of the empathic act, this is not as trivial as to say that the Other is an empathic object. One may wonder, isn’t it obvious that the colleague I am speaking with is my colleague, the desk I am standing by is to my left or right, and so forth? Why do we take intentional correlation so seriously that we make it the point of entry for transcendental inquiry? Since we are already acquainted with the Other as a foreign subject, why do we need such empty and formal correlation? After all, the entirety of our lived experience of the Other already constitutes some kind of intentional relation. We do not need a transcendental reduction in order to “discover” this intentional relation, as if it were not there prior to such transcendental exploration. The utmost importance of analyzing this correlation, as Husserl points out, consists in uncovering the previously non-thematized and, thus, hidden accomplishments of conscious life (Hua 6/118[116]). “When the reduction comes into play, the anonymous achievement of acceptance and validity hitherto concealed in a functioning naivété is revealed” (Zahavi, 2001, p.9; cf. Hart, 1992, p.7). As I have demonstrated, a concrete analysis of the empathic act, together with other analyses of imagery and signitive intentionality, critically illuminates the fact that, unlike straightforward spatial perception, empathic intentionality is bi-directional in nature.

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127 This is a particularly Levinasian critique of Husserl’s theory of the transcendental reduction. See, for instance, “their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor” (TI, p.33)
In this sense, the transcendental reduction is, once properly performed, a method of explicating something that has always been operative and functioning in conscious life, yet something that has not been noticed or thematized in the ongoing natural attitude. Without strictly grasping the correlational nature of the Other’s givenness, there would be no occasion for shifting one’s point of interest from the naiveté that characterizes our dogmatic comprehension of the Other to the “enlightened” waking life. Thus, as Husserl sees it, intentional correlation – “the formal and most general structure” that relates the ego to the Other (Hua 6/145[142]) – is far beyond an empty characterization (Hua 1/60[20]), but is something that paves the way for a new direction of research, i.e., it renders phenomenologically understandable the ontic sense of the Other as an alter ego.

To briefly summarize, the transcendental reduction serves two purposes within transcendental inquiry. First, it systematically abstains from practically or theoretically accepting the Other. To repeat, this abstention by no means entails that the Other consequently drops out of the picture of the transcendental sphere; the abstention, properly understood, is nothing but a “calling into question” or “inhibiting” naïve prejudice and dogmatism with regard to the Other (Hua 1/60[20]). The Other, as it were, is never lost but is retained as an intentional correlate of the empathic cogito (Hua 1/123[93]). Second, the transcendental reduction results in a realm of pure subjectivity, to which the Other originally appears in her genuine manner of givenness; and the Other is, in this sense, experienced as an intentional phenomenon (Cf. Hua 6/156[153]). This does not mean, however, that the Other is reduced to a mere phenomenon, as if there were an Other-in-herself that we could search for behind that phenomenon (Cf. Hua 1/122[90]). Phenomenologically speaking, it is countersensical to postulate a noumenon that is intentionally unattainable. Everything that appears is that which manifests as a phenomenon in conscious life – as Husserl famously puts it, “soviel Schein, soviel Sein” (Hua 1/133, 15/451). By means of the transcendental reduction, we can explicate the sense validity of such manifest phenomenon, i.e., we can provide an account of the Other as it is given in conscious life.

2.2 Husserl on the primordial reduction

At this point, let us clarify the nature of the primordial reduction, which is, according to Husserl, a radicalization of the transcendental reduction (Hua 1/124[93],
126[95], 15/6, 6/187[183]). That is, only after carrying out the transcendental reduction, and thus being “inside the universal transcendental sphere”, can we see exactly the function and scope of the primordial reduction (ibid.). Although some commentators hold that the primordial reduction is nothing but a continuation and further development of the transcendental reduction (Haney, 1994, p. 29; Theunissen, 1986, p. 57ff), what the primordial reduction is supposed to “call into question,” and what it is meant to open up, as I will argue, is substantially different from what the transcendental reduction does. Husserl occasionally states that the primordial reduction overlaps with the transcendental reduction in that both reductions lead to a realm of apodicticity, so that the phenomenological enterprise can be secured as a rigorously justified research endeavor (Cf. Overgaard, 2002, p.214-15). Nonetheless, it would be a serious mistake to conflate both reductions. Hence, we should carefully differentiate the primordial from the transcendental reduction; in doing so, we can also further dissect the existential motivation underlying the primordial reduction.

To begin with, the transcendental reduction suspends the naïve tendency to take the Other’s existence for granted in such a way that the Other comes to be presented to pure subjectivity. As stated earlier, a transcendental theory of the Other amounts to the systematic examination of the subjective life where the Other originally appears. This is only the first step, because the disclosure of pure subjectivity requires further scrutiny. As Husserl realizes in Crisis, the transcendental reduction reveals a transcendental ego, an ego that is by no means empty or without any content. On the contrary, it is the concretization of streaming conscious life, “each ‘I’ is considered purely as the ego-pole of his acts, habitualities, and capacities and thence as being directed at what appears in ontic certainty ‘through’ the appearances, [through] the manners of givenness of the latter” (Hua 6/187[184]). To put it another way, my intentional directed-ness at the Other is always carried out within a cluster of intentional accomplishments and acquisitions (ibid.), which either actively or passively are somehow already infused into, and “contaminate,” such directed-ness. This is not to say that the correlation as such is contaminated or, better, distorted by egoic activity. Rather, the point is that, insofar as the Other is supposed to be a reduced phenomenon, it turns out that, upon closer look, the ego has already conferred meaning upon, and thereby determined, it to such an extent that what is supposed to be brought to light in constitutional analysis is already constituted by the
ego. Insofar as the ego implicitly confers meaning upon, and determine, the Other, its
givenness can never be sufficiently primordial. A radical explication of the Other’s
appearance, in the strictest sense, should analyze her appearance according only to the
way she primordially appears. Hence, the primordial reduction should “neutralize,” or
suspend, any egoic activity in the first place. This pinpoints what is really at stake in
the primordial reduction – the intentional directed-ness at the Other, which affects the
way in which the Other appears, and which should be “put into question” in respect to
the primordiality of the Other’s givenness. As Husserl puts it, the Other “doch nicht
bloße Vorstellung und Vorgestelltes in mir sind, synthetische Einheiten möglichen
Bewährung in mir, sondern sinngemäß eben Andere” (Hua 1/121; my italics). It is
equally true that all the Other’s constitutive effectuations must also be put into
question, since they are precisely what we aim to clarify. Failure to do so would
otherwise lead to a vicious circular in that, as Overgaard (2002, p.213, 218) points out,
our transcendental explication of the Other’s co-constitutive functions would thus be
biting its own tail by simply accepting or presupposing the very constitutive
effectuations we are seeking to clarify.

