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Finn Tarp*

Summary

■ Foreign aid looms large in the public discourse; and international development assistance remains squarely on most policy agendas concerned with growth, poverty and inequality in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. The present review takes a retrospective look at how foreign aid has evolved since World War II in response to a dramatically changing global political and economic context. I review the aid process and associated trends in the volume and distribution of aid and categorize some of the key goals, principles and institutions of the aid system. The evidence on whether aid has been effective in furthering economic growth and development is discussed in some detail. I add perspective and identify some critical unresolved issues. I finally turn to the current development debate and discuss some key concerns, which I believe should be kept in mind in formulating any agenda for aid in the future. ■

JEL Classification: F35, O10.

Key words: foreign aid, aid impact

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Aid and Development

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Foreign aid has undergone many fundamental shifts since the middle of the last century. After a timid start in the 1950s, the multi- and bilateral aid system grew up during the 1960s and 1970s alongside the more traditional colonial relations, which continued to influence interactions between the North and the South. The set of institutions through which aid was allocated became gradually more complex, and the same goes for the various aid modalities. Growth remained for a long period of time in the 1950s and 1960s alone as the main and overriding goal of aid; but step by step more aims were added. New development strategies were formulated during the 1970s, and aid thinking took yet another dramatic turn in the 1980s. Macroeconomic crisis set in and while short run stabilization and structural adjustment policies demanded overriding attention, the global economic architecture started to change in ways few could foresee at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

Aid is a scarce resource, so it is relatively easy to reach agreement that it is meaningful to discuss how it should be allocated. It is much more complicated to arrive at a common position in deciding whether focus should be on the needs of developing countries as measured by for example the extent of poverty or on their potential for growth, see Llavador and Roemer (2001). While resource allocation is at the very core of economics, lack of consensus about key causal relationships and the appropriate levels of aggregation and time perspective are pronounced in the aid literature (Kanbur, 2001). This is undoubtedly a result of the great complexity of the development challenge itself, but accumulated professional knowledge and insights seem to fare relatively poorly in the often highly ideological development debate. An example is the set of issues surrounding equity and development, addressed in the 2006 World Development Report (World Bank, 2005a). Similarly, economic growth should neither stand alone nor be perceived as an obstacle to poverty reduction as argued from contrasting ideological perspectives. Growth is indispensable for sustained poverty reduction in the poorest countries, and growth tends to reduce poverty as shown by Ravallion (2001). At the same time, there is great variation in the data on growth and poverty reduction. Aid can potentially help reduce poverty via macro-growth, but the ultimate impact is closely related with as yet insufficiently understood microeconomic, institutional and deeper structural factors.

Foreign aid and its effectiveness in promoting growth and development in developing countries has been an area of intense controversy ever since Rosenstein-Rodan advocated aid to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (1943). Early optimism and confidence in the impact of foreign aid have certainly been tempered with time. Browsing through successive editions of a leading text book in development economics provides a telling illustration. In the first edition of his *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, Meier (1964) dedicated some 18 pages to the issue of foreign aid. He started out by asking: 'How much aid?' By the time of the 6th edition (Meier, 1995), the treatment of foreign aid had been cut in half, and the questions raised were: 'Why official assistance?', and 'Does aid work?'; and in the 2000 edition (Meier and Rauch, 2000), 'foreign aid' is not even listed in the index.

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Meanwhile the debate about the usefulness and design of foreign aid has continued unabated. Some insist aid is a waste of resources and even harmful to aid receiving countries, Dichter (2005). They point in particular to Africa and scores of failed projects and swiftly conclude that aid has been an outright disaster. Others are disappointed and sceptical, a prominent example being Easterly (2001, 2003, 2005, 2006), who highlights aid's inability to buy growth. Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) view the potential impact of aid as seriously circumscribed, but remain largely supportive. A complementary approach in the middle ground is that aid has worked in the past in furthering growth and development, see Tarp (2000). Aid is not equally effective everywhere, and much remains to be learnt about how aid impacts in theory and practice. Focus should therefore be both on ways and means to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid disbursements and on increasing the total flow of resources. A final approach is to emphasize that a doubling of worldwide aid flows is our generation's challenge, a moral obligation of rich countries that will send 'forth mighty currents of hope' and lead to 'the end of poverty', see Sachs (2005).

Departing from the so-called micro-macro paradox from the 1980s, formulated by Mosley (1987), to which I shall return in Section 4, the analysis of aid's impact on growth became dominated by macro-econometric frameworks during the second half of the 1990s. Much of this debate has focused on whether the effectiveness of aid is conditional on policy or whether aid can be expected to have a separate and positive impact, independent of policy. This has involved a mixture of concerns. They range from technically demanding econometric modelling issues to fundamentally different approaches to the design and implementation of development strategy and policy. Overall, the view that aid works in promoting growth and development has gained ground in recent years in the academic literature; but disagreement remains characteristic in assessments of the necessary and sufficient conditions for aid to have a positive contribution on the development process. The same goes in relation to (i) different views on what constitutes 'good' economic policy and how economic policy and deeper structural characteristics interact with the efficiency of foreign aid, and (ii) the institutional framework through which aid is channelled. Aid has for example been subjected to critique for being donor driven, and this has led to repeated demands for new forms of partnership, see Helleiner (2000). One response has been to shift attention to recipient country 'ownership', but what this means in theory and practice remains subject to differing interpretations.

Nevertheless, widespread calls have in the last few years been made for 'a big push' or a Marshall Plan for Africa. Sachs (2005) is a passionate spokesman for this approach, which is set out in the UN Millennium Project Report (2005), and also The World Economic Forum (2005) and the Commission for Africa (2005) report can be consulted. The Commission for Africa was launched by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in February 2004 with the aim of taking a fresh look at Africa's past and present and the international community's role in its development path. These initiatives have called forth both praise and critique, with Sachs and Easterly appearing to occupy opposing ends of the spectrum. Viewing their assessments from the perspective of historical developments in foreign aid, on the one hand, and the analytical literature on aid effectiveness, on the other, is a general aim of this paper.

The remainder of this study is structured in six parts.¹ In Section 1, I define what is meant by foreign aid and provide selected data on amounts and trends involved. Section 2 contains general historical background, while Sections 3 and 4 turn to the allocation and impact of foreign aid. In Section 5, I discuss the current debate, while Section 6 concludes.

¹ In preparing this review, I rely both on field experience and a variety of academic outputs. They include (i) a Routledge book volume on *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons learnt and Directions for the Future* (see Tarp, 2000); (ii) several articles published over the past five years, including in particular work with Dalgaard, Hansen and Roland-Holst listed in the references; and (iii) the notes from my inaugural lecture held at the University of Copenhagen on 29 November 2002 under the heading *'Reflections on the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid'*.

1. What is foreign aid?

What is foreign aid? Loosely speaking it covers governmental transfers to poor countries that are destined for developmental purposes. For a more precise definition it is useful to turn to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. DAC is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries. According to DAC, the term 'foreign aid' or 'development assistance' refers to financial flows that qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA is defined as the sum of grants and loans to aid recipients that are: (a) undertaken by the official sector of the donor country; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare in recipient countries as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms, where the grant element is equal to at least 25 per cent.²

In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation costs are included in ODA; but grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded, and transfer payments to private individuals are in general not counted. The same goes for private charity, commercial loans and foreign direct investment (FDI).

While the OECD operates with a consolidated list of recipient countries to capture all aid-like flows, this list was until 2005 divided into two parts. Only aid to 'traditional' developing countries counted as ODA. For these (Part I) countries there is a long-standing United Nations (UN) target from 1970 that they should receive 0.7 per cent of donors' Gross National Income (GNI) as aid. Assistance to the 'more advanced' Eastern European and 'more advanced' developing (Part II) countries was recorded separately as 'official aid' (OA), which was not included as part of ODA. It can finally be noted that DAC countries account for almost 95 per cent of all aid flows.³

In 2002 the total amount of foreign aid disbursed by donors to developing countries and multilateral organisations reached 61.5 billion US\$ (Table 1). Table 1 also shows that the average citizen in the OECD-DAC countries contributed less than US\$ 68 as ODA in 2002. This can be compared to a figure of around US\$ 52 in 1960-73 and almost US\$ 77 in 1992.⁴ It is equally clear from the table that the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI is with a few exceptions very far from being reached. In this perspective, it is hardly surprising that some such as Sach (2005) and many others find present levels of aid unacceptably low. It can also be noted that multilateral organisations disbursed some 30 per cent of total foreign aid (Table 2), with the IMF and World Bank being the major channel, followed by the EU, the UN and the regional development banks.

Table 3 gives an overview of aid per capita and aid in per cent of GNI in aid receiving Part I countries with a population of more than 2 million. It is a widespread perception in for example the US that foreign aid amounts to a very significant resource, in both absolute and relative terms, and aid is indeed not an insignificant flow measured relative to developing country production and income. At the same time, aid does not appear that sizeable when measured in relation to GNI or

² Conventionally the market rate of interest used to assess a loan is taken as 10 per cent. Thus, while the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 per cent, it is 100 per cent for a pure grant, and lies between these two limits for a soft loan. In calculating total ODA no adjustment is made to take account of the smaller grant element of loans. The value of grants and the nominal value of loans that qualify are simply added up.

