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CHAPTER NINE

Normative Power and the Future of EU Public Diplomacy

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1. Introduction—Normative Power and Public Diplomacy

We Europeans believe that public diplomacy plays a special role in the external relations of the European Union...Public diplomacy should reflect not only what we do or want to do; but also what we are and what we stand for. As we move towards a new and uncertain global order, this is probably more important than it has ever been. The values we considered self evident before, may not always be so in future.¹

For the last two decades scholars of the European Union (EU) have been seeking to understand the EU's "international identity" in order to make sense of what the EU is and what it stands for, as much as understanding what the EU does or wants to do in global politics.¹ The normative power approach to the EU in global politics has been developed specifically to understand the EU's international identity by examining its principles, actions, and impact.² As Vicki Birchfield points out, the normative power approach represents a variation on the dialectic of being and becoming³—that it involves both empirical analysis and "critical normative intervention."⁴

Steffen Bay Rasmussen, in line with the theme of this volume, suggests that "public diplomacy is generally associated with the notion of soft power...a method by which the attractiveness of a country's ideals and values can be promoted."⁵ But he has also made clear that the "arguments about normative power also recognise that attraction—and the corresponding diffusion of ideas and norms—does not happen automatically, [but through] specific mechanisms for normative diffusion."⁶ This

emphasis on normative power as an explicitly theoretical concept requiring an understanding of social diffusion and normative practices is important.⁷ As Janice Bially Mattern has discussed, there is absolutely nothing soft about “soft power”—in the US case it is almost always used for the pursuit of “national interest,” rather than because it is less coercive.⁸

What is necessary is an understanding of the specific mechanisms or modes of diffusion in the normative power approach and the roles they might play in EU public diplomacy (PD). In pointing to the different modes of diffusion in the normative power approach, Anna Michalski has suggested that “the strength of the EU’s normative power is decided by its ability to shape other actors’ perceptions of the appropriate cognitive content of international politics.”⁹ Rasmussen argues that “public diplomacy refers to the mechanisms of informational diffusion and the cultural filter diffusion” in the normative power approach.¹⁰ These different mechanisms or modes are discussed more extensively below.

The mainstream approach to describing PD as “winning hearts and minds” comes from the British role during the Malayan emergency of the 1940s and 1950s.¹¹ The phrase has subsequently come to be associated with the US misunderstanding of the *Kampung Baru* (“new village”) counterinsurgency program and propaganda struggles of the Vietnam War.¹² Thus in this chapter we look instead at the aim of *sharing* hearts and minds rather than winning them. This emphasis reflects the aim of moving the study of the EU as a global actor away from zero-sum winning-losing approaches towards understanding the role of the EU as sharing “European communion.”¹³

As Margot Wallström, the former vice-president of the European Commission, recognized in 2008, the EU was rapidly moving from the old and relatively certain global order of the Cold War towards the new and relatively uncertain global order of the twenty-first century:

This is not an exercise in “national branding”; it is not “propaganda,” because we know that this does not work. It is the recognition of a fundamental shift, and especially so in relatively open societies, of how power, influence and decision-making has spread, and how complex it has become.¹⁴

As the next five sections set out, this fundamental shift in the role of the EU in global politics requires a recognition of how the EU has “gone global” (section 2); how EU diplomacy is “going public” (section 3); how EU PD needs to consider “sharing minds” (section 4); how the normative power of PD can ensure the EU is “remaining distinctive” in global politics (section 5); and concluding on the normative power approach to the future of EU PD (section 6). The chapter concludes, in line with Wallström, that the fundamental shift of how power, influence, and decision making has spread and become complex demands the reconsideration of normative power and EU PD. The emphasis in this chapter is on the

future of EU PD in a more globalized, multipolar, multilateral world. The chapter does not seek to explore the role of EU member states within this future shift but clearly, as Mai'a Davis Cross discusses in her chapter, if the EU and its member states are to have a future role at all, they must develop synergies not antergies in external actions and PD.