To reiterate, what we intend to explicate is how the Other originally appears
precisely as a foreign subject, a peculiar appearance that antedates any kind of egoic
activity. Thus, the task of understanding the Other’s co-constitutive functions amounts
to phenomenologically working out what is primordially intended and how it is
primordially intended in empathic experience. As Husserl realizes, “further regressive
inquiries” (Hua 6/187[184]) regarding the transcendentally reduced sphere show that
egoic activity has already been infused into, and impacts, the Other’s “thereness-for-
me.” Therefore, what a radical philosophical inquiry should call into question is
precisely such egoic activity in the first place. This is what Husserl reminds us of
when he asks,

“wie mein ego innerhalb seiner Eigenheit unter dem Titel „Fremderfahrung“ eben Fremdes konstituieren kann – also mit einem Sinne, der das Konstituierte von dem konkreten Bestande des sinnkonstituerenden konkreten Ich-selbst ausschließt, irgendwie als sein Analogon?” (Hua 1/126; italics altered)
As the above quotation indicates, Husserl clearly distinguishes between the ego’s constitutive acts and what is constituted therein, and he holds that the outcome of such acts should be “put in check” in the first place, so far as the genuine sense of the Other is concerned. That is, the phenomenologist should put egoic activity on hold, so as to radically interrogate empathic experience, wherein the Other primordially appears as an alter ego.

The last observation is of peculiar importance, because it makes clear that what the primordial reduction puts into question is the ego’s own intentional activity. Accordingly, it is now rather plain that the primordial reduction is a more difficult methodic operation to undertake than the transcendental reduction. Whereas the transcendental reduction inhibits any natural dogmatism concerning the Other’s existence “at one stroke,” the primordial reduction has to proceed in a more tortuous way so as to reach the realm where the Other’s initial or “primordial” appearance precedes egoic activity. To this end, Husserl thinks that we need to “block” all intentionality that is directed at the Other. As he puts it,

“wir schalten alles jetzt Fragliche vorerst aus dem thematischen Felde aus, das ist, wir sehen von allen konstitutiven Leistungen der auf fremde Subjektivität unmittelbar oder mittelbar bezogenen Intentionalität ab und umgrenzen zunächst den Gesamtzusammenhang derjenigen Intentionalität, der aktuellen und potentiellen, in der sich das ego in seiner Eigenheit konstituiert und in der es von ihr unabtrennbare, also selbst ihrer Eigenheit zuzurechnende synthetische Einheit konstituiert” (Hua 1/124, 15/6).

This statement requires further qualification. First, depending on how one translates the term, “Leistung,” the primordial reduction can be interpreted in two different directions. Normally, Leistung in Husserl means “establishment,” or “accomplishment,” namely, the ego’s intentional performance, the outcome of which is a kind of “effect,” or “output.” Many commentators follow Dorion Cairns’ English translation 128 and stress the latter point by rendering Leistung as “effect.” In this

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128 See the following full quotation from Cairns’ translation: “as regards method, a prime requirement for proceeding correctly here is that first of all we carry out, inside the universal transcendental sphere,
regard, what is primordially suspended is the constituted result, i.e., the intentional reference to the Other. In light of the previous analysis, however, it seems more appropriate to suggest that Husserl actually stresses the first point; that is, Leistung refers to the ego’s intentional performance, or constituting activity. Accordingly, what we need to put into question, contra the first interpretation, is the ego’s own intentional performance.

Second, it follows from the first point that what is rendered “problematic” in the transcendental realm is the ego’s “constitutive activity” insofar as it is directed at the Other – namely, insofar as the ego’s intentional performance and acquisitions are already infused into, and “contaminate,” the ego’s intentional directed-ness at the Other. This peculiar [eigentümliche] reduction (Hua 1/124), to be sure, is not simply a suspension of “the naïve acceptance of the being validity [Seinsgeltung] of the Other, as in the case of all objective things naïvely and simply existing for us in straightforward consciousness” (Hua 1/126). It is performed at a different level: the transcendental reduction, as stated earlier, already “suspended” the naïve position toward the Other; by contrast, the primordial reduction is effected upon the ego’s own empathic activities. The result is obviously a tentatively solipsistic sphere inasmuch as the primordial reduction leads the transcendental ego into a sphere of purified ownness [Eigenheit], a realm in which “I alone remain” (Hua 1/125[93]), and in contrast to which there is a realm of pure foreignness [mir Fremdes] (Hua 1/135[105]).

The last point is crucial for Husserl’s transcendental project. Husserl does not mean to do away with the Other once and for all in favor of securing an ultimately undoubttable stratum of knowledge. On the contrary, Husserl works as an archeologist and “digs” into the ego’s primordial experience of the Other; to this end, he needs to first of all artificially suspend the ego’s own active and passive acts (Hua 14/82), so as to gain a pure experience of how the Other as a foreign subjectivity initially

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129 For this line of interpretation, see, e.g., Zahavi (2001), Overgaard (2002), and Crowell (2012).
The reduction to primordial interiority, in this sense, is intrinsically twofold in orientation: on the one hand, it is a clarification of the primordial self-constitution of the transcendental ego, an *Umgrenzung* of the entirety of transcendental subjectivity; on the other hand, and seen conversely, it is a clarification of the primordial constitution of the *first* transcendental Other (Hua 1/131[100], 137[107], 8/495, n.2), an *Umgrenzung* of the realm pertaining to the Other in the proper sense. Husserl indicates this point in a manuscript written in 1921:

> „wir können auch sagen: es handelt sich um die Klärung der Selbstapperzeption, die in der solipsistischen Inneneinstellung motiviert ist und möglich ist vor der Einfühlung, anderseits der Apperzeption nach der Einfühlung“ (Hua 14/81).

