Limits to Liberal Government

An Alternative History of Governmentality

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Published in:
Administration & Society

DOI:
10.1177/0095399715587521

Publication date:
2018

Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print

Citation for published version (APA):
Limits to Liberal Government: An Alternative History of Governmentality

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Abstract
In contrast to the widely voiced notion about a current neoliberal hegemony, the article seeks to demonstrate that the distinctly liberal form of governmental rationality and practice is neither neoliberal, at least not in the conventional sense of the word, nor hegemonic. Rather than a minimal government pursuing laissez-faire politics, liberal government is an ‘omnipresent’ form of government aiming to widen and deepen a particular regulatory game of freedom and security. Important as this form of omnipresent government may currently be, however, it is also limited by the persistence and pervasiveness of the key historical alternatives to liberal government: domination, democracy, and discipline.

Keywords
liberalism, governmentality, governance, regimes

The current success of liberalism has become a vital issue of debate, giving rise to claims about a more or less global neoliberal hegemony (Bradley & Luxton, 2010; Harvey, 2005; Plehwe, Walpen, & Neunhöffer, 2006), new forms of global governance (Lee & McBride, 2007), the dominance of profit

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and corporations in public life (Chomsky, 2011; Crouch, 2013), and the infamous liberal end to history (Fukuyama, 2006). Liberalism and neoliberalism have also been seen to give rise to specific policies of deregulation and market fundamentalism (Larner, 2000; Pedersen & Campbell, 2001), as well as the administrative paradigm of New Public Management (NPM), including various forms of post-NPM conducted under the heading of “governance” (Bevir, 2013; Catlaw & Sandberg, 2014; Jessop, 2002). The article makes two interrelated claims in relation to this debate.

In contrast to the dominant interpretation of liberal government as a “neoliberal” return to minimalist government, market fundamentalism, and laissez-faire politics, the article claims that liberal government is rather a form of omnipresent government, currently expressed in most exemplary fashion by the governance paradigm of administrative policy and regulation. Such liberal government is not an extension of the political ideology or economic theory of liberalism, but rather a form of government shaped by its relations to the historical alternatives on the level of governmental rationality and practice: dominance, democracy, and discipline. This implies, second, that current assumptions about an era of liberal hegemony should be tempered by a more nuanced understanding of the specific limits of liberal government produced by the persistence of alternative forms of governmental rationality and practice, as opposed to the focus on ideological alternatives and party-political compromises.

The article is structured as follows. The first section provides a general discussion and definition of the concept of liberal government as introduced by Michel Foucault in his later lectures. Proceeding from this definition, the following section discusses the need for a revision of “the history of governmentality” underpinning the notion of liberal government. Third, I outline a model of governmental regimes based on an alternative history of governmentality. The ensuing sections elaborate the forms of government identified in this analysis in more detail. I conclude by discussing the contributions of the analysis to the overall ambition of providing critical and effective histories of the present.

**Liberalism as Government**

The argument presented here takes its basic inspiration from the work of Michel Foucault, in particular, the lectures given at College de France between 1977 and 1979 titled “Security, Territory and Population” and “The Birth of Bio-Politics” (Foucault, 2007, 2008). As Foucault (2008) states at the conclusion of the lectures, the purpose of his approach is to
analyze “liberalism” not as a theory or an ideology, and even less, obviously, as a way in which “society” represents itself, but as a practice, that is to say a “way of doing things” directed towards objectives and regulating itself by continuous reflection. Liberalism, then, is to be analyzed as a principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government. (p. 318)

Two crucial implications follow from this approach to the analysis of liberalism.

The first implication is that government is understood “... as an activity that consists in governing people’s conduct within the framework of, and using the instruments of, a state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 318). This definition of government clearly deviates from more conventional definitions of government as a particular institutional arrangement or a specific set of actors. Rather, the definition must be seen against the background of what Deleuze has referred to as Foucault’s (1988) “functional” analysis of power (p. 25). In contrast to institutional or behavioral ideas of power, Foucault identifies power with the alignment of otherwise disparate ideas, forms of knowledge, institutions, strategies, taxonomies, instruments, technologies, and so on according to particular functions such as normalization or extraction. This assemblage of diverse elements gives rise to more or less stable networks referred to as “economies” or “dispositifs” of power (Dean, 2013, p. 45). The sedimentation and transformation of such networks are the main focus of Foucault’s work.

In general, the concept of government indicates an analytical orientation toward the particular system of the state within this broader analysis of power. Taking on the perspective of the state raises the question of how and to what extent the state is shaped by, and takes part in, the historical development of broader ensembles of power. This question can be pursued from a societal perspective as a question of the role of the state in the innovation, diffusion, and maintenance of power relations within a particular ensemble of power. By contrast, the analysis conducted here takes on a more state-oriented perspective focused on the codification of power ensembles as strategies for government intervention within the framework of the state. Such an analysis focuses on the codification of power as government, as well as conflicts between different forms of government in concrete strategies of intervention within the state.

The second implication that follows from Foucault’s approach is that the “rationalization of the exercise of government” must be seen as a phenomenon in its own right, distinct from liberal democracy, the political ideology of liberalism, and liberal economic theory. The governmental rationality of liberalism is not determined by the ideology or theory of liberalism or by the
role of liberalism in the party-political domain. Although the exercise of liberal government in a particular political system is perhaps unlikely (if not impossible) without a certain commitment to liberalism in the domain of ideology and politics, the concrete practices of liberal government are not determined by ideological configurations. As such, Foucault’s approach can be seen as a revised form of regime analysis challenging the conventional understanding of political regimes as national political economies that can be classified along distinctions between democratic vis-à-vis autocratic forms of government (see, for example, Burnell & Schlumberger, 2012) or along ideological heritage and party-political configurations (see, for example, Esping-Andersen, 1990; Geddes, 2005; Jessop, 2002).

Foucault does in fact locate the origins of liberal government in the German “ordo-liberal” tradition, which is opposed to market fundamentalism and the laissez-faire politics envisioned by classical “anarcho-liberalism.” Indeed, Foucault’s (2008) analysis can even be said to parallel an analysis of comparative political economy in his subsequent discussion of the spread of this new form of liberal thinking in France and the United States (p. 185). The fact that the “birth” of liberal government is given a geographical location seems to lend itself easily to a distinction between a continental European form of liberalism defined to varying degrees by compromises with Socialism or Social Democracy and an Anglo-American tradition representing classical liberalism and current neoliberalism in its purest form. Such an interpretation would, however, miss the key point of Foucault’s analysis.