³ The OECD decided in 2005 to revert to a single list of ODA recipients, abolishing what is referred to as Part II in what follows. The new DAC list of ODA recipients is with a few exceptions consistent with World Bank practice, see http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,2340,en_2649_34447_35832055_1_1_1_1,00.html for full details on the rather complicated set of changes that have taken place over the years.

⁴ Note that constant 2002 prices are relied on in Table 1. Moreover, only sixteen of the now 22 DAC member countries had joined the DAC before 1970, so the concept of an 'average DAC citizen' is not strictly the same over time, see http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,2340,en_2649_33721_1893350_1_1_1_1,00.html.

government budgets in the donor countries or in comparison with the population size of aid receiving countries.

Table 1. Net ODA disbursements by donor

	2002 Prices - \$ Billion				Percent of Total			
	ODA per Capita (2002 Prices - \$)				Percent of Donor GNI			
	1960-73	1992	1998	2002	1960-73	1992	1998	2002
United States	14.7	14.1	9.4	13.3	47.1	23.0	18.3	21.6
	74.9	55.3	34.8	46.1	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1
Japan	2.5	10.5	10.4	9.3	8.0	17.1	20.2	15.1
	24.5	84.4	82.2	72.8	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2
France	3.9	7.2	5.1	5.5	12.8	11.8	9.9	8.9
	80.6	126.2	87.3	92.3	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4
Germany	2.8	6.6	4.9	5.3	9.1	10.7	9.5	8.7
	48.0	81.4	59.5	64.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
United Kingdom	3.2	3.6	3.8	4.9	10.2	5.8	7.4	8.0
	58.0	61.3	64.7	83.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3
DK, NL, NO and SE	1.3	7.1	7.4	8.7	4.2	11.5	14.4	14.1
	44.6	211.9	217.0	248.2	0.3	1.0	0.8	0.9
Other DAC	2.6	10.9	9.4	11.3	8.5	17.8	18.2	18.4
	23.0	57.9	46.0	53.6	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3
Non-DAC	..	1.4	1.0	3.2	..	2.2	2.0	5.2
	67.2	..	0.3	0.1	0.4
Total	31.0	61.3	51.5	61.5	100	100	100	100
	51.6	76.9	61.7	67.6	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2
Bilateral ODA	26.5	41.9	34.9	43.5	85.5	68.3	67.8	70.7
Multilateral ODA	4.9	19.1	16.6	18.0	15.6	31.1	32.2	29.3

Notes: Denmark (DK) since 1978, Netherlands (NL) since 1975, Norway (NO) since 1976, and Sweden (SE) since 1975 have all had ODA in percent of GNI above 0.7. Luxembourg has been above the UN ODA target of 0.7% since 2000.

Source: OECD (2004).

Table 2. Multilateral aid disbursements

	2002 Prices - \$ Billion				Percent			
	1960-73	1992	1998	2002	1960-73	1992	1998	2002
Multilateral, Total	2.8	16.3	14.4	17.0	100	100	100	100
<i>of which:</i>								
United Nations	0.9	5.3	2.6	3.8	31.4	32.6	17.9	22.1
IMF and WB	0.8	5.3	5.0	6.0	30.0	32.7	35.0	35.1
European Commission	0.6	3.8	4.6	5.1	23.1	23.1	32.3	30.3
Regional Development Banks	0.4	1.6	1.9	1.8	15.4	10.0	13.2	10.5
Other Multilateral Institutions	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.6	1.6	2.1

Source: OECD (2004).

Table 3: Average annual (1993-2002) aid shares for countries with populations larger than 2 million

Country	Aid per capita	Country	Country	Aid in % of GNI	Country
Malaysia	0.3	Tunisia	Saudi Arabia	0.0	Georgia
Saudi Arabia	1.2	Burundi	Malaysia	0.0	Papua New Guinea
Brazil	1.7	Sri Lanka	Argentina	0.0	Cote d'Ivoire
India	1.7	Togo	Venezuela, RB	0.0	Nepal
Nigeria	1.8	Zimbabwe	Brazil	0.1	Togo
Venezuela, RB	1.8	Madagascar	Mexico	0.1	Angola
China	2.0	Niger	Turkey	0.1	Bolivia
Mexico	2.0	Chad	Iran, Islamic Rep.	0.2	Honduras
Myanmar	2.2	Somalia	Chile	0.2	Guinea
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2.5	Liberia	Costa Rica	0.2	Albania
Argentina	3.4	Egypt, Arab Rep.	Uruguay	0.2	Tajikistan
Turkey	3.5	Tanzania	Colombia	0.3	Ghana
Korea, Dem. Rep.	4.1	Angola	China	0.3	Serbia and Montenegro
Congo, Dem. Rep.	5.2	Uganda	South Africa	0.4	Madagascar
Uzbekistan	5.2	Ghana	Oman	0.4	Senegal
Cuba	5.2	Cambodia	Panama	0.4	Haiti
Colombia	5.3	Central African Republic	India	0.4	Benin
Turkmenistan	7.0	Cameroon	Croatia	0.5	Central African Republic
Costa Rica	7.1	Burkina Faso	Thailand	0.5	Cambodia
Indonesia	7.3	Mali	Algeria	0.6	Armenia
Chile	7.4	Eritrea	Dominican Republic	0.7	Congo, Rep.
Kazakhstan	8.6	Benin	Kazakhstan	0.7	Chad
Iraq	8.8	Sierra Leone	Nigeria	0.7	Uganda
Pakistan	8.8	Georgia	Peru	0.9	Kyrgyz Republic
Sudan	9.2	El Salvador	Turkmenistan	0.9	Ethiopia
Algeria	9.2	Malawi	Indonesia	1.0	Tanzania
Bangladesh	9.8	Haiti	Jamaica	1.0	Niger
South Africa	10.6	Kyrgyz Republic	Ecuador	1.1	Burkina Faso
Thailand	10.8	Guinea	Philippines	1.1	West Bank and Gaza
Philippines	11.4	Cote d'Ivoire	Paraguay	1.2	Mali
Dominican Republic	12.2	Lao PDR	Tunisia	1.2	Lao PDR
Afghanistan	12.8	Lebanon	Uzbekistan	1.4	Burundi
Uruguay	13.0	Senegal	Guatemala	1.4	Liberia
Panama	13.2	Papua New Guinea	Lebanon	1.7	Eritrea
Vietnam	14.3	Serbia and Montenegro	Morocco	1.8	Mongolia
Ethiopia	14.8	Rwanda	Pakistan	2.0	Zambia
Ecuador	16.5	Congo, Rep.	Syrian Arab Republic	2.0	Malawi
Peru	17.3	Armenia	El Salvador	2.6	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Syrian Arab Republic	17.5	Mozambique	Egypt, Arab Rep.	2.8	Sierra Leone
Tajikistan	18.0	Honduras	Bangladesh	2.9	Mauritania
Nepal	18.2	Bolivia	Sudan	3.1	Rwanda
Paraguay	18.7	Zambia	Sri Lanka	3.2	Nicaragua
Croatia	18.9	Albania	Azerbaijan	3.8	Mozambique
Kenya	19.7	Mongolia	Vietnam	4.3	
Yemen, Rep.	20.4	Jordan	Congo, Dem. Rep.	4.9	
Azerbaijan	20.7	Mauritania	Zimbabwe	5.2	
Morocco	20.9	Nicaragua	Yemen, Rep.	5.4	
Jamaica	21.4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Cameroon	5.9	
Guatemala	22.2	West Bank and Gaza	Jordan	6.3	
Oman	22.6		Kenya	6.8	

Note: Aid per capita is constant US \$ and aid in percent of GNI are averages of annual observations.

Source: World Bank (2004).

Turning to the aid receiving countries, the available data confirm that global aid levels have kept pace with both incomes and population in the developing world during the past three decades. Figure 1 presents ratios of total ODA to GNI and population in aid receiving countries. It may be comforting to some that ODA per capita almost doubled in real terms; but perhaps the most revealing aspect here is the downturn from 1991-92 after the steady increase in the previous decade, and the fact that aid has only remained more or less stable as a share of GNI in recipient countries.





Figure 2 shows that the allocation of aid from 1993 to 2002 as measured by the aid to GNI ratio in aid receiving countries is highly skewed. Most Part I countries received aid on the order of 3.1 per cent of their GNI per year with a median of 6.8 per cent. This corresponds to a distribution of aid per capita with a mode of 18.5 US\$ per year with a median of 34.6 US\$. Illustrative country examples have been added to Figure 2, and they demonstrate that the relative size of the aid inflow varies significantly among countries such as Vietnam, Bolivia, Tanzania and Mozambique.

The 15.1 per cent size of the aid to GNI ratio in for example Tanzania may seem high. It should be kept in mind, however, that this share reflects not only the size of the aid flow, but also the very low level of income. Income per capita in Tanzania has just recently grown to around US\$ 300 per capita, so Tanzania only received about US\$ 32 per capita per year in foreign aid from 1993 to 2002.

Modest expectations are on this background advisable when analysing the overall impact of past aid on growth. Many constraints have hampered growth in Tanzania, and aid has been used for a multitude of purposes, which are in many cases only indirectly related to generating economic return.