That is, both orientations go hand in hand with each other: the clarification of self-apperception illuminates the “site” of the Other’s originally appearance, whereas the clarification of empathic apperception dissects the extent to which the Other co-constitutes or “mundanizes” the ego’s conscious life. Thus, it is a mistake to overstress the *solipsistic* aspect alone and overlook the *transcendental* aspect of the primordial reduction. As Husserl explicitly highlights, it is only through a radicalized form of reduction that we can phenomenologically make sense of “the intrinsically first Other” (Hua 1/131[100]), whose genuine transcendence is substantially distinctive from the transcendence of other spatial-temporal entities (Hua 8/483). To be sure, both the solipsistic and transcendental aspects of the primordial reduction are so essentially intertwined that the clarification of the latter necessarily presupposes the former, and a clarification of the former lays the ground for the latter. In Husserl’s words, by means of the primordial reduction, we gain “a founding stratum” (Hua 1/127[96]), “an essential structure of the universal constitution” (Hua 1/125[93]), in

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and through which the transcendent ego can constitute, at the most primordial level, “the Other in the mode of alter ego” (Hua 1/131). In this regard, it is fair to suggest that it is precisely because Husserl notices the complexity of the constitution of the Other that he painstakingly proposes this difficult yet indispensable “intersubjective” reduction (Zahavi, 1997, p. 306; n.1). In Husserl’s view, there is no easy solution to the problem of the Other’s alterity, if we try to do justice to the issue at stake, without naïvely or dogmatically taking the Other’s alterity for granted.

Bearing these insights in mind, let us further determine what is opened up by the primordial reduction. The first result is obvious: the primordial reduction distinguishes one’s own genuine sphere from that of the Other. In Husserl’s words, “restricting ourselves to the ultimate transcendent ego and the universe of what is constituted in him, we can say that a division of his whole transcendent field of experience belongs to him immediately, namely the division into the sphere of his ownness – with the coherent stratum consisting in his experience of a world reduced to what is included in his ownness (an experience in which everything ‘other’ is ‘screened off’) – and the sphere of what is ‘other’” (Hua 1/131[100]; my italics).131

This distinction is important, not because it opens a solipsistic, self-confined world, but rather because it provides the first possibility for pure and simple self- and, correlatively, other-experience. As Husserl stresses in the early 1920s (Cf. Hua 14, Beilage VIII), the most important thing that is “singled out” by such a solipsistic reduction is that “sowie wir die intentionalen Leistung der Einfühlung, der Fremderfahrung außer Betracht halten, haben wir eine Natur und eine Leiblichkeit” (Hua 1/134, 1/127-29; cf. Hua 15/445). This is not to say that we now have a solipsistic world, in which I alone exist. The point would rather be that the solipsistic reduction unfolds an experiential layer wherein the ego most originally experiences the world, without the effect of the Other’s co-constitutive functions. The upshot of this “original self-experience” (Hua 1/133[103]) is that I, the solipsistic ego, “govern and hold sway” over a lived body, in and through which I somatically perceive the world as primordially reduced, namely as it stands without any reference to other subjectivities. To repeat a bit of what has already been said, I am the center of

131 See a similar point in Levinas: “being is produced as multiple and as split into same and other; this is its ultimate structure” (TI, 269).
orientation and the ego-pole of affection: “wenn ich andere Menschen eigenheitlich reduziere, so gewinne ich eigenheitliche Körper, wenn ich mich reduziere als Menschen, so gewinne ich meinen Leib und meine Seele, oder mich als psychophysische Einheit, in ihr mein personales Ich, das in diesem Leib und mittelst seiner in der Außenwelt wirkt, von ihr leidet, und so überhaupt vermöge der beständigen Erfahrung solcher einzigartigen Ichbezogenheiten und Lebensbezogenheiten mit dem körperlichen Leib psychophysisch einig konstituiert ist” (Hua 1/128, 15/49). With this self-explication (Hua 1/135[102-03]), we can exactly identify what does not belong to the genuinely egoic sphere, or what belongs to the genuinely foreign sphere. In Husserl’s words, only in contrast with originaliter self-experience can we come to see what originaliter Other-experience looks like (Hua 1/135). More precisely, in contrast with my being the center of orientation and the ego-pole of affection, the genuinely alter ego can accordingly be characterized as a kind of “analogue” in the proper sense (Hua 125[94]), i.e., as another center of orientation and another ego-pole of affection. As we shall see shortly, this definition is by no means a trivial one. For now, it is enough to stress that, according to Husserl, although we live in an inextricably intersubjective world, in the context of the natural attitude of the life-world, we nonetheless do not truly understand the genuine sense of the Other as a foreign subjectivity, nor the genuine kind of intentionality directed at the Other. “Es ist nun das Problem, wie es zu verstehen ist, daß das ego solche neuartige Intentionalitäten in sich hat und immer neu bilden kann mit einem Seinsinn, durch den es sein eigenes Sein ganz und gar transzendiert” (Hua 1/135; italics altered). And such an understanding, in Husserl’s opinion, has to be in “contrast with the self-experience and the system of its harmoniousness – therefore [in contrast with] the self-explication of genuine ownness” (ibid.).

The above distinction between one’s own genuine sphere and that of the Other leads us to the second consequence of the primordial reduction, namely, that it differentiates one’s own constitutive functions from those of the Other. The previous conclusion that the Other should be defined as an analogue of, or an alter ego to, the transcendental ego, seems to imply that the Other’s alterity is derived from and is in accordance with the ego’s ipseity and, while it would seem that, insofar as this is the case, the genuine character of alterity is thus jeopardized by or even sacrificed to such
ipseity, this assessment is apparently mistaken. As pointed out in section 1, the main objective of the primordial reduction is to investigate the co-constitutive functions of the Other’s alterity, namely to make sense of such alterity. In Husserl’s words, it is to investigate the way of “wie Fremdes sinnmitbestimmend auftritt” (Hua 1/97, my italics). Along with the distinction between one’s own genuine sphere and the foreign sphere, we can see exactly, in contrast with egoic constitution, what the Other’s co-constitutive functions consist in. More specifically, the primordial explication of one’s own corporeality, and its operative functions accounts for the sense in which the Other’s body exists as another functioning body. In view of Husserl’s static analysis, it is a foreign center of orientation in that it decentralizes the ego. Whereas in view of Husserl’s genetic analysis, the Other’s corporeal presence primally exerts an affective allure that calls one to action, insofar as the Other’s affective, or addressive, force initially triggers one’s intentional response. As Husserl summarizes in a manuscript written in 1929,

“der Andere, den ich von meinem primordialen Sein her in Einfühlung, also in der bekundenden Vergegenwärtigung erfahre, ist für mich anderes Ich, ist so wie ich Subjekt für diese Welt, diese selbe, zu der ich als Konstitutierender Beziehung habe, er ist von mir als Konstituierender erfahren” (Hua 15/42; my italics).