2. Gone Global—The EU in Global Politics

As any diplomatic service, the EEAS will consist of a central administration and EU delegations in third countries and at international organisations... Furthermore, the EEAS will consist of a number of geographic directorates general covering all regions of the world, as well as multilateral and thematic departments, a policy planning department, a legal department and departments for interinstitutional relations, information and public diplomacy.¹⁵

The EU's imperative for engagement with the world beyond itself has deep roots and was an integral component of the earliest stages of European integration.¹⁶ Being an innovative development in international relations—a regional organization that has sought to “go global” in the exercise of its influence—there is no previous model for it to follow. There is, however, a danger in being seduced by wanting to be a Westphalian post-Westphalian power: to want to play the games that states play rather than seeking to be an innovator in international relations. This tension between postmodern, post-Westphalian states can be found in the work of Thomas Diez and Robert Cooper.¹⁷ The debate regarding the ideal type of power the EU is being and becoming has been critically relevant over the past decade, with an emphasis on the four ideal types of “region-state,” “liberal-internationalist,” “civilian power,” and “normative puissance.”¹⁸

The EU has already established the panoply of instruments that any respectable state might want to run a foreign policy: a diplomatic infrastructure (embryonic, imperfect but in place), membership of key international organizations, a network of bilateral and multilateral relationships, and military power (albeit small but now with missions on the ground). More innovatively the EU has developed the novel approach of increasing its size by persuading third countries that membership is the only respectable course of action for a (post-)modern European state. As the excerpt from the 2010 Council decision on the European External Action Service (above) illustrates, the main elements of the EU's external actions include geographical and thematic diplomacy, together with information and PD.¹⁹ One immediate challenge for EU external action and PD is that responsibility for enlargement still falls under the remit of the Directorate-General for Enlargement of the European Commission. Another challenge is that the EU's desire in the 1990s to improve relations with its nearest neighbors, who had no immediate prospect of membership, was

soon overcome by the security discourses of the “war on terror” in the evolution of the European Neighborhood Policy, ENP.²⁰

The EU thus has a very well-established relationship with its near neighbors—both prospective members and aspirants—but what of engagement with the world beyond? The EU has already “gone global.” From early in its history it developed a network of association agreements and other forms of economic relationships. To these were added as “political dialogues” exchanges of views with third countries. Consequently embedded in the EU’s foreign policy identity is this desire to remake the world—to create a negotiated order—largely through multilateralism.²¹ This network of stabilization and association agreements, the ENP, and Generalized System of Preferences “plus” (GSP+) arrangements all serve as examples of the EU’s layers of institutionalized global relationships. In this respect, going global provides an opportunity for procedural diffusion and PD in the 20 association agreements identified by the EEAS in May 2011—including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, South Africa, Turkey, and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.

In 2003, the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) placed multilateralism as the touchstone, and arguably the *raison d’être*, of the EU’s international presence. The ESS set out the strategic objective of effective multilateralism: “[i]n a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.”²² The security strategy also contained a list of countries who were possible strategic partners, which was largely a list of great and emerging powers. As Richard Youngs argued in 2005, many believe there is a need to harness EU power to promote objectives in a more concrete fashion and to make these relationships work in the EU’s best interests.²³ The ESS list included the United States, Russia, Japan, China, Canada, and India, but was also open to “all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.”²⁴ The list of strategic partnerships now includes ten countries: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, and the United States.

At present there is a huge commitment of time for the High Representative and vice-president of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, in the conduct of EU diplomacy, but the direct benefits for the EU are not always apparent. While the creation of the EEAS was intended to relieve the routine aspects of diplomacy from the Commission and the Council, there are still unnecessary burdens for these two institutions and often with indeterminate effect. Examples include enlargement, negotiations, development cooperation, trade negotiations, international climate change negotiations, as well as the international economic and financial issues. Setting aside these capacity and coordination problems of making EU diplomacy work the EEAS, at best, aspires to create a twentieth-century

diplomatic infrastructure in a twenty-first century world. The EU currently underplays the need to engage with peoples as much as states. As Mark Leonard and more recently Thomas Diez have argued, there is a need to build relationships with non-EU publics and civil society organizations.²⁵ Having gone global with the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS in 2010, the EU is now going public with its diplomacy and public affairs.