In contrast to the idea of national and regional regimes based on various combinations of liberal, conservative, and socialist/social democratic traditions, Foucault locates governmental regimes in the interplay between governmental practice and the larger societal ensembles of power, extending beyond the realm of the state and the political. The majority of Foucault’s work is thus concerned with the analysis of a disciplinary form of power found in domains such as medicine, science, architecture, and the family, which is systematically contrasted with the feudal notion of sovereignty (see Foucault, 1995, for the exemplary analysis). Foucault’s analysis of liberal government is a relatively late addition to this research focus, based on (a) the identification of a third form of power beyond discipline and sovereignty, ingrained in the rise of the modern state and (b) the reinterpretation of discipline and sovereignty as forms of governmental practice in the light of this addition. The following two sections shed more light on each of these steps, in particular, with respect to the liberal nature of liberal government and the methodology and specific empirical claims of the so-called history of governmentality on which the analysis of liberal government is based.
What Is Liberal About Liberal Government?

The result of this revised analysis of governmental regimes advanced by Foucault (2007) is three “archeological layers” of governmental practice: sovereignty, a program of raison d’état based on disciplinary power and a form of “governmental management” that has “the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (p. 108). This latter form of “governmental management” is what Foucault will later identify as the liberal form of government, defined by a regulatory “game” of freedom and security. What makes liberal government liberal, in spite of its rejection of classical liberal theory and ideology, is the commitment to freedom (Rose, 1999). Freedom is, however, nothing in itself for liberal government. Freedom is intrinsically bound up with “. . . the strategies of security, which are, in a way, liberalism’s other face, and its very condition . . . . The game of freedom and security is at the very heart of the new governmental reason” (Foucault, 2008, p. 65).

The basic outline of Foucault’s analysis is, however, complicated somewhat by a modulating style of argument, which is exasperated by the fact that the analysis is delivered in the form of lectures. Correspondingly, further development of Foucault’s outline has since become the focal point of a strand of governmentality studies (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 2010) that have produced valuable analyses of the role of freedom within liberal government (Rose, 1996, 1999), the reliance on techniques of self-government (Cruickshank, 1999), and the liberal attempt to shape the population through bio-power and bio-political regulation of the individual and the population (Binkley & Capetillo, 2009; Catlaw, 2007). Although these contributions have provided crucial insights into the nature of liberal government, they are also rather diverse in their understanding of liberal government, in particular, with respect to the current claims about the resurgence of liberal ideology and the existence of neoliberal hegemony.

Although variations of liberalism are clearly acknowledged in the governmentality tradition and elsewhere, most contributions proceed from the idea of a basic continuity between different forms of liberalism (Crouch, 2013; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002). The seminal analysis conducted by Rose (1996, 1999) denotes liberal government as a form of “advanced liberalism,” the development of which is fueled by the internal inconsistencies of, as well as external pressures on, classical liberalism. Echoing the same line of argument, Dean’s (2013) careful reading of Foucault leads to the conclusion that (American) neoliberalism represents the fullest realization of liberal governmentality (p. 66). A recent and otherwise thorough collection of essays
consistently equates liberal government with neoliberalism and identifies Foucault’s approach, inter alia, as a “useful instrument to understand the reasons for the new hegemony of liberal political philosophy” (Lemm & Vatter, 2014, p. 3).

This notion of a basic continuity between different forms of liberalism tends to underestimate the pervasive difference between anarcho-liberalism and a form of liberal government defined by the regulatory game of freedom and security. More specifically, liberal government is too easily conflated with the neoliberal program of market fundamentalism, corporate prerogatives, deregulation, and laissez-faire politics underpinning current claims about the existence of a more or less global liberal hegemony (Bradley & Luxton, 2010; Crouch, 2013; Plehwe et al., 2006). As clearly stated by Foucault (2008), however,

We should not be under any illusion that today’s neo-liberalism is, as is too often said, the resurgence or recurrence of old forms of liberal economics which were formulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and are now being reactivated by capitalism for a variety of reasons to do with its omnipotence and crisis as well as with some more or less local and determinate political objectives. (p. 117)

Liberal government is “new” exactly because it does not revert to the market fundamentalism and laissez-faire program of classical liberalism. Indeed, liberal government can, as we shall see, even be said to substitute the anarcho-liberal ideal of minimal government with an idea of “omnipresent” government.

**Liberal Government and the History of Governmentality**

There is, however, also a more fundamental and methodological reason for the tendency to equate the practices of liberal government with current neoliberal hegemony: the reliance on the history of governmentality. This history of governmentality is outlined by Foucault (2007) in his reflections about changing the original title of his lectures on “security, territory and population” to “a history of governmentality,” which has since come to define the core of the research program of governmentality studies (p. 108). On one hand, the term governmentality can simply be treated as a synonym of liberal government and governmental management. On the other hand, governmentality also denotes a specific methodological program focused on the historical transformation brought about by liberal government in relation to
preceding “archeological layers” of discipline and sovereignty. More specifically, the history of governmentality can be summarized as the idea that sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality constitute three overlapping layers of power and governmental practice, emerging in the historical span from pre-modernity to the present day much like the gradual addition of geological strata (Foucault, 2007, p. 107).

In a wider sense, this approach is guided by Foucault’s overarching goal of providing “effective histories” of the present, that is, to conduct a historical analysis of the power relations that have shaped present thoughts and action. Although this ambition has been pursued in different ways throughout Foucault’s oeuvre, the principles of effective history involve a persistent opposition against the historical schematics of sequential phases and eras, against the idea of singular decisions, events, and revolutions shaping history, as well as the totalizing narratives about historical origins and final causes, historical necessity, and the triumph of will or spirit (Foucault, 1997, p. 140). Fruitful as Foucault’s approach to history may be in other respects, it also tends to reinforce the idea of liberal hegemony due to its historical schema of “layering.” Thus, the analysis is rendered partially ineffective by an overestimation of the role of liberal government and an underestimation of the persistence and present relevance of other layers of power.