To briefly conclude, we have accounted for the transcendental functions of the primordial reduction. First, it calls egoic activity into question so as to understand the Other’s primal co-constitution; second, it distinguishes two intrinsically intertwined aspects from each other, that is, the primordial egoic sphere and the equal-primordial foreign sphere. As Husserl sees it, we need to strictly differentiate between self-experience and other-experience, between ownness and otherness, so that we can precisely understand the transcendental sense of what it means for the Other to be a

132 For an examination of and response to this line of critique, see Tengelyi (2012).

133 To be noted, despite his severe criticisms of Husserl, Levinas agrees with him upon this point, as he explicitly states, “the alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other is other with respect to a term whose essence is to remain at the point of departure, to serve as an entry into the relation, to be the same not relatively but absolutely. A term can remain absolutely at the point of departure of relationship only as I” (TI, p. 36; italics altered).
foreign subjectivity. To quote Husserl: “the intrinsically first other (the first ‘non-
Ego’) is the other Ego. And the other ego makes constitutionally possible a new
infinite domain of what is ‘other’: an Objective Nature and a whole Objective world,
to which all other egos and I myself belong” (Hua 1/137[107]). In short, it is only
through the Other’s co-constitution that I, the transcendental ego, understand myself
as a subject living in the shared social world, that is, as a subject who has a peculiar
perspective upon the world, and who bears the responsibility of responding to the
Other. The primordial reduction, on this account, methodically clears the ground for a
radical explication of the Other’s co-constitutive functions. In other words, such a
radical reduction reveals the fact that, at the most basic level of intentional life, the
Other cannot be done away with. As Husserl rhetorically states,

“phenomenology […] encompasses in a certain sense all that it has
carefully excluded; it encompasses all cognition, all of the sciences, and,
with respect to objectivity, all objectivities, even the whole of nature.
Phenomenology, of course, excludes the actuality of nature, the actuality
of heaven and earth, of men and beasts, of one’s own ego and the egos of
others; but it retains, so to speak, their soul, their sense” (Hua
10/335[347]).

But what is the phenomenological “sense” of the Other’s alterity, or what do the
Other’s co-constitutive functions amount to at the most primordial level of
intersubjective experience? To be sure, the primordial reduction is a radicalized
investigation into the ego’s experience of the Other, a radicalized examination of the
manner in which the Other primordially appears to the ego’s intentional life. But how
can such an examination be carried out, so as to achieve the required radicality?
Could it be the case that this examination, or self-critique, is conducted simply due to
an egoic interest, e.g., the interest to establish a rigorous science (Cf. Hua 6, §56)?
Indeed, Husserl consistently claims that, insofar as it is fully worked out,
phenomenology is ultimately a phenomenology of intersubjectivity; even when
phenomenology aims at the full-fledged constitution of the objective world and,
ultimately, of universal knowledge (Hua 6/15[17]), the primordial reduction is still, to
be sure, initiated by an interest in alterity in the first place, and is oriented towards
understanding the Other at the highest level.

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Concretely speaking, the primordial reduction is a radical examination of the egoic life to which the Other most originally appears; that is, at the most fundamental level, the primordial reduction is motivated by an existential confrontation with the Other – the foreign subjectivity that existentially alters egoic life, insofar as it affects and decentralizes the ego in and through the interpersonal encounter. Nonetheless, how does such an existential confrontation motivate radical self-examination? And how should we account for such existential motivation? Husserl’s analysis of the primordial reduction inevitably engenders such questions and, while he provides the proper ground for further investigating them, he nevertheless rarely answers them. It is in this regard that, I think, Emmanuel Levinas offers important insights. In Levinas’ view, a radical reduction – a radical self-critique – is not an existential accident, as if it were artificially designed to effect a personal transformation as to lead an apodictic life (Cf. Hua 6/140[137]); rather, its existential significance is deeply rooted in the face-to-face encounter with the Other, and motivated by the Other’s presence – by the Other’s interrogating “gaze.” Let us take up this issue in the next section and explain the existential motivation behind Husserl’s primordial reduction.

3. Alter-ation and “putting into question”

Before getting into the concrete analysis of the above questions, I need to make some preliminary remarks so as to specify the scope of this section. It is well known that Levinas presents what is perhaps the most severe critique of Husserl’s approach to the Other, and many commentators agree with his critique by arguing that Husserl’s phenomenology, and his theory of intentionality in particular, is in nature a kind of objectifying theory, so much so that it cannot capture the Other’s genuine alterity.134 Other commentators, by contrast, hold that there is more commonality than

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134 For further discussion, see Drabinski (2001), "Introduction." Roughly speaking, Drabinski distinguishes between two different ways of reading Levinas’ critique. First, the “supplement” view holds that Husserlian phenomenology is “solely” concerned with consciousness, subjectivity, and intentionality, and has nothing positive to say about the Other, ethics, or moral consciousness, whereas Levinas’ philosophy, by contrast, supplements and deepens Husserl’s phenomenology inasmuch as it offers a deeper appreciation for ethics and justice. Second, the “substitution” view holds that Levinas’ philosophy not only supplements the ethical lacuna in Husserl but also breaks with it, insofar as Levinas’ ethics breaks with the entirety of western ontology, which privileges the same over the Other, totality over alterity, and objectifying intentionality over sensuous intentionality. For a Husserlian critique of Levinas, see, e.g., Römp (1989), Lee (2003), Bernet (2000) and, above all, Derrida’s famous article, “Violence and Metaphysics” (2001, chapter 4).
difference between Husserl and Levinas (Crowell, 2012; Drabinski, 2001; Overgaard, 2003). My main interest here pushes past a mere consideration of the relation between the two thinkers and focuses, rather, on the way in which Husserl’s work sheds light on Levinas’ work and vice versa: Husserl’s primordial reduction delineates the phenomenological context of Levinas’ theory of ethics (Crowell, 2012, p.1), and Levinas’ philosophy, in turn, helps to clarify the existential motivation of the primordial reduction and its ethical import.