3. Going Public—EU Diplomacy and Public Affairs

The main objectives under the Public Diplomacy part of the Industrialised Countries Instrument are to enhance the visibility of the EU as a whole, promote a better understanding of EU's actions and positions and exert a positive influence on how the EU is perceived in partner countries. This is done by supporting EU Centres, public policy think tanks and research institutes. Targeted events are organised in partner countries. This complements national initiatives which typically focus on the bilateral relationship with Member States.²⁶

Despite the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS, PD remains the Cinderella of the EU's global engagement. As the EEAS sets out (above), the main objectives of PD are to improve visibility, understanding, and perception of the EU in global politics. There is the need to strengthen the sharing of collective EU norms, identities, and values beyond the confines of diplomatic interaction. There is the pressing need to ensure that meaningful sharing of EU norms and values with those that should be reached—the wider publics and civil society of third countries.

Since the creation of the EEAS and its PD objectives, a rapidly emerging literature has sought to both describe the conduct of PD and make recommendations regarding the development of its PD.²⁷ However, what has been less discussed are the theoretical understandings on which the conduct and advocacy of the EU going public rest. As briefly discussed here, theoretical approaches regarding modernity, postmodernism, liberalism, superpower politics, and postcolonial theory are all implicated in a PD approach.

Robert Cooper has argued that the development of the EU's global presence demands the need to revert to the double standards of the colonial era if the EU is to engage effectively. In Cooper's terms, for "post-modern states," such as the EU, to conduct politics with "modern states," such as the developed world, may result in a qualitatively different form of relationship.²⁸ According to this logic, pursuing EU policies through diplomatic tactics such as constructive engagement with third parties may appear to validate unsavory elites through those contacts. This was clearly the case in EU relations with the dictators overthrown in the 2011 Arab uprisings.²⁹ For example, there was support of some EU member states

for Ben Ali in Tunisia, Qaddafi in Libya, and Mubarak in Egypt. At the very least the EU needs to ensure that the publics of these third parties are aware that the EU is not legitimizing dictators with whom the EU is speaking. In short, the EU needs to work harder at what Kagan identified as Europe's strength in forging the relationships created with peoples—alongside EU connections with their governments.³⁰

Clearly Cooper's type of approach is not without significant concerns regarding the primacy given to top-down traditional diplomacy over bottom-up PD, and the aims of security over democracy.³¹ As the Arab uprisings have illustrated, the EU cannot revert to a colonial view of modern and nonmodern peoples, but must instead encourage practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation.³²

This is not "liberal mush," but rather would serve both an instrumental and a normative purpose.³³ The attitudes of publics to US foreign policy across the globe between 2003–8 illustrated how not having a systematic approach to "sharing hearts and minds" in third countries generates a more difficult climate for the pursuit of interests and ideals. As Pew Research and other public opinion sources have made clear, once public support is lost, mistrust of the United States will persist in both Europe and the Middle East.³⁴ This was not always the case for the United States. The power and influence that the United States exercised during the Cold War was comprised of a number of hard power components—military strength and alliances. However, as an important adjunct the United States created strategic shared value communities with allies (the "West") and acted tactically through the education of the elites of its allies through educational opportunities in the United States and the training of present and future military leaders. This created a unique reservoir of sympathetic elites: albeit one largely squandered over the last two decades.

The challenge for the EU is of course radically different to that of the United States during the Cold War. The EU is not engaged in an ideological or military struggle against an identifiable "other." Instead the struggle for EU PD, as the EEAS makes clear, (above) is to improve both the internal and external understanding of the EU; to make itself both heard and seen in an increasingly multipolar world; and to improve the perception of the EU in partner countries in the context of eurozone crisis and austerity politics. During the twentieth century former European metropolises followed a similar practice to the US Cold War strategy of facilitating education for the nascent elites of the newly independent, postcolonial states. Education in the former colonial power still represents an attractive proposition to the successor generations of those in former colonies. For example, British Chevening scholarships, French Eiffel scholarships, and Commonwealth scholarships all provide opportunities for study in Europe. In the earlier colonial period education in the metropol provided the springboard for turning back the ideas of the colonizers against themselves in decolonial struggles (think of Mahatma

Gandhi). The normative potential of generating such “social independencies” is considerable, although there is also clearly a risk of sustaining postcolonial hegemony.