The approximation of Foucault’s (2007) analysis to the idea of liberal hegemony is found in the propositions (a) that there is a general development toward pre-eminence of governmentality, which is also to say liberal government, over “all other types of power” throughout “the West” and (b) that the state is gradually taken over by the new form of governmental management through a process referred to as “governmentalization” (pp. 107-108). These are empirical claims that can and should be debated. In the history of governmentality, however, they are rather the result of a particular historical grid of analysis, that is, the notion of archeological layering, ingrained in the very definition of liberal government through its envelopment in the history of governmentality. As such, it is not a simple slip in the argument when the programmatic outline of the history of governmentality leads Foucault (2007) to claim that “we live in the era of governmentality” (p. 109).

Proceeding from this, albeit revised, idea of liberal hegemony, sovereignty, and discipline are seen to lose their relevance in current governmental practice, at least in their original form. More specifically, the role of earlier layers is defined by what Foucault (2007) calls the overall “system of correlation” between forms of governmental practice:

There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security . . . what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the
system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms [i.e. sovereignty], mechanisms of discipline and mechanisms of security. (p. 8)

Setting aside the fact that this stark rejection of clear-cut eras is not easily reconciled with the claim that “we live in the era of governmentality,” the more substantial implication of the relations of correlation put forth as the main alternative to sequential history is the proposition that the addition of new forms of practice retroactively changes earlier forms of practice in terms of their overall function as well as their internal logic and programs.

These retroactive changes in the overall system of correlation work both ways. For one, the expression of retroactive changes is found in what Foucault (2007) calls the “reactivation” and “transformation” of sovereignty and discipline according to the new logic of liberal government (p. 9). This line of argument is a continuation of Foucault’s (1995) most well-known example of transformations in the function and internal logic of a particular regime produced by changes in the overall system of correlation: The proposition that the transition from feudal sovereignty into practices associated with the rule of law, popular sovereignty, and democracy is essentially a modification required by the rise of disciplinary society. In addition to this logic of adjustment of earlier practices to the logic of new practices, however, the relations of correlation also suggest a form of continuity and equivalence between different regimes in the sense that newer additions can be seen as modifications and extensions of earlier layers. This latter issue is particularly evident in the case of the relation between discipline and liberal government.

Indeed, Foucault (2008) initially characterizes liberal government as “...a sort of intensification or internal refinement of raison d’État; it is a principle for maintaining it, developing it more fully, and perfecting it” (p. 22). This stance resonates widely within governmentality studies, in particular, through the dominant interpretation of liberal government as a more or less extensive modification of the original “bio-political” mode of intervention advanced by raison d’état and disciplinary government (see, for example, Binkley & Capetillo, 2009; Catlaw, 2007; Gill, 1995; Lemm & Vatter, 2014; Rose, 2007). Hardt and Negri’s (2000) much debated analysis of “Empire” expresses the logic in exemplary fashion by defining current bio-political practice as an “intensification and generalization of the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity” (p. 23). Although this interpretation is understandable in the light of Foucault’s initial position, it also tends to blur the fact that a defining feature of liberal government, perhaps the defining feature, is its staunch opposition to the disciplinary model of government. To better understand this opposition, and the nature and limits of liberal government in a wider sense, an alternative to the notion of an overall system of correlation pursued by Foucault and the majority of governmentality studies is needed.
A Model of Governmental Regimes

The problem with the history of governmentality is not the notion that history progresses through archeological layering, which is indeed a sound idea, compared with sequential history and other more conventional grids of historical analysis. The problem occurs rather with the translation of the process of historical layering into an analysis of current conditions by way of the framework of a general system of correlation suggested by Foucault. In particular, this framework simultaneously downplays the persistence and continued relevance of earlier regimes and the distinct nature of liberal government due to the focus on the retroactive changes brought about by the addition of new regimes. Correspondingly, Figure 1 presents an alternative model of the current governmental regimes produced by the process of historical layering.

The core proposition underlying this model is that the principal effect of archeological layering should be found in the gradual construction of a set of external and highly specific relations between internally consistent and persistent regimes, as opposed to the internal transformation of these regimes according to the logic of newer and more dominant regimes.

Although this model retains the basic traits of the historical layers identified by Foucault, it does involve a number of revisions. The first revision concerns the relation between fundamental bifurcation between sovereignty and security. Whereas the history of governmentality ascribes a somewhat limited role to security, which is primarily identified as the “essential technology” of liberal government and governmentality, the ensuing analysis is
based on a claim about a fundamental historical split between sovereignty and security at the level of basic political rationality. Security, thus understood, is not a form of technology, nor an attribute of liberal government only, but a form of political authority constituting the primary historical alternative to the political rationality of sovereignty. Second, the model assigns a much more prominent role to the role of popular sovereignty and democratic government, which is largely reduced to an insignificant addition to dynastic sovereignty in the established history of governmentality. Third, the analysis introduces “control” as a distinct ensemble of power corresponding to the particular liberal form of government (based on Deleuze, 1992).

In light of these revisions, the result of historical layering can be summarized in terms of (a) tangential relations indicating a historical relationship and mutual recognition between the regimes of domination and discipline and, alternatively, popular sovereignty and liberal government. In spite of their historical and logical proximity, these regimes are nevertheless mutually exclusive, based on a constitutive historical split between the political rationalities of sovereignty and security. Relations of (b) opposition indicate explicit critique and rejection within the same framework of political rationality. Although the shared framework may lead to overlap between the involved regimes at the level of specific instruments, the underlying conflict about the interpretation of sovereignty and security, respectively, is radical and decisive. Finally, relations of (c) incongruence exist between regimes divided by the political rationalities of sovereignty and security, as well as the historical opposition between competing regimes shaped by these two forms of rationality. Such relations are expressed as mutual “blind spots” and indifference rather than explicit rejection.

The following sections analyze the governmental regimes in more detail. Each regime is analyzed in terms of its constitutive forms of political rationality, or more specifically, the basic premises, purposes, and goals constituting the principles of “rationalization” of government, as well as the specific governmental programs and instruments of intervention. These levels of analysis are inspired by Rose and Miller’s (1992) distinction between rationality, programs, and technologies of government. In contrast to Rose and Miller’s association of programs with “knowledge,” theories, and modes of “problematization,” however, I interpret programs more specifically as operationalizations of government, that is, procedures and organizational principles that specify how to conduct the business of governing. Instruments add a further dimension of specification in terms of specific mechanisms of regulation and intervention. This latter dimension substitutes the level of “technologies” applied by Rose and Miller. Finally, I add the dimension of political identities, denoting the “characteristic ways of forming subject, selves,
persons, actors or agents” found within specific practices and programs of government (Dean, 2010, p. 32).