With regard to Levinas’ philosophy, I restrict myself to his methodic operation of “putting into question.” This is controversial, however, because Levinas himself never explicitly states that “putting into question” serves his methodic purposes, nor does he systematically address the function and scope of “putting into question” with regard to his philosophy, although he admits that his philosophy “owes everything to the phenomenological method” (TI, p. 28). As I will demonstrate, “putting into question” somehow serves the same function as the primordial reduction does in Husserl, and a systematic analysis of Levinas’ methodic operation will elucidate the ethical implications of the phenomenological method.

3.1 The Other and alter-ation

As stated earlier, Husserl’s analysis of the primordial reduction inevitably gives rise to some further questions. That is, we need to ask what after all motivates such a peculiar reduction. Or, why should we grapple with such a tremendously difficult operation to begin with? For Husserl, the primordial reduction clearly serves an epistemological purpose in that it enables him to clear the ground for a rigorously scientific examination of the way in which the ego’s intentional accomplishments and acquisitions, which “contaminate” the intentional directed-ness at the Other, indispensably affects how the Other appears. Accordingly, a thorough intentional analysis of subjective life can reveal the manner in which the Other originally appears. However, one may wonder, to follow Levinas, whether such an attempt to do justice to the phenomenal appearance of the Other is inherently self-interested. On Husserl’s account, reduction puts in check our natural or straightforward engagement with others, and analyzes the nature of social engagement from the restricted sphere of

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135 For further discussion on this issue, see Peperzak (1998).
egoic life. Hence, the fundamental phenomenological motivation for achieving such pure subjective experience is to explicate how one experiences the Other in one’s own intentional life. The result of such self-explication or -interrogation, to be sure, consists in grounding the sense-validity of the Other in one’s own experience.

As Husserl famously claims in *Crisis*, radical self-explication leads to subjective self-responsibility (Hua 6/200[197]). That is, it results in a radical resolve, or determination, to “shape one’s whole personal life into the synthetic unity of a life of universal self-responsibility and, correlatively, to shape oneself into the true ‘I,’ the free, autonomous ‘I’” (Hua 6/272[338]). It is on the basis of the apodicticity gained by such self-reflection that the ego can claim to be a reasonable and autonomous subject. Husserl believes that only on the basis of such autonomy can we finally establish a community of rational beings (ibid.). In short, as a rigorous science, phenomenology is ultimately grounded in egoic apodicticity; as such, it follows that ethics, or the position that the ego takes toward the Other, is first and foremost rooted in egoic self-reflection, whereby the performance of any good deed done toward the Other, therefore, turns out to be an outcome of one’s own self-interrogation and self-position-taking, namely the result of one’s own desire, *to be a responsible man* (Cf. Hart, 1992, p.27ff). In short, self-reflection precedes, and leads to, actual position-taking towards the Other; self-reflection, in this sense, lays the ground for the ego’s ethical responsibility for the Other.

It is precisely upon this point that Levinas presses Husserl’s theory of the primordial reduction in *Totality and Infinity* (henceforth as “TI”). If we strictly consider the primordial situation in which the radical primordial reduction is put into motion, we cannot help asking: how can the ego radically carry out the sort of self-critique in question? Or, more concretely, how can the ego put his own intentional activity into question, so as to do justice to the Other’s primordial manifestation? Can such a putting into question be performed simply due to the ego’s own interest in explicating the primordial form of his experience of the Other? In other words, can such a reduction be enacted without the presence of the Other? These questions, to be sure, do not mean that Levinas entirely rejects Husserl’s use of the primordial reduction. Levinas has no quarrel with Husserl’s differentiating between one’s own genuine sphere and the foreign sphere, since he himself precisely follows Husserl’s lead when he distinguishes the same from the Other, ipseity from alterity, and “being
at home with oneself” from “the exterior being of the Other” (Cf. Crowell, 2012, p.7). As Levinas admits, “the primordial sphere […] corresponds to what we call the same” (TI, p.67). What Levinas really questions is the role of the Other’s alterity in motivating the primordial reduction. As Drabinski stresses, “this reduction begins the phenomenological accounting for how one awakens to one’s self, in moral consciousness, already possessed and obsessed by the Other. What is the sense and origin of this traumatic awakening? This is Levinas’s most originary phenomenological question” (Drabinski, 2001, p. 8). If we pay close attention to the Other’s motivating facticity, we can immediately see the ethical meaning therein. That is, insofar as its motivating basis is concerned, the primordial reduction can only be registered and initiated by the presence of the Other. As Theunissen points out, “through the Other I am only so far alter-ed that his factual appearance brings about my act of empathy. I would not empathically put myself into the there if there were no Other, if he did not factically exist over there” (Theunissen, 1986, p. 92; my italics). In other words, the Other’s presence (in the sense we have articulated in section 1) not only alters me in empathic experience but also motivates further self-interrogation, i.e., putting oneself into question.