These theoretical approaches of postmodernism, state-centrism, liberalism, and postcolonialism all illustrate the potential benefits and risks of EU PD. In contrast, the rest of this chapter will articulate a normative power understanding of the EU diplomacy and public affairs in “going public.” Working within critical social theory the normative power approach seeks to understand the interrelationships between material and nonmaterial forms of power in global politics. It attempts to understand whether and how physical and material forms of force and incentives are separable from nonmaterial forms of ideational power. To interrogate this possibility the approach distinguishes between three forms of power—physical force, material incentives, and normative justification. Conceptualizing normative power as ideational nonmaterial justification involves a three-part understanding of its use and analysis linking principles, actions, and impact. As the next section will now illustrate, a normative power approach to analyzing EU PD is facilitated by distinguishing between six modes or mechanisms of diffusion.³⁵

4. Sharing Minds—EU Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy acquires particular importance in the context of the new EU diplomacy. This is very much related to the fact that the EU formulates its policy in public and that secrecy is inimical to its way of decision making, thus raising the need for information and communication... Indeed, a notable dimension of EU diplomacy is its transformative nature as the EU is a normative power focusing on the promotion of its values and normative framework.³⁶

Josep Lloveras Soler, a former head of delegation at the European Commission, has argued that new EU diplomacy needs to learn to add value in the post-Lisbon period. He adds that a notable dimension of EU PD is the normative power of formulating policy in public, rather than secret. As summarized by Anna Michalski,³⁷ the normative power approach identifies six different ways in which policy and norm diffusion takes place: (i) *contagion* (unintentional diffusion); (ii) the *informational* mode through strategic communications; (iii) the *procedural* mode through institutionalized contractual agreements with third parties; (iv) *transference* through exchanges of goods, aid, trade, or technical assistance; (v) *overt* diffusion through the physical presence of the EU abroad; and (vi) the *cultural filter* leading to the construction of knowledge by third parties. This framework will now be used to understand the sharing of minds through EU PD.

Contagion

The contagion diffusion of norms takes place through the diffusion of ideas between the EU and the rest of the world. The discussion of historical precedence in the previous section suggests there are lessons to be drawn here for the EU as a “European communion.” The EU needs to devote greater attention to producing “value interpreters” in third countries—those individuals and social actors who have developed an intuitive understanding of EU norms and values, how these impact upon the development of political and social institutions in the EU, and how they impact on an EU worldview. As an equal partner to EU diplomacy it needs to ensure that there is a reservoir of understanding in third countries as to the purposes to which short-term diplomatic decisions are intended to eventually lead. In this way PD is a means of sharing minds with others through promoting the contagion of ideas, understandings, and perceptions.

Informational

The informational diffusion of norms occurs through references to a range of strategic communications such as new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications such as initiatives from the High Representative or the president of the Commission. Drawing on Umberto Eco’s idea that “translation is the language of Europe,” European Commissioner Leonard Orban has argued that for the EU

a society is multilingual not only when its citizens can speak different languages, but also when its languages maintain a constant communication through translation. Translation is indeed a continuous negotiation between the author, the translator and the reader. In Europe, we know this only too well, negotiation being the very essence of our staying together.³⁸

Hence, the emphasis on value interpreters, value translation, and continuous negotiation is important for both the sharing of the EU amongst members and sharing minds through PD. However, this is not to create apologists for an EU foreign policy, which will not always constitute international best practice. Rather, it is to avoid a repeat of the experience of the United States, which has witnessed an ongoing decline in the number of “value interpreters” willing to even-handedly critique its foreign policy. Value interpreters are political and social commentators, and those with the respect of publics, who are willing to interpret EU actions in an open-minded manner. From this informational diffusion perspective, the purpose of PD is to ensure that interpreters and translators are able engage in a continuous negotiation regarding the EU in public settings outside Europe.

Procedural

The procedural diffusion of norms takes place through the institutionalization of relationships between the EU and third parties, involving political partnership as found in interregional cooperation agreements, membership of an international organization, association agreements, or enlargement of the EU itself. There are three procedural ways in which the EU can seek to build a body of value interpreters: first, to bring people to the EU; second, to give greater attention to EU "value translation"; and third, to ensure that such interpretation and translation remains a two-way communication process. These are the processes through which European values are experienced, translated, interpreted, and reflected on. There is already a considerable intellectual exchange between EU states and third countries. Shorter and longer duration migration has provided an important pool of value interpreters as migration to and from postcolonial societies have created kinship links that generate the sharing of ideas between states and societies outside the EU. Scholarships and educational exchange opportunities are structured approaches to facilitating the exchange of ideas. All of these are important and provide an informed "inside" view of European societies and facilitate the view that collective EU attempts to engage with the world beyond the EU are not inspired by malicious and malevolent design. The procedural institutionalization of relations provides opportunities for sharing minds with others through two-way partnership and communication processes. For example the EU's Visitors Program, established in 1974, facilitates short visits to the EU institutions from over 170 countries around the world.³⁹