**Domination: Dynastic Sovereignty and Royal Prerogatives**

Foucault’s interpretation of sovereignty as the basic archeological layer in the triangle of sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality identifies sovereignty as a principle of absolute rule rooted in the historical context of empires, monarchies, and feudal societies. This emphasis on the original “dynastic” core of sovereignty is consistent with more conventional discussions of sovereignty as the founding principle of empires, city-states, and forms of political organization preceding the modern nation-state (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Spruyt, 1994). The basic governmental principle of dynastic sovereignty is domination, which is to say undisputed rule over a given territory and any individual within this territory. In the current state of affairs, such domination is usually considered “exceptional” and rarely included in discussions of routine administrative practice. In the history of governmentality, domination is understood largely in similar fashion as a historical layer less relevant to current practice (Foucault, 2003, p. 35). The governmental rationality and practice of domination is, however, as crucial in the current political system as it ever was.

Some of the most essential programs in the governmental practice of domination are warfare and the state of exception. The conventional area of focus for such programs is of course military warfare and armed conflict. However, the current importance of the governmental program of warfare is rather an effect of what Hardt and Negri (2004) have referred to as the tendency of war to become “general matrix for all social relations of power and techniques of domination, whether or not bloodshed is involved” (p. 13). Although Hardt and Negri’s (2000) claim is somewhat reductionist, as is their earlier and related claim about the resurgence of “Empire,” warfare is becoming an increasingly general program of governmental intervention, extending well beyond the limits of military action. Currently, wars are increasingly being waged on vague and illusive enemies, such as terrorists (Neal, 2010), crime (Simon, 2007), drugs (Benavie, 2009), and obesity (Monoghan, 2008). Such wars testify to a wider and broader application of the program of warfare and its founding distinction between friends/allies and enemies in the everyday administration of areas such as immigration, social policies, labor market, or urban planning beyond the old institutions of the army and the treasury. Furthermore, such wars gradually incorporate warfare into routine administrative practice, reaching from the blurring of military efforts, police intervention, and regular
administration in the case of terrorism to the purely administrative approach in the case of obesity.

This application of older programs originally developed as the royal prerogatives of imperial monarchs is even more pronounced in the case of extraordinary measures, emergency powers, and the state of exception. The state of exception refers to the suspension of the normal legal order under conditions of war and siege. Although most constitutional frameworks define emergency powers in rather specific terms and place limits on the suspension of normal conditions, declaring and maintaining a de facto state of exception have become a much more general form of governmental practice. Indeed, it has been argued that the “the state of exception has become permanent and general: the exception has become the rule, pervading both foreign relation and the homeland” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 7, italics in original, see also Agamben, 2005).

This generalized state of exception implies in increasingly pronounced tendency to base governmental intervention on the claim that “normal conditions no longer apply.” This is demonstrated in exemplary fashion by the current maintenance of a state of exception in the war on terror, leading to suspension of a number of civil rights (Neal, 2010). The need for “extraordinary measures” is, however, also called on routinely in the more general wars such as those waged on obesity and illness. Whereas constitutional definitions of emergency powers have always assumed a clear causality in which the state of exception is a response to war, or at least a warlike situation such as those occurring with natural disaster or catastrophes, the generalized and routinized state of exception questions such causality: War on illusive enemies may be as much an effect of maintaining a state of exception as the other way around.

The essential regulatory instrument of domination is banning and exiling. This argument has been pursued most consistently in Agamben’s revision of Foucault’s analysis. Whereas Foucault found physical punishment, and in particular, the death penalty to be the ultimate instrument of sovereign power, Agamben (1998) advances the claim that physical punishment is in fact rather secondary to the equally medieval praxis, in terms of historical origin, of banning or exiling. Condemning offenders to exile and a status of “outlaws” is, according to Agamben, the principal form of punishment in the earliest forms of political community. Indeed, the practice of banning is what originally makes a community distinctly political, that is, subject to the exercise of a distinctly political form of power. In its most general form, the ban involves an “extreme form of relation” in which someone is included in a community solely through exclusion: The ban makes the outlaw an exile, but by the
structure of the ban, the outlaw also remains a non-person within the community (Agamben, 1998, p. 18).

Current use of the instrument of banning is clearly different from its medieval roots. Exiling is no longer a punishment for specific transgressions dispensed by chiefs and monarchs. The practice of banning and exiling is nevertheless preserved, albeit in a modified form, in the governmental management of “residual groups” with no identifiable social purpose for the current political community. As such, a number of groups are identified and managed as de facto exiles, including immigrants and refugees (Hanafi & Long, 2010), the homeless and the sick (Biehl, 2013), indigenous populations (Perera, 2002), captured terrorists (Elden, 2009), and prostitutes (Munro & Giusta, 2008). The status of exile is clearly not an explicit “sentence” or “punishment” in any of these cases, but rather an effect of the complicated regulatory and legal framework surrounding these groups.

In terms of political identities, domination ultimately rests on a relation between an ultimate ruler and political subjects with no other intrinsic value or meaning than their subjugation to the ruler. This codification of the distinction between ruler and ruled originally found in relation between the monarch and his or her people is still endemic to practices of domination. The dynastic and feudal core of the relation is retained in current practices of domination insofar as the “royal prerogatives” originally bestowed on the monarch is retained by current rulers. The modern framework of constitutional nation-states and international order, according to this line of argument, has not simply served to cull the old royal prerogatives, but has also given rise to modified versions of such prerogatives. Although the particular groups affected most visibly by such prerogatives are defined as residual or particular in relation to the mainstream of the political community, they nevertheless illustrate the fundamental status of political individuals as subjects of domination in terms of what Agamben (1998) has called “bare life,” that is, a state of exposure to abandonment.

**Popular Sovereignty and Democracy**

In addition to the original dynastic formula, sovereignty can also be seen as a source of democratization and restriction of the absolute power expressed by the royal prerogatives of feudal monarchs or current rulers. The basic formula for this counter-movement against dynastic sovereignty is popular sovereignty. The more or less revolutionary movement against absolute power and dynastic sovereignty can clearly be seen as the starting point for a process of regime formation that has resulted in the institutionalization of democracy as a pervasive form of governmental practice. As indicated by Figure 1, the
basic result is an oppositional relation between exception and rights that which can be interpreted in strictly binary terms as a relation of mutual negation. The original conflict between individual rights and the royal prerogatives of past and present sovereigns, thus understood, constitutes a fundamental conflict within the political rationality of sovereignty, which is entirely pervasive in the political system today.