The foregoing analysis gives rise to two theses that demand careful consideration. First and foremost, phenomenology does not comprise a theoretical framework of, say, rational axioms, which are taken to be normative rules for practical life. Instead, it constitutes a sincere attempt to describe and reflect upon our concrete, mundane experience. This also holds true for Levinas: his way of providing a deeper account of phenomenology consists in faithfully working out what a radical examination or Sichbesinnung of that experience entails. As Drabinski writes, “I do not thematize the Other, nor do I thematize myself immanently. Rather, in moral consciousness, I come to myself as already called by the other, already interrupted, already, as Levinas will say in Otherwise than Being, traumatized and obsessed” (Drabinski, 2001, p. 8). Hence, our first task consists in, by means of phenomenological reflection, faithfully describing this manner of “already having been interrupted,” of “already having been altered.” We may even say that the genuine manner of the Other’s givenness precisely lies in the way in which the Other alters the self in the pre-reflective, pre-thematic encounter.
Second, we can now see the facticity that the Other *ipso facto* has already brought me into the world by imposing a foreign perspective upon me. In Levinas’ words, “the notion of the face […] opens other perspectives: it brings us to a notion of meaning prior to my *Sinngebung* and thus independent of my initiative and my power” (TI, p. 51). To paraphrase, I experience the world, and myself, from my own, unique personal perspective. No matter how radically I interrogate this perspectivity, it is, and always will be, my perspectivity, an absolute standpoint that is lived from within. However, this perspectivity is immediately challenged, and brought into relativity, once a foreign perspective comes into being. In Levinas’ view, “the absolute standpoint taken by Husserl’s interrogation of the transcendental ego limits the scope of what appears and therefore how life is rendered to reflection”; for this reason, “we must be attentive to the position taken prior to, within, and subsequent to the passage to the absolute” (Drabinski, 2001, p. 38). In this sense, genuine self-interpellation, or the consideration of one’s own standpoint from an “external” perspective can only be motivated by a foreign standpoint, “an awakening that comes from the Other” (TI, p. 86, 195). Therefore, the motivation behind the primordial reduction lies in problematizing, or putting into question, the very standpoint taken by the reflective ego, and this “putting into question” can only be provoked by the Other’s presence.

As Levinas puts it, “reflection can, to be sure, become aware of this face to face, *but the ‘unnatural’ position of reflection is not an accident in the life of consciousness*. It involves a calling into question of oneself, a critical attitude which is itself produced in the face of the other and under his authority” (TI, p. 81; my italics).

### 3.2 Levinas on “putting into question”

With the last two theses, we can pinpoint the phenomenological context and motivation of Levinas’ account of “putting into question,” and thereby reconsider his account in such a way that specifies the sense in which the primordial reduction, properly understood, is intrinsically ethical.

To begin with, Levinas holds that “putting into question” is a form of self-critique or -explication in that what he tries to disclose is how the subject genuinely understands its very subjectivity, an understanding that is stripped of any dogmatic opinions about that subjectivity. For Husserl, phenomenological self-explication aims to make the conscious life of the world intelligible without making reference to any
naïve practical or scientific presuppositions about such conscious life. Yet, Husserl’s in every other way insightful consideration of such self-explication leaves one central question untouched, i.e., its motivation (Cf. Drabinski, 2001, p. 39). As Levinas stresses, such self-explication cannot be artificially, or accidentally, accounted for: it must be motivated by a certain existential factor, i.e., by something inherent in subjective life. As already stated, self-explication cannot be truly motivated by a self-interest, because the latter is not sufficiently radical to challenge one’s own perspective, to problematize one’s own subjectivity. In Levinas’ words, the genuine form of self-critique

“discovers the dogmatism and naïve arbitrariness of its [egoic] spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology; it then seeks to exercise this freedom in such a way as to turn back at every moment to the origin of the arbitrary dogmatism of this free exercise” (TI, 43).

Indeed, in order for the self-explication, or -reflection, in question to be truly radical and full-fledged, one must question the very standpoint from which one undertakes such an endeavor in the first place; furthermore, the motivation behind this questioning, or self-interpellation, can neither be rooted in oneself, nor lie within the context of the “same,” in Levinas’ terminology, but must be actuated by a foreign perspective – the Other’s gaze upon “me.” “The critique […] calls into question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same – is brought about by the other” (ibid.). But then questions immediately arise, e.g., how does the Other bring the same into question? And what is precisely questioned by the Other, the same as a whole or some naïve conception of the same? Furthermore, what are the implications of such questioning or interpellating from the Other?

According to Levinas, the motivating Other is by no means a postulated alterity, an extramundane being that we can never come across in our ordinary life, although his semi-theological language does give rise to the impression that the Other in Levinas amounts to, for instance, God. For Levinas, the Other is another concrete human being, e.g., an orphan, a widow, or any other person, whom we meet in the street, in the city square, or in the train station, for instance. What is of essential
primacy in Levinas’ work is “the relationship of man to man – signification, teaching, and justice – a primacy of an irreducible structure upon which all the other structures rest” (TI, p.79). What Levinas emphasizes is of course not the trivial point that we encounter other people in our day to day lives; rather, the philosophical question Levinas raises is how the ordinary face-to-face encounter constitutes one’s self-consciousness, and one’s ethical self-interpellation, in particular. The Other’s face, to be sure, addresses me and, as such, the Other is not just another person that stands by my side (TI, p.80), another inconsequential ‘someone’ who is replaceable by anyone else. As Levinas sees it, the Other looks at me, and the gaze itself supplicates, or demands, a response (TI, p.75). That is, the fact that the face has turned to me is a superincumbent phenomenon that I, as the addressee, cannot turn away from. Even though the face may not have explicitly or linguistically communicated anything, the addressing as such constitutes a facticity par excellence. It invites, or even requires, ‘my’ response in whatever form; and this invitation or requirement is something that I cannot do away with – I am inherently bound to take up a position, once I am addressed by the Other’s very presence (Cf. TI, p75). Even if I evade, and thereby turn down, the Other’s innocent gaze, such evasion already constitutes a primal form of recognition, i.e., the Other’s appeal must be answered and I am the one who should do the answering. As Levinas later on argues in Otherwise than Being, the Other’s gaze poses a kind of “inversion of intentionality,” which both arrests the ego’s spontaneous movement of subjectivity, and suspends its naïve convictions, or position-taking, with respect to the Other (TI, p.63; cf. OB, p.47). In short, the Other causes the ego to reflect upon its own being, and puts the ego’s subjectivity into question by inviting the ego to respond.