2. Historical background

Foreign aid in its modern form emerged out of the disruption that followed World War II. The international economic system had collapsed, and war-ravaged Europe faced a critical shortage of capital and an acute need for physical reconstruction. The response was the European Recovery Programme, commonly known as the Marshall Plan. During the peak years the US transferred some 2-3 per cent of its national income to help restore Europe. The motives behind the US aid were multifaceted, ranging from the selfish to the generous. Containing communism around the Soviet bloc and trying to secure access to raw materials and gain a leading role in the global trade and investment system were critically important nationalistic concerns. Altruistic aims also played a role and helped mobilize support from a wide spectrum of political opinion. The Marshall Plan, which was administered by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the predecessor of the OECD, was implemented on schedule, and its success fuelled highly optimistic expectations about the future effectiveness of foreign aid.

After the success of the Marshall Plan the attention of industrialized nations turned to the developing countries, many of which became independent around 1960. Economic growth in a state-led planning tradition became a key objective during the 1950s and 1960s, and it was widely believed that poverty and inequality would be quickly eliminated through growth and modernization ('trickle down'). A major part of the rapidly increasing bilateral flows during the 1950s came from the US, but colonial ties remained strong, and developing regions continued to receive bilateral (country-to-country) support from the former colonial powers, notably France and the United Kingdom. Yet, the 1960s was also the decade where a range of new bilateral donor agencies was established in, for example, the Nordic countries. They accounted for much of the increase in aid flows in the 1970s.

A transition toward more independent, multilateral relations began to emerge during the 1960s. This created a constituency for foreign aid, and the non-aligned movement gave for some time an articulated developing country focus to this voice,⁵ as did the various organs of the UN, which accounted for around one third of multilateral assistance during 1960-73 as shown in Table 2. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (or World Bank), established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, play a central role in multilateral development assistance, especially following the creation of the International Development Association (IDA) in 1960. IDA channels resources to the poorest countries on 'soft' conditions alongside the regional development banks, formed from 1959 to 1966, and the European Commission.

The original Marshall Plan was built around support to finance general categories of imports and strengthen the balance of payments (i.e. programme aid), but from the early 1950s project aid became the dominating aid modality. Some donors continued to supply programme aid, but aid was increasingly disbursed for the implementation of specific capital investment projects and associated technical assistance to support advances in infrastructure and productive sectors.

The multilateralism of aid became somewhat more pronounced after the mid-1970s, when the UN, World Bank and other multilateral agencies expanded their activities quite considerably, and the share of multilateral aid in total aid has since then remained close to 30 per cent. The 1970s also saw an increased focus on employment, income distribution, and poverty alleviation as essential objectives of development and foreign aid. The effectiveness of trickle-down was widely questioned, and new strategies referred to as 'basic human needs' and 'redistribution with growth' were formulated. Nevertheless, the typical project aid modality remained largely unchanged; and micro-economic project evaluation, also referred to as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), was expanded and widely relied on in the aid debate. Many projects were favourably evaluated, and during the 1960s and 1970s, economic progress was visible in much of the developing world. Many developing countries borrowed heavily during the 1970s, and this made eminent sense at the time. Inflation was high and credit exceedingly cheap. After the first oil crisis in 1973, commercial banks started playing a large role in international lending by recycling OPEC petrodollars and issuing general-purpose loans to developing countries to provide balance of payment support and expand exports. Bilateral donors and the international financial institutions (IFIs) were no longer alone on the lending scene, and international lending surged, permitting high growth with little debt-servicing difficulty.

The 'golden era' of the 1960s and 1970s came to an abrupt end at the beginning of the 1980s. The second oil shock in 1979 reversed economic conditions, and there was a huge increase in interest rates due to the economic stabilization policies in the developed countries, in particular in the US. Developing countries were faced with a combination of higher oil prices, import compression and a significant decrease in export opportunities due to slower overall global growth. The international debt crisis erupted, and macroeconomic imbalance became characteristic in many developing countries. It became evident that the downturn was longer lasting, not temporary as in 1973, and numerous debtor countries with depleted foreign exchange reserves, including bigger third world countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and the Philippines, had to turn to the IMF. On the political scene Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher came to power in the US and UK, and in the World Bank Anne Krueger became Vice President and Chief Economist, replacing Hollis Chenery. This change was symbolic and substantive (Kanbur, 2003). Economic circumstances in

⁵ The first official non-aligned movement (NAM) summit was held in September of 1961. Among the prominent developing country leaders, who helped NAM get off the ground, were Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India, Abdel Nassar of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia. Formally speaking, the non-aligned movement is an international organization of over 100 developing countries, which consider themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. While influential during the 1960s and 1970s, NAM started losing influence in the 1970s.

the developing countries and the relations between the North and South had changed radically. The crisis hit hard, especially in many African countries – progress over previous decades ground to a halt, inflation got out of control and the deficit in the balance payments could not be financed on a sustainable basis. Focus in development strategy and policy shifted to internal domestic policy failure, and achieving macroeconomic balance (externally and internally) became widely perceived as an essential prerequisite for renewed development. In parallel a series of damaging political and military conflicts broke out, including mass homicides, major refugee problems and famines in a variety of African countries.

‘Rolling back the state’ turned into a rallying call in the subsequent structural adjustment efforts, and reliance on market forces, outward orientation, and the role of the private sector, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were emphasized by the World Bank and others. In parallel, poverty alleviation somehow slipped out of view in mainstream agendas for economic reform, but remained at the centre of attention in more un-orthodox thinking such as the ‘adjustment with a human face’ approach of the UN Children’s Fund (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987).


At the same time, bilateral donors and international agencies struggled with how to channel resources to the developing world. The changing economic context and future perspectives had altered the development scene. Quick-disbursing macroeconomic programme assistance, such as balance of payments support and sector budget support, which were not tied to investment projects, and which could be justified under the headings of stabilisation and adjustment, appeared to be an ideal solution to the dilemma of maintaining the resource flow and the desire to promote policy reform. Financial programme aid and adjustment loans (and eventually debt relief) became fashionable and policy conditionality more widespread. In other words, a rationale had been found for maintaining the flow of resources, which corresponded well with the orthodox guidelines for good policy summarized by the ‘Washington consensus’ (Williamson, 1997).⁶

Total aid therefore continued to grow steadily in real terms until the early 1990s, and as a rising share of the growing national income of the donor community more than tripled during 1970–90. After 1992, total aid flows started to decline in absolute terms (especially in the US) until the turn of the millennium. Many reasons account for the fall in aggregate flows after 1992. During the budget crisis in the US, for example, aid became an easy target for significant downsizing. The decline of communism and the end of the Cold War no doubt played a role as well, and the same can be said for the weakening patron-client relationships among the developing countries and the former colonial powers. The traditional support of foreign aid by vocal interest groups in the industrial countries receded. Bilateral and multilateral aid institutions were subjected to criticism, and at times characterized as blunt instruments of commercial interests in the industrial world or as self-interested, inefficient rent-seeking bureaucracies. Moreover, acute awareness in donor countries of cases of bad governance, corruption, and ‘crony capitalism’ led to scepticism about the credibility of governments receiving aid. The potential role of foreign aid in all this attracted attention, and the fear that foreign aid can generate undesirable aid dependency relationships became clear during the second part of the 1990s and persisted into the 21st century. In parallel, the perception that policy conditionality was failing to promote policy reform started to assert itself, see Kanbur (2000) and Svensson (2003). This assessment prompted a keen interest in new kinds of donor-recipient relationships. One outcome was the call for increased national ownership of aid programmes. Another was that World Bank and independent academic researchers started digging into the aid-growth relationship using modern analytical techniques. The more recent the attempts to develop randomized programme evaluation also appeared on the scene, see for example Duflo

⁶ See Rodrik (2006) for a critical up-to-date review.

(2004).⁷ Meanwhile the developing world was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis, which affected development outcomes in a number of countries and modified the framework within which aid is implemented.

Finally, when reviewing the role and impact of foreign aid, it should be kept in mind that the world economy has during the past few decades seen major changes in international relations that go far beyond the changes in foreign aid. Growth in trade, GDP and the relationship between trade and growth have filled volumes with statistical tables, policy analysis, and academic research. With reference to foreign aid, a few trends are of particular relevance.⁸ Figure 3 shows how global trade as well as ODA, GNI and FDI in aid-receiving countries evolved from 1970 onwards until after the turn of the millennium. It is evident that global trade has been growing faster than both GNI and aid flows to poor countries, especially from around the mid-1980s, so flourishing international commerce has not so far been associated with a boom in charitable activity. Moreover, while Figure 3 is a bit deceptive in overstating the relative size of FDI,⁹ it is nevertheless clear that the relative importance of FDI to aid started changing very considerably in the early 1990s.



In sum, globalization has modified the context in which foreign aid is implemented. This suggests, on the one hand, that a broader and more refined awareness of the implications of coexistence between public and private investment in developing countries would be beneficial. It implies, on the other hand, that aid's role in generating foreign exchange has changed relative to other entries on the balance of payments.

⁷ I will not pursue the set of issues related to this approach to aid impact evaluation here, but see Bigsten, Gunning and Tarp (2006) and Thorbecke (2005) for elaboration.

⁸ For further elaboration see Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004).

⁹ FDI accounted for only 2.3 per cent of GDP in low- and middle-income countries in 2003, and 0.6 per cent in 1990. Trade was 41 per cent in 1990 and 60 per cent in 2003.