Transference

The transference diffusion of norms occurs when the EU is involved in the transfer of material and immaterial assets such as humanitarian aid and technical assistance, but is equally likely to be the result of more "grass roots" engagement of EU agencies and support for NGOs on the ground. There is more that can be done through public policy and transference to facilitate greater numbers of value interpreters. The "humane" handling of visa applications for travel to the EU and less daunting entry-point experiences do not conflict with appropriate border control arrangements and travel restrictions but would give the EU a competitive advantage over the present and future arrangements that prevail in the United States. The Erasmus and Socrates education exchange programs are a remarkable success story in having facilitated university student exchanges from member states and applicant states in creating social bonds within an EU of 27. The number of Erasmus students exchanged has gone from three thousand in its first year (1987) to a total of three million over the 26 year period to 2013.⁴⁰ There are minor educational initiatives attached to existing trade and aid agreements with third countries and the EU

needs to approach these more strategically and systematically. The need to use these to stimulate greater society-to-society contact as an adjunct of EU diplomacy was recognized in the creation of the Erasmus Mundus program beginning in 2004. Between 2004 to 2012 14,000 students from around the world have studied on Erasmus Mundus masters courses. Such transference diffusion facilitates a deeper sharing of minds than almost any other form of PD. There are similarities to traditional exchange programs such as EU and member state visitors programs, but are believed to have a deeper effect through earlier and more sustained sociocultural experiences. Whether it is the "Erasmus generation," "Erasmus generation 2.0," or the "Erasmus Mundus generation" that is being facilitated through PD transference, the longer-term consequences will take more than a generation to recognize.⁴¹

Overt

The overt diffusion of norms occur as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations, with the most obvious example including the role of EEAS delegations in third countries and at international organizations. The overt presence of EU PD goes beyond EEAS delegations to include the roles of the High Representative herself and the special representatives. As Catherine Ashton's statement on the European Parliament's Salafranca report illustrates, for the newly appointed special representative on Human Rights "communications and public diplomacy will be also be key. The EUSR should help us to be more visible and to promote human rights across the whole range of the EU's external policies."⁴²

It is also possible to go further with in-country cultural diplomacy and in-country education. In-country cultural diplomacy goes beyond the role of EEAS delegations in third countries generating publicity about the practices and policy of the EU. What is needed is a more sustained and reflective approach to the sharing of ideas and information about cultures and peoples between and with the citizens of third countries. Censorship and other forms of control of information in third countries often ensure that peoples are not well served by the information that they possess on the EU. Such barriers to entry can be tackled by the same manner in which European industry has approached barriers to entry in important markets—by "outsourcing" to those third countries. The EU needs to enhance its presence in third countries to create value interpreters. The models of the Alliance Française, British Council, Goethe-Institut, Instituto Camões, Instituto Cervantes, and Società Dante Alighieri are instructive in that their work in third countries generates remarkable loyalty and affection through their educational and cultural activities. The EU needs a comparable but more active presence in third countries. The creation of the network of European Union National Institutes for

Culture (EUNIC) in 2006 marks a first step towards more overt public and cultural diplomacy. The EUNIC is made up of 29 members from 24 of EU member states in a network of international cultural relations institutes working in over 150 third countries with over 2,000 branches.⁴³