In this regard, we can further explore the existential sense of “putting into question.” For Levinas, the very characteristic of being an ego consists in egoic freedom, just as intentionality is the defining characteristic of conscious life in Husserl. Like the transcendental functions of Husserl’s primordial reduction, Levinas holds that what is put into question is the naïve conception of egoic freedom, according to which subjectivity consists in acting freely and arbitrarily, and subjective spontaneity consists in acting in accordance with one’s own will. Accordingly, what is rendered problematic by the Other’s face is, above all, this egoic freedom, or the ego’s own standpoint. In other words, the ego’s free disposition is now impeded,
insofar that exceptional presence “marks the end of powers” (TI, p.87), by placing demands on the ego, such as “thou shall not commit murder.” The Other’s gaze, in this sense, does not amount to an obstacle for egoic freedom, as if it were something to be overcome at the end of the day (Cf. TI, p.84). On the contrary, the supplicating gaze is something that I, as the addressee, cannot bypass or ignore. Its nakedness upsets me: it calls into question the unjustified status of my freedom and, in this sense, makes my freedom feel shame insofar as its existence is unjustified (TI, p.86). However, this does not mean that what is questioned is egoic freedom and subjectivity as a whole. As a principle of philosophical inquiry, putting into question is not a negation of the same in favor of the Other, nor a negation of interiority in favor of transcendent exteriority. As Levinas explicitly states, this is simply not the case, because “alterity is possible only starting from me” (TI, p.40; original italics), an ego that is capable of responding, welcoming, and, most importantly, taking up ethical responsibility for the Other. Then what is put into question precisely?

Throughout Totality and Infinity, Levinas consistently indicates that the most important objective of his approach consists in challenging the naïve conception and conviction that takes freedom to be both the sui generis form of rationality and, furthermore, the ultimate ground of autonomous subjectivity. The Other with her supplicating gaze “calls in question the naïve right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being” (TI, p.84; cf. 43, 86, 171, 303) and, by doing so, illuminates “the unjustified facticity of power and freedom” (TI, p.84). In this sense, the Other’s presence calls me into execute a sort of self-critique of my own freedom or, in Husserlian terms, it problematizes the ego’s own subjective standpoint and intentional activity enacted therein. As Levinas argues, self-critique serves to truly defend the genuine sense of subjectivity (TI, p.26), insofar as it brings subjectivity to its full concretization by “trac[ing] freedom back to what lies before it [and] disclos[ing] the investiture that liberates freedom from the arbitrary” (TI, p.84-5; cf. p.86, 89).

Like Husserl’s primordial reduction, Levinas’ putting into question is not solely a suspension of egoic freedom. More importantly, the self-critique of egoic freedom, according to Levinas, justifies freedom. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas distinguishes between two sorts of justice. According to its traditional and political conception, justice is understood as that which “ensure[s] the most complete exercise
of spontaneity by reconciling my freedom with the freedom of the others” (TI, p.83). To be just, therefore, is to take up a normative position within, and according to, a rational system that guides individual acts. In this sense, to question one’s own standpoint is nothing other than to question the failure to take up one’s appropriate responsibility according to that rational system. The problem with this view lies in the fact that such a justice system does not investigate “the undiscovered value of spontaneity” (ibid.). It simply assumes that human beings are born rational and that this rationality, to be sure, is paramount to “the reflection of a universal order which maintains itself and justifies itself all by itself” (TI, p.87). However, the undiscovered statues of egoic spontaneity is, philosophically speaking, precisely that which is problematic and needs to be clarified. How can the justice derived from within egoic spontaneity be justified by such spontaneity itself? Would not this form of justice, no matter how promising it seems to be, turn out to be deceptive, insofar as it cannot be justified by unexamined freedom? Levinas believes that this is the case. To be just to others cannot simply be derived from one’s own freedom; the face of the Other, along with its supplicating and demanding gaze, by contrast, discloses “the unjustified facticity of power and freedom” (TI, p.84) and questions the very standpoint the ego takes towards the Other. In this sense, egoic freedom is neither comprised of the unreflected upon arbitrary nature of an isolated being nor the blind obedience to a rational and universal law. Instead, “my arbitrary freedom reads its shame in the eyes that look at me” (TI, p. 252). As Levinas argues, “morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent” (ibid.); and to question one’s own freedom is the only way of bringing that freedom to justice. Like Husserl (Cf. Hua 6/193[189]), for Levinas, the essence of reason does not consist in securing an objective foundation of knowledge for man, but in calling the ego’s standpoint into question and in inviting him to justice (Cf. TI, p.88).

Furthermore, to justify one’s own freedom does not amount to investigating one’s being so as to either complete the exercise of spontaneity, by reconciling my freedom with that of others, or to resume the privilege of egoic freedom. The upshot of Levinas’ insight is that such self-critique ultimately results in “submitting oneself to an exigency, to a morality” (ibid.). That is, the Other’s questioning gaze causes the ego to attend to the Other’s presence, to respond to the Other’s appeal (TI, p.253). However, this response should not be confused with the ego’s possible “benevolence,”
or any “good intentions” the ego might have (TI, p.225), because such acts of good will would stem, after all, from the ego’s free will, or unjustified spontaneity, and could, furthermore, ultimately be traced back to a primal intention to be a good man. This is obviously not the case in responding to the Other’s innocent gaze: genuine good consists in the exigency of taking up the responsibility that such alterity requires; and, in the face of the Other, I am the irreplaceable answerer, who responds with, “Here I am” (Cf. TI, p.63). As Levinas explains, in the Other’s addressing gaze, “the will is free to assume this responsibility in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse this responsibility itself; it is not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of the Other has introduced it” (TI, p.218-19). As Levinas further argues in Other than Being, this sort of attending, to be sure, constitutes one’s own ethical singularity: it is I who must answer, it is I who must respond, in that very moment of being addressed. That is, I am in an irreplaceable position of taking up the Other’s appeal, and this irreplaceability of answering individuates the ethical ego. “It is my responsibility before the face looking at me” (TI, 214; my italics). The appeal of the Other’s face, to which I respond, makes me realize the most original sense of what it means to exist with others; that is, in being exposed to the Other’s supplicating gaze, I am bound with the urgency of responding and experience the acute nature of the ethical situation. And it is by taking up this responsibility that “I am brought to my final reality” (TI, p.178).