3. Aid allocation

Foreign aid has over the years been justified in public policy pronouncements in widely differing ways, ranging from pure altruism to the shared benefits of economic development in poor countries and further on to political ideology, foreign policy and commercial interests of the donor country. Few dispute that humanitarian sentiments have motivated donors. Action following severe natural calamities, which continue to be endemic in poor countries, is an example. Food and emergency relief also remains an important form of aid. In addition, the data available in Table 3 suggest that donors allocate relatively more ODA to the poorest countries. The broader validity of this casual observation is confirmed in cross-country econometric work, Alesina and Dollar (2000). While studying bilateral aid only, they conclude that most donors give more aid to poorer countries, *ceteris paribus*. They stress as well that there is considerable variation among donors.

Emphasis on the needs of poor countries was a particularly prominent characteristic – and the underlying economic rationale – in much of the policy literature on foreign aid in the 1950s and 1960s. Here focus was on estimating aid requirements in the tradition of the two-gap model (Chenery and Strout, 1966). The two-gap model has become somewhat unfashionable, at least in academia,¹⁰ and the role of aid has changed to a much more multi-dimensional set of concerns (Thorbecke, 2000). Economic return is by no means the only goal of aid. Nevertheless, growth and economic development in aid receiving countries have continued as a yardstick for the effectiveness of aid both in their own right and as necessary conditions for the realisation of other development aims such as the reduction of poverty and the achievement of broader social goals. It is from this perspective that the discussion in Section 4 on aid's impact on growth should be seen.

A second observation from Table 3 is that large, populous and poor countries, such as China and India receive relatively small amounts of aid in per capita terms. Smaller countries such as Mali, Ghana, Bolivia and Sri Lanka are given more favourable per capita treatment. This finding is confirmed econometrically by Alesina and Dollar. They stress, however, the critical and complex importance of political and strategic considerations in aid allocations.

It is not new that selfish motives are critical in donor decisions. In the past, the Cold War was used as a powerful justification for providing aid to developing countries to stem the spread of communism. Similarly, aid from socialist governments was motivated to promote socialist political and economic systems. Other strategic interests play a role as well. The US has over the years earmarked very substantial amounts of aid to Egypt and Israel;¹¹ being a former colony is an important determinant in getting access to French aid; and voting behaviour in the UN can affect aid allocation both bilaterally (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and through the multilateral system (Andersen, Harr and Tarp, 2006). Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy (2006) offer further valuable insight on how bilateral donors are influenced in aid allocations by their own strategic and commercial interest versus the development motives of aid recipients, and on the fact that not all donors behave the same.

In sum, there is often a wide gap between donor rhetoric and practice when attention is on the size and allocation of foreign aid. This gap is illustrated by the failure of the donor community to meet the established international target of contributing 0.7 per cent of their national income as ODA. As shown in Table 1, only the group of Nordic countries and the Netherlands have consistently met this target, while the US contributed around 0.1 percent of the US GNI in 2002.¹² Finally, it is well established that total ODA, ODA per capita, ODA as a share of GNI and ODA as a share of total financial inflows vary considerably in real terms in many aid receiving countries

¹⁰ Some would formulate this more strongly. See Jones (1995) and Easterly (1999) for two key references.

¹¹ To this list can be added Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, US aid to Iraq amounted in 2005 to US\$ 3.5 billion.

¹² This share has increased in the last couple of years, but US aid as a share of US GNI remains small.

(see Tarp, 2006). Economic management in general and management of aid inflows in particular are no easy tasks in developing countries.

4. The impact of foreign aid

Various approaches have been tried to deal with the challenge of measuring the ‘true’ impact of aid on development, as reflected for example by growth or progress in social indicators.¹³ One is to compare implicit or explicit targets with actual outcomes. The problem with this is that failure or success in reaching a target may be caused by reasons that have nothing to do with the provision of foreign aid. Another quite common approach is to rely on before-and-after comparisons, but also this line of analysis suffers from its inherent inability to attribute changes in observed outcomes to foreign aid. In other words, it is not satisfactory in assessing the impact of aid to argue casually that since growth in Africa is far from satisfactory aid ‘does not work’. Similarly, the fact that some aid projects have failed does not in any way prove that aid as a whole is a fiasco. Unsuccessful investment projects and public sector activities abound in even the best of political, social and economic circumstances all around the world and few would dream of lambasting private multinational firms for failed initiatives if the bottom line is on average satisfactory. In fact, most would probably agree that if investments are always successful then investor behaviour is likely to be too risk averse. Development is and will always be a particularly risky business, so any serious analysis must either (i) try to dig deeper in an attempt to uncover whether foreign aid has on average had a positive impact on development in aid receiving countries or not, or (ii) aim at identifying the mechanisms through which aid impacts on for example growth, including the potential positive and negative effects (i.e. returns) associated with foreign aid.

To be able to measure the effect of aid the researcher must in principle be able to compare the value of a chosen indicator (such as growth or poverty reduction) in two strictly independent situations: with and without aid. To establish the ‘true’ measure of aid impact, the importance of all other circumstances that have affected a given country over time needs to be properly accounted for.¹⁴ Alternatively, if a group of countries is compared (with and without aid) the analyst needs to account for the impact on the chosen indicator of the other differences that exist among the units of observation, like in a controlled experiment. This is the fundamental evaluation challenge, and there is in social science no way of addressing this problem (i.e. the challenge of establishing an appropriate counterfactual) in a broadly acceptable way without making assumptions that are bound to be debatable, in theory and in practice.

In Section 3 it was pointed out that aid has been given for many reasons that have little to do with socio-economic advancement in aid receiving countries. This has undoubtedly constrained the impact of aid on growth and development. The targets for aid have also varied wildly from one decade to the next. The same goes for the general political, social and economic circumstances as discussed in Section 2, and the modalities and sources of aid have changed as well. As a result, the conditions under which aid has had to operate have changed dramatically from one decade to the next. Coming up with simple answers about how aid has worked – or not worked – in promoting development in the past is no easy task. We can draw on history, but we do not have available the possibility of perfectly controlled experiments. There is, to be sure, no simple way of accounting properly for all the many varied and complex factors of daunting size, which have played a role in African development over the past 30 years – alongside foreign aid amounting to generally around US\$ 35 per capita per year.

¹³ See Bigsten, Gunning and Tarp (2006) for further elaboration of this point.

¹⁴ This includes choosing the length of individual time units and an appropriate overall time horizon, which are by no means simple choices.

In any case, the past decades have witnessed a massive outpouring of studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid. This topic has been a central and recurring theme with which many development economists, subscribing to the different paradigms of development thinking have grappled. The question whether aid works or not has been approached from different methodological and ideological perspectives. More specifically: (i) the impact of aid has been evaluated at the micro- and macroeconomic level; (ii) cross-country comparisons as well as single-country case studies have been relied on; and (iii) aid effectiveness research includes broad surveys of a qualitative and inter-disciplinary nature as well as more quantitative econometric work.¹⁵ As a point of departure for the remainder of this paper it is relevant to stress that there is widespread agreement in the literature that aid has in many cases been highly successful at the microeconomic level. The most rigorous project evaluations are done by the World Bank, and the reports from the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank are generally encouraging. For the period 1993-2002 an average rate of return of 22 per cent has been noted and decent project rates of return have over the years been reported regularly in one survey after the other, including for example Mosley (1987) and Cassen (1994). Overall, a mass of project evidence has been collected, and few dispute that aid interventions have worked in helping improve social outcomes through better health, helping promote develop appropriate technology (i.e. the green revolution) etc. Yet, doubts about aid's overall impact on growth and development linger on, and the question is raised whether all this adds up at the macro level.

It is therefore relevant to turn to how the empirical literature on aid's macroeconomic impact on growth has evolved. This choice of focus can be justified on several grounds. First, as an extension of the microeconomic evidence, numerous case studies support according to the World Bank (1998) the observation that aid has, at times, been a spectacular success. Yet, in establishing causal links, the critical challenge is as noted above to pinpoint a credible counterfactual, and it is never straightforward to generalize from case studies. Another reason for the popularity in the past 10-15 years of the cross-country panel data approach is that it makes it possible to move well beyond simplistic aid-growth correlation analysis, where the analysis of causal effects is indeed rather primitive. It should, in fact, come as no surprise to the informed observer that the simple correlation coefficient between growth and aid can easily turn out to be insignificant, or negative. Donors allocate as already discussed more aid to poorer countries, subject to difficulties and shocks of many kinds, including natural and man made calamities. When countries have done well for a while so average income has gone up, donors tend to transfer less aid and eventually they will withdraw (as it happened in for example the case of Korea). While such 'graduation' may take a while, simple correlations are on this background likely to show a negative relationship; and they will for sure not reveal the 'true' impact of aid.

In the modern aid-growth work, the analyst can attempt to control for the impact of a large range of variables, and becomes in this way able to move somewhat closer to the ideal of having a reliable counterfactual.¹⁶ The analyst is, at least in principle, capable of addressing issues such as the identification problem inherent in having aid allocated endogenously in the foreign aid system. Second, a focus on growth makes it in a wider perspective possible to draw on both traditional growth theory and new growth models to illustrate how aid can potentially impact through a highly diverse set of channels.¹⁷ Third, macroeconomic studies are required in order to help generalize about the overall impact of aid on growth and economic development. Fourth, the aid-growth

¹⁵ The reader may wish to consult for example Cassen and associates (1994) for a useful survey with a broader scope than the present paper. Other references include World Bank (1998) and (2000).