In the majority of governmentality studies, the historical and logical relation between dynastic sovereignty and popular sovereignty is used to problematize and deconstruct the latter. Popular sovereignty, so the argument goes, amounts to little more than a correction or modification of dynastic sovereignty (Foucault, 2003, p. 35). More radical versions of the argument interpret popular sovereignty as an extension and reinforcement of dynastic sovereignty, subjecting citizens even more efficiently to domination through the formula of individual rights. The result is a “new and more dreadful foundation from the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves” (Agamben, 1998, p. 121). Such deconstruction is, however, a questionable approach to the governmental practice of democracy. Although the reliance on the political rationality of sovereignty may produce certain dilemmas and paradoxes, to which democratic theory and analysis are certainly not oblivious, the commitment to popular sovereignty makes a rather decisive difference for the rationalization of government.

The key programs putting this rationalization into operation are the institutionalization of rights and electoral procedures. The institutionalization and protection of rights are the key principle supplanting the ultimate prerogatives of the monarch. The number and nature of such rights are of course subject to ongoing discussion, but the core constitutional rights are generally held to include the right to vote, the right to seek office, the right to congregate, and the right to publically state opinions (Bond & Smith, 2013; Roller, 2005, see also Democracy Index, Freedom House, Democracyranking.org). In addition to the cluster of rights intended to enable distinctly political practices, the right of ownership is sometimes included. Historically and logically, the individual ownership of land marks the principal demarcation line in relation to the feudal system of serfdom based ultimately on monarchical sovereignty (Waldron, 1988).

Electoral procedures provide an additional, more or less unquestioned, program of democratic government. Although there are of course more demanding forms of democratic practice such as participation and deliberation, these are usually practiced as additions rather than fundamental alternatives to the baseline of electoral procedures. Electoral procedures, furthermore, can be interpreted rather broadly as mechanisms of representation, including not only the casting and calculation of votes but also various systems of
mandating and delegating, the various forms of parliamentary oversight, as well as the making and contesting claims to representation.

The pivotal instrument of democracy is legal protection, that is, constitutional guarantees and an independent system of law as protection against domination. This understanding is somewhat akin to Foucault’s (2007) claim that the archeological layer of sovereignty is reduced to an assemblage of “juridico-legal techniques” in the modern area (p. 7). The advent of a governmental rationality of popular sovereignty means that sovereignty is submitted to a system of constitutional guarantees, protections against infringement, and in a wider sense, an entire legal system based on and settling the rights of the individual. For Foucault, however, this development is not interpreted as democratic government, but rather as a development driven on a more fundamental level by the emergence of disciplinary society.

The principal form of political identity corresponding to the formula of political rights, as exercised in detail by political and democratic theory, is citizenship. The category of citizenship is well established in the national framework, whereas human rights and cosmopolitan democracy are premised on ideas of a more global or universal citizenship. Moreover, the traditional category of citizenship is being challenged by identity politics and politics of recognition (Thompson, 2006). The purpose of identity politics is to gain recognition of certain groups and collectives constituting political identities based on religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, and so on. Although the politics of recognition may mark a progressive development of popular sovereignty, it also tends to reinforce rather than transgress the current limits of democratic government insofar as identity politics remain thoroughly invested in the old conflict with domination. Based on the analysis presented here, the principal problem of democracy is not the extension of political rights to new political subjects, important as it may be, but the limitations of democracy in relation to other regimes.

**Discipline and Disciplinary Securitization**

In the history of governmentality, discipline constitutes a second archeological layer that gradually overrules forms of government based on sovereignty. Indeed, discipline is “foreign to the form of sovereignty . . . and should logically have led to the complete disappearance of the great juridical edifice of sovereignty” (Foucault, 2003, p. 36). Although the schematics of historical layering tend to underestimate the continued importance of sovereignty, both as dominance and discipline, the analysis of a distinct form of disciplinary power that cannot be subsumed under the logic and political rationality of sovereignty is undoubtedly one of Foucault’s major accomplishments. It is
pursued most consistently in the analysis of correction and surveillance in the modern institutions of the prison, the school, the factory, and so on (1995), but also plays a vital part in the analysis of madness (1988), sexuality (1990), medicine, and “the clinic” (1994).

Whereas these widely cited analyses of discipline focus on disciplinary power in and across various social institutions outside the state, the history of governmentality led Foucault to approach discipline as a distinctly governmental practice. The result of this analysis is the claim that \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t} and the institutionalization of disciplinary ‘police’ constitute the core of the administrative modernity of bureaucracy and the regulatory state. Whereas this analysis has the advantage of being able to draw on the extensive work on disciplinary programs and instruments done by Foucault himself and others, it also remains somewhat ambiguous in terms of the more general question of political rationality and the rationalization of government within \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t}.

The analysis of \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t} is preceded by Foucault’s programmatic outline of the history of governmentality, which seems to indicate that \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t} should be seen as an instance of the new governmental management, originally defined as the apparatus of security. At the level of specific techniques of intervention, however, \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t} exclusively relies on disciplinary instruments. In effect, this analysis seems to suggest that governmentality, which would then include both \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t} and liberal government, is essentially an extension and modification of the disciplinary form of power. As stated earlier, however, this interpretation tends to underestimate the distinct nature of liberal government and its opposition to \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t}.

The source of this problematic interpretation is, first and foremost, Foucault’s receding interest in the initial problem of security. More specifically, the distinction between discipline and security as the “essential technology” of governmentality ingrained in the history of governmentality blurs the fact that the governmental exercise of discipline is entirely premised on a rationalization of government as a matter of security. This coupling of a political rationality of security and disciplinary mechanisms does, however, come to the fore with the characterization of \textit{raison d’
\textorderr{\textcyr{e}t}}\text{\textcyr{a}t} as a practice concerned with managing the population as a “system of forces,” as opposed to the old concerns of dynastic sovereignty:

\begin{quote}
No longer territorial expansion, but the development of the state’s forces; no longer the extension of possessions or matrimonial alliances, but the increase of the state’s forces; no longer the combination of legacies through dynastic alliances, but the composition of state forces: all this will be the raw material, the object, and, at the same time, the principle of intelligibility of political
\end{quote}
reason . . . this maintenance of the relation of forces and the development of internal forces of each element, linking them together, is precisely what will later be called a mechanism of security. (Foucault, 2007, pp. 295-296)

However, Foucault does not pursue this apt characterization of the historical moment of transition between sovereignty and raison d’état to its full conclusion. Security is not simply a mechanism in this transition, nor will it only be recognized “later”: The new governmental practice of managing the population as a system of forces was based on a disciplinary securitization from the outset, which is to say a utilization of disciplinary programs and instruments within the framework of a new political rationality of security. The concept of “securitization” is usually limited to the field of international relations, where it denotes a slightly expanded realm of security concerns (Dillon & Neal, 2008). Although such contributions have expanded the narrow scope of conventional security policy, they still tend to focus on issues of war and domination and ultimately to conflate security with sovereignty. The practices of raison d’état, however, are based on a particular form of disciplinary securitization that abstracts itself entirely from the political rationality of sovereignty.