Cultural Filter

The final factor shaping and transforming the diffusion of EU norms is the cultural filter. The cultural filter is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion.⁴⁴ The cultural filter involves a number of mechanisms of identity, domestic salience and the construction of knowledge, including persuasive engagement, venues for dialogue and argument, and the transference and status of ideas. As the brief discussion of the five previous modes or mechanisms of PD diffusion illustrate, the cultural filter presents the greatest challenge for EU PD. For this reason, it might be suggested that as an adjunct to the EU's Instrument for Stability that promotes the strengthening of law and order in third countries the EU needs to be able to deploy a longer-term presence that promotes civil society "best practice" through education and the promotion of the free exchange of ideas. While the Instrument for Stability is specifically focused on conflict prevention, crisis management, and peace building, its crisis management activities give support to mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, strengthening rule of law, transitional justice or the role of natural resources in conflict. This presence could take place through the creation of a network of European "progressive foundations," similar yet different to the US "freedom houses," which would support governance best practice, the role of the media, social institutions, and the role of the state in democratic societies. This would take place by providing both the means to facilitate the gathering of intellectuals and other social actors within the "progressive foundation" host country, from the neighboring countries and regions, and to bring individuals and organizations from the EU member states, and beyond, to exchange experiences and ideas. There is clearly the expectation that such foundations would not be positively received in all host societies, particularly those with authoritarian governments. There are at least two routes to engaging with this expectation: first to ensure that foundations are nongovernmental organizations that work with and through both host and (non-European) regional organizations, NGOs, and civil societies. The second route is to encourage reciprocity with host governments and societies in the setting up of their partner foundations within the EU.

An immediate response to this idea might be to question "which" Europe is being promoted? It was not, however, difficult to measure and promote the "Copenhagen criteria" for applicant states. Since the Lisbon Treaty, it has become easier to decide which EU norms and values

to support and promote in third countries. The consolidated Treaty on European Union now identifies a catalogue of principles in articles 2 and 3, in particular freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance. Natalia Chaban's work on popular opinion has identified how Asian news media professionals already see some aspects of the EU's normative power through its promotion of freedom, democracy, human rights, equality, and the environment.⁴⁵ The capacity of EU governments and societies to facilitate the rights and cultures of minorities is an obvious norm to support and promote in third countries, for example. Care and consideration will need to be exercised alongside principles and commitment with some governments and societies, which will be reluctant to see their control over information relinquished.

Although support for EU "progressive foundations" in third countries would be controversial, they may be facilitated by the newly created European Endowment for Democracy (EED) which, in the European neighborhood will assist:

pro-democratic civil society organisations, movements and individual activists acting in favour of a pluralistic multiparty system regardless of their size or formal status. The EED will also provide assistance to young leaders, independent media and journalists, provided that all the beneficiaries adhere to core democratic values and human rights as well as subscribe to principles of non-violence.⁴⁶

A regional-based approach to the idea of an overt presence to address the cultural filter could also encompass a network of EU universities shared with each region. During times of economic crisis and the ideology of austerity there will be resistance to the costs of educational expansion. But EU member state universities have been busy setting up satellite university campuses around the world over the past two decades for commercial reasons. In this case, as with local and community colleges around the world, the longer-term educational, social, and commercial benefits need to be argued for both the EU and the host society. There are antecedents to this with the 32 EU Centers of Excellence spread around the developed world in the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, Russia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan. Within the EU the European University Institute Florence (Italy), College of Europe Bruges (Belgium), and Natolin (Poland) all serve as examples of EU colleges. Such EU university colleges could be initially located in China, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South East Asia. These would not be institutions to teach "European integration" as is the focus of current EU educational initiatives in third countries. Nor should they be "full-spectrum" universities engaged in all of the scientific and technical pursuits as other EU universities are already creating such satellites in third countries. Rather their central remit would be as schools of

public administration, law, journalism, and civil-military relations, not unlike the role of the Central European University created in 1991 to support the democratic transitions in Europe and Central Asia. Clearly, the governments of some developing countries of Asia and Africa have concerns about the idea of “democratic transition” being taught in local colleges and universities. Hence the importance of engaging with local and regional civil societies and NGOs in host countries to help clarify the developmental benefits of such education to host governments.

Their purpose would be to offer short- and long-term education to the next generation of top civil servants, lawyers, judges, journalists, and the senior military personnel. The curriculum would be devoted to examining how such professions are organized and practiced across the member states of the EU. Once established, the independence of content and functioning of these universities, as well as the progressive foundations, would have to be maintained diligently by local civil society, the EU, its member states, and regional partners involved in the establishments. By supporting the establishment of progressive foundations and shared university colleges, EU PD could provide a means of sharing minds with others by actively engaging with the cultural filters of identity, domestic salience and the construction of knowledge in a local context.