¹⁶ The same can be said about the use of randomized programme evaluation, which I do not pursue as already noted above. For perspective see Thorbecke (2005).

¹⁷ For a pertinent cautioning set of observations see Solow (2001).

literature continues to be highly influential in shaping common perceptions about the significance and impact of foreign aid. Fifth, whether aid helps growth or not is essentially an empirical question.

The quantitative cross-country analyses of the macroeconomic impact of foreign aid on growth, which by now spans almost four decades, can be classified into three generations, see Hansen and Tarp (2000). Work in the first two generations (where aid's impact on growth via savings and investment was in focus) was inspired by the simple Harrod-Domar model and the two-gap Chenery-Strout extension. This framework was as mentioned in Section 3 used extensively in the past as the analytical framework of choice for assessing aid impact; but from the early 1990s a third generation of panel based econometric studies came to dominate the academic and public discourse. This work was motivated in part by the availability of much better (panel) data across a range of countries and in part by insights emerging from new growth theory and the rapidly increasing number of general empirical studies of growth. In addition, the endogeneity of aid and other variables is addressed more consistently than before,¹⁸ and the aid-growth relationship is appropriately perceived as non-linear.

The underlying idea behind the Harrod-Domar model was indeed simple. Assume that physical capital is the only factor of production (so investment is the key constraint on growth) and assume as well that all aid is invested. Then it is straightforward to calculate the growth impact of additional aid. If aid corresponds to six per cent of the gross national product and the capital-output ratio is estimated at 3.0,¹⁹ which is a rather typical estimate, then aid adds two percentage points a year to the growth rate. The impact of aid is clearly positive, and aid works by helping to fill either a savings- or a foreign exchange gap, where the latter relates to the argument that aid represents foreign currency and as such can facilitate imports of goods and services that may in some cases be critically important in output production over and above aid's impact on relieving the savings constraint. This kind of reasoning has, however, led to wildly overoptimistic expectations about aid's potential impact.

First, it is a tall order to expect both a linear relationship between output and capital and that all aid is invested. Aid is as discussed in Section 3 provided for many reasons. For example, food aid in famine situations is not intended as investment. In addition, the share of aid that ends up being invested (rather than consumed) will, in even the very best of circumstances, depend on the degree of fungibility of the foreign aid transfer.²⁰ On the other hand, even if aid adds to domestic savings and investment on less than a one to one basis, aid does continue to have a positive impact on growth in the traditional line of thinking – as long as total savings and investment go up.²¹

A second line of critique of the Harrod-Domar and two-gap approach has been the argument that growth is less related to physical capital investment (including aid) than often assumed

¹⁸ The wider ranging and complex econometric endogeneity problems inherent in relying on time averages for aid and growth, typically used in panel data growth regressions are laid out in Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004). They point out that not only aid but also policy is likely to be endogenous.

¹⁹ Note from Figure 1 that the annual median aid to GNI ratio amounted to 6.8 per cent from 1993 to 2002.

²⁰ Fungibility arises when the recipient can reallocate own resources to other ends when aid is provided. There is limited and conflicting evidence on the degree of fungibility of foreign aid, see for example Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998).

²¹ This observation goes back to Papanek (1972, 1973) and inspired Hansen and Tarp (2000), who reviewed 131 cross country regressions produced over three decades. They challenged the widespread perception among academic researchers and aid practitioners that there is no significant macroeconomic links associated with foreign aid as stated by for example Michalopoulos and Sukhatme (1989) and White (1992). A re-examination of the then existing literature revealed that (i) aid increases savings, although not by as much as the aid inflow, (ii) aid increases investment, and (iii) aid has on average a positive effect on the growth rate whenever growth is driven by capital accumulation. Hansen and Tarp therefore suggested that the micro-macro paradox identified by Mosley (1987) to which I shall return below is non-existent – even in the context of the traditional aid-growth literature.

(Easterly, 2001). If the key driver of the productive impact of aid is related more to incentives and relative prices and more generally to the policy environment then it becomes important to consider potentially distortionary effects of aid on incentives and economic policies in the aid receiving system and vice versa. An example is ‘Dutch disease’, and domestic demand and resource allocation may be twisted in undesirable directions following a large aid inflow if macroeconomic management is weak. One concrete example is that aid donors often pay much higher wages to national experts and staff than equally – or in many cases – more important national institutions.²²

Third, a large and growing literature on the political economy of aid, see for example Kanbur (2003), Gunning (2005) and Svensson (2000), has argued that if aid allows a recipient government (local elites) to pursue behaviour that is in any way anti-developmental then the potential positive impact of aid can be undermined. There are many such examples available in practice ranging from outright misuse of aid by corrupt governments to more subtle issues such as the potential negative impact of aid on domestic taxation (Adam and O’Connell, 1999).

The third generation debate about aid’s impact on growth is rooted in the above kinds of observations as well as in Mosley’s (1987) micro-macro paradox. He suggested that while aid seems to be effective at the microeconomic level,²³ identifying any positive impact of aid at the macroeconomic level is harder, or even impossible. In fact, the micro-macro paradox seemed self evident to many at the time it was formulated where the general atmosphere was one of aid fatigue and lack of belief in a positive impact of aid on growth. Another explanation, which can be referred to as the ‘iron law of regressions’, received less attention. It must never be overlooked that once we try to explain a ‘dirty’ dependent variable with noisy data and weak proxies it should come as no surprise that the result is biased towards zero, or in this case even towards the negative given the aid allocation behaviour of donors. What Mosley and many after him have struggled with is how to control for the wildly changing circumstances under which aid has been implemented. We can (and should) look to history and try to treat it as a controlled experiment, but we are at the end of the day limited by the extent to which our proxies capture the massive changes in circumstances under which aid is implemented over time and across countries.

Boone (1994) managed to stir up the aid-growth debate again in the early to mid-1990s. His work was cited in *The Economist* on 10 December 1994 under the colourful heading: ‘Aid Down the ‘Rathole’’, and Boone did indeed suggest that aid does not create, nor correlate with those underlying factors which cause growth. Boone did not, however, occupy centre stage for long. His underlying theoretical model was qualified by Obstfeld (1999). Moreover, Boone treated the aid-growth relationship as linear, and did not account for the potential endogeneity of aid. Finally, and much more importantly, a highly influential idea spread, in part due to effective backing by the World Bank. This is the idea that while aid has on average no impact on growth aid may still work in some countries or time periods. Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) pursued this and argued that ‘aid works, but only in countries with ‘good policy’’. They based this conclusion on an aid-policy interaction term, introduced to capture the non-linearity between aid and growth, and this term emerged as statistically significant in their panel data analysis. In sum, Burnside-Dollar provided an attractive and very elegant solution to the micro-macro paradox with clear-cut and easy to interpret policy implications, which were in addition very much in line with orthodox development thinking.

Burnside and Dollar, and more recently Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), have used the foregoing framework as a basis for suggesting that aid should be directed to ‘good policy’ countries to improve aid’s impact on poverty alleviation. The index meant to capture ‘good policy’ has gradually been expanded from the Burnside-Dollar focus on budget surplus, inflation and openness

²² See Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) for a recent contribution.

²³ Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) also discuss the micro-economic evidence on positive ex-post rates of return of World Bank aid projects, referred to above. Median returns range between 10 to 30 per cent for the period 1996 to 2001.

to the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index.²⁴ The argument for allocating aid selectively is also, at least partly, justified with reference to the finding that the amount of aid countries receive has no impact on the quality of their macroeconomic policies, a finding that also appeared to emerge from Bank-funded research (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001).²⁵ While the Bank's Monterrey document (World Bank, 2002) toned down these recommendations, and the World Bank (2005b) strikes a very different line of argument in its interpretation of the policy reform process during the 1990s, the basic thrust in much of the international aid debate remains that macroeconomic performance evaluation and policy criteria should play a key role in aid allocation.

The thorny academic dilemma in all this includes that: (i) Hansen and Tarp (2001) found that the Burnside-Dollar result is far from robust. In fact, it appeared at the time that diminishing returns where aid squared is introduced into the analysis to capture non-linear effects between aid and growth was the empirical specification with most support in the data. In contrast, the data did not support the Burnside-Dollar aid-policy interaction term;²⁶ (ii) Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) showed the same with the Burnside and Dollar data set, once it had been made available to researchers outside the World Bank, performing a general-to-specific test; (iii) Easterly *et al.* (2004) found the Burnside-Dollar aid-policy story to be fragile in the face of an expansion of the data set in years and countries; and finally (iv) Roodman offers a comparative assessment of the large number of stories on the relationship between how much foreign aid a country receives and how it grows, which the contemporary econometric literature has generated. He concludes that the aid-policy link (identified by Burnside-Dollar) proves the weakest, while the aid-tropics link (identified by Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2004) is most robust.

Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp argue that aid and policy both depend on the average rate of growth even though they are predetermined in the original system. They therefore take account of this in their empirical testing, which also controls for the potential endogeneity of institutions. In their attempt at assessing the importance of structural characteristics on aid effectiveness they add the fraction of land in tropical areas as a proxy for climate related variables, and this variable and its interaction with aid outperform both the 'good policy' and 'the diminishing returns' model. In concluding, Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp make the point that it does appear from the data as if aid has been far less effective in tropical area over the last 30 years. They also stress that it is hard to believe that aid should, inherently, be less potent in the tropics. The real explanation for the aid-tropics link is in their assessment likely to lie elsewhere; and they call for further research to help disentangle the channels through which aid matters for productivity and efficiency. Their result also highlights that while there is certainly merit in more sophisticated versions of arguments for selectivity, macroeconomic allocation rules depend critically on understanding of the complex links

²⁴ The CPIA index assesses the quality of a country's present policy and institutional framework in 20 different dimensions, assessed by World Bank experts on a scale from 1 to 6. Each item has a 5 per cent weight in the overall rating. The items are grouped into four categories: 'Economic Management', 'Structural Policies', 'Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity' and 'Public Sector Management and Institutions'.

²⁵ This volume was reviewed by Tarp (2001).

²⁶ The turning point at which increased aid will start having a negative impact on growth was originally estimated around 25 – 40 per cent. This is, as is clear from Figure 1, very far above the typical aid country, and Hansen and Tarp (2000) warned that the empirical identification of the turning point should in any case be interpreted with great care. The diminishing returns thesis was not put forward as a definitive statement about how aid impacts, or what would happen if aid was increased, more as a way of characterizing the data and putting the fragility of the Burnside-Dollar policy story into perspective. When trying to capture non-linearities in the aid-growth relation it is advisable to test all respectable alternative economically and statistically meaningful specifications before conclusions are drawn. In sum, the diminishing returns story should not be interpreted as an argument against more aid *per se*.

in particular country circumstances between aid, growth and development objectives such as poverty reduction.

What this (and the long list of other studies listed in for example Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004) adds up to can in my assessment be summarized as follows:

- It may well be true that ‘aid pays a growth price’ as growth regularly gives way to other concerns as the most important criterion for aid.²⁷ Yet, the single most common result of recent empirical aid-growth studies is that aid has a positive impact on per capita growth.²⁸ At the same time, aid is by no means a panacea for growth and poverty reduction.
- The way in which data are dealt with to address the complex issue of identifying the impact of aid on growth is critically important for the conclusions drawn. Methodological choices matter.
- The impact of aid on growth is not the same across aid recipients. There are differences in aid efficiency from country to country; and it remains unclear what drives these differences. In particular, the importance of ‘deep’ structural characteristics in affecting how aid impacts on growth is not yet fully understood.

Furthermore, using ‘good policy’ (in the form of the CPIA index) as a basis for allocating aid selectively is questionable. There are at least three reasons:

- An attraction of the original Burnside-Dollar index was its simplicity. It was controversial but easy to interpret. It is much harder to derive clear cut policy advice based on any positive interaction between aid and the CPIA. The CPIA is, as already noted, a composite index of 20 different variables grouped in four categories. In spite of the descriptive value of the CPIA index, which I do not question, it is from an analytical point of view far from easy to decipher what drives aid efficiency when indicators of ‘economic management’, ‘structural policies’, social policies’ and ‘public sector management and institutions’ are aggregated into one measure. In addition, trade-offs between the elements of the index are bound to arise in practice. For example, placing greater emphasis on budget balance (an element in ‘economic management’) may well be in conflict with improving health care, education etc. belonging to the component ‘building human resources’ which forms part of ‘policies for social inclusion/equity’. Improved budget balance may also lead to a lower ‘pro-poor expenditure index’ shown to be poverty reducing by Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004).
- The changes in the CPIA index may well be caused by the growth performance, in which case the CPIA should not be used as an exogenous variable.²⁹ Moreover, Mauro (1995) highlights that using expert evaluations may be problematic, the argument being that an

²⁷ Food aid in famine situations geared toward increased consumption is a specific case in point as is, more generally, aid for consumption that is not investment targeted.

²⁸ Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) estimate that the aggregate real rate of return on foreign aid financed investments is in the range of 20-25 per cent. Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) are more critical, and their approach to the use of external instruments in cross-section analysis is potentially interesting, provided strong exogenous instruments can be found. This remains to be seen. Their account of the panel data literature needs considerable revision to become comparable with existing studies referred to above.

²⁹ Similar concerns are alluded to by Cornia (2005) when he points out that it far from clear what can be concluded based on negative correlation between ‘bad governance/corruption’ and ‘slow/negative growth in GDP per capita’. It may – in Cornia’s formulation – be that other unobserved variables are at work, such as ‘high illiteracy and low land productivity that simultaneously reduce growth and the salaries of civil servants, who therefore asks bribes whenever possible’.

evaluator is likely to conclude that a particular set of institutions is good if the country in question is growing rapidly.

- The use of ‘good policy’ may lead us to punish countries with unfavourable conditions instead of helping them. This is so since there is a very high probability that a country with a low CPIA is in the tropical region. If the variation in aid effectiveness across countries is not policy induced, but rather a result of poor initial conditions, a different approach to allocating aid has to be established. At the same time, every effort has of course to be made to help put in place improved policy, which helps growth and poverty reduction.

In sum, it is advisable to be alert about what is in fact unknown. This implies, for example, that more attention should be given in future research on foreign aid and development to different modalities of aid (such as project versus programme assistance) and their design and application in different types of aid receiving countries. One difficulty in this is that it is by no means straightforward to derive general results across countries with available theory and data.³⁰

To put this in further perspective, it may be useful to take a pragmatic look at the aid-growth data in Table 4 (and the three additional tables in the Annex), which illustrates the difficulties of coming up with simple aid-growth stories. Inherent in this table is the following question: ‘Does aid above/below average in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s help determine whether countries were successful in terms of growth in the subsequent decades?’ As is clear from the table there are 16 categories of aid-growth experiences. They can be summarized as follows in four sets of growth experiences:

- 18 countries experienced negative growth in both the 1980s and 1990s. The clear majority of countries in this group received below average aid in both the 1970s and 1980s. Only two countries (Djibouti and Gabon) are associated with above average aid in both decades.
- 11 countries experienced positive growth in the 1980s, but negative growth in the 1990s. Most of these countries received below average aid in both decades. There is only one case where aid remained above average (Guinea-Bissau), and only two countries where aid went from below to above average aid (Gambia and Somalia).
- 33 countries had negative growth in the 1980s, but positive growth in the 1990s. The majority of countries in this group had below average aid in both the 1970s and 1980s. There is only one country where aid went from above average to below average aid (Fiji).
- 48 countries had positive growth in both the 1980s and 1990s, the majority with below average aid in both the 1970s and 1980s. Two countries (Jamaica and Lesotho) moved from below average to above average aid, and three went from above to below average aid (Egypt, Swaziland and Tunisia).

It should be recognized up-front that the implicit 10 year aid-growth impact lag in Table 4 is longer than the four-year lag that is typical in cross-country regression work, and I reiterate that this kind of empirical overview can at best be illustrative. No causality can be implied. Yet it does seem to me that while there is little in this that identifies aid as a highly potent driver of growth and development across the board (aid cannot buy growth and development), there is even less in Table 4 to suggest that aid has done harm from an overall point of view.³¹

³⁰ See Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) for an attempt, relying on cross country data.

³¹ In addition to the results included in the Annex, we have experimented with a series of alternative groupings and classifications, including for example varying growth rates. The overall picture remains the same.

Table 4. Aid and growth, 1970-2000

		Negative growth (1990-2000)		Positive growth (1990-2000)			
		Aid below average (1980-90)	Aid above average (1980-90)	Aid below average (1980-90)	Aid above average (1980-90)		
Negative growth (1980-90)	Aid below average (1970-80)	Algeria Angola Cen. African Rep. Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote d'Ivoire Ecuador Haiti Honduras Iraq	Liberia Madagascar Niger Sierra Leone Togo Zambia	Sao Tome and Principe	Argentina Bolivia Ethiopia Ghana Guatemala Guyana Iran, Islamic Rep. Lebanon Malawi Mali Mozambique	Namibia Nicaragua Nigeria Panama Peru Philippines Saudi Arabia Trin. and Tob. Uganda Venezuela, RB	Costa Rica El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Senegal
	Aid above average (1970-80)		Djibouti Gabon	Fiji	Kiribati Mauritania Pa. New Guinea Samoa	Suriname Syrian Arab Republic Vanuatu	
Positive growth (1980-90)	Aid below average (1970-80)	Burundi Cameroon Chad Kenya Mongolia Paraguay Rwanda	Gambia, The Somalia	Bangladesh Barbados Benin Bhutan Brazil Burkina Faso Chile China Colombia Dom. Republic Guinea India Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia	Mauritius Mexico Morocco Myanmar Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Sudan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Uruguay Vietnam Zimbabwe	Jamaica Lesotho	
	Aid above average (1970-80)	Congo, Rep.	Guinea-Bissau	Egypt, Arab Rep. Swaziland Tunisia	Ant. and Bar. Belize Botswana Cape Verde Dominica Grenada Jordan	Oman Seychelles Solomon Islands St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vinc. and Gren. Tonga	

Note: Aid is ODA/capita in constant US\$, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita
Source: World Bank (2005c)

Hard and clear cut evidence is difficult to uncover from this kind of analysis. There is no simple answer. We are instead left with lots of special cases, where country specific circumstances have played a key role in determining the growth outcome and how donors reacted in the allocation of aid. This is one motivation why cross country regression analysis has been so popular. Data are after all the plural form of anecdotes. But the picture in Table 4 also helps suggest why controversy remains.