The essential program of raison d’état and disciplinary securitization is the police. Police is an apparatus . . . installed in order to make raison d’État function. . . . It is the intervention of this field of practices called police that brings to light this new subject [the population] in this, if you like, general absolutist theory of raison d’état. (Foucault, 2007, p. 286)

The disciplinary police of raison d’état is not, however, an expression of authoritarian government as suggested by current connotations of the term police state. The police functions developed within raison d’état correspond rather to the regulatory and bureaucratic state, or simply “administrative modernity par excellence” (Foucault, 2007, p. 321). The disciplinary police state of raison d’état is a state of unlimited regulatory ambition, dedicated to the regulation of every detail of individual behavior, even with “all the more care for it being small,” to ensure that forces are maximized to their fullest potential (Foucault, 2007, p. 45).

Going back to a number of key texts from the era of French bureau development, Foucault reminds us that the majority of bureaus are put forth as necessary domains of good police. Necessary bureaus include, depending on the particular context, a selection of bureaus for literacy, health, charity, religion, morals, theater and games, property, production, and so on (Foucault,
2007, p. 334). Taken to its most radical conclusion, this line of argument suggests that the police state of raison d’état accounts for the entire array of modern policies and their corresponding agencies, except for the three domains originally developed in accordance with the requirements of dynastic sovereignty and monarchical administrations: the army, the treasury, and the justice department (p. 321).

The bureaucratic model of organization can also be seen as an expression of disciplinary programs with respect to the hierarchical organization within each bureau. Hierarchical organization is a fundamental disciplinary technique equally visible in the management of the plague-stricken town, the prison, and the factory. The application of the twin principles of functionally delimited bureaus and hierarchy leads to the basic bureaucratic model of separate bureaus with an internal hierarchy but no external hierarchy between them or any interaction between the bureaucratic domains, except at the level of the commanding officers of each bureau. Moreover, the bureaucratic journal systems and their underlying principles of comprehensive registration, inspections, and documentation can be seen as an organizational expression of the disciplinary idea of surveillance. In sum, bureaucracy is developed as an intrinsic component of “... state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive function, is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police)” (Foucault, 1995, p. 216).

Although the relation between discipline and security remains unclear in the established history of governmentality, the principles of disciplinary securitization are nevertheless visible in several instruments of discipline. In particular, Foucault’s analysis of the plague-stricken towns at the end of the 17th century as a “compact model of the disciplinary mechanism” conveys this point: In contrast to the earlier sovereign technique of banning and exiling to colonies (camps) used to battle leprosy, the plague-stricken town relies entirely on key disciplinary programs such as curfews, quarantines, timetables, and surveillance and registration of the healthy, the sick, and the dead. The common function of these measures is to ensure the safety of the population by meeting the death, confusion, fear, and ultimately, the “evil” of the plague with public order and the protection of public health (Foucault, 1995, p. 197).

In a wider sense, the governmental practice of managing the population as a system of forces to enhance the safety of the state, which includes the population as well as those who govern it, provides the basic logic for state involvement in the operation of the entire disciplinary apparatus of detailed norms, instructions, drills, surveillance, and correction intended to produce “docile bodies” in the “complete and austere institutions” of the prison, the school, the factory, and the hospital (Foucault, 1995). The docile body, from
the perspective of disciplinary securitization, represents an individual transformed into a force for the state. The disciplinary programs surrounding the individual are, however, supplemented by an entire apparatus of “statistics” about population size, health, age, productivity, mobility and other factors needed to ensure the regulation of the forces of the population on a systemic level (Foucault, 2007, p. 315).

The notion of “docile bodies” can be said to constitute the basic blueprint for political identities in raison d’état. However, the docile body is not simply a subject defined in terms of subjugation to norms, correction, and instructions. Contrary to the conventional interpretation of raison d’état as the origin of the realist doctrine of state security “by any means possible” and hence the ultimate submission of the individual to the interests of the state, the analysis of raison d’état pursued here defines the relation between ruler and ruled in the bio-political terms of the well-being of the population. At the most general level, “... the objective of police is everything from the being to well-being, everything that may produce this well-being beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state’s strength” (Foucault, 2007, p. 328).

For raison d’état, the political community is the population understood as a system of forces. The population is not, however, a mass of more or less dispensable individuals, but an entity that must be kept healthy, vigorous, and ultimately happy to ensure the safety of the state. This understanding of the political community is the original disciplinary formula of what has come to be known as “bio-politics” (Binkley & Capetillo, 2009). Bio-politics consists in the management of population as a biological and organic entity. Political authorities conducting bio-politics, correspondingly, exercise a form of careful development of the population that is largely akin to functions such as raising, nursing, teaching, or even preaching. Disciplinary political authority is in this sense “paternalistic,” provided that this term can be used in a purely analytical manner.

The size and health of the population, questions of mortality rates, diseases, and the entire area of public health constitute one of the most basic areas of intervention in the management of the population as a system of forces. Governmentality studies have been particularly productive in this domain, not least due to Foucault’s own focus on matters of physical and mental health. A large number of case studies have found evidence of disciplinary policing in health policies, urban planning and sanitation, consumer protection, and so on (Binkley & Capetillo, 2009; Elbe, 2009; Rose, 2007). Although other welfare policies have perhaps yet to be researched with the same intensity, the disciplinary intervention and policing can be observed in labor market policies (Gill, 1995; McKinley & Taylor, 2014) and education (Peters & Olssen, 2009).
Liberal Governmentality and Liberal Securitization

Although Foucault’s initial stance suggests a basic continuity between raison d’état and liberal government, the ensuing analysis opens an increasingly wide gulf between these two forms of government. The source of this ambiguity is once again the rather shorthanded discussion of the apparatus of security and the unclear relation between discipline and security already visible in the analysis of raison d’état. Interpreting security as the intrinsic rationality of the governmental use of disciplinary mechanisms found in raison d’état, however, sheds light on the fact that the relation between liberal government and raison d’état is essentially based on conflicting interpretations about how to ensure security.