As Levinas tries to demonstrate throughout Totality and Infinity, the radical self-critique triggered by the Other’s presence reveals a fundamental fact, namely that “the freedom of the subject […] implies responsibility […]. The coinciding of freedom with responsibility constitutes the I, doubled with itself, encumbered with itself” (TI, p.271). Accordingly, to be a free man is in the meantime to be a responsible man, a man encumbered with an irreplaceable responsibility toward the Other. It is in this regard that, I think, what Levinas actually elaborates upon is more a defense of subjectivity than of the Other’s alterity; that is, he unfolds the fundamental sense of what it means to be a subject – to be responsible for the Other. As Levinas most explicitly states:

“the call to infinite responsibility confirms the subjectivity in its apologetic position. …To utter ‘I,’ to affirm the irreducible singularity in
which the apology is pursued, means to possess a privileged place with regard to responsibilities for which no one can replace me and from which no one can release me” (TI, p.245).

“The differences between the Other and me […] are due to the I-Other conjuncture, to the inevitable orientation of being ‘starting from oneself’ toward ‘the Other.’ The priority of this orientation over the terms that are placed in it (and which cannot arise without this orientation) summarizes the theses of the present work” (TI, p. 214).

In this sense, as Husserl’s primordial reduction unfolds the transcendental functions of alterity, Levinas’ account of “putting into question” is inherently comprised of two intimately interwoven aspects. On the one hand, it suspends the arbitrary and naïve presupposition of subjective freedom; on the other hand, the Other’s supplicating gaze brings the ego to full individuation by means of shedding light on his inherent and irreplaceable responsibility toward the Other. In accordance with this characterization, we are entitled to “name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics” (TI, p.43; cf. p.304).

In a nutshell, if we radicalize Husserl’s primordial reduction by means of thinking more seriously the Other’s co-constitutive functions, then we can readily, if not easily, see its ethical signification. The Other’s co-constitutive life, to be sure, does not only consist in bringing the ego out of his somatic center, i.e., decentralizing the ego’s personal perspectivity; more importantly, as Levinas argues, such decentralizing as such already constitutes a sort of ethical questioning in that it awakens the ego’s self-critique of its own standpoint. As Levinas argues, the upshot of such self-critique is not only the self-explication of the ego’s own conscious life or freedom, as is already evident in Husserl; moreover, the self-critique brings the ego to an awareness that “I” am not free to refuse the Other’s appeal and that “I” must respond to the Other’s sincere gaze. In short, fully developed transcendental subjectivity, together with all its intentional capacities, is intrinsically encumbered with an irreducible responsibility. In this sense, “the ethical, beyond vision and certitude, delineates the structure of exteriority as such. Morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy” (TI, p.304).
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2. Works by other authors


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Abstract

This dissertation investigates the problem of empathy by means of systematically analyzing Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity vis-à-vis the Schutzian critique. I demonstrate that Husserl begins with a somewhat Cartesian position that supports the Schutzian interpretation. That is, Husserl thinks that the Other’s body is a meaningless physical substance and that one needs to appeal to one’s own conscious reservoir of knowledge, such as memories, so as to understand, explain and predict the Other’s outward behavior. However, Husserl refines such a Cartesian account and develops a new conception that stands in sharp distinction with the Schutzian interpretation. On this account, Husserl holds that the Other’s body is an expressive unity and originally discloses the Other’s mental life and that empathy, as a form of empathic perception, is characterized by some distinctive features, such as its twofold intentionality. This thesis attempts to examine the Schutzian critique and unfold the complex nature of empathic experience according to Husserl’s new account.

In chapter one, I focus on the problem of how the body functions in empathic experience and how it makes it possible for the empathizer to adopt other people’s perspectives. I argue that empathy is essentially regulated by bodily capacities, such as bodily mobility, orientation and double sensation. And I suggest that embodied empathy can be understood as a form of quasi-perspective-taking.

In chapter two, I focus on the problem of the social situation and its significance for empathic understanding. I argue that the social situation not only anonymously stays in the background but also serves as an ecological niche from which other people come to affect us and become present in our conscious life in the first place. With Husserl’s genetic method, I analyze the affective structure of the situation and how it frames a meaningful context for the interpersonal encounter.

In chapter three, I focus on the problem of empathic intentionality and argue that, unlike external perception simpliciter, empathic perception is intrinsically characterized by its unique bi-directionality – empathy is at once directed at other people’s sensuously given bodies and their non-sensuously given subjectivity. With the help of Husserl’s image theory, I show how such twofold empathic intentionality is at work in and through our ordinary experience and further specify its accomplishment – such unique intentionality provides a quasi, pre- or non-predicative understanding of other people’s perspectives of their lived environment.

In chapter four, I focus on the problem of the Other’s bodily expressivity and examine Husserl’s two different conceptions thereof. Husserl firstly thinks that other people’s outward behavior just indicates their inner life and that it is in itself a meaningless physical substance. I show that this account faces some serious difficulties and that Husserl later on substantially revises his view. Husserl secondly thinks that other people’s outward behavior not only indicates their inner life but also originally discloses it through its unitary Gestalt. Accordingly, the Other’s body is understood as a twofold unity of expressing exteriority and expressed interiority.

In the fifth and final chapter, I methodically analyze Husserl’s theory and unfold its existential-ethical implications. That is, I argue that a radical reflection upon the nature of subjectivity will ultimately illuminate the fact that subjectivity exists already within an intersubjective network and that subjectivity in its full sense consists in taking up its responsibility for other subjects. The intersubjective nature of subjectivity leads to the facticity that subjective freedom is encumbered with ethical responsibility.
**Sammenfatning**


I kapitel et, fokuserer jeg på problemet om hvordan kroppen fungerer i den empatiske erfaring og hvordan den gør det muligt for det empatiske subjekt at indoptage andres perspektiv. Jeg argumenterer for at empati essentielt er reguleret af kropslige kapaciteter såsom kropslig mobilitet, orientering og den dobbelte berøring. Og jeg foreslår at kropslig empati kan forstås som en form for quasi-perspektivtagning.


I det femte og sidste kapitel reflekterer jeg metodologisk over Husserls teori og fremlægger dens eksistentielle og etiske implikationer. Jeg hævder at en radikal refleksiv undersøgelse af subjektiviteten vil kunne afdekke i hvilket omfang subjektiviteten allerede er indlejet i et intersubjektivt netværk og at subjektiviteten først kommer til fuld udfoldelse når den påtager sig et ansvar over for andre.
Subjektivitetens intersubjektive natur medfører at den subjektive frihed er pålagt et etisk ansvar.