5. Remaining Distinctive—The Normative Power of Public Diplomacy

Foreign policy in general has had the tendency to pretend to start from a coherent identity but in fact only constructed this identity in the process. It may be a unique character of the EU (indeed as a normative power) to celebrate diversity, and thus in contrast to the standard practice, it may be a core point of EU public diplomacy to “sell” and engage with different values and policy stances rather than to impose coherence when there is none.⁴⁷

The chapter has argued how, in the context of the Lisbon Treaty and creation of the EEAS, the “fundamental shift” in global politics identified by Margot Wallström demands the consideration of the normative power approach when thinking about EU PD.

In this context, the EU needs to become more active in its approach towards PD where focusing upon value interpreters and value translators operating in third countries is crucial. If the practice of EU diplomacy is to be more fully understood in third countries there is the need to be more active in ensuring that there is an audience aware of the EU’s aspirations. This does require an active form of engagement that is itself intended to facilitate the greater exercise of EU normative power. It will not be an approach that will yield quick results but is an essential component of smoothing the path of the EU as it goes global.

The chapter has further set out, following Wallström and Birchfield, that normative power and PD are interlinked through the dialectic of being ("what we are and what we stand for") and becoming ("what we do or want to do"). In this respect the chapter has suggested that EU PD should seek to share its values and objectives such as the more liberal norms of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, together with the more social norms of equality, solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance.

However, as Diez has suggested it may also be worth considering a further norm worthy of promotion through the practice of EU PD—that of diversity. Diez argues, alongside Wallström and Birchfield, that the construction of identity through the practice of foreign policy and PD is one of becoming, rather than pretending a coherent identity of being from the outset. In this respect he argues that the EU as a normative power needs to celebrate diversity in its PD—that it is not quite *sui generis* enough in attempting to engage with different values internally while imposing coherence on EU values externally.⁴⁸ Diez's advocacy of diversity and dialogue in EU PD is in line with the observation that the principle of subsidiarity can provide "a shared *raison d'être* where the Union acts to better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart."⁴⁹ In this context it is worth reflecting on the idea that the normative power of EU PD may lie in remaining distinctive by not copying the traditional twentieth-century diplomacy and PD of states, but developing the inherent EU capacity for diversity and dialogue among 28 member states as a means of engaging in a more pluralist twenty-first century world of multipolarity and multilateralism.

6. Conclusion

First, this chapter has argued that the study of the EU's public policy can benefit from, indeed demands, a normative power approach to understanding the power of ideas in global politics. Second, it has been suggested that having "gone global" with the Lisbon Treaty and EEAS, a normative power approach can help thinking about the relative importance and use of traditional and/or PD. Third, the chapter has set out how the normative power approach to theorizing EU diplomacy and public affairs can be useful as the EU is increasingly "going public." Fourth, the main analysis of the chapter used the six modes or mechanisms of diffusion of the normative power approach to understand how EU PD could move toward "sharing minds" through engagement, dialogue and presence in third country societies. Fifth, the chapter has reflected on the value of subsidiarity and diversity in the fundamental shift of being and becoming when the EU practices PD.

As has been developed throughout, a normative power approach to the future of EU PD moves the emphasis away from imitating twentieth-

century traditional diplomacy and towards creating a more distinctive and appropriate twenty-first century PD. This normative power approach has suggested the need to move away from imitating US "soft power" for the pursuit of EU "supranational interests." In this respect, the traditional emphasis on the Cold War propaganda war of "winning hearts and minds" has been rejected in favor of *sharing* hearts and minds. This rejection of "national branding" or "propaganda" through soft power is in recognition of the fundamental shift of twenty-first century politics of how power, influence, and decision making has spread and become more complex. For the future of EU PD the fundamental shift is clear—there is a need to build relationships with non-EU publics and civil society organizations. This has been painfully demonstrated through the Arab uprisings, where the traditional paradigm of security, national interest, and diplomacy justified maintaining relations with authoritarian dictators. In contrast a normative power approach with an emphasis on *sharing* minds through EU PD suggests how to develop the six different mechanisms or modes of diffusion through contagion, information, procedure, transference, overt presence, and engagement within the cultural filter. In conclusion the normative power of PD can help the EU in "remaining distinctive" because "the EU needs to be unambiguously a *normative power* demonstrating that visions of the future for our neighborhood and in global politics more generally cannot be expressed adequately in either economic or security terms but need to be leavened with ideas, opinions, and issues of conscience."⁵⁰

Notes

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