There is indeed continuity between raison d’état and liberal government insofar as both forms of government rationalize political actions and decisions through the logic of securitization. Liberal government is, however, based on an entirely different mode of securitization opposed specifically and directly to the disciplinary logic found in raison d’état. The crucial aspect of the liberal mode of securitization, and the source of the conflict with raison d’état, is the liberal commitment to freedom as an instrument of government intervention. Liberal government remains committed to the same basic objective of managing the population for purposes of security, originally developed within raison d’état and the police model of administrative modernity.

In contrast to the interpretation of the population as a system of forces to be managed through ever more detailed regulation at the individual and the systemic levels, however, liberal government defines the regulatory object of the population in terms of a capacity for self-management at the individual as well as the systemic level. The governmental practice suited to this type of regulatory object is management of the population as a system of freedoms allowing the self-governing capacity of the population to flourish. The liberal “game” of freedom and security described by Foucault (2008) as “the very heart” of this new form of governmental reason (p. 65) is based on the maxim that more freedom will, if managed properly, produce more security. The key regulatory challenge for liberal government, correspondingly, is the “... management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free” (p. 64).

Within the game of freedom and security, freedom is not a moral or legal principle, nor a matter of fundamental rights or protection from intervention. Liberal government seeks to increase behavioral freedom based on an expected security outcome and carefully calibrates and adjusts freedoms according to this ongoing calculus of freedom and security: Security is the principle for calculating the cost of manufacturing freedom (Foucault, 2008,
Such management of the conditions in which one can be free is more or less invariably based on the framework of fundamental rights so essential to popular sovereignty and democratic government. Although liberal government may fully respect such rights, the management of the population as a system of freedoms involves economic and social freedoms that are not granted or protected as “rights,” but regulated as areas of routine intervention.

The essence of liberal government, correspondingly, is not limited government, as is often suggested in discussions of liberal ideology, but rather a form of good government interpreted specifically as the ability to “construct and consume” freedom in such a way that the self-managing ability of the population produces more security (Foucault, 2008, p. 63). The population does provide liberal government with a principle of “self-limitation” insofar as governmental overreach is seen as potentially damaging to the self-governing capacity of the population. This principle of self-limitation, however, merely states that government must know how to manage self-government, not that good liberal government is necessarily less or small government. The only firm principle derived from the self-limitation of liberal government is its opposition to the “ideal or project of an exhaustively disciplinary society” guiding raison d’état and the regulatory idea of the police:

In the horizon of this analysis we see instead the image, idea, or theme-program of society in which there is an optimizing of systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear in the rules of the game rather than on the players, an finally in which there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals. (Foucault, 2008, p. 260)

Although Foucault never gave a name to this new ensemble of power appearing at the “horizon” of liberal government, Deleuze (1992) has described the “theme-program” of society found in liberal government as a “control society,” signifying the emergence of control as the new non-disciplinary ensemble of power. This new ensemble of control corresponds to Foucault’s characterization of liberal government as an “omnipresent” form of government that is pervasive and intrusive, albeit entirely non-disciplinary. An omnipresent government based on mechanisms of control as government “. . . which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right, and a government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the social” (Foucault, 2008, p. 296).

The basic program of such omnipresent liberal government is governance. In the words of Thaler and Sunstein (2009), authors of one of the most exemplary
current manuals for good liberal government, “We are not for bigger government, just for better governance” (p. 14). The liberal opposition toward disciplinary securitization and raison d’état invariably requires a rejection of the administrative modernity of the police and its key principles of bureaucracy and unlimited regulatory ambition. This rejection has, in turn, led to the development of a new program of governmental action under the heading of “governance.” In other words, good liberal government has become a matter of (good) governance, conventionally understood as a paradigm of administrative policy and reform that includes various subgroups and clusters such as NPM, good governance, network governance, and democratic governance (see Jessop, 2011, for an overview).

As such, the governance paradigm constitutes a practice-oriented, normative program of government action, even in its theoretical guises. Indeed, some of the more theoretically advanced discussions of governance can be said to better illustrate the underlying logic of liberal government than variations of the governance program authored directly by government institutions. In particular, concepts such as meta-governance (Jessop, 2011) and collibration (Dunsire, 1996) provide exemplary operationalizations of the core liberal governmental challenge of constructing an omnipresent government around the “self-governance” of the population. Concepts such as metagovernance and collibration describe the liberal combination of self-limitation and omnipresent management in relation to the self-governing capacity of the population in terms of a self-reflexive “irony” of governmental intervention, signifying a middle way between regulatory pessimism and optimism based on a flexible combination of three overall “modes of governance”: state, market, and civil society (or networks; Jessop, 2011; see also Meuleman, 2008).

The distinction between state, market, and civil society so central to the governance paradigm is essentially an expression of the reconfiguration of the regulatory object of the population originally put forth by raison d’état. This reconfiguration is based on a reciprocal relation between the “light” intervention required to construct and maintain a self-regulating market mechanism and the “heavy” intervention in the “... social factors, which now increasingly become the object of governmental intervention” (Foucault, 2008, p. 141). The heavy intervention in the broader social realm beyond the market is, however, combined with paradigm of “soft regulation” on the level of regulatory instruments. Omnipresent government may be heavy in terms of its ambition to cover all social factors relevant to game of freedom and security, but the preferred regulatory instruments themselves are soft, compared with the detailed norms, instructions and continuous correction of behavior found in disciplinary government. Liberal government and governance displays a consistent preference for “communicative,” “reflexive,” and
“network-based” forms of intervention associated with civil society rather than the state tradition of disciplinary police (Esmark, 2009).