5. Discussion of the current aid and development debate

Has foreign aid been a success or failure in promoting development? Based on some of the most influential contributions to the foreign aid literature over the past decade, including for example the works of Boone, Burnside-Dollar, Sachs and Easterly, it might appear that ‘The answer, my friend, is blowin’ in the wind’.³² Boone (2006) has recently reiterated that ‘the history of large aid flows is, to date, a major failure’, while Burnside-Dollar (2000) found that aid promotes growth, but only when policy is ‘good’.

On the other hand, Sachs (2005) and the UN Millennium Project (2005) argue emphatically that aid has worked and should be ‘scaled up’. Sachs has played a key role as special adviser to the UN Secretary General on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and he makes a concerted effort to reinstate many of the traditional arguments within development economics for believing aid works in helping poor countries break out of poverty traps. He refers to investments attuned to local needs and uses a vocabulary, which is phrased along gap-filling lines of thinking. He also dismisses corruption and domestic policy failure as the fundamental ‘cause’ of Africa’s problems, and argues instead that the causal links originate in poverty and the lack of growth. Sachs furthermore provides (p. 259) ‘ten dramatic examples that prove the naysayers wrong’. These examples, which are referred to as ‘clear aid triumphs’, range from aid’s contribution to the Green Revolution of Asia to the eradication of smallpox and polio and on to the mobile phone revolution in Bangladesh. They demonstrate in Sachs’ words (p. 265) some common themes. ‘First and foremost, scaling up is possible when it is backed by appropriate and widely applicable technology, organizational leadership, and appropriate financing’; and he goes on to state that in ‘the case of the Millennium Development Goals, the promising technologies exist, but have not been scaled up’.

Cornia (2005) pointedly notes that Sachs deserves a lot of credit for his ‘passionate advocacy’. Moreover, Sachs does manage to call attention to at least some of the ways in which aid has helped poor people in the past, and his suggestion that much more can and should be done and his menu of initiatives deserve in my assessment attention.³³ At the same time, it is as argued by Cornia problematic that so much of the present development debate is being cast in terms of increases in aid flows for the achievement of the MDGs. This is to quote Cornia ‘reductionist’ as it ignores that the development process is much more sensitive to macroeconomic, financial and technological changes (or their lack thereof) than to the aggregate volume of aid. In addition, even if it is accepted that aid works, and works well, it is unlikely that the MDGs can be reached if aid is increased to 0.7 per cent of donor GNI as argued by Sachs. The return will in even the best of circumstances not be big enough. I am afraid that mobilising such optimistic expectations may in the final analysis lead in a few years to frustration and an undesired backlash.

Easterly has over the years been an articulated critic of foreign aid, and in his latest contributions (Easterly, 2005, 2006), he attacks the UN Millennium Project and the work of Sachs head on. He refers to the white man’s burden and ponders ‘Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest

³² Bob Dylan song, where the full text is available at <http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/blowin.html>

³³ The UN Millennium Project (2005) goes on to recommend no less than 449 interventions to end poverty.

have done so much ill and so little good'. Easterly deserves a lot of credit for demonstrating in his many writings that much went wrong in aid in the past, and he is absolutely right in identifying the lack of attention to micro-economic incentives as a particularly sore point. Much can – and should – be gained in thinking about aid in the future from taking this to heart.³⁴ At the same time, his sarcastic style and his lashing out at anyone, who seems to argue that aid may have something to offer, and his rejection of any type of 'planning' and coordination is far from balanced.³⁵ It is as if the word 'planning' triggers him off, and makes him conclude the exact opposite, i.e. 'the right plan is to have no plan'. Easterly is right in pointing out that a lot of individual initiative has been stifled over the years under the burden of dogmatic and centralized planning practices and bureaucratic incompetence. Human initiative and appropriate incentives are correctly identified by Easterly as two critically important elements in making development happen. However, it is in the context of the present paper unfortunate that Easterly fails to distinguish issues of foreign aid from issues of appropriate development strategy. It is crucial in evaluating the effectiveness of aid to distinguish failures of the aid process from failures of overall development strategy;³⁶ and this Easterly seems to ignore. As an aside much of our present knowledge about what works and what does not work in development is based on research sponsored by aid agencies (including much of both Easterly's and Sachs's work – as well as my own!).

Summing-up, Easterly and Sachs have done a commendable job in energizing the current debate about foreign aid; but looking ahead it is important that their respective conflicting approaches do not get in the way of much needed constructive and forward looking dialogue about how best to design and implement aid in the future. The way in which I would summarize the existing situation of the current aid and development debate is therefore that there does seem to be consensus about at least the following three points:

- Much has been learnt from both successes and failures about development and development policy over the past 50 years, and lots of disagreement remains as well. On many questions our profession is still searching for appropriate answers.
- The more than one billion people, who are living in extreme poverty in today's world, should not be left to themselves. Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) state: 'developed countries should not abandon the poor to their plight'; Easterly (2005) notes: 'Aid can still do much for the poor'; and even Boone (2006) argues that: 'The aid successes with which we are all familiar ... are important'. Much of the controversy in the academic and policy debate is about aid's performance in the past. The need and relevance of such action in the future is (ignoring the 'pure' ideologists aside) not disputed,³⁷ but whether such action is justified by political, economic or moral considerations varies.

³⁴ See Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004) for an elaboration of this point and a set of examples.

³⁵ It is certainly amusing to read about 'Bono, Sachs, the Dalai Lama, and the pope' in Easterly (2001, p. 126), but Easterly (2006) creates far too many caricatures. While it may be good analytical economics to simplify the world, the real world and the development process are more complicated than that.

³⁶ Aid failure comes in two forms. First is failure in the aid strategy where aid is pursued in spite of the fact that we know it fails to support any of the elements of successful development strategy. An example is programme lending in an environment where the recipient simply diverts fungible resources to unproductive uses. The second kind of aid failure relates to aid delivery, including design, modality or implementation. Examples here include transferring inappropriate technology, relying on inadequate technical assistance personnel or ignoring (in Easterly's terminology) that 'incentives matter'.

³⁷ To illustrate, I fully acknowledge the key incentive and agency problems associated with aid transfers such as those uncovered by Svensson (2000, 2005), and he does not on this basis conclude that aid is without potential impact on the development process.

- There are many examples where aid has worked at the micro-level to the benefit of developing countries and their populations. It is also true that aid is far from flawless. There are many cases where aid has not worked to help the poor. Sachs (2006) notes: 'Current aid suffers from four inter-related flaws', and goes on to pinpoint these flaws. Whether all this adds up to a positive net impact on growth at the macro level is contentious.

6. Conclusion

Controversy is rampant in the debate about aid and development. This is not particularly surprising. Even a cursory look at history shows that development over the past 30-50 years has been a complex and variegated process. There have been interrelated changes in resource accumulation, population growth, growth in knowledge and improvements in production technology, all operating in an environment, characterized by frequent and dramatic transformations in politics and institutions.³⁸ Moreover, social science lacks the ability to carry out fully controlled experiments and therefore has to rely on interpretations of history. The analyst must be aware of the dangers of over-simplification, and single-cause theories have not fared well in development economics. This reflects that simple policy recommendations are often inappropriate in a complex world, and this is so whether such recommendations have emanated from the planning tradition of the 1960s and 1970s or from the free market thinking of the 1980s.

On this background, I have tried to highlight in this paper that one cannot conclude that aid has been a failure just because growth in for example Africa has been less than desired, or because projects have failed. It is exceedingly easy to arrive at a negative association between aid and growth, but such correlations do not provide a definitive causal answer. There is no logical inconsistency in development terms between little growth and aid inflows of the size experienced in the past. Aid allocation matters for the analysis; and complex development problems and issues are looming in the background. Major changes have taken place in the global economy and affected the environment in which aid is implemented, and targets for aid have been changing from one decade to the next. Simple correlation analysis or story telling cannot – and should not – be allowed to settle the causality debate on their own; and aid has in any case been of much too limited a size relative to the size of the problem to turn the wheels of history.

I recognize as should be clear from this paper that cross-country econometric studies are associated with critical methodological choices, and that many significant changes have taken place in the world economy over the past decades. Coming up with the 'true' aid-growth relationship is far from easy, and aid is of much too limited size to turn the wheels of history. Yet, this does not make it justified to reject aid as a useful instrument in the fight against poverty. If we are agreed that aid works at least somewhere and sometimes, then aid must be outright harmful elsewhere for the average impact to be nil. I can follow that some aid has not done all that much good, and this is a shame. Yet, there is a significant difference between doing little good and doing outright harm. I fail to see that the empirical evidence adds up to a suggestion that a lot of ill has actually been done across an important sample of countries. Similarly, it is one thing to call attention to problems that should definitely be addressed, it is quite another to dismiss foreign aid as harmful. My overall assessment is that nuanced and subtle assessments are advisable with the empirical evidence in hand at present.