The regulatory and behavioral assumptions behind this form of intervention have been elaborated most consistently in Thaler and Sunstein’s (2009) work on “nudging.” Proceeding from an explicit exclusion of state- and market-based forms of intervention, that is, legal regulation and economic incentives, nudging can be defined as the strategic modulation of “choice architecture” using an array of instruments such as campaigns, information flows, design, network building, architecture, and physical planning to guide individual choice toward more health, wealth, and happiness for the individual itself and the community as such (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009, see also Catlaw & Sandberg, 2014). Although nudging is the preferred form of intervention from a governance perspective, governance by incentives is not ruled out per se. The least preferable mode of intervention for the governance paradigm, however, is invariably the state tradition of “bureaucracy,” “hierarchy,” and “regulation,” that is, the administrative modernity of disciplinary police. Stances might vary between limited acceptance of administrative modernity as a necessary but insufficient instrument of government, and more radical interpretations of administrative modernity as an entirely dysfunctional approach in the current state of affairs (see Castells, 2000, for a particularity radical example of the latter and Gay, 2000, for a critical elaboration).

This reconfiguration of the population as an object of regulation corresponds to a new form of political identity defined in terms self-governance, self-management, and entrepreneurship, as opposed to the disciplinary idea of the docile body. The political authority exercised over the population of self-governing individuals has been described aptly as “libertarian paternalism” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). Although somewhat influenced by the Anglo-American context, the concept of libertarian paternalism captures the inherent ambiguousness of a government that is at once self-limiting and omnipresent. The paternalistic form of political authority found in raison d’état is not simply retained by liberal government, but the logic of liberal securitization nevertheless dictates that the self-management of the individual and the population must be continuously and pervasively framed, supervised, and guided by government.

**Conclusion: A Critical and Effective History of the Present?**

Although my analysis is indebted to the work of Foucault and others taking up his initial analysis, it is also based on the claim that established history of
governmentality tends to render the analysis “ineffective” insofar as it overestimates the role of liberal government and underestimates the role of other regimes. I shall conclude by reflecting on how this revised analysis might contribute to a more critical and effective history of the present.

Finding effective strategies of resistance, mobilization, and other forms of possible “counter-conduct” in relation to specific forms of power and government is perhaps the key critical ambition of the history of governmentality (Lemke, 2011). In this respect, the established history of governmentality remains potentially ineffective to the extent that the interpretation of liberal government as a modified and more subtle form of discipline, and in some cases, also domination, will invariably lead to ineffective strategies of counter-conduct. This is not to say that liberal government constitutes an historical improvement over other forms of government. The liberal commitment to the game of freedom and security requires an omnipresent government and “mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of confinements. There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 4).

The revised history of governmentality does not provide such “weapons” itself. It is, however, crucial to recognize the distinct nature of the liberal game of freedom and security and such mechanisms of control to not confuse the appropriate strategies of counter-conduct with the revolutionary projects turned against domination or ways to escape disciplinary intervention and regulation. Whereas centuries of experience with domination and discipline have produced a repertoire of viable individual and collective strategies for counter-conduct and resistance, this task is very much in its infancy when it comes to liberal government.

One of the more consistent approaches has been to reinforce democracy and submit liberal government to the programs and instruments of democratic government (Bevir, 2006; Catlaw & Sandberg, 2014). Although this approach is certainly necessary, as the insistence on democracy always is, its effectiveness is also questionable. Liberal government is highly adept in constructing new categories such as output legitimacy, stakeholders, and accountability that maintain the tangential relation to democratic government. Further development of this strategy thus requires a more stringent approach to the question of whether the categories of liberal government can be transformed into actual democratic practice, or whether a working compromise between democracy and liberal government will somehow have to be accepted.

Another strategy has been to take a disciplinary stance against liberal government, although not always explicitly so, by insisting on the essentials of bureaucracy and welfare (Gay, 2000; Olsen, 2006). This strategy is potentially effective insofar as disciplinary instruments such as clear norms and
rules, fixed schedules, minimum standards, and the original compensatory logic of welfare are indeed genuinely disruptive for the liberal game of freedom and security. However, the strategy also potentially reintroduces the problems associated with disciplinary intervention, leading to a need for discussion of the extent to which programs and instruments originally coined within the framework of the disciplinary police can be reshaped in less disciplinary fashion. Current reflections on a revised public ethos (Adams & Balfour, 2014; Stivers, 2008) and progressive forms of public administration (Box, 2008; Catlaw, 2007; Stout, 2010) might point to a way for such discussions, but further attention to the original framework of the disciplinary police is required.

The revised history of governmentality also has implications for analyses of governmental technologies. In his reflections on the principles of archeological layering, Foucault suggests that the analysis of such layers is complementary to the “actual history of the techniques themselves.” The latter would then refer to the analysis of individual and specific techniques as they pass through the various ensembles of power, or, reversing the schema, to an analysis of different forms of power and the points of transition between them as seen through the prism of a particular technique (Foucault, 2007, p. 8). Rather than including the level of governmental technology directly in the analysis, then, the history of governmentality enables the history of specific technologies such as contracts, budgets, evaluation schemas, auditing systems, and so on against the background of overall governmental rationality and practice.

Although the revised history of governmentality retains this idea of partnership with the history of the technologies themselves, it does change this partnership in terms of the nature and number of governmental practices, but also more fundamentally through an emphasis of the radical changes and functional reorientation of technologies from one regime to another. For example, Power’s (1999) analysis of audit society is in many ways an exemplary history of technology, but it also tends to blur the liberal use of audits as a technology of supervision and the earlier disciplinary function of surveillance. By contrast, the revised history of governmentality suggests that future histories of technologies themselves should perhaps be less continuous and better acknowledge the radical nature of the transformations that technologies undergo as they pass from one regime to the next.

Implications for the critical and effective history of the present can, finally, be discussed in terms of a partnership with the institutional perspective on current forms of government. Although governmental organizations and institutions are not included in the analysis of governmental rationality, programs, and instruments, they are nevertheless important arenas for contestation between different forms of government. On one hand, this implies that
the alternative history of governmentality provides a framework for understanding political contestation in parliamentary institutions, including issues such as the pervasive “center” consensus on the principles of liberal government and the convergence of left and right on the call for a return to the principles of disciplinary government.

However, the administration is the most important arena of contestation when it comes to the all-important conflict between disciplinary police and governance. As such, the revised history of governmentality fundamentally questions the current debate about governance as a “purely technical” matter of administrative policy and reform. This claim is not meant to suggest a blurring of politics and administration in the conventional sense of political instrumentalization of the administration. The point is rather that the conflict between disciplinary policy and governance is an essentially political conflict, perhaps the most important one in the current state of affairs, played out primarily within the institutional and organizational framework of the administration.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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