Burnside-Dollar added welcome analytical nuance to Boone, as have others; but the Burnside-Dollar solution to the micro-macro paradox has been countered over and again in the literature and is shown to be highly delicate. Methodological choices do matter. Nevertheless, the

³⁸ See Tarp (2000), and here especially the summary and synthesis (authored with Sherman Robinson).

single most common result in the modern aid-growth literature is that aid has a positive impact on per capita growth. No excessive claims about parameter sizes and total aid impact should be made on this basis. Foreign aid has been associated with development successes and failures, and the fundamental analytical problem is that nobody has to date identified the underlying development model. We are therefore necessarily working with reduced form models, which are debatable. Yet, this should of course not be allowed to totally overshadow the established results at hand. I am in this context puzzled that Easterly so often ignores these and instead tries to use cross country work as a basis for his critical view of foreign aid. The ‘iron law of econometrics’ suggests that with noisy data, a ‘dirty’ dependent variable and weak proxies results will be biased towards zero. The challenge is against this background to clarify whether the data still have anything meaningful to say; and I believe this is indeed the case when sufficient care is exercised.³⁹

It is in my assessment justified to argue for increased aid, but expectations about its impact on growth should be kept at reasonable levels. This is where the many claims of Sachs and the Millennium Project can at times give rise to worry. It would be unfortunate if unrealistic expectations about aid impact are built up much along the lines of what happened back in the 1950s and 1960s, in the early stages of aid’s existence. At the same time, asserting that (i) aid has a positive impact; (ii) should be ‘scaled up’, and (iii) that its impact does not appear to be conditional on ‘good policy’, is not in any way in contradiction with suggesting that future aid should be carefully redesigned. In this we should draw on the many insights offered by aid critiques, including prominent ones such as Easterly. His investigations do as noted by Sen (2006) ‘offer the basis for a reasoned critique of the formulaic thinking and policy triumphalism of some of the literature on economic development’; but there is a difference between helping to cure a patient and eliminating him. It must as well not be overlooked that much is indeed already happening on the foreign aid scene. Major shifts have taken place in aid modalities over the past 15 years, and Adam (2005) highlights the issues of the role of independent evaluation, of coordination among multiple donors, and attempts to sharpen the incentives for recipients to maximize ‘reform effort’. He also argues that the general rise of a culture of transparency and accountability is more than superficial, and goes on to point out that the March 2005 Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness is an attempt to codify some of the best-practice developments observed in a number of countries.⁴⁰

Turning to the debate about the allocation of aid, there is in my view merit in more sophisticated versions of arguments for selectivity. It makes for example little sense to do structural adjustment lending when the macro policy environment is ‘bad’ and there is little possibility for policy reform. However, I am based on the empirical work on aid effectiveness during the past decade convinced that macro criteria cannot – and should not – stand alone in evaluating the effectiveness of most development assistance and determining its allocation. ‘Good policy’ can be dangerously misleading as the fundamental criterion for aid allocation, and simplistic macro rules-of-thumb may reinforce the adversity of those living under substandard governance. It is a regrettable fact that many of the world’s poorest people live in conditions of substandard national, regional, and/or local governance and lack any tenable means of changing these institutions. It would be gravely ironic for aid agencies to compound the misfortunes of these people with discriminatory aid allocation. We do not at present have the necessary complete and generalized understanding of the complex links in particular country circumstances between aid, growth and development objectives such as poverty reduction to justify selectivity as the basic approach in aid allocation. Country specific circumstances that are difficult to generalize are critical in the

³⁹ One can also note that the conventional wisdom at the end of the 1980s tended to over-emphasize or misinterpret studies which had found a negative or insignificant relationship (see Hansen and Tarp, 2000).

⁴⁰ The text of this forum is available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf>. See also Adam and Gunning (2002) and Adam *et al.* (2004).

generation of aid policy advice. This does not mean that old-fashioned conditionality should be brought back to rule the way; but it may be time to recognize more openly that development aid involves contractual relations between donors and aid recipients, which deserve increased attention.⁴¹

Turning to my final point, I would like to stress, first, that it would be gravely ironic if we let disagreement about overall development strategy and the macroeconomic impact of aid get in the way of pursuing practical and useful aid funded activities in poor countries. There is much to criticize in foreign aid, but possibilities for constructive and forward looking action should be kept in mind throughout. There are in my experience lots of them out there in practice, which deserves to be uncovered more precisely and implemented effectively to the benefit of those in need.

⁴¹ This is pursued further in Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004).

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Table A.1. Aid and growth, 1970-2000

		Negative growth (1990-2000)		Positive growth (1990-2000)		
		Aid below average (1980-90)	Aid above average (1980-90)	Aid below average (1980-90)	Aid above average (1980-90)	
Negative growth (1980-90)	Aid below average (1970-80)	Algeria Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote d'Ivoire Ecuador Gabon Haiti Honduras Iraq Madagascar	Liberia Sierra Leone Zambia	Argentina Bolivia Costa Rica El Salvador Fiji Ghana Guatemala Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua	Nigeria Panama Peru Philippines Saudi Arabia Trin.and Tob. Uganda Venezuela, RB	Equatorial Guinea Guyana
	Aid above average (1970-80)		Central African Republic Niger Togo	Suriname Syrian Arab Republic	Kiribati Malawi Mali Mauritania	Papua New Guinea Senegal Vanuatu
Positive growth (1980-90)	Aid below average (1970-80)	Cameroon Kenya Paraguay		Antigua and Barbuda Bangladesh Barbados Brazil Chile China Colombia Dom. Republic India Indonesia Jamaica Malaysia Mexico Morocco Oman	Pakistan Sri Lanka St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia Sudan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Uruguay Zimbabwe	Benin Grenada Nepal
	Aid above average (1970-80)	Congo, Rep.	Burundi Chad Comoros Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Rwanda Somalia	Belize Botswana Egypt, Arab Rep. Swaziland	Burkina Faso Dominica Jordan Lesotho Seychelles Solomon Islands St. Vincent and the Grenadines	

Note: Aid is ODA share of GNI, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita
Source: World Bank (2005c)

Table A.2. Aid and growth, 1970-2000

		Negative growth (1990-2000)		Positive growth (1990-2000)			
		Aid below median (1980-90)	Aid above median (1980-90)	Aid below median (1980-90)	Aid above median (1980-90)		
Negative growth (1980-90)	Aid below median (1970-80)	Algeria Angola Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote d'Ivoire Ecuador	Haiti Honduras Iraq Madagascar Sierra Leone	Sao Tome and Principe	Argentina Ethiopia Ghana Guatemala Iran, Islamic Rep. Malawi Mozambique Namibia	Nigeria Peru Philippines Saudi Arabia Trinidad and Tobago Uganda Venezuela, RB	El Salvador
	Aid above median (1970-80)	Central African Republic Liberia Niger Togo Zambia	Djibouti Gabon	Bolivia Fiji Guyana Lebanon	Mali Nicaragua Panama	Costa Rica Equatorial Guinea Kiribati Mauritania Papua New Guinea Vanuatu	Samoa Senegal Suriname Syrian Arab Republic
Positive growth (1980-90)	Aid below median (1970-80)	Burundi Kenya Mongolia Paraguay		Bangladesh Benin Bhutan Brazil Burkina Faso Chile China Colombia Dominican Rep. Guinea India Indonesia	Malaysia Mexico Myanmar Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Sudan Thailand Turkey Uruguay Vietnam Zimbabwe		
	Aid above median (1970-80)	Cameroon Chad Congo, Rep. Rwanda	Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Somalia	Barbados Egypt, Arab Rep. Lao PDR Mauritius	Morocco Swaziland Tanzania Tunisia	Ant. and Barbuda Belize Botswana Cape Verde Dominica Grenada Jamaica Jordan	Lesotho Oman Seychelles Solomon Islands St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Tonga

Note: Aid is ODA/capita in constant US\$, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita
Source: World Bank (2005c)

Table A.3. Aid and growth, 1970-2000

		Negative growth (1990-2000)		Positive growth (1990-2000)			
		Aid below median (1980-90)	Aid above median (1980-90)	Aid below median (1980-90)		Aid above median (1980-90)	
Negative growth (1980-90)	Aid below median (1970-80)	Algeria Congo, Dem. Rep. Cote d'Ivoire Ecuador Honduras Iraq Madagascar	Sierra Leone Zambia	Argentina Bolivia Costa Rica El Salvador Fiji Ghana Guatemala Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua	Nigeria Panama Peru Philippines Saudi Arabia Trin. and Tob. Uganda Venezuela, RB	Equatorial Guinea Guyana Kiribati Malawi Mali Mauritania Papua New Guinea Senegal Vanuatu	
	Aid above median (1970-80)	Gabon Haiti	Central African Republic Liberia Niger Togo	Suriname Syrian Arab Republic			
Positive growth (1980-90)	Aid below median (1970-80)	Paraguay		Barbados Brazil Chile China Colombia Dominican Rep. India Indonesia Jamaica Malaysia Mexico Morocco	Oman St. Lucia Sudan Thailand Turkey Uruguay Zimbabwe		
	Aid above median (1970-80)	Cameroon Congo, Rep. Kenya	Burundi Chad Comoros Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Rwanda Somalia	Ant. and Barb. Bangladesh Belize Botswana Egypt, Arab Rep. Pakistan	Sri Lanka St. Kitts and Nevis Swaziland Tunisia	Benin Burkina Faso Dominica Grenada Jordan	Lesotho Nepal Seychelles Solomon Islands St. Vin. and Gren.

Note: Aid is ODA share of GNI, and growth is average annual growth in GDP/capita
Source: World Bank (2